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Abstract 
Whilst the impact of genocide on the populations being targeted is routinely studied, the 
impact of genocide on international society is routinely overlooked. With this in mind, this 
thesis brings the study of genocide into IR, via the English School, in order to understand the 
broader impact of genocide on the ordering structure of international society. The thesis puts 
forward a novel approach in that it explores the relationship between genocide and 
international legitimacy and how this relationship has critical implications for the United 
Nations. It will be argued that genocide holds a special relationship with international 
legitimacy because it is internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from both a legal 
and moral perspective. It is proposed therefore, that this particular injustice has more of a 
profound impact on the ordering structure of international society than is presently 
recognised. In sharp contrast to much of the thinking that underpins present foreign 
policymaking, it will be claimed that because of the special relationship that genocide holds 
with international legitimacy, genocide can be understood to pose a threat to international 
order as it erodes both the legitimate authority of the UN (which acts as the cornerstone of 
international legitimacy) and the UN Security Council (which acts as the stabilising function 
in international relations) more than any other crime. It is hoped that through understanding 
the crime's relationship with international legitimacy, and the post-Cold War legitimacy 
crisis, a more informed understanding of genocide can be acheived. Although the 2005 UN- 
led Responsibility to Protect initiative addressed some of the issues at hand, its endorsement 
has not resolved the fundamental problem of altering political will. If one accepts that 
genocide has a significant impact on international order, then one has to accept that the 
prevention of genocide is within the national interest of all states, that is, if they value 
international stability. 
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1 Introduction 
How do we think about, conceptualise, and understand genocide in International Relations? 
It is this question that lies at the heart of this thesis. Whilst the impact of genocide on the 
populations being targeted is routinely studied, it seems clear that the impact of genocide on 
international relations is routinely ignored. ' Yet how can we expect our actions to be right if 
our understanding is wrong? The way we understand genocide will naturally shape our 
behaviour toward it. Therefore, the premise of this thesis is that how we think about 
genocide and the implications of genocide for international relations is extremely important. 
To gauge this let us consider the following question: why is it so important to understand 
genocide within an international context? 
1.1 Genocide prevention: unrealistic? 
Genocide refers to the destruction of a group. However, if I am not a member of that group, 
why should I care about its destruction? Traditionally, in answering this controversial 
question, scholars have tended to espouse universal moral principles when advocating 
compassion and humanitarian intervention. Genocide, it is claimed, constitutes a crime 
against humanity. The problem is that such understanding tends to be built upon the 
assumption that humanity exists. 2 For those that refute the idea, the claim that genocide is a 
crime against humanity is flawed, as humanity is nothing more than a word. As Alexander 
Herzen bluntly stated: "The word `humanity' is repugnant; it expresses nothing definite and 
only adds to the confusion of all remaining concepts a sort of piebald demi-god. What sort of 
unit is understood by the word `humanity'? "3 Although this view may seem 
uncompassionate, the dominance of realism in 20`h century political discourse has often seen 
such understanding upheld at the international level. 4 Since realists reject the idea that states 
have a moral obligation to anyone other than their own citizens, they have tended to oppose 
' This thesis will use capital letters (International Relations) to refer to the discipline of IR and small letters 
international relations) to refer to the everyday sphere of international relations. 
Of particular relevance here is William Bain's critique of the normative theory to be found within the English 
School. See William Baia, 'One Order, Two Laws: Recovering the 'Normative' in English School theory', 
Review of International Studies (vol. 33, no. 4,2007, pp. 557-575). 1 Alexander Herzen My Past and Though translated by Constance Garnett (London: University of California 
Press, 1982), p. 523. 
4 The dominance of realism is raised by Tim Dunne and Brian Schmidt: "From 1939 to the present, leading 
theorists and policy-makers have continued to view the world through realist lenses", see Dunne and Scmidt, 
`Realism', in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds. ), The Globalization of World Politics; An 
Introduction to International Relations. fourth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 92. 
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genocide prevention as a humanitarian concern that is of little real concern to a state's 
national interest. From this perspective genocide prevention remains just another policy 
option; one that should only be opted for when there are national interests at stake. 
This is put into context in Alex Alvarez's work, Governments, Citizens and Genocide in 
which the author explains that diplomats are often held hostage to Realpolitik strategies. 
Because of this, the prevention of genocide and mass violence in general, is given little 
political priority. 5 For instance, in 1975 prior to the Indonesian oppression in East Timor, the 
Australian ambassador to Indonesia wrote that Australia should assume a "pragmatic rather 
than a principled stand", because "that is what national interest and foreign policy is all 
about". 6 Such rhetoric was also to be found as James Wood, a US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defence, placed Rwanda-Burundi on a list of potential trouble spots only to be 
informed by a superior: "Take it off the list.... U. S. national interest is not involved.... we can't 
put all these silly humanitarian issues on lists like important problems in the Middle East and 
North Korea and so on". 7 Similarly, as Slobodan Milosevic engineered a process of 
destruction and dispossession in the former Yugoslavia, George Bush's secretary of state, 
James Baker, repeatedly stated: "We don't have a dog in this fight". 8 The sentiment 
expressed within these statements underlines the central point that genocide prevention is not 
considered to be in a state's national interest. 
9 Because of this, policymakers seem to view 
genocide prevention as somewhat altruistic and part of an unrealistic foreign policy agenda. 
As Nicholas J. Wheeler's seminal study succinctly concludes: "state leaders will accept 
anything other than minimal casualties only if they believe national interests are at stake". 
'o 
The interesting point to consider here is that genocide is also considered to be the "crime of 
crimes" in international law, yet carries much less political weight than `lesser crimes' such 
as drug trafficking or piracy. " For instance, long-term collective security strategies are 
5 Alex Alvarez, Governments. Citizens. and Genocide. a Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 137. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
sIbid, p. 141. 
9 For further statements which reiterate such a policymaking attitude see, Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. 
Brown, (eds. ), Humanitarianism and Suffering. The Mobilization of Em y (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 3 - 4. 10 Nicholas, J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 301. 
" The idea that genocide constitutes the "crime of crimes" is taken from the ruling set out by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1998. This will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
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adopted when attempting to prevent crimes such as nuclear proliferation, international 
terrorism, drug trafficking, and piracy at the international level. 12 Yet at present there is no 
such long-term collective security strategy when it comes to genocide prevention. We have 
to question: why it is that collective security strategies are formulated to address crimes such 
as these, but not genocide. Essentially, it would seem that crimes such as drug trafficking are 
considered to be transnational crimes in that they pose a transnational threat. By which it is 
meant that such crimes outstrip the individual security capacity of states who then work 
collectively to address this security deficit. From this perspective, such crimes pose an 
international threat which transcends national boundaries. Accordingly, policymakers 
perceive that the collective interest furthers the national interest within such specific contexts. 
It seems fair to suggest that the failure of any long-term collective security strategy toward 
genocide implies that policymakers do not perceive that genocide poses a transnational threat. 
Although policymakers will undoubtedly recognise the horror of genocide and accept that 
genocide may cause mass migration - which can cause regional instability - it is clear that 
mass migration is not exclusive to genocide and genocide in itself remains a low priority 
issue. 13 Such understanding only goes to re-state the point that when it comes to genocide 
prevention, policymakers do not perceive that they have a "dog in the fight" and in turn do 
not treat the prevention of genocide as a matter of national interest. 
This point is fleshed out further in Andrew Hurrell's analysis on `War, Violence and 
Collective Security': '4 
Although the collective security element in security management has increased, we remain as 
far away as ever from anything approaching a functioning system of collective security. 
Peace is not indivisible, and states and their citizens remain unwilling to bear the costs of 
collective security action in complex and dangerous conflicts in which their national interests 
are only weakly engaged. It may well be that the horrors of the Rwandan genocide prompted 
increased normative momentum in areas of human security and the responsibility to protect. 
12 For an overview see Bruce Jones, Pascual Carlos and Stephen John Stedman, Power and Responsibility. 
Buildine International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2009). See 
also, Maryann Cusimano Love, (ed. ), Beyond Sovereignty. Issues for Global Agenda, fourth edition (Boston: 
Wadsworth, 2007). 
13 For example, when addressing the impact of the Rwandan genocide, the 2001 Intervention Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty stated, "Its consequence was not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for 
Rwanda: the genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and continues to do so". See Report of the 
International) Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 1. For an accompanying analysis, see Gerard Prunier, 
From Genocide to continental War. The `Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis in Contemporary Africa (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2009). 
14 Andrew Harrell, On Global Order. Power. Values. and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter seven. 
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But the continued failure of outside states to undertake a collective action in Darfur highlights 
the continuity of the problem 15 
The statement primarily underlines the fact that collective security is still in its infancy and 
that a functioning collective security system remains a long way off. However, the statement 
also underlines a stark point that despite the post-Cold War normative momentum and the 
2005 UN endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): we do not even expect states to 
collectively confront the crime of genocide because the common perception is that the direct 
interests of states are not served by engaging in such "complex and dangerous conflicts ". 
Yet whilst this is undoubtedly true (all genocide scholars would accept that genocide 
prevention may lead states into complex and dangerous foreign policy agendas), it is also 
quite clear that states are willing to engage in such complex and dangerous foreign policy 
agendas when they perceive that their national interests are at stake. Hurrell therefore also 
rightly points out that the lack of political will surrounding genocide prevention stems from 
the fact that states do not see a valid link between genocide prevention and national interest. 
Critically, this brings us back to the central question raised at the start: how do we think 
about, conceptualise, and understand genocide in International Relations? It is only through 
such understanding that we can hope to answer related, yet equally important questions, such 
as what is the impact of genocide upon the current world order? Does genocide pose a 
transnational threat to states? How realistic is the realist perspective when it comes to 
genocide prevention? What is the relationship between genocide prevention and national 
interest? The importance of such questions cannot be overstated for it is difficult to see how 
the political will of the politically unwilling can be altered without such questions being 
answered. A somewhat bizarre reality therefore is that the post-Cold War debate over 
humanitarian intervention has strangely overlooked the relationship between humanitarian 
intervention and political will. This was raised in 2001 as the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) stated, "Although the international debate on 
humanitarian intervention has focused largely on questions of authority and capacity, the 
dearth of effective international responses has in most cases resulted from a lack of will. In 
neither Rwanda nor Srebrenica did a lack of authority or capacity stand in the way of 
15 lbid, p. 190. 
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action". 16 The sentiment expressed remains relevant nearly ten years on as although the 
debate over humanitarian intervention has often referred to a general lack of political will 
amongst policymakers, it has done little to answer the question of why actors should 
intervene. As stated above, this question seems to have been somewhat overlooked because 
people believe that it is within the interest of humanity to prevent such crimes, yet 
policymakers act on behalf of the state rather than humanity (at least within the context of 
complex and dangerous foreign policy agendas). In turn the discourse has done little to alter 
the will of the politically unwilling. 
This brings us back to the critical point that international society's understanding of genocide 
within the context of international relations will undoubtedly shape policymaking attitudes 
toward the issue of genocide prevention. This relationship between understanding genocide 
and the prevention of mass atrocity crimes such as genocide was raised in 2007 by Gareth 
Evans (President of the International Crisis Group). In a key note speech entitled "Prevention 
of Mass Atrocities: From Mandate to Realisation, " Evans stated: 
If ridding the world once and for all of mass atrocities is to be doable, we need three kinds of 
strategies: conceptual, to frame the issues involved, and to embed the framing in policymakers 
mind and instincts in a way that there's no preliminary stumbling block to the kind of 
necessary global reflex action I have described; institutional, to create structures and 
processes, both in intergovernmental and national settings, which will be capable of delivering 
the preventative and reactive responses required; and political, to ensure that when each new 
atrocity or potential atrocity situation comes along the actual response is effective. " 
Evans, (who also notably co-chaired the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty), rightly places the conceptualisation of mass atrocity crimes as one of three 
primary strategies which it is hoped will aid the prevention of mass atrocity crimes such as 
genocide. 18 Whilst one cannot necessarily prioritise any of the three strategies, it seems clear 
that any attempt to develop institutional and political responses to genocide remain dependent 
on one's conceptualisation of genocide. This brings us back to the central question of how we 
16 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 207. 
Gareth Evans, `Preventing Mau Atrocities: Making the Responsibility to Protect a Reality', Keynote address 
to the UN University and International Crisis Grrnro Conference (10/10/2007). Available at 
fitte: //www. crisisgroup. ora/home/index. cfm? id=5116&1=1 Accessed 01/04/2008. 
" For an in-depth analysis see Gareth Evans,. possibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once 
and For All (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). This will be discussed further in chapter six. For 
an accomplished overview on the means available for the prevention of genocide see John G. Heidenrich, Hw 
to Prevent Genocide. A Guide for Policymakers. Scholars. and the Concerned Citizen (London: Praeger, 2001). 
David, A. Hamburg, Preventing Genocide. Practical Stews Toward Early Detection and Effective Action 
(London: Paradigm, 2008). 
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understand genocide in international relations. It is this first strategy therefore that this thesis 
aims to engage with and its primary focus is on trying to establish a more informed 
understanding of genocide from an IR perspective. 
1.2 The IR dimension 
At this point the reader may be asking just how, over sixty years after genocide was codified 
into international law, are policymakers failing to correctly conceptualise genocide? The 
answer it seems may lie in academia. Kenneth J. Campbell is one of few IR scholars to put 
this into context in his 2001 publication Genocide and the Global Village. 19 Campbell claims 
that policymakers fail to formulate effective policy with regard to preventing genocide, 
precisely because they misunderstand the "transovereign threat" posed by genocide. 20 
Intriguingly, he goes on to claim that the failure of scholars to consolidate knowledge from 
inter-related fields of study has in turn fuelled this misunderstanding. As Campbell explains: 
For far too long, specialists in international law, human rights, humanitarian assistance, 
international security, peace and conflict resolution, ethnic conflict studies, and regional 
studies (for example, the Balkans and the Great Lakes region of Central Africa) have blithely 
assumed that we did not need the genocide scholars to tell us what genocide is. Most of the 
time we have been wrong! In virtually every case where a think tank, national government, or 
IGO put together a panel of "experts" to investigate the international community's failure to 
stop contemporary genocide, the genocide scholars have been strangely absent. 2' 
The statement highlights that even within the context of interdisciplinary research; the 
discipline of genocide studies has found itself marginalised. The absurdity being that 
genocide scholars are not invited to the debate even when genocide prevention is the topic of 
discussion. It would seem, therefore, that scholars have not necessarily provided 
policymakers with the tools that they have needed, as scholars have failed to provide a more 
informed understanding of genocide and its impact on international society. 
Although the above statement highlights the broader omission of genocide from policy 
frameworks, Campbell also address the specific omission of genocide from the discipline of 
IR. Intriguingly, Campbell claims that between 1945 and 1995, neither of the leading IR 
journals, Foreign Affairs or International Affairs published a single article on genocide. 22 
The example underlines the stark fact that genocide remains a peripheral issue not just within 
19 Kenneth, J. Campbell, Genocide and the Global Village (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
20 Ibid, see chapters one and two. 
21 Ibid, p. 107. 
22 Ibid. 
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policymaking but also within the discipline of IR itself. Again this illustrates the point that 
the impact of genocide upon international relations remains under-researched and under- 
theorised, especially from an IR perspective. Whilst the international debate over the 
genocide in Darfur has seen both Foreign Affairs and International Affairs publish articles on 
genocide, it is evident that genocide remains outside the mainstream focus of IR. 23 For 
example, in what has became the first real comprehensive introductory text in the field of 
genocide studies, IR scholar Adam Jones presents an overview on the social science 
perspectives which are found in the discipline of genocide studies. 24 In doing so, the author 
presents the "Political Science and International Relations" perspectives to be found on 
genocide. 25 Primarily however, the analysis is grounded on the empirical investigations that 
have been carried out by Political Scientists such as R. J. Rummel, Barbara Harff and Ted 
Gurr, which, although important, do not compensate for the lack of IR analysis to be found 
on the subject of genocide. Whilst Jones touches upon the work of constructivists to 
highlight how the role of norms could be useful for the study of genocide, it is evident that 
this overview ultimately reveals more about what IR has failed to contribute, rather than what 
it actually has contributed. 26 
This omission is even more surprising when one considers the relationship between genocide 
and the central tenets of IR: war, power, sovereignty, and the role of the state. To put this 
into context let us consider R. J. Rummel's famous empirical investigation aptly entitled, 
Death by Government. " The author's extensive empirical research concludes that 
169,198,000 people were murdered by governments (between 1900 and 1987) in acts of what 
the author labels as "domicide". To go back to the central concepts within IR, this tragic 
outcome highlights the lethal cocktail that can arise from mixing together three of IR's most 
central concepts: the state, power, and sovereignty (as the latter implies state immunity). 
Martin Shaw is both an IR and genocide scholar who notably addresses the role of the state, 
sovereignty, and power, yet goes one step further in stressing the need to better understand 
23 Two seminal publications appeared in relation to the genocide in Darfur, see Hugo Slim, 'Dithering Over 
Darfur? A Preliminary Review of the International Response'. International Affairs (vol. 80, no. 5,2004, pp. 
811-828). Scott Straus, 'Darfur and the Genocide Debate', Foreign (vol. 84. no. 1.2005, pp. 124-134). 
u Adam Jones, Genocide. A Comnnhenaive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006), part three. 
u Ibid, pp. 307 - 321. 26 Whilst the focus on norm within the study of genocide remains a peripheral aspect, notable work has been 
produced in this area that supports Jones' claim that the role of norms provides a useful tool for understanding 
genocide. See Lee Ann Fujii, 'Transforming the Moral Landscape: The Diffusion of the Genocidal Norm in 
Rwanda', The Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 6, no. 1,2004, pp. 99 - 114). 27 Rudolph J. Rummel, Death By Government (New Jersey: Transaction, 2008). 
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the relationship between war and genocide in international relations. 
28 Furthermore, Dirk 
Moses claims that genocide should be understood as an extreme form of counter-insurgency 
in that state leaders seek to destroy the group[s] that they perceive to be a threat to the state, 
even if no such threat exists. 29 Both of these views tie in with Benjamin A. Valentino's claim 
that genocide and mass violence should be understood as brutal strategies utilised by state 
leaders to eradicate perceived threats (whether real or non-existent). 
30 Such perspectives, 
stress the relationship between genocide and IR which allow us to refute the claim that the 
study of genocide falls outside the remit of what should constitute IR. Accordingly, it would 
seem that IR scholars have often failed to engage in how the central tenets underpinning the 
discipline of IR contribute to the ongoing phenomenon of genocide in international relations. 
Somewhat worryingly, the state-centric nature of IR as a discipline may also help explain 
why genocide has been marginalised. Simply speaking, it would seem that violent attacks 
against the state (terrorism) have been studied extensively within IR, yet violent attacks made 
by the state against civilians (genocide or crimes against humanity) have not received 
anywhere near the same amount of academic interest. This is despite the fact that, as R. J. 
Rummel's study illustrates, the most destructive force in international relations remains the 
state as opposed to the terrorist. Tim Dunne is one of few IR scholars to address this issue in 
his co-authored analysis with Daniela Kroslak: `Genocide: Knowing What It Is That We 
Want to Remember, or Forget, or Forgive'. 31 The title of the piece speaks volumes when one 
considers that it was written as part of a reflective work on the Kosovo crisis, a crisis which 
saw IR scholars having to engage with the question of whether the acts in Kosovo constituted 
28 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). Also of relevance here is Martin Shaw's 
critique of a special edition of the Review of International Studies in which the author claims that the 
contributors failed to consider the Rwandan genocide in an issue that specifically chose to focus on violence in 
international relations between 1989 and 1999. See Martin Shaw, `Strategy and Slaughter', Review of 
International Studies (vol. 29, no. 2,2003, pp. 269 - 277). " Dirk A. Moses, 'Security and Pre-Emption: Genocide Studies and Holocaust Historiography -A 
Convergence? ', keynote lecture, presented at the 2d Global Conference on Genocide by the International 
Network of Genocide Scholars, at University of Sussex, (28th -1" July 2010). See also, Dirk A. Moses, 
`Moving the Genocide Debate Beyond the History Wars', Australian Journal of Politics and History (vol. 54, 
no. 2,2008, pp. 248 - 270). As well as Moses, moire. Colony. Genocide: Conquest. Occupation. and 
, Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010) esp. chapter one. 
Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions. Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
31 Tim Dunne and Daniela Kroslak, 'Genocide: Knowing What It Is That We Want to Remember, or Forget, or 
Forgive', in Ken Booth, (ed. ), The Kosovo Tragedy. Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 
chapter one. The authors acknowledge that the title is adapted from the work of Colin Tatz: "it is essential that 
we know what it is we want to remember, or to forget, or to forgive", see p. 43. 
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genocide. Intriguingly, the authors provide an analysis of the definitional debate surrounding 
genocide (a similar approach will be put forward in Chapter Three). In doing so, the authors 
illustrate Campbell's point that IR scholars have to engage in such debates surrounding the 
definition of genocide rather than simply assuming they know what it is. Furthermore, 
Dunne and Kroslak draw upon the work of R. J. Rummel, as well as Ken Booth, to highlight 
a point of specific relevance here: "The discipline of International Relations needs to forget 
its habit of selectively describing and explain the past. Instead of taking `family snaps' of 
human history, we must not forget the blood and immorality". 32 The statement addresses the 
fact that IR has selectively studied the history of international relations to the point that it has 
failed to engage, at least explicitly, with the impact of genocide on international relations. 33 
The critical point is that IR needs to help explain and understand genocide in order to help 
prevent it. 
For example, IR scholars often raise the post-Cold War `humanitarian crises' that occurred in 
Somalia and Rwanda. In doing so, they critically fail to differentiate between the fact that 
Somalia represented a failed state plagued by chaos and anarchy, whereas Rwanda 
represented a genocidal state implementing a process of systematic destruction. To put this 
into context let us consider Mary Kaldor's seminal work on New and Old Wars, in which the 
author places genocide, failed states, terrorism, civil war and many other types of conflict 
within the melting pot of "new wars". 34 The example illustrates the growing tendency within 
IR to group conflicts and crises together despite the fact that the causes of such conflicts and 
crises will undoubtedly differ. Trying to establish a `one size fits all remedy' therefore is 
futile as it is evident that our response to each conflict has to be built upon understanding the 
specific causes that underpin each particular problem. If IR scholars simply place all human 
rights violations within a single `melting pot', they cannot hope to learn the relevant lessons 
32 Ibid, p. 42. 
33 Richard Falk is one of few IR scholars to raise this point in his analysis, see Richard Falk, Achieving Human 
Aida (London: Routledge, 2009), chapter six. See also, Richard Falk, `The Challenge of Genocide and 
Genocidal Politics in an as of Globalisation', in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, (ed. ), Human Rights in 
Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For further analysis on how genocide has 
impacted upon international society see R. J. Vincent, `Racial Equality', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, The 
Einanion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), esp. pp. 250-254. 
34 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era (Oxford: Polity, 2000). For a critical 
analysis see, Stathis Kalyvas, `"New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? "' World Politics (vol. 54, 
no. 1,2001, pp. 99-118). Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, `From Cold Wars to New Wals', in Clive Jones and Caroline 
Kennedy-Pipe, International Security in a Global Age g The Twenty-First Century (London: Frank 
Cass, 2000, pp. 9-27). 
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involved in each. 35 Such over-simplification ultimately hinders international society's ability 
to prevent such crises in the future. This brings us back to a central point of this thesis: how 
we conceptualise and understand genocide in international relations shapes our reactions 
toward it. 
The point here is not to get into any disciplinary blame game, or to overlook the valid 
contributions that some IR scholars have made to the study of genocide. Instead, the aim is to 
highlight the fact that it is not easy to answer the questions raised above (see page four), 
because so little research has been conducted into the broader implications of genocide in 
international relations. For instance, the discipline of genocide studies has produced a vast 
amount of excellent case study literature documenting individual cases of genocide. 36 More 
recently, a comparative approach has been adopted as genocide scholars have attempted (and 
succeeded) to highlight the common themes and patterns that can be attributed to the practice 
of genocide. 37 Yet critically, the discipline of genocide studies has little to say regarding the 
implications of genocide for the current world order. Despite the fact that issues of truth, 
justice, and reconciliation have often been studied within the context of the targeted groups, 38 
the broader implications of genocide have not been addressed. At this point genocide 
scholars may raise the point that the case study analysis within the field has highlighted the 
transnational instabilities that arise from genocide via repercussions such as mass migration. 
However, although this is an important and valid point, the reality is that problems such as 
's For such analysis see, Barbara Harft `No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide 
and Political Mass Murder since 1955", American Political Science Review (vol. 97, no. 1,2003, pp. 57-73). 36 It should be stressed here that there are a number of works within the discipline of genocide that demonstrate 
a thorough understanding of IR, albeit implicitly. For such analysis of 20th century genocides see Donald 
Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Donald Bloxham, The 
Great Game of Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the 
Nation State. vol. II: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (London: I. B. Taucis, 2005). Mark 
Levene, Genocide in the A¢e of the Nation State. vol. I: The Meaning of Genocide (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005). 
Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis. History of Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). Ben 
Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime. Race. Power and Genocide in ambod under the Khmer Roug 1975 79 
(London: Yale University Press, 1995). 
For a broad overview see Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil. A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (London: Yale University Press, 2007). Eric D. Weitz, A Cen of Genocide. Uto 
of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions. Mass 
Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
For relevant discussion on transitional justice see, Alexander L. Hinton, Transitional Justice. Global 
Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
2010). Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf with Pierre Hanzan, Localizing Transitional Justice Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence (Chicago: Stanford University Press, 2010). Phillip Clark and Zachary Kaufman (ed. ), After Genocide. Transitional Justice. Post-Conflict Reconatrection and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (London: C Hurst and Co Publishers, 2009). 
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refugee movements are not exclusive to genocide and can be caused by a number of different 
issues such as climate change, failed states and other forms of internal conflict. 39 Whilst 
genocide scholars have predominantly focused on issues related to such case study research, 
they too come under scrutiny as they have failed to take into consideration more recent 
international developments regarding genocide in international relations. For example, 
neither of the two leading journals of genocide the journal of Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies or the Journal of Genocide Research have published a single article on the 
Responsibility to Protect. This is despite the fact that it was unanimously endorsed by the 
UN General Assembly in 2005, and is grounded upon the idea that states have a 
responsibility, both domestically and internationally, to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (see Chapter Six). In summary, it 
would seem that the discipline of genocide studies is no better placed than that of IR when it 
comes to understanding the broader implications of genocide in international relations. 
Again, it feels necessary to stress that the intention here is not to participate in some sort of 
academic blame game but to simply illustrate the point that, at present, the political will of 
the political unwilling remains unaltered as scholars have failed to explain why genocide 
should be given more political importance. As previously stated, scholars have tended to 
assume that this is self-evident, in that genocide is a crime against humanity, yet whether 
wrong or right, policymakers do not make policies on the behalf of humanity (this will be 
expanded upon in Chapter Two). From this perspective, the question naturally arises: so 
what now? It is here that the conclusions drawn from Campbell's work are of relevance as 
the author proposes a "remedy" in order to overcome the problem of misinformed state 
policy, namely that scholars need to establish a "normative consensus". As Campbell 
explains: 
We "experts" must first overcome our own intellectual ignorance (and arrogance) regarding 
genocide if we hope to be effective in convincing busy policymakers to think differently about 
genocide and the national interest. Indeed, it is high time to bring in the genocide scholars. 
They are best prepared to address the definitional, historical, motivational, quantitative, 
process, and remedial controversies regarding genocide. And what the genocide scholars do 
not know about humanitarian intervention, regional politics, refugee problems, public opinion, 
39 For an analysis of the problem see, Sodako Opts, The Turbulent Decade. Confronting the Refugee Crises of 
the 1990a (New Yo± W. W. Norton, 2005). See also, Roberts Cohen and Francis M. Deng, `Mass 
Displacement Caused By Conflicts and One Sided Violence: National and International Responses', SIPRI 
Yearbook 2009: id International Available at 
httn: //www. brookinas. edn/""/media/Fileshc/articles/2009/0608 lila gtcohen/0608 intamal dis 
pj ntcoheyodf Accessed 25/05/2010. 
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the proper use of force, and global governance, we can provide. By bringing together the best 
minds and experience regarding the nature of genocide, the use of military force, and public 
opinion, we may finally be able to offer policymakers a way to stop the scourge of humanity. 40 
The statement embodies an important logic as it explains that in order for international 
society's actions to be effective, its understanding has to be informed. It is therefore of critical 
importance that we go back to the drawing board and consolidate knowledge within 
interrelated fields. Whilst no single volume can attempt to address the scale of the problem in 
its entirety, it is hoped that this research will make an important and heuristically valuable 
contribution. 
Problematically, this link between genocide prevention and conceptualisation leaves us with a 
difficult starting point for inquiry regarding the way that we frame and conceptualise 
genocide. Notably, the above statement made by Gareth Evans regarding the three strategies 
needed for mass atrocity prevention places emphasis on framing the issues involved, in a way 
that removes the preliminary stumbling blocks that may hinder a global reflex action. Whilst 
it seems fair to say that most people would sympathise with such an approach, it is also very 
important that scholars do not fall into the trap of framing genocide as a transnational threat, 
and/or genocide prevention as a matter of national interest, just because they want genocide 
prevented. One cannot help but feel that Campbell himself falls into this trap. The reader is 
often bombarded with a series of overtly bold claims which are never fully substantiated: 
"Unchecked genocide has damaged the very fabric of our present liberal international 
society" 41 "Genocide is a transovereign problem, facing the international community. Indeed 
the worst problem". 42 "Unchecked genocide could destroy the very fabric that holds together 
our present international system". 43 "Genocide threatens to destroy whatever security, 
democracy, and prosperity exists in the present international system". 44 The real problem is 
not that such claims are wrong but that the author's overtly brief analysis can never justify 
such claims. For instance, Campbell's theoretical chapter on "The Grand Strategic Context" 
is less than eight pages long, in which his sub-section on "Contemporary Genocide as a 
Transsovereign Threat" is less than two paragraphs 45 This is despite the fact that these two 
paragraphs set out Campbell's focus on genocide and globalisation which leaves the reader 
4Ö Campbell, Genocide and the Global V'1lage. p. 107. 41 Ibid, p. 3. 
42 thld, p. 11. 
431bid, p. 12. 
44 Ibid, p. 16. 
451bid, pp. 11-12. 
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somewhat perplexed as it is simply ludicrous to present the relationship between these two 
(arguably) essentially contested concepts in less than one hundred and fifty words. Such an 
overtly brief analysis leaves Campbell's central claim that genocide prevention is in the "vital 
national interest" of states to be built on a series of assumptions. 46 
To return to Campbell's aforementioned "remedy", we may have a responsibility to inform 
"busy policymakers", but this does not dictate that we should somehow present genocide 
studies in a `fast-food format' since few policymakers will be convinced of such 
unsubstantiated claims. Obviously this becomes a complex issue when one considers the 
relationship between understanding genocide and preventing genocide. For instance, Dirk 
Moses is a highly accomplished genocide scholar who claims: "`Genocide Studies' is no 
ordinary academic discipline. It seeks knowledge in the service of an urgent moral 
imperative: the prediction, prevention, and interdiction of genocides. An activist fervor 
drives the social scientist beyond the ivory tower". 7 Whilst anyone with any knowledge of 
genocide is bound to be sympathetic to this statement it seems that scholars have to approach 
such a statement with extreme caution. As Henry Huttenbach (the editor of the Journal of 
Genocide Research) rightly points out: whilst genocide scholars, and the discipline of 
genocide studies itself, has a role to play in advising policymaking, this cannot see academic 
inquiry lapse into political activism. " Huttenbach, therefore, distances himself from the idea 
that the discipline of genocide studies is above and beyond the ivory tower and that the 
genocide scholar is driven by an "activist fervor" (to use Moses's phrase). In doing so, 
Huttenbach aligns himself with the IR perspective put forward by Hedley Bull in that whilst 
scholars may never be able to be objective to the point that they can make value free claims, 
scholars have to at least attempt to detach themselves from the subject matter. 49 It is this 
latter perspective that is upheld here: the scholar's role remains the same regardless of the 
subject they are studying (this will be discussed further in Chapter Two). 
'6 lbid, p. 16. 
47 Dirk Moses, Whv the Discipline of Genocide Studies Has Trouble Exo, g How "Genocides" End? 
(22/12/2006). Available at gyp: //howaenocidesendssrc. or oses/ Accessed, 26/02/ 2010. 
Henry R. Huttenbach, `From the Editor: New Directions', Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 7, no. 2,2005, 
169 -170), p. 170. 49Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A && of World Order Politics. third edition. (London: Palgrave, 
2002), p. xxxv. For further an analysis see Robert Jackson, 'International Relations as a Craft Discipline', in 
Cornelia Navari, (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 
2009), pp 24 - 27. This will be discussed further in Chapter Two. 
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The point is that even when it comes to the horror of genocide, the academic has to accept that 
we should not frame genocide in a certain light just because that is how we want it to be seen. 
Policymakers should not be duped through misrepresentation, but guided through conceptual 
rigour. Quite simply, within the context of this thesis, it is important to question whether 
genocide constitutes a transnational threat and whether its prevention is in the national interest 
of states. If one finds that it is not, then one has to accept this outcome and formulate a 
different line of inquiry. One could, for instance, advocate the aforementioned idea of 
humanity, yet it is clear that policymakers do not construct policy on behalf of humanity but 
rather on behalf of the national interest. This thesis, therefore, starts from the view that one 
should develop an understanding of genocide and genocide prevention by beginning with the 
facts of the problem rather than from any specific faith in any particular form of response. 
Accordingly, in order to gain an understanding of the facts within the context of genocide's 
impact on international relations, critically, we need to establish not just an understanding of 
genocide but also an understanding of international relations. 
1.2.1 Meet the IR family 
The intent to bring the study of genocide into an IR framework raises the question of which 
IR theory should be utilised in order to best serve this objective. Whilst Campbell implies 
that genocide scholars need to be brought into IR, this is not as straightforward as one may 
think. These two disciplines do not represent two singular families of thought that can be 
simply introduced to each other. If one were to survey the contemporary landscape of IR as a 
discipline one would see an ever changing landscape. Realists, liberals, marxists (and their 
neo-counterparts), constructivists, feminists, post-structuralists, and English School scholars 
(to name a few), all strive to put forward their interpretation of the subject matter which, in 
turn, alters the remit of the subject matter itself. Amidst this complexity is an ever frustrating 
oversimplification, as IR scholars are continually categorised under simplistic headings. For 
example, can the richness of Thomas Hobbes be aptly portrayed by the label of realism, a title 
which Hobbes never laid upon himself? At times the discipline feels more like a music store 
as scholars strive to categorise, label, and present theorists in an easy to digest format: is 
Johnny Cash gospel or country? Is E. H. Carr a realist or an English School pluralist? On the 
one hand it seems that any attempt to present someone's life work (in any field) under a 
simple heading is a gross over-simplification. Yet on the other hand there seems to be an 
evident need to utilise such labels as a way of framing the complexities involved. The reality 
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is that if we were to label every musician in a music store using their name alone, the 
customer would be left bewildered. 
The point here is that in addressing the suitability of an IR theory, one has to get to grips with 
the fundamental concerns of each theory to assess which holds most relevance for the study 
of genocide. One way of framing this is to think of each IR theory as a family of scholars. 
Just as mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers may disagree on certain issues, it is clear that 
they remain bonded by a specific gene pool. The same is true for IR theory. Although 
realists may disagree over issues of security (defensive and offensive realism) they are still 
bonded by a theoretical `gene pool' as they share a fundamental commitment to the study of 
state security, survival, and power within the anarchical realm. In much the same way, 
liberals may disagree over the role of institutions but still share a commitment to co-operation 
and liberty, whereas cosmopolitans may differ on the need for a world government yet still 
share a commitment to humanity. SO It is here that the theoretical `gene pool' of the English 
School is of particular interest as its focus on justice and order at the international level 
provides a fruitful framework for trying to understand the broader impact of genocide on the 
ordering structure of international society (this will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
Two). 
The term the English School was first coined by Roy Jones in 1981 in a critical piece entitled 
`The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure's' Ironically, it was 
Jones who first referenced the existence of a so-called English School, yet in calling for its 
closure, he actually provided a collective title under which many subsequent IR scholars 
52 would operate. Significantly, scholars such as Andrew Hurrell, Robert Jackson, Tim Dunne 
and Nicholas J. Wheeler sought to expand upon the English School legacy laid down by 
earlier scholars such as Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, John R. Vincent and 
Adam Watson, amongst others. " As Tim Dunne explains, these early English School 
s0 For a brief overview on the commitments of each IR theory, see Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. 
Roy Jones, `The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure', Review of International 
(vol. 7, no. 1,1981, pp. 1-13). See also Ole Weever, 'International Society - Theoretical Premises 
Unf ilfilled? ' Cooperation and Conflict (vol. 27, no. 1,1992, pp. 97-128). 52 For a historical overview which traces the origins of the English School back to the British Committee, see 
Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society. History of the English School. (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 
1995), 
" For an insight il overview see Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The Enaliah School of International 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), see chapter one. 
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scholars "carried the torch for normative international relations theory during the long- 
positivist realist phase of American International Relations". 54 In carrying forth this torch in 
the post-Cold War era, contemporary English School scholars have ensured that normative 
theorising continues to play an integral role in current International Relations theory. As a 
result, the English School has outlived Jones's initial call for its closure and in stark contrast; 
it now has more pupils than ever before. 
The title of this project, "Genocide and its Threat to International Society", reflects the 
English School approach to be utilised throughout this study. In essence, this thesis wears its 
English School heart on its sleeve for as Barry Buzan explains: "International society is the 
flagship idea of the English School. It carves out a clearly bounded subject focused on the 
elements of society that states form amongst themselves". 55 As the statement implies, the 
English School approach stems from the belief that an international society exists both in an 
abstract sense and in reality. The former suggest that international society can be used as an 
analytical tool that helps us make sense of international relations which leads scholars to view 
international society as an ideal type. 56 The latter suggests that states have constructed a 
society at the international level. This society actually exists and is evident in the norms, 
rules, values, principles, and institutions that states construct in an attempt to help create 
order within the anarchical realm, thereby creating what Hedley Bull famously described as 
an Anarchical Society. 57 The statement captures how states embed commitments to both 
order and justice within the anarchical realm of international relations. It is this order/justice 
framework therefore that underpins English School inquiry and is of particular relevance here 
as it helps us establish an understanding of how genocide impacts upon "the institutional 
structure of the relations between states". 58 In other words, through exploring the 
Dunne, Inventing International Society. pp-12 -15. Hidemi Suganami, `C. A. W. Manning and the Study of International Relations', Review of International Studies (vol. 27, no. 1,2000, pp. 91-107). S4 Tim Dunne, `International Society: Theoretical Promises Fulfilled? ' operation and Conflict (vol. 30, no. 2, 1995, pp. 125- 154), p. 145 -146. 55 Bey Buzan, From International Society to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 1. For such analysis, we Edward Keene, `The Development of the Concept of International Society: An Essay 
on Political Argument in International Theory', in Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld, Confronting the Political in- tnational Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), chapter two. 57 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of World Order Politics- third edition (London: Paigrave, 2002). 
ss This is taken from Suganami, see Linklater and Sugananmi, The English School of International Relations p. 42. This focus leads Suganami to claim that a more accurate title to describe English School scholars would 
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relationship between order, justice, and genocide, we can gauge the impact of genocide upon 
international order which therefore helps us to answer the questions raised above, such as 
whether genocide prevention is in the national interest of states. 
Essentially, this thesis will argue that in preventing genocide, international society saves 
more than `just' strangers (to use Nichols J. Wheeler's central idea). 59 To validate this claim 
this project explores the relationship between genocide and international legitimacy and how 
this relationship has critical implications for the United Nations (UN). It will be argued that 
genocide holds a special relationship with international legitimacy because it is 
internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from both a legal and moral perspective. It 
is from this perspective that we can see genocide as a threat to international order as it erodes 
the legitimate authority of both the UN (which acts as the cornerstone of international 
legitimacy) and the UN Security Council (which acts as the stabilising function in 
international relations) more than any other crime. It is hoped that through understanding the 
crime's relationship with international legitimacy, and the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis, a 
more informed understanding of genocide can be established. Whilst the 2005 UN-led 
Responsibility to Protect initiative addressed some of the issues at hand, as Andrew Hurrell 
touched on above, its endorsement has not resolved the fundamental problem of altering 
political will. As a result, genocide prevention is not deemed to be in the national interest of 
states because genocide is not considered to pose a transnational threat. It is here that this 
thesis challenges such mainstream thinking, for if one accepts that genocide has an impact 
upon international order, then one has to accept that the prevention of genocide is within the 
national interest of all states; that is, if they value international stability. 
1.3 Genocide and Its threat to International society: an overview 
With any attempt to adopt an interdisciplinary approach it is important to specify the 
parameters of one's research. Notably, this thesis does not engage with many of the central 
questions to be found within the discipline of genocide studies; what are the causes of 
genocide, is genocide a modern phenomenon, how should genocide be prevented. Although 
such questions are important, the focus here is specifically on the relationship between 
have been "institutionalists". However he accepts that this term is associated with neo-liberalism and that since 
the English School is now widely accepted within the IR community this latter term is the most appropriate. 
Nicholas, J. Wheeler, Saving S pers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 2000). 
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genocide and the current world order. It is also worth noting that this thesis does not engage 
in case study research. Quite simply the field of genocide studies is saturated with case study 
research and as previously stated; the focus here is not on studying the impact of genocide 
upon the targeted populations, but on how genocide impacts on the ordering structure of 
international society itself. To achieve this, a series of interdisciplinary steps will be taken 
throughout this thesis. 
Chapter Two will address The Suitability of the English School and, in doing so, set out the 
IR framework for this thesis which subsequent chapters will then build upon. Quite simply, 
if one is to understand the broader impact of genocide in international relations it is 
imperative that one has an understanding of both genocide and international relations. It is 
here that this chapter sets out an IR framework for this thesis. The intention is not to answer 
any research questions as such, but to flesh out the core assumptions within the English 
School approach and their relevance for understanding genocide from an IR perspective. At 
the same time, the chapter also aims to highlight that genocide could be studied from 
alternative IR perspectives and that the assumptions embodied within alternative IR 
approaches will undoubtedly shape one's view of genocide in international relations. It is 
hoped that this sheds light on potential areas of further research, for as previously stated there 
is much work to be done on bringing the disciplines of IR and genocide studies closer 
together. 
In Chapter Three the thesis moves on to the question of what is genocide. If we are to bring 
the study of genocide into the discipline of IR, it is important that IR scholars understand the 
definitional debates surrounding the term's use. As Campbell rightly pointed out, IR scholars 
are not necessarily well versed in this debate and it is imperative that any such analysis is not 
grounded on the assumption that IR scholars already know what genocide is. As will be 
discussed, the concept of genocide remains highly contested within the discipline of genocide 
studies, and these debates, as well as their relation to the legal definition of genocide have to 
be factored into our understanding. This point is made even more important when one 
considers the common misuse of the term genocide in international relations as it is often 
wrongly associated with an array of international issues such as deforestation, H. I. V., and 
abortion. Critically, such misuse debases the central meaning of the word genocide which 
fuels the fire of misunderstanding. If IR scholars are to help provide policymakers with a 
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more informed understanding of genocide, then it is imperative that such problems are 
addressed, hence the title of the chapter: Words Matter: Genocide and the Definitional 
Debate. 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five go hand in hand as they aim to support the central claim of 
this thesis that genocide poses a threat to international order. To substantiate this claim, 
Chapter Four provides the theoretical groundwork, in that it explores the relationship between 
Genocide and International Legitimacy. Chapter Four sets out an understanding of 
international legitimacy prior to addressing the relationship between genocide and 
international legitimacy. It will be claimed that genocide holds a special relationship with 
international legitimacy because it is internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from 
both a legal and moral perspective. Yet at the same time, it also highlights that from a 
political perspective, genocide is not viewed in the same light. Despite the fact there is an 
international expectation that genocide should be prevented, policymaking remains 
entrenched in the understanding that states should not engage in such "complex and 
dangerous" foreign policy initiatives unless national interests are at stake. Hence, this 
explains that they do not see a link between the prevention of genocide and the national 
interest. 
It is this latter aspect that naturally leads us into Chapter Five's focus: Genocide as a Threat 
to International Stability. Utilising the relationship between genocide and the first-order 
institution of international legitimacy, the chapter shifts its focus to exploring how genocide 
impacts upon the secondary-institution of the United Nations. It is proposed that genocide 
poses a threat to international order as it erodes the authority of the UN (which acts as the 
cornerstone of international legitimacy) and the UN Security Council (which acts as the 
stabilizing function in international relations) more than any other crime. Such understanding 
helps shed light on how genocide impacts upon the legitimacy process that underpins 
international relations. From this perspective one can see how the Rwandan genocide played 
an integral role in the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis that arose over Kosovo. This novel 
approach, therefore, helps us understand just why genocide should be viewed as a 
transsoverign threat. From this perspective, the prevention of genocide should be considered 
within the national interest of all states, if, that is, they value international order. 
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Chapter Six, The Responsibility to Protect: Resolving the Legitimacy Crisis?, simply picks up 
where Chapter Five left off. Essentially, the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect in 
2005 saw international society come together to try and resolve the legitimacy crisis. 
Although the R2P has helped address certain problems to be found within the post-Cold War 
legitimacy debate, it has done little to further the prevention of genocide and may actually 
have created certain obstacles that hinder the prevention of genocide in the future. However, 
in failing to acknowledge the role that genocide played in creating the legitimacy crisis, 
international society failed to address certain fundamental questions, which in turn leaves 
unresolved tensions within the legitimacy process. Five years on from the endorsement of the 
R2P it seems that the R2P has become somewhat of the `master concept' (in relation to mass 
atrocity crimes), -yet it is clear that a more informed understanding of the relationship between 
the R2P, the 1948 Genocide Convention (UNGC), genocide prevention, and the legitimacy 
crisis is needed. 
It seems clear that in a post-R2P world states have a choice whether to embed the normative 
principles embodied in the R2P or not. It is here that Chapter Seven, The Three Traditions 
Re-visited, re-engages with the realist, rationalist, and revolutionist foreign policy perspectives 
set out in Chapter Two. Utilising the understanding set out in previous chapters, the analysis 
evaluates the legitimacy of the three alternative perspectives toward the prevention of 
genocide in a post-R2P world. Essentially, international society can progress, or regress upon 
its R2P commitment. It is here that the crime of genocide is utilised to highlight how difficult 
it is to see how states can legitimately regress back to the rules that underpin realism and 
English School pluralism. From this perspective it is claimed that English School solidarists 
and cosmopolitans provide a more legitimate framework for advancing the R2P norm in 
international relations as we try and answer the question of how international society should 
develop in a post-R2P world. 
Chapter Eight offers a brief overview of the thesis by engaging with the "East Tennessee 
Question". The "East Tennessee Question" is taken from the work of Ken Booth and provides 
an apt context for re-visiting the central debates within this thesis. It also provides a fruitful 
framework for considering more critical questions regarding the relationship between 
genocide and international society. This helps shed light on potential areas for further 
research. 
20 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
In summary, the intention of this thesis is to bring the study of genocide into IR via the 
English School in order to understand genocide and its broader impact upon the ordering 
structure of international society. At present, the disciplines of IR and genocide studies have 
failed to provide more informed answers in relation to the question: why should policymakers 
prioritise genocide prevention? In addressing this question, this thesis puts forward a new 
approach in that it explores the relationship between genocide and international legitimacy 
and how this relationship has critical implications for the United Nations. It will be argued 
that genocide holds a special relationship with international legitimacy because it is 
internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from both a legal and moral perspective. In 
sharp contrast to much of the thinking that underpins present foreign policymaking, it will be 
claimed that because of the special relationship that genocide holds with international 
legitimacy, genocide can be understood to pose a threat to international stability as it erodes 
both the legitimate authority of the UN (which acts as the cornerstone of international 
legitimacy) and the UN Security Council (which acts as the stabilising function in 
international relations) more than any other crime. It is hoped that through understanding the 
crime's relationship with international legitimacy, and the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis, a 
more informed understanding of genocide can be established. Whilst the 2005 UN-led 
Responsibility to Protect initiative addressed some of the issues at hand, its endorsement has 
not resolved the fundamental problem of altering political will. If one accepts that genocide 
has an impact upon international order, then one has to accept that the prevention of genocide 
is within the national interest of all states, that is, if they value international stability. 
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2 The Suitability of the English School 
As stated in Chapter One, the disciplines of IR and genocide studies do not represent two 
singular families of thought that can be simply introduced to one another. Understanding 
genocide within the context of international relations requires not only an understanding of 
genocide, but also of international relations. Accordingly, this chapter addresses the 
suitability of the English School as a relevant framework for serving the needs of this thesis. 
Primarily, this chapter will address the "three traditions" identified by Martin Wight (realism, 
rationalism, and revolutionism), as the assumptions embodied within these three alternative 
world views help illustrate the point that one's view of IR, will shape one's understanding of 
genocide within it (section 2.1). Having established this, the chapter will flesh out the central 
tenets to be found within the idea of an international society and why these have relevance for 
the study of genocide (section 2.2). The chapter will finish with an analysis of English 
School methods and their relevance for the study of genocide (section 2.3). The intention 
therefore is to provide a framework in this chapter for understanding genocide from an 
English School perspective which subsequent chapters can then build on. 
2.1 The three traditions 
It was in the 1950's, whilst lecturing at the London School of Economics, that Martin Wight 
first identified the three traditions of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism as a teaching tool 
to help students navigate the realist - idealist dichotomy that dominated the discipline of IR in 
the inter-war period! As Andrew Linklater explains, "In his lectures, Wight lamented the 
way in which debates between realism and utopianism in the inter-war years had neglected the 
via media with its distinct focus on international society". 2 For Wight, there was middle 
ground to be found between the overt pessimism embodied within realism and the overt 
optimism embodied within what he labelled as revolutionism. Responding to this neglected 
middle ground; Wight brought the rationalist tradition, which he associated with Hugo 
Crrotius, back into his analysis of international theory. It is here that the three traditions are of 
See Hedley Bull's thoughtful introductory essay in Martin Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions 
Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (ed. ), (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992). Wight was obviously influenced 
by the idealist-realist framework presented by E. H. Carr, The Twenty Year Crisis 1919-1939 (London: 
Macmillan, 2001). For a discussion on Cart's position within the English School see, Tim Dunne, vIn eating 
bft ational Society. History the R ho of (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), chapter two. 2 Andrew Linklater, `The English School', in Scot Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et all, Theories of International 
Relations. fourth edition (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2009), p. 87. 
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particular relevance as they present an understanding of how the English School approach fits 
within the broader context of IR. Furthermore, the three traditions illustrate how the 
assumptions embodied in alternative IR approaches shape one's world view which is an 
important point to consider when one approaches the study of genocide from an IR 
perspective. 
To flesh out what is meant by the three traditions, let us turn to Andrew Linklater's work on 
`Progress and its Limits: System, Society and Community in World Politics'. 3 Notably, 
Linklater equates system, society, and community with the three traditions of Martin Wight to 
discuss the potential for progress in international relations. For Linklater, the realist 
perspective represents a more pessimistic approach (international system), whereas the 
revolutionist approach is much more optimistic (international community), leaving the English 
School to occupy the middle ground (international society). 
Whilst the complexities involved in this overview will be discussed below, in Fig 1.1,1 
attempt to bring the Linklater/Wight juxtaposition to life in order to help illustrate the three 
alternative world views. 
Fig. 1.1, an overview of the Linklater/Wight juxtaposition. 4 
International System 
Realism 
Machiavellian Tradition 
Whether driven by human 
nature (realism) or 
international anarchy (neo- 
realism) states seek power, 
security, and survival as a 
pre-determined national 
interest. 
Pessimistic View 
International Society 
Rationalism 
Grotian Tradition 
States engage in 
communicative dialogue to 
establish common norms, 
values, principles, and 
institutions, thereby creating 
an international society. 
International Community 
Revolutionism 
Kantian Tradition 
International relations 
progress to the point that a 
community of humankind is 
established thereby 
fundamentally altering the 
present Westphalian-centric 
view of international 
relatinnc_ 
Optimistic View 
3 See Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations, A Contemporary 
Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter four. 
4 The dotted lines between the three traditions aim to represent the idea of blurred boundaries. 
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Prior to engaging in an analysis of Fig.!.!, it is necessary to acknowledge that the simplicity 
of the spectrum accentuates many of the overt stereotypes to be found in any use of Martin 
Wight's three traditions. As Hedley Bull explains, Wight himself feared that such reification 
of the three traditions would only further simplify and distort the three concepts which Wight 
himself never published. 5 Indeed, the attempt to classify the history of ideas within three 
traditions has come under understandable scrutiny. For instance, Edward Keene explains that 
such an approach focuses on the continuities of thought to be found within the history of 
ideas, yet this critically dictates that discontinuities of thought may be forgotten. 6 However, 
as touched upon in Chapter One, there is no IR theory that does not fall foul of using such 
intellectual stereotypes and despite the limitations involved, these stereotypes remain 
important because they are needed to make sense of the complexities involved. 
Figure 1.1, therefore aims to simply illustrate the point that the three traditions of realism, 
rationalism, and revolutionism offer different perspectives on the potential for progress in 
international relations. This is important because one can see that one's position on this 
spectrum consequently holds implications for how one starts to theorise the impact of 
genocide on international relations, just as it would with any other concept, such as war, 
sovereignty, diplomacy, or justice. Each tradition embodies assumptions that one has to be 
aware of when attempting to understand genocide from an IR perspective. To consider this 
further, let us first of all address the tradition of realism. 
2.1.1 International system: realism 
In Linklater's analysis on the potential for progress in international relations, Linklater 
equates the tradition of realism with the idea of an international system. As he explains, "The 
Hobbesian or Machiavellian perspective represents the anti-progressivist approach to 
international relations which contends that states belong to an international system in which 
there is seldom relief from competition and conflict". 7 The statement encapsulates the 
scepticism embodied in the realist view of international relations. Unlike English School 
scholars, realists tend to see a world of international instability rather than international order. 
S See Hedley Bull's introductory essay in Martin Wight, International Theory The Three Traditions. esp. xiii. 6 This is taken from David Boucher's discussion on this topic in which he presents an alternative to Carr's two 
traditions and Wight's three traditions with a focus on Empirical Realism and Universal Moral Order. See 
David Boucher, The Limits of h' 'n tern tional Rel tions Natural Law. Natural Rights and Human Rights in Transition (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 7. 7Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations p. 117. 
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The origins of this instability are traced back to the anarchical structure (neorealism) or 
human nature juxtaposed with the anarchical structure (realism). 8 With no world government 
to constrain the conditions of anarchy or human nature, states remain embroiled in a never 
ending competition for power, security, and survival. 9 Essentially, states are locked into this 
international system of competition and conflict which prevents any potential for progress 
toward an international society or international community. 
This helps explain why realist policymakers see genocide as just another insoluble problem. 
Significantly, realists reject the so-called idealistic belief that "no problems - however 
hopeless they may appear to be - are really insoluble, given well-meaning, well-financed, and 
competent efforts". 10 Although realists would like to live in a world without problems such 
as genocide, they do not see how such problems can be resolved without the establishment of 
a world government. At the same time realists remain highly sceptical toward the idea that a 
world government can be established. This is important because it begins to illustrate why 
realist policymakers do not believe that genocide prevention is in the national interest of 
states. Critically, this realist view does not stem from a commitment to amoralism but a 
genuine fear that "the path of justice and honour involves one in danger". " As stated in 
Chapter One, genocide prevention has the potential to lead states into "complex and 
dangerous" foreign policy agendas (to use Andrew Hurrell's phrase). 12 For realists, complex 
and dangerous foreign policy agendas have the potential to undermine state security and 
should, therefore, only be pursued when matters of vital national interest are at stake. Moral 
crusades do not fall within this realist framework for as Morgenthau succinctly stated, whilst 
the individual has the right to say, "let justice be done, even if the world perish", the state 
does not have the right to say this on behalf of its citizens. 13 From this perspective states 
' For the neo-realist view, see Kenneth Waltz, IbM of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979). For the realist view see Hans Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Amongst Nations. 
1 lie Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985). For an analysis on the relationship between 
the two theories, see Kenneth Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), chapter 
five. 
9 For a relevant overview see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1987). 
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations. p. 9. 
" This classic Athenian rationale comes from Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War translated by Rex 
Warner, (New York: Penguin, 1972), p. 405. 12 This phrase will be utilised throughout this thesis. 
13 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among p. 12. 
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should not send their `sons and daughters' to die "saving strangers". 14 It is for this reason 
that genocide is viewed as an insoluble problem. This is something that genocide scholars 
need to consider carefully as too often genocide scholars naively dismiss such policymaking 
as amoral. 
On the other hand, realists need to consider whether their view of genocide stems from their 
understanding of human nature, cooperation, national interest, anarchical structure -a mix of 
these - or, more importantly, genocide itself. 
15 By this I mean that despite realists having a 
pessimistic view of human nature, a narrow understanding of national interest, a relative 
gains approach toward cooperation, and/or, a neo-realist belief that the anarchical system can 
push states to behave in certain ways, realists do accept that on certain issues: states do 
cooperate within the anarchical realm. As stated in Chapter One: states often cooperate on 
security issues when they perceive that the threat posed outstrips their individual security 
capacity. Although realists reject the liberal appeal to the idea of absolute gains, they do 
acknowledge that cooperation is a vital feature of international relations. 16 This is important 
because it highlights that the realist view - that genocide prevention is not within the national 
interest of states - stems not from their view of cooperation, human nature et al., but their 
view of genocide. In other words, realists do not believe that genocide poses a security threat 
to states. It is this perception of genocide, therefore, that drives realists to claim states should 
not, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, engage in genocide prevention unless there are 
matters of national interest at stake. This brings us back to the fact that policymakers do not 
view genocide as a transnational threat. 
Yet as stated in Chapter One, IR scholars have given very little thought as to how genocide 
impacts upon the current world order. As a result, the realist understanding of genocide 
seems to be built on a series of assumptions rather than any serious critical analysis. The 
14 This is taken from Nicholas, J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Wheeler provides an apt critique of the realist position with regard to 
humanitarian intervention. 
's For a relevant analysis on the national interest see, Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions chapter 
six. Also, Scott Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theo ýy (New York: Palgrave, 2005). 
For a neo-realist analysis of cooperation see, Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', International Organisation (vol. 42, no. 3,1988, pp. 485-507). 
16 For an insightful overview see Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell, Duncan Snidal, `The Relative-Gains 
Problem for International Cooperation', The American Political Science Review (vol. 87, no. 3,1993, pp. 727- 743). 
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intention of this thesis therefore is to shed light on this specific issue, which may help provide 
policymakers with a more informed understanding of genocide. This will allow this thesis to 
re-engage with the realist view of genocide in Chapter Seven's analysis of the three 
traditions. With this in mind, let us turn our attention to the tradition of revolutionism, prior 
to moving onto a more detailed analysis of rationalism and its suitability for this thesis. 
2.1.2 International community: revolutionism 
The tradition of revolutionism remains the most under-theorised tradition (at least from an 
English School perspective), identified by Martin Wight. For Wight, revolutionism was a 
hybrid category which captured the "soft" revolutionaries from Kant to Nehru, as well as the 
"hard" revolutionaries of Jacobins and Marxists. '7 Despite the fact that this in itself, provides 
enough food for thought, Wight created subdivisions within this tradition as he attempted to 
distinguish the non-violent revolutionism of Pacifism (which he labelled as "inverted 
revolutionism") and Wilsonianism (which he labelled as "evolutionary revolutionism") from 
the more hard-line approach of Marx. '8 Amidst such complexity, it is clear that English 
School scholars need to develop a stronger theoretical understanding of revolutionism. 
However, it is also clear that the revolutionist tradition transcends the present Westphalian 
state-centric perspective embodied in the English School understanding of international 
society. Whether one upholds a Kantian commitment to an international community, or a 
more critical utopian commitment to a world society, the variety of revolutionist perspectives 
act to remind both realism and rationalism of the moral imperfections to be found in the 
present state-centric model. 19 Essentially, this ethic of radical change is what defines the core 
of the revolutionist position. 
It is important then to stress that Fig. 1.1, reflects Linklater's focus on the "softer" 
revolutionary position of Kant, and the idea of an international community. As Linklater 
'7 Wight, International Theory. IIie Three Traditions p. 267. 
's Ibid, pp. 159 - 160. It should be noted that Wight also experimented with other sub-divisions within realism 
and rationalism. 19 The idea that revolutionism acts to remind the other two traditions that the present state centric system is 
morally deficient is taken from Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism. Critical Theory in 
Ind Relations (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 8. Notably there is considerable work to be done 
on the relationship between the concept of international society and the idea of an international community 
and/or world society. See, Ian Clark, International Leery and World , ociety (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). HjM Butan. From International Society to World Societv't English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of ßlobaliaation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Iver B. Neumann, `The English 
School and the Practices of World Society', Review of International Studies (vol. 27, no. 3,2001, pp. 503-507). 
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explains, "The Kantian tradition represents the progressivist tendency in international thought 
since its members believe in the existence of a latent community of humankind, and are 
confident that all political actors have the capacity to replace strategic orientations with 
cosmopolitan political arrangements governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and 
force". 20 Perhaps the best way of viewing this Kantian perspective is in terms of what 
humanity should move away from, rather than exactly what humanity should move toward. 
For example, a Kantian commitment to humanity implies that we should move away from the 
present Westphalian state-centric model as this serves the interests of states rather than the 
interests of humanity. Yet at the same time there remains significant debate amongst Kantians 
as to how societal relations should be ordered instead . 
21 The pressing point is that this 
perspective prioritises the value of humanity over that of the present state system (realism), or 
society of states (rationalism). 
To relate this revolutionist focus back to the study of genocide, it seems clear that 
revolutionists could utilise the occurrence of genocide to illustrate just how the present state 
system is failing humanity. In doing so, revolutionists would pose a direct challenge to the 
realist and rationalist dependency on states and state policymakers. 22 Indeed, many moral 
theorists have appealed to the idea of humanity, human nature, and human essence, to 
condemn acts, such as genocide, as inhuman. 23 However, as raised in Chapter One, this 
approach seems to be built upon an assumption that humanity and human essence exists. 24 
One cannot help but think that the widespread participation of "ordinary people" in the 
genocidal process highlights the tragic reality that such acts are, in fact, human. 25 This 
somewhat profound philosophical argument was put into sharp context in the aftermath of the 
Nazi atrocities (which later became known as genocide and the Holocaust26) as news and 
20 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations. p. 117. 21 See, Garret. W. Brown, 'State Sovereignty, Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism', European Journal of 
International Relations. (vol. 11, no. 4,2005, pp. 495-522). 
u See Booth, Theory of World Security. 
23 Norman Geras, `Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity', in John K. Roth, (ed. ), Genocide and Human 
Rights. A Philosophical Guide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), chapter fourteen. 
For a seminal critique see Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). For an overview of this debate which notably draws on both Rorty and Geras amongst 
others, see Boucher, The Limits of Ethics in International Relations, nine. 25 The term and the idea of ordinary people committing such acts is taken from Christopher Browning, iOrd nary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (London: Penguin, 2001). For such 
a 
26 
nalysis see also, Yehuda Bauer, $g the Holocaua_t (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 21. For an analysis on the relationship between the two terms see, Dirk Moses, The Holocaust and Genocide', in Dan Stone, (ed. ), The Historioraphy of he Holocaust (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004, pp. 533 - 551). 
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images of events began to filter through mainstream British society. After viewing a Daily 
Express exhibition on the horrors that took place in Belsen, one thirty year old woman when 
interviewed stated, "I'm afraid it didn't make me feel anti-German; it made me feel anti- 
humanity. Would the same have happened here, I wonder, if we'd had the same government? 
I've heard some violent anti-Semitic talk which makes me think it would. I feel it's the fault 
of humanity at large, not the Germans in particular. , 27 The statement highlights that just as 
one can appeal to the idea of humanity to condemn the crime of genocide, one can equally 
appeal to the crime of genocide to refute the existence of common humanity. 
To link this back to the relevance of this thesis, the pressing point is not that this thesis rejects 
the idea of humanity, but that this thesis is not built upon the assumption that humanity exists. 
By this I mean that I do not uphold the Kantian premise that human beings are inextricably 
connected: "a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere" 28 The problem 
that this author has with such sentiment is the fact that between April-July 1994, the 
Rwandan genocide took place, yet quite clearly this was not felt everywhere as the world's 
attention was focused not on Rwanda but on events such as the World Cup in America 
(which also took place in June-July 1994). Whilst, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the 
Rwandan genocide did have an impact upon the authority of the UN thereby impacting upon 
the current world order, the fact that its impact was not felt everywhere demonstrates that 
international society has not progressed to the point that "a community of humankind" (to use 
Linklater's phrase) has been established. This brings us back to the understanding set out in 
Fig. 1.1. Whereas cosmopolitans believe that international relations should progress toward 
an international community, English School scholars do not believe that this represents an 
accurate picture of where international relations stand at present and remain sceptical toward 
the idea that an international community can be established. Perhaps this is best summarised 
in Paul Keal's English School study on the historical expansion of international society. Keal 
highlights that the laws and ideas embodied within the expansion of international society led 
international society to be constructed upon the dispossession of indigenous lands, the 
The term Holocaust with a capital H, is usually used to refer to the Jewish tragedy, for such discussion see, `Is 
There a New Anti-Semitism? A Conversation with Raul Hilberg', j&W (vol. 6, no 1-2,2007). Available 
+k%-/jnftVW . 
logoo'ournal. com/islim 6.1-2/hilberg. htm Accessed (12/05/2008). The author is unknown. 
Joanne Reilly, Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Came (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 69. 
2" Immanuel Kant cited in Garrett. W. Brown, Grounding Cos litanism. From Kant to the Idea of a 
Cosmmutu (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 1. Emphasis in original. 
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dehumanisation of indigenous peoples, and ultimately genocide. 29 However, despite 
acknowledging the "moral backwardness" of international society, Keal intriguingly 
concludes that international society remains the most appropriate framework for resolving the 
issues at hand. This neatly brings us back to the point raised in Chapter One: this thesis starts 
from the view that one should develop an understanding of genocide and genocide prevention 
by beginning with the facts of the problem rather than from any specific faith in any 
particular form of response. 
2.1.3 Summary 
Prior to engaging in a more in-depth focus of what the English School is, rather than what it 
is not (realism and revolutionism), it is hoped that this broad IR overview underlines the point 
that one's understanding of IR shapes one's understanding of genocide within international 
relations. This is a simple yet important point. For example, genocide scholars continually 
refer to the failure of the `international community' to prevent genocide, yet it is clear that 
most IR theorists do not actually accept that an international community exists. Kantians 
may hope that international relations progress toward the establishment of an international 
community; nevertheless, they do not believe that an international community already exists. 
When genocide scholars use the term `international community', they seem to be simply 
repeating a political mantra often put forward by politicians. Such political rhetoric does not 
provide an accurate portrayal of international relations. Of course, one can study genocide 
utilising any IR perspective they see fit, yet the overarching point here is that one has to 
understand the assumptions embodied within each IR approach and how they shape the 
subsequent understanding of genocide put forward. 
It is here that the relevance of the English School for this thesis comes to the fore. To gauge 
this let us consider Martin Wight's use of a statement made by the historian A. J. P. Taylor, 
"There is a third way between Utopianism and despair. That is to take the world as it is and 
improve it; to have faith without creed, hope without illusions, love without God". 30 The 
statement underpins the critical point that English School scholars do not have a pre- 
determined world view. Significantly, the rationalist tradition does not uphold the view that 
29 Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples The Moral Backwardness of international Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Perhaps somewhat bizarrely, the author does not engage with Zygmunt Bauman's seminal thesis: Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity, 
1989). 
30 A. J. P. Taylor, cited in Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions p. 29. 
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human nature is, essentially good, or essentially bad. 31 Instead, it sees international society as 
a construction, rather than a natural outcome, and shares a much discussed common ground 
with constructivism, as both schools of thought uphold the classic Wendtian view that 
"Anarchy is What States Make of It". 32 This brings us back to the logic put forward in 
Chapter One, that one should develop an understanding of genocide and genocide prevention 
by beginning with the facts of the problem rather than from any specific faith in any 
particular form of response. The English School approach, therefore, allows this study of 
genocide to escape any pre-determined commitment to ideas regarding the national interest 
(realism), or humanity (revolutionism). With its focus on the relationship between justice 
and order, the English School offers a highly relevant framework for assessing the impact of 
genocide upon the ordering structure that underpins international relations. With this in 
mind, it is important to flesh out the English School approach in more detail as this will aid 
our understanding of why the English School provides a suitable framework for studying the 
impact of genocide on international order 
2.2 International society: rationalism 
For English School scholars, international society is both an idea and a reality that cannot be 
bracketed off from the traditions of realism and revolutionism. A distinctive feature therefore 
of the English School is the theoretical pluralism that underpins its view of IR. As Wight 
was keen to point out, "rhe three traditions are not like three railroad tracks running parallel 
into infinity ... the three traditions are streams, with eddies and cross-currents, sometimes 
interlacing and never for long confined to their own river bed". 33 This seminal statement 
demonstrates Wight's theoretical pluralism, as he saw IR as a three way conversation 
between the traditions of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism. 34 To suggest that an 
informed understanding of IR could be acheived from studying either tradition in isolation 
was, for Wight, a fallacy. For Wight the "eddies and cross-currents" to be found between the 
31 See Wight, International Theory Three Traditions. p. 28. 32 Alexander Wendt, `Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics'. 
(vol. 46, no. 2,1992, pp. 391-425). Notably, English School scholars do not uphold 
the positivism within Wendt and therefore distance themselves from Wendt's subsequent famous claim, see 
Alexander Wendt, `Why a World State is Inevitable', European Journal of International Relations (vol. 9, no. 4, 
2003, pp. 491-542). For such analysis see, Christian Reus-Smit, `The Constructivist Challenger after 
September 11', in Alex J. Bellamy, (ed. ), International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
33 Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions. p. 260. 
1 The idea of a three way conversation is taken from Dunne, Inventing International Society. p. xiii. 
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three traditions dictates that one cannot find a pure realist stream, a pure rationalist or a pure 
revolutionist stream. The logic being, that if one were to trace the history of ideas then one 
would reveal an interwoven tapestry of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism. To return to 
Fig. 1.1, English School scholars see IR as a three way conversation between the three 
traditions as no single tradition can lay claim to hold a "monopoly of legitimate 
knowledge". 35 
Having established an understanding of the conversation to be found in realism and 
revolutionism, the focus here is on the conversation to be found in rationalism, which will 
allow us to re-engage with in a broader conversation at a later date (see Chapter Seven). To 
flesh out this idea of an international society let us return to Linklater: 
The Grotian tradition occupies the intermediate position since it believes there has been 
qualified progress in world politics exemplified by the existence of a society of states which 
places constraints on the state's power to hurt and facilitates international cooperation. States 
in this condition are orientated towards communicative action -to participation in diplomatic 
dialogues in which they advance claims and counterclaims with a view of establishing global 
standards of legitimacy which distinguish between permissible and proscribed behaviour. 36 
The statement encapsulates the spirit of the international society approach as English School 
scholars believe that although societal relations have developed beyond that of an 
international system, they have not progressed, and indeed are unlikely to progress, to the 
point of an international community. As a result, international society represents the middle- 
ground position. As Hidemi Suganami explains, even if one does not accept the Walztian 
neo-realist claim that the anarchical realm is the permissive cause of war, it is evident that the 
international environment is "undoubtedly war-conducive". 37 The statement captures why 
English School scholars are more optimistic than neo-realists as English School scholars do 
not believe that the structure of the anarchical realm itself, causes war. However, it also 
underlines why English School scholars remain less optimistic than revolutionists as the 
nature of the anarchical realm increases the likelihood of conflict, thereby reducing the 
possibility of harmonious relations. The idea of an international society therefore, stems 
from the belief that just as individuals at the domestic level create a society based upon 
establishing collective understandings, states create an international society by establishing, 
what Linklater refers to as, "global standards of legitimacy". These standards of legitimacy 
35 Bellamy, International Society and its Critics p. 11. 36 Linidater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations. pp. 117-118. 37 Hidemi Suganami, 'Understanding Man, The State, and War', )motional Relations (vol. 23, no. 3,2009, 
pp. 72 - 388), p. 378. Emphasis in original. 
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are expressed via the norms, values, principles, and institutions found in international 
relations (these will be discussed below). It is claimed that these collective understandings 
enable and/or constrain the behaviour of states, thereby increasing the likelihood of order at 
the international level. 38 
It is worth pausing here to consider the role of Hugo Grotius within this tradition as it is clear 
that contemporary English School scholars have distanced themselves from both the Grotian 
and Wight appeal to the legitimacy of natural law. Notably, Wight (who was a passionate 
Christian and wrote extensively on the subject matter3), associated rationalism with reason 
and the capacity of human beings to discover: "a system of eternal and immutable principles 
radiating from a moral source that transcends earthly power (either God or nature)". 40 Whilst 
such faith led Wight to accept Grotius's commitment to natural law, the majority of 
contemporary English School scholars have rejected such thinking. Rationalism is now 
commonly utilised by English School scholars as shorthand for international society rather 
than any commitment to ideas such as reason or natural law. 41 The implication of this 
distinction is therefore critical and needs to be clarified to avoid potential confusion. 
Essentially, seminal English School scholars such as Hedley Bull reject the idea of natural 
law, yet remain within the Grotian tradition as they uphold the central idea that collective 
understandings, such as those expressed in international law, can, and indeed do, shape the 
behaviour of states at the international level, as they do individuals at the domestic level. 42 
Although Bull's interpretation of Grotius has come under scrutiny, 43 the focus here is not 
upon the history if ideas that underpin the English School approach, but on the central tenets 
that underpin the concept of international society. 
31 Critics such as Martin Shaw highlight that this state-centric approach overlooks the complexities within states 
regarding the relationship between individuals and/or citizens and states, we Martin Shaw, Global Society and 
International Relations. Sociological Concerts and Political Perspectives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 
chapter five. 
" See Ian Hall, The International Political Thought of Martin Wight (New York: Palgrave, 2006), chapter two. 
40 Martin Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions. p. 14. 
41 This idea is taken from Paul Keal's succinct overview of this debate, see Paul Keal, European Conquest and 
thee$ights of Indigenous Peonies. introduction, esp. pp. 4-5. 
Hedley Bull, 'The Importance of Grotius', in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, (ed. ), 
Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1992). See also, Edward Keene, 
end the Anarchical Society. Grotius. Colonialism and Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). For a legal analysis which rejects the Grotian commitment to natural law yet 
acknowledges the importance of his work, see C. Van Vollenhoven, 'Grotius and the Study of Law', The 
American Journal of International Law (vol. 19, no. 1,1925, pp. 1-11). 
43 Bence Jeffrey, Hugo Grotius in International Thought (Now York: Palgrave, 2006), chapter five. For further 
relevant scrutiny of Bull's position see, John Williams, 'Hedley Bull and Just War: Missed Opportunities and 
Lessons to be Learned', European Journal of International Relations (vol. 16, no. 2,2010, pp. 179 - 196). 
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The idea that a society is constructed at the international level, as it is at the domestic, brings 
us back to the centrality of international legitimacy. ` 4 In appealing to the idea of 
communicative dialogue between states, Linklater also rejects the idea of natural law. Whilst 
states may appeal to such ideas within the deliberative process, it is clear that such ideas in 
themselves are not regarded as legitimate by most contemporary English School scholars. 
Instead, English School scholars focus on the collective understandings that are forged at the 
international level and how these collective understandings facilitate the likelihood of 
international order. This is not to suggest that international legitimacy, acts as a causal effect, 
but through forging international agreements, states increase the likelihood of international 
stability within the anarchical realm 
45 The English School position, therefore, seeks to 
prioritise the value of international order over values such as power (realism) and/or 
humanity (revolutionism). It is for this reason that English School scholars focus on 
standards of legitimacy forged between states as these act to tame the anarchical realm. The 
fear being that just as international relations can progress, they can also regress, and the 
survival of international society requires a consensus being forged over the basic principles of 
international order. ' 
For English School scholars, the existence of order within anarchy demonstrates that states 
engage in civilising processes. 47 It is here that the English School's focus on universal human 
rights and humanitarian intervention is of specific relevance as it is clear that states have 
attempted to incorporate a commitment to international justice into existing understandings of 
international order. Scholars such as R. J. Vincent, Tim Dunne, James Mayall, Nicholas J. 
Wheeler and Robert Jackson have discussed whether it is possible to integrate transnational 
commitments to human rights into the present Westphalian order. As is well documented, 
this has seen English School scholars play a prominent role in the post-Cold War debate over 
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international relations. The reason for this 
perhaps lies with the legacy of Hugo Grotius, for as R. J. Vincent explains, whilst Grotius 
upheld the idea of sovereignty and non-intervention, he accepted that in certain exceptional 
"For an excellent overview see, Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford 
University Press, 1990), chapter one. 
`5 For such analysis see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society,, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
esp. p. 248. This will be returned to in Chapter Four's focus on international legitimacy. 
46 Tim Dunne, `Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist and Coercive interpretations of 
International Society', Millennium (vol. 30, no. 1,2001, pp. 67 - 91). " Such thinking is taken from Andrew Linklater, see Linklater and Suganami, The English School of 
Jn rnational Relations. p. 130. 
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cases, such as state tyranny, intervention could be deemed legitimate. 48 Obviously, as 
Vincent himself accepts, such ideas can predate Grotius. The idea that war can be used as an 
instrument of justice (as suggested by humanitarian intervention advocates) can be traced 
back to the theory of just war presented by St. Augustine and St. Aquinas 49 The debate has 
obvious relevance here as genocide stands as the paradigm example of state tyranny. 
However, it is also important to note that despite the fact that the debate over humanitarian 
intervention has been around for centuries, the array of legal, moral, and political 
perspectives involved dictates that this remains one of the most unresolved and divisive 
debates in IR. 
To put this into context, let us consider Nicholas Wheeler's seminal statement: "humanitarian 
intervention exposes the conflict between order and justice at its starkest". 50 The statement 
underlines Wheeler's belief that - more than any other debate - the debate over humanitarian 
intervention exposes the tensions to be found between order and justice. The reason for this is 
quite straightforward in that the debate draws upon the fundamental principles that are seen to 
underpin both order (state sovereignty) and justice (human rights) in international society. 
Within this context, the humanitarian intervention debate poses the question: can states use 
war as an instrument of justice to alleviate mass suffering in another state (without the target 
state's permission). s' Significantly, the position that one takes within this debate reflects 
one's view of how international society should be ordered. It is for this reason that Wheeler 
rightly claims that the debate over humanitarian intervention exposes the tensions to be found 
between order and justice more than any other debate. Yet to take this logic one step further, 
it seems evident that since genocide prevention is internationally regarded as the benchmark 
example of what constitutes a just cause (within the context of humanitarian intervention), 
4' R, J, Vincent, `Grotius, Human rights, and intervention', in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam 
Roberts, (ed. ), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1992), chapter eight. 
49 For an overview see, Alex, J, Bellamy, Just Wars. From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). Oliver, 0, 
Donovan, Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars. a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. third edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000). Michael 
Walzet, Atvý= about (London: Yale University Press, 2004). James Turner Johnson, Morality and 
ontemporarv Warfare (New York: Yale University Press, 1999). 
Vincent, 'Grotius, Human rights, and Intervention', pp. 246 - 248. s' For an overview of the relevant debates, see Thomas, G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007). Jennifer M. Welsh, (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). D. K, Chatterjee and D. E, Scheid. (eds. ), Ethics and foreign intervention in 
International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). J. L., Holzgrefe, and Robert O. 
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical. Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
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then one could make the case that genocide prevention exposes the conflict between order and 
justice in an even starker light than the broader debate over humanitarian intervention. As will 
be discussed in Chapter Four, genocide holds a relationship with international legitimacy that 
`lesser' human rights violations do not. This needs to be considered carefully when assessing 
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 
Prior to engaging in such analysis, it is important to take stock of the English School pluralist- 
solidarist divide in order to gain a more informed understanding of the divisions that exist in 
the international society approach. At present, pluralists and solidarists remain divided over 
what principles, values, norms and institutions should be prioritised to resolve the tension 
between justice and order international society. The intention here is to gain a more informed 
understanding of this pluralist-solidarist divide prior to engaging in an analysis of norms and 
institutions and their relevance for the study of genocide. 
2.2.1 The pluralist-solidarist divide 
The English School pluralist-solidarist distinction was first raised by Hedley Bull and has 
since been analysed by leading figures in the field such as Linklater, Dunne, and Wheeler. 52 
To return to Linklater's spectrum regarding system (realism), society (rationalism), and 
community (revolutionism), then it is clear that questions arise over where the boundaries 
between these three traditions lie. It is here that the pluralist-solidarist divide is of relevance 
as pluralists have more in common with realists and solidarists have more in common with 
revolutionists. The divide is put into the overarching context of the three traditions in 
Linklater's analysis: 
The underlying idea is that relations between political communities can progress from one in 
which they treat one another as simply a brute fact to take into account in deciding how to act ('a system') towards a more fully societal one in which they share interest in governance 
through common institution (`a society'). Societal relations can in turn develop from a 
minimalist ('pluralist) one, in which the common goal is restricted to the maintenance of the 
orderly coexistence of separate political communities, towards a more advanced ('solidarist) 
one, in which the goal increasingly incorporates the protection of human rights across 
separate communities. Where the evolution progresses to an exceptionally high point where the society can no longer appropriately be said to consist of separate political communities 
which are determined to maintain their sovereignty or independence, the label `community' 
comes to be used. 53 
52 See Hedley Bull, `The Grotian Conception of International Society' in Hebert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations, (eds. ), Diplomatie Investigations Essays in the Theory of International Politics. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966). 
3 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of Inte ational Relatin.. e p. 8. Emphasis added. 
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The statement primarily reiterates the three traditions whilst also going one step further to 
explain just how the English School pluralist-solidarist divide fits into the via media position 
of international society. Essentially, English Schools pluralist believes that societal relations 
can, and indeed have, moved beyond that of an international system, yet question the ability of 
states to progress beyond a minimal level of orderly co-existence. In sharp contrast, English 
School solidarists believe that international society can, and indeed has, entrenched notions of 
international justice within a society of separate communities (this nevertheless remains less 
optimistic than the Kantian view of a community of human kind). 
To illustrate the pluralist-solidarist divide, Fig. 2.1.1, utilises the understanding set out above 
to offer an overview of how the divide fits within the context of three traditions: 
Fig. 2.1.1, an overview of the pluralist solidarist divide within the context of the three traditions. 
System International Society Community 
Realism Rationalism Revolutionism 
Pluralism Solidarism 
Absolute sovereignty Conditional sovereignty 
Non-use of force Humanitarian intervention 
Pessi 
View 
'iistic 
View 
Fig. 2.1.1, simply illustrates the point that English School pluralists are located at the realist 
wing of international society, whereas English School solidarists are located at the 
revolutionary wing of international society. Significantly, English School pluralists and 
solidarists appeal to different norms, values, principles, and institutions when putting forward 
their normative argument of how international society should be ordered. 
Let us first of all take stock of the English School pluralist position. As Nicholas Wheeler 
explains, "Pluralists focus on how the rules of international society provide for an 
international order among states sharing different conceptions of justice". 54 The focus on 
different concepts of justice highlights that English School pluralists are more sceptical than 
54 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 11. 
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English School solidarists. Essentially, English School pluralists believe that in a world full of 
competing legal, moral, and political claims, establishing a universal understanding of justice 
is highly unlikely. In turn they claim that international society should be ordered upon the 
principles of absolute sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force. 55 To go back to the 
idea - that societal relations are shaped by the legitimate standards that states establish through 
communicative dialogue - pluralists tend to champion those understandings that support their 
commitment to sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force. Whilst English School 
solidarists attempt to advocate a more universal understanding of justice, English School 
pluralists share a realist fear that powerful states will exploit their powerful position to impose 
their understanding of justice upon weaker powers. Embodied in this pluralist approach, 
therefore, is a highly normative commitment to upholding these principles of order in an 
anarchical realm plagued by competing moral claims. 
On the contrary, English School solidarists offer a more optimistic approach toward the 
potential for progress in international relations. This is again raised by Wheeler (who is 
himself a solidarist), as he explains that solidarism, "looks to strengthen the legitimacy of 
international society by deepening its commitment to justice. Rather than see order and justice 
locked in perennial tensions, solidarism looks to the possibility of overcoming this conflict by 
developing practices that recognise the mutual inter-dependence between the two claims". 56 
The statement aptly underlines the sentiment to be found in English School solidarism as 
solidarists believe that states can forge common understandings of universal justice which in 
turn help overcome the tension to be found between order and justice at the international level. 
As previously stated, English School solidarists reject the pluralist view that order and justice 
are locked in a state of perennial tension. Despite the fact that there are many competing 
legal, political, and moral claims, solidarists believe that it is still possible to forge global 
standards of legitimacy regarding a commitment to both order and international justice. To go 
back to the idea - that societal relations are shaped by the legitimate standards that states 
establish through communicative dialogue - solidarists tend to champion those understandings 
that support their commitment to conditional sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. This 
illustrates why solidarism reflects a more optimistic view of international relations as 
ss The seminal English School pluralist account remains, Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant. Human 
Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). This will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter Seven. 
Wheeler, Saving Strangeerrs, p. 11. 
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solidarists believe that states can progress beyond levels of minimal co-existence to establish a 
broader commitment to international justice. 
Evidently, the English School should not be considered as a harmonious school of thought. 
There remains substantial division between pluralists and solidarists over the relationship 
between order and justice in international relations. It is here that the crime of genocide raises 
some interesting questions. To consider this further it is important to address the idea of 
norms, values, principles and institutions. Despite the fact such terms are frequently used by 
English School scholars, at times their meaning remains unclear and confused. 57 Clarity is 
therefore important in aiding the objective of introducing the study of genocide into an 
English School framework. Of specific interest here are two terms, norms and institutions. 
The reason for focusing on these two terms is two-fold. Primarily, the vague nature of these 
two terms dictates that they are open to much more interpretation than terms such as value or 
principle. More importantly, alternative IR approaches attribute different meanings to these 
two terms. It is important, therefore, to flesh out exactly what these terms mean from an 
English School perspective in order to illustrate why they hold relevance for the study of 
genocide. 
2.2.2 Norms 
The use of the term norm can be found in a variety of IR traditions which only goes to add to 
the confusion surrounding the term's use. As Robert Jackson explains, for positivists, norms 
simply refer to "reoccurring patterns of behaviour", whereas English School scholars view 
norms as: "a standard of conduct by which to judge the rightness or wrongness, the goodness 
and badness of human activity". " Significantly, the two meanings represent starkly different 
understandings that reflect contrasting IR approaches. Whilst positivists focus on the causal 
power of norms, English School scholars claim that the power of norms comes from their 
perceived moral worth. 59 States forge collective understandings of what constitutes proper 
57 For an overview on the definitional problems surrounding these terms see Buzan, From International to World 
may, pp. 163 - 167. For example, Buzan claims, `The terms `norms', `rules', `values' and `principles' are 
scattered throughout the literature of both regime theory and the English school, yet it is seldom clear what, if 
anything, differentiates them, and in many usages they seem interchangeable", p. 163. ss Robert Jackson, `International Relations as a Craft Discipline', in Cornelia Navari (ed. ), Theorising 
international Society. English School Methods (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), p. 22. 
Traditionally English School scholars have not viewed causal explanations in a favourable light, however, 
there is an increasing number of scholars that seek to explain the causal nature inherent within the traditional 
English School approach, see K. J. Holsti, Theorising the Causes of Order: Hedley Bun's The Anarchical 
Society', in Cornelia Navari, Theorising International Society, chapter six. 
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behaviour which are then expressed formally (legal norms) or more informally (moral 
norms). Accordingly, this is one of the many areas of overlap between the English School 
and constructivism as both schools of thought claim that the behaviour of states are shaped by 
more than conflict and competition alone. 
60 Although norms do not guarantee that states will 
act in a certain manner, English School scholars claim that they do increase the likelihood of 
international order. Through the construction of norms, states establish a `yardstick' by which 
to measure one another's actions. States, in turn, appeal to such understandings when 
attempting to justify their actions, thus norms act to enable, yet also constrain, even the most 
powerful actors in international relations. 
61 Norms therefore, feedback into the central idea 
raised by Linklater, that international society is constructed upon states establishing "global 
standards of legitimate behaviour". 
This focus on norms in the English School has specific relevance for the incorporation of 
genocide into the study of IR. This is perfectly illustrated by the crime of genocide itself. As 
Adam Jones explains, Raphael Lemkin, (the man who invented the word genocide): "is an 
exceptional example of a norm entrepreneur", 
62 which Jones understands to mean: "an 
individual or organisation that sets out to change the behaviour of others". 63 Drawing upon 
Samantha Power's award winning publication A Problem From Hell, M Jones reflects that 
Lernkin became inspired by a radio address made by British Prime minister Winston 
Churchill for the BBC in August 1941. Describing the policy of extermination utilised by the 
Nazis as their armies advanced into Eastern Europe, Churchill claimed, "We are in the 
presence of a crime without a name". 
65 Responding to this statement, Lemkin (who had been 
a student of Philology, Philosophy, and Law), constructed the term genocide by combining 
the Greek genos (meaning race or tribe) and the Latin cide (meaning kill). It was then in 
1944 that the word genocide first appeared in his seminal publication Axis Rule in Occupied 
60 Whilst there is significant overlap between the English school and constructivism, this English School 
approach to norms, differs substantially, from the positivist strand of constructivism. See Christian Reus-Smit, 
`The Constructivist Challenger after September 11', in Bellamy, International Society and its Critics, chapter 
four. For a seminal constructivist analysis see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 
jIthaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), chapter three. 
For such analysis see, Wheeler, Saving Strangers. p. 6. 
62Adam Jones, Genocide. A Comprehensive Introduction (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 8, also, pp. 316 - 320. 
63 Ibid" p. 317. 
d` See Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide. (London: Flamingo, 2003). 
65 Ibid, p. 20. 
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Europe. " Accordingly, Jones claims that Lemkin attempted to fill a void in international 
law. 67 This attempt was successful as within just four years of Lemkin inventing the term, 
the word genocide was codified into international law with Lemkin himself playing a central 
role in forging the consensus needed to establish the 1948 United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention, or UNGC). 
Whilst this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, the point here is that one can 
see how the English School's focus on norms has explicit relevance for the study of genocide. 
It is the act therefore, that international society has recognised as a crime called genocide, 
that this thesis incorporates into the English School's framework. Evidently, the 1948 
Genocide Convention raises many intriguing questions regarding the state of international 
society. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the 1948 Genocide Convention placed a 
conditional limitation on state sovereignty yet states accepted the Genocide Convention. As a 
result, genocide prevention was deemed to constitute rightful conduct from both a legal and 
moral perspective. However, any glance at the historical record since 1948 illustrates that 
states have continually failed to uphold this legal and moral obligation. Although English 
School scholars and constructivists speak of "life cycles" when discussing norms, it seems 
misconceived to think that the "anti-genocide norm", 68 embodied in the Genocide Convention 
has come to an end of its lifecycle. 69 As the three points below demonstrate, the anti-genocide 
norm has continuing relevance: 
1. In the post-Cold War era, the ad hoc tribunals for both Rwanda and Yugoslavia 
invoked the 1948 Genocide Convention and in 1998 genocide was classified as the 
"crime of crimes" by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
2. In 1998, the 1948 legal definition was incorporated directly into the establishment of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
3. In 2005, the Responsibility to Protect reiterated international society's responsibility 
to prevent genocide (see Chapter Six). 
66 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation. na ysis of Government Proposals for 
Redress (New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2005), esp. chapter nine. 
67 Jones, Genocide. A Conmrehensive Introduction. 317. 
This is taken from Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rig. In Theory and Practice (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), p. 251. ' For an analysis on the life cycle of a norm, we Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, `International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change', I=MWiQIW Organization (vol. 52, No. 4,1998, pp. 887-917), p. 895. 
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This chronology of events raises interesting questions regarding i) what is the power of this 
norm, ii) what does this say about the power of norms in general, iii) what is the relationship 
between this norm and international society. In doing so, the anti-genocide norm highlights 
the tension between the realist claim that such moral norms have no real power, and the 
English School claim that such norms enable and constrain power in international relations. 70 
It is here that the idea of institutions comes to the fore as English School scholars recognise 
that whilst norms play an important role in international relations, institutions have a greater 
impact on shaping the behaviour of states in international society. Essentially, institutions 
have more power than norms. 
2.2.3 Institutions 
Again the idea of institutions can be found in a number of IR theories, most notably the 
English School and neo-liberal institutionalism. To gauge the English School perspective let 
us consider the five institutions identified in Hedley Bull's seminal study, The Anarchical 
Society. 7' As Bull explained, his understanding of institution had a specific focus which 
differed from that found in alternative approaches: `By an institution we do not necessarily 
imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices 
shaped towards the realisation of common goals. 9972 Such understanding led Bull to identify 
the five institutions of the balance of power, international law, great power management, war, 
and diplomacy. In doing so, Bull clearly attempted to distinguish between non-administrative 
institutions such as the balance of power and administrative institutions such as the UN. For 
instance, writing at a time when the UN was highly ineffective as an organisation, Bull could 
see that the great powers, rather than the UN, represented a more profound institution in 
international relations. This is not to say that Bull did not believe that organisations such as 
the UN play an important role in international society. Instead, his approach toward such 
organisations was to analyse how administrative institutions, such as NATO, contribute to the 
workings of non-administrative institutions, such as the balance of power. 73 
70 For an excellent analysis on this issue see Ward Thomas, The Ethics of estructio Norms and Force in International Relations (London: Cornell University Press, 2001), chapter one. 7' Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of World Order Politico third edition (London: Palgrave, 2002). 
72 Ibid. p. 74. 
731bid, p. xxxv. 
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The relationship between these two types of institutions is put into a sharper context in Barry 
Buzan's analysis on the `the primary institutions of international society' in which Buzan 
differentiates between primary and secondary institutions. 74 The former aligns itself with 
Bull's understanding of non-administrative institutions, such as the balance of power, whilst 
the latter refers to administrative institutions, such as NATO. This primary/secondary 
division reiterates Bull's focus on how the latter contribute to the workings of the former, for 
instance, how does the UN as a secondary institution contribute to the primary institution of 
international law? Although these primary institutions are not fixed (they may evolve, rise 
and/or decline over long periods of time), for Buzan, they represent: "durable and recognised 
patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate 
societies and embodying a mix of norms, rules and practices". 75 From this perspective, 
primary institutions act as the master concept within the context of norms, values, rules, 
principles, and institutions as the former feed into the establishment and workings of the 
latter. Historically, primary institutions play more of a profound role in shaping societal 
relations. For instance, one would expect the institution of international law to shape the 
behaviour of states more than an informal moral norm that may have arisen over a much 
shorter period of time. 
On analysing the secondary literature on institutions, Buzan claims that one cannot help but 
sense that there needs to be a hierarchy. 76 As Buzan notes, Wight, Bull, Mayall, Holsti, 
James, and Jackson have all identified a different number of primary institutions within their 
own work. 77 Despite the fact that such divergent perspectives may add to any conceptual 
confusion, the central point that Buzan raises is whether certain primary institutions hold 
more power in international society than others? This leads Buzan into deconstructing the 
idea of primary institutions into Masters and Derivatives: 
74 Buzan, From international to World Society. chapter six. 
75 Ibid, p. 181. Buzan provides a list of characteristics to underpin his understanding of norms, see pp. 181-182. 
76 Ibid, p. 182. 
lbid, p. 174. 
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Fig. 2.1.4, Buzan's list of contemporary international institutions. 78 
Primary Institutions Secondary Institutions 
Master Derivative (examples of) 
Sovereignty Non-Intervention UN General Assembly 
International Law Most regimes, ICJ, ICC 
Territorial Diplomacy Boundaries Some PKOs 
Bilateralism Embassies 
Multilateralism United Nations Conferences, 
Most IGO's regimes 
Great Power management Alliances NATO 
Equality of people Human rights UNHCR 
Humanitarian intervention 
Market Trade liberalisation IBRD, IMF, BIS 
Financial liberalisation 
He emonic stability 
Nationalism Self-determination Some PKOs 
Popular sovereignty 
Democracy 
Environmental stewardship Species survival CITES, UNFCCC, 
Climate stability Kyoto Protocol, IPCC, 
Montreal Protocol, etc. 
This overview clearly underlines the difference between primary and secondary institutions 
which will be upheld throughout this thesis. It also highlights the complexity to be found 
within the English School understanding of primary institutions, as Buzan raises the idea of 
Master and Derivative. 
Responding to the obvious question of what relevance does this have for the study of 
genocide, it is clear that the crime of genocide exposes tensions to be found between the 
primary institutions outlined by Buzan. For example, Buzan identifies the Master institution 
of Sovereignty which is `served' by the Derivative institution of non-intervention. On the 
contrary, the Master institution of equality of people is `served' by humanitarian intervention. 
This is of specific relevance when one considers the norm embodied within the 1948 
Genocide Convention, as evidently the legal obligation to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide exposes a clash of institutions between sovereignty and equality of people. For 
English School pluralists, humanitarian intervention should not be considered as an 
institution of international relations it challenges the ordering institution of sovereignty. In 
sharp contrast, English School solidarists claim that international society has increasingly 
7e This is taken directly from Buzan, Ibid, p. 187. 
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moved toward accepting humanitarian intervention as a legitimate practice in contemporary 
international relations. It is here that the idea of legitimate practice or more specifically, 
international legitimacy is of particular relevance as it not only plays an integral role in 
resolving the tension that arises between institutions, but also the tension that arises between 
norms, values, and principles. This in turn has a profound impact upon the pluralist-solidarist 
debate over what type of international society should be favoured? In order to bring this 
section to a close then, it is important to return to the idea of international legitimacy in order 
to establish an understanding of how the pluralist-solidarist debates can be resolved. 
2.2.4 Summary 
As Ian Clark and Tim Dunne have noted, international society should not be anchored upon 
any fixed set of norms, values, principles or institutions: "international society is essentially 
neither pluralist nor solidarist: it is essentially legitimist". 79 Essentially, Dunne and Clark put 
forward the view that international legitimacy underpins the construction of international 
society, and it is this view that is upheld throughout this thesis. 80 For instance, in Buzan's 
analysis of institutions, the author acknowledges that even primary institutions can rise, 
evolve, and decline. From this perspective, the primary institutions identified by Buzan, are 
not fixed, and therefore remain dependent upon something. This something, it is claimed 
here, is international legitimacy and therefore, this thesis upholds the view that international 
society should be anchored upon the central concept of international legitimacy (the meaning 
of the term will be discussed in Chapter Four). As Clark explains, 
We should acknowledge that international society is constituted by its changing principles of 
legitimacy (first order), which express its commitment to be bound: we can then trace its 
evolving (second order) rules, revealed in its practices with regard to sovereignty, non- 
intervention, and non-use of force 81 
The implications of this statement cannot be overstated as Clark puts forward the idea that the 
international society is primarily constructed upon the process and practice of international 
legitimacy. This understanding goes to reaffirm the premise here, that international society 
should not be grounded upon any pre-determined pluralist or solidarist view of what 
79 See Clark's discussion of Dunne, Legitimacy in International Society, p. 23 - 24. '0 Perhaps one could adapt the understanding set out by James Mayall as he claims that international law is the 
"bedrock institution on which international society stands or falls", Mayall, cited in Buzan, From International 
to World Society, p. 170. The premise of Clark's analysis being that international legitimacy, as opposed to 
international law, is the "bedrock institution on which international society stands or falls". 
81 Clark, Leggy in International Society p. 24. 
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institutions, norms, values, and principles should be prioritised in international society. 
These are second order rules that remain dependent upon the first order principle of 
international legitimacy. When one comes to answer the question then of what type of 
international society, it is imperative that one engages in an understanding of international 
legitimacy, and how this shapes international society's commitment to be bound by any set of 
norms, values, principles and institutions 
It is with such understanding in mind that this thesis explores the relationship between 
genocide and international legitimacy in chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven. In doing so, it 
attempts to bring the study of genocide into IR, via the English School, with a specific focus 
on international legitimacy. The pluralist-solidarist divide therefore has significant relevance 
for trying to understand the problems facing international society in any attempt to put the 
theory of genocide prevention into practice. Having set out an understanding of the English 
School debates in international society, this chapter now turns its attention to the final 
question: how should international society be studied? 
2.3 Methodological considerations 
The English School's commitment to theoretical pluralism outlined above (see section 2.2), 
raises the question of whether the idea of international society should be prioritised over that 
of international system and international community. This brings in the secondary, yet 
equally important question, of whether or not, the interpretivist approach that is commonly 
associated with the study of international society should also be prioritised over that of 
alternative methodological approaches utilised in the study of realism or revolutionism. 82 
This section will therefore engage in this debate as it attempts to justify this thesis's position 
that the concept of international society, and the interpretivist methodology aligned with it, 
should be prioritised in the English School approach. 
As is well documented, the methodological questions facing the English School are made 
more challenging by the fact that seminal English School scholars, such as Wight and Bull, 
tended not to engage in any in-depth methodological analysis. 83 This has left critics outside 
the English School somewhat struck by its methodological ambivalence. Putting this into 
context, leading constructivist, Martha Finnemore, claimed: "simply figuring what its 
92 For a brief analysis see Dunne, Inventing International Society pp. 6- 12. 83 For an overview see Navari, Theorising International Society, introduction. 
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methods are is a challenge". 84 Responding to such criticism, 2009 saw English School 
scholars come together to establish the first real comprehensive collection of essays 
addressing this problem, Theorising International Society, English School Methods. 85 This 
provided a notable follow up to the 2005 publication International Society and its Critics 
which, along with a series of other key texts, demonstrates that English School scholars are 
attempting to address the intellectual deficits to be found within the English School 
approach. 86 Whilst the contemporary nature of such on-going debates provides a problematic 
starting point for inquiry, the focus here is on the central question: how should we study 
international relations from an English School perspective? 
Let us first of all pause to consider the question of methodological pluralism. Notably, 
Linklater associated the three traditions of Martin Wight with three different methodologies: 
realism with positivism, rationalism with interpretivism, and revolutionism with critical 
theory. 87 In doing so Linklater formulated a framework for the juxtaposition of theoretical 
pluralism with methodological pluralism. Again, such an overview can cause confusion 
rather than clarity to those less familiar with the English School. As a result, in Fig 3.3.1, I 
attempt to provide an overview of Linklater's juxtaposition. 
Fig. 3.3.1, an overview of the relationship between methodological and theoretical pluralism. 
International System 
Realism 
Positivism 
International Society 
Rationalism 
Interpretivism 
International Community 
Revolutionism 
Critical theory 
In relation to the question of how we should study IR from an English School perspective, 
Fig 3.3.1, illustrates how the commitment to theoretical pluralism leads into complex debates 
84 Cited in Linklater and Suganami, The English School, p. 79. 
85 Cornelia Navari, Theorising International Society, English School Methods (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 
2009). 
86 See Alex J. Bellamy, (ed. ), International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Also, Andrew, Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations, A Contemporary 
Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
87 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism (London: Macmillan, 1990), chapter one. 
47 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
over methodological, ontological, and epistemological pluralism. Primarily, the debate over 
methodological pluralism is quite straight forward in that if we are to uphold a three way 
conversation between the three traditions, then one has to be open to engaging with 
alternative research methods (though the relationship between Kant and critical theory 
remains problematic"). However, the more pressing question is whether a commitment to 
theoretical pluralism entails a commitment to ontological and epistemological pluralism as 
well? 
It is here that Richard Little's focus on `The English School's Contribution to the Study of 
International Relations' is of particular relevance. Significantly, Little expands on the 
methodological pluralism set out by Andrew Linklater to advocate the rather more radical 
position of methodological and ontological pluralism. 
89 In contrast to the mainstream 
position upheld by English School scholars, Little claims that the concepts of system, society, 
and community should be understood as having equal status within English School 
theorising. By this he means that the idea of an international society should not be given 
priority over the idea of an international system or an international community. Furthermore, 
this leads Little to reject the idea the rationalist tradition should be viewed as a via media 
position between that of realism and revolutionism. Instead, Little claims that the natural 
orientation of the English School is one of methodological and ontological pluralism: "the 
school, from an early stage, has been committed to developing a pluralist approach to the 
subject expressed in both methodological and ontological terms". 90 
To address this understanding, let us first consider the point that the three traditions should be 
understood as having an equal status within English School inquiry. Notably, Linklater, 
whose original work forms the basis of Little's analysis, refutes the claim that English School 
scholars should understand international society as one of three dimensions of study. 91 On 
the contrary, Linklater claims that "explaining international society is its [the English 
School's] central purpose, and its observations about the dimensions of world politics which 
ß8 This draws us back to the point that the relationship between international society and international 
community and/or world society is under-theorised. In relation to this point, Barry Buzan noted, "the 
conjunction of world society, revolutionism and Kant rings several alarm bells", From international to World 
Society p. 27. 
0 Richard Little, `The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', European Journal 
of International Relations (vol. 6, no. 3,2000, pp. 395-422). 
Ibid, p. 395. Notably Buzan claims that Little's idea is promising yet cannot understand why one cannot study 
each tradition using alternative method, see Buzan, From International to World Society, pp. 23 - 24. 91 Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, p. 119. 
48 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
are central to Hobbesian and Kantian approaches must be viewed in this light". 92 The 
statement provides much needed clarity as it demonstrates that in focusing purely upon 
international society, one does not necessarily have to sacrifice one's commitment to 
theoretical pluralism. Essentially, English School scholars draw insight from the traditions of 
realism and revolutionism but utilise this insight to further their understanding of 
international society and how it relates to both the international system and international 
community. To return to the idea of a three way conversation, one does not have to give 
equal weight to all of the claims made in a conversation. Whilst Little is perfectly entitled to 
suggest that system, society, and community should be understood in equal terms, his claim 
that this is how the founding fathers of the English School envisaged English School inquiry 
is misconceived. 
This is even more explicit as Little advocates a commitment to ontological pluralism. As 
Cornelia Navari explains, "A plurality of methods does not imply a plurality of ontologies, 
much less epistemologies. So far as the English school is concerned, not everything goes". 93 
The point is that even within the context of theoretical pluralism, there remain limits. 
Methodological pluralism does not entail ontological and epistemological pluralism. To use 
Marsh and Furlong's phrase, one's ontological and epistemological foundation is "a skin not a 
sweater". 94 From this perspective, Little's attempt to advocate ontological pluralism 
represents a methodological step too far as scholars should not change their ontological and 
epistemological foundation at will. Although it is somewhat unclear in Little's analysis as to 
whether each ontological unit (system, society, community) can be studied utilising different 
methods, the key point here is that one cannot simply alter their ontological position when 
adopting an alternative research method. To put this into context let us re-engage with 
Dunne's claim that the English School represents a conversation between three schools of 
thought. Quite simply, I am willing to listen to realists and I accept that they may provide 
insightful views but I do not accept the foundational claims made by realists. If I did accept 
such foundational claims, then I would be accepting that they had provided me with the truth, 
which I believe to be unobtainable within the study of societal relations. It is imperative, 
92 ibid. 
93 Navari, Theorising International Society. p. 5 
94 David Marsh and Paul Furlong, `A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science' in 
David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds. ), yº and Methods in tiolitical Science. second edition (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
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therefore, that one upholds the central tenets of one's methodological approach when 
engaging in theoretical pluralism. Again, it is important to stress that Little has the right to 
make such a claim, yet it is evident that such understanding does not represent the work of 
Wight, or Bull, or the `classical approach' that this analysis now turns its attention to. 
2.3.1 Genocide and the `classical approach' 
To relate this debate back to the question of how we should study IR from an English School 
perspective, this thesis prioritises the idea of international society and the interpretivist 
approach that is traditionally aligned with it. From an English School perspective this 
tradition is indebted to the classical approach first outlined by Hedley Bull who remained 
heavily sceptical toward the idea that human relations could be studied in a scientific way. 95 
Unlike Wight, Bull was willing to engage in a conversation with the `science' embodied in 
the Behaviouralist approach that was prominent at the time. However, as Bull states, he only 
did this so that he could "turn on them and slaughter them in an academic Massacre of 
Glencoe". 6 The statement explicitly underlines the anti-scientific sentiment expressed in 
Bull's approach to the study of IR. The classical approach, therefore, that Bull advocated 
embodied a clear interpretivist commitment to understanding (Verstehen) as opposed to 
causal explanation (Erklaren). 97 As a result, the classical approach helps serve the objective 
of this thesis as this work sets out an understanding of how genocide impacts on international 
society. 
Addressing the Wight-Bull axis to be found in the English School study of IR, Robert 
Jackson explains the foundations of this classical approach: "What we are concerned with in 
the English School approach is not technical facts but human relations, and human relations 
understood in terms of normative standards. Inquiry into world politics is inseparable from 
normative inquiry. I refer to this as the classical approach, following Hedley Bull. s98 The 
statement captures the anti-positivist ethic found within the classical approach as the English 
School never set out to uphold a scientific form of inquiry. One only has to note the title of 
Jackson's analysis: `International Relations as a Craft Discipline', to understand that 
91 Hedley Bull, `International theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', World Politics (vol. 18, no. 3,1966, 
pp. 361-377). 
"This is taken from Hedley Bull's introduction in Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions, p. xi. 97 For a related IR perspective see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Ea 'n; a and Understanding International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). For a more research specific account see Alan Bryman, Social 
Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
98 Jackson, `International Relations as a Craft Discipline', p. 21. 
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advocates of the classical approach do not believe that human relations can be studied in a 
scientific way. For example, a central element in understanding and defining genocide is that 
of "intent". Essentially, genocide scholars try and establish an understanding of the 
perpetrators intentions when defining whether genocide has or has not been committed (see 
Chapter Three). To claim that such a question can be answered utilising scientific methods 
seems grossly misconceived for it is evident that a perpetrator's physiological state of mind 
cannot be measured in a scientific manner. Yet at the same time, just because we cannot 
make a scientific measure of "intent", does not mean that we cannot use our capacity for 
judgement in attempting to establish whether a perpetrator intended to destroy a group of 
people or not. The capacity for judgment, therefore, is central within both the study of 
genocide and the English School approach. 99 
This common ground is also apparent when one considers the interdisciplinary nature of both 
genocide studies and the English School approach. From an English School perspective, the 
interdisciplinary nature of IR was explicit in Martin Wight's seminal paper: `Why is there no 
International Theory? ' As Hedley Bull points out, this paper was originally entitled: `Why is 
there no body of international theory? "0° In highlighting the difference, Bull upholds Brian 
Porter's original interpretation: "What Wight meant was that the student will not find the 
history of thought about International Relations in ready-made and accessible form: the 
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have to be put together". '°' Accordingly, Wight's intention was 
to stress the relationship between International Relations Theory and Political Theory in order 
to escape the ahistorical dominance of positivism. Whilst realists strive to uphold a scientific 
methodology, the English School scholar, in this classical mould, tends to view international 
relations as a jigsaw with different disciplines providing different pieces of information. This 
jigsaw of information was unmistakable as Wight stressed the importance of History, 
International Law, Philosophy, Political theory and Literature when attempting to understand 
" For a relevant analysis, see Linklater and Suganami, The English School of International Relations, pp. 97 - 
108. For a relevant analysis which expands the debate beyond the central concern here into the relationship 
between theory and practice, see Richard Shapcott, IR as a 'Practical Philosophy': Defining the 'Classical 
Ah', British Journal of International Politics (vol. 6. no. 3,2004, pp. 271- 291). 
' Hedley Bull's introduction in Martin Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions. p. xxi. 
ß01 Ibid. 
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the relations between states at the international level. 102 This became a central component of 
Bull's `classical approach' as he drew upon philosophy, history, and law. 103 
The interdisciplinary nature of this classical approach is extremely compatible with the study 
of genocide. Just as one of the English School's founding fathers (Martin Wight) stressed the 
need for international disciplinary research into international relations, it was Raphael 
Lernkin, "the father of genocide research", 104 who is noted to have "stressed the 
interdisciplinary concepts of psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics when he 
taught on genocide". 105 Like Wight, Lemkin upheld an interdisciplinary approach toward his 
subject matter. It would seem that both scholars believed that one has to put as many of the 
interdisciplinary jigsaw pieces together, as one can, in order to gain a more informed 
understanding of either international relations or genocide. However, as one would expect, 
the broad scope of such research can be highly problematic. Putting this issue within the 
context of genocide studies, Adam Jones explains that the proliferation of academic 
production, with schools and sub-schools, has essentially obliterated the idea of the 
"renaissance" man which in turn hinders such interdisciplinary research. 106 With this in 
mind, it is imperative that one sets clear research parameters when attempting such 
interdisciplinary inquiry and ultimately accepts one's research limitations. To be clear, the 
focus of this thesis is very specific: understanding the impact of genocide upon the ordering 
structure of international society. 
2.3.2 Conclusion 
Hopefully, the above analysis of the three traditions, theoretical pluralism, and 
methodological considerations, provides some insight into how the study of genocide can be 
brought into the discipline of IR. To put this into context, let us consider Kenneth J. 
Campbell's aforementioned study of genocide from an IR perspective. Intriguingly, 
Campbell states that his theoretical framework is a "hybrid of realism, neo-liberal 
102 For an insightful analysis see, Hall, The International Thought of Martin Wigs esp. pp - 88 - 97. 103 Bull, `International theory: the Case for a Classical Approach', p. 361. 104 This label is taken from an in-depth analysis of Lemkin see, Dominik J. Schaller and Juergen Zimmerrer, 
(eds. ), `Raphael Lemkin: the'Founder of the Genocide Convention' as a Historian of Mass Violence', Journal of Genocide Research. special issue (vol. 7, No. 4,2005). 
11. E is taken form Tanya Elder's primary research conducted upon Raphael Leinkin, see Tanya Elder. 'What 
you see before your eyes: documenting Raphael Lemkin's life by exploring his archival papers 1990-1959'. Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 7, no. 4,2005, pp. 25 - 55), p. 490. Notably, Lemkin was a lawyer and 
arguably a historian, so obviously felt no such need to include these fields of study on his list. ' Jones, Genocide. A Comprehensive Introduction, p, xxiii. 
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institutionalism, and social constructivism". 107 In adopting this so-called hybrid position, 
Campbell seemingly commits himself to a theoretically pluralistic approach. To go back to 
the idea of a conversation, it seems his intention is to engage in a three way conversation 
between realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. However, the 
problem is that Campbell makes no real attempt to justify this approach, and therefore does 
not address the implications that such an approach has upon the knowledge claims 
subsequently made. At no point are the methodological, ontological, and epistemological 
implications of such an approach given any consideration. This chapter, therefore, has 
addressed certain key aspects that illustrate the potential compatibility for studying genocide 
from an English School perspective. This helps shed light on how this thesis aims to bring 
genocide into the study of IR, via the English School. In doing so, it lays the foundations for 
the chapters that follow. 
Overall, it is clear that to understand genocide within the context of international relations, 
one has to have an understanding, not just of genocide, but also of international relations. 
However, the task of bringing genocide into an IR framework is not as straightforward as it 
may first seem. As the three traditions highlight, each IR theory carries with it certain 
assumptions that shape one's understanding of genocide. At present, English School scholars 
have utilised the approach outlined throughout this chapter to address concepts such as war, 
diplomacy, human rights, and humanitarian intervention within an overarching framework of 
order and justice. The intention therefore is to apply the English School approach to the 
study of genocide in order to explore the relationship between genocide, justice, and order. 
The reason being, that this allows us to gain a more informed understanding of how genocide 
impacts upon the ordering structure of international relations. The intent therefore, to study 
genocide from an English School perspective, leads us naturally into the pressing question: 
what is genocide? 
107 Campbell, Genocide and The Global Village. p. 5. 
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3 Words Matter: Genocide and the Definitional Debate 
"Few ideas are as important, but in few cases are the meaning and relevance of a key idea less clearly agreed", 
Martin Shaw. ' 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, the intention of this thesis is to bring the study of 
genocide into IR via the English School in order to understand the impact of genocide on 
international relations. The question of what genocide is therefore naturally arises for as 
Kenneth J. Campbell suggested in Chapter One, IR scholars are not necessarily well versed in 
this definitional debate. The debate is not just important for identifying what genocide is, but 
also identifying what genocide is not. Problematically, genocide is now commonly 
associated with a wide range of non-genocidal related issues such as H. I. V., environmental 
degradation, and slavery. This has created a bizarre reality in which, as Helen Fein explains, 
"Virtually everything but genocide as Raphael Lemkin first defined it - "the destruction of a 
nation of ethnic group" - is called genocide". 
2 For example, Michael Freeman states, "a 
conservative, British journalist, described the budgetary proposals of the Labour Party in 
1992 as "fiscal genocide", by which he meant that the proposed tax rates were higher than he 
thought desirable". 3 Within such a context, one cannot even attempt to justify using the term 
genocide; however, one can understand why it was used, as its use implies that something is 
fundamentally wrong. In explaining such misuse, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn explain 
that language is used to convey feelings as well as information. 4 It would seem that genocide 
embodies an element of `shock and awe' and is therefore used to convey emotionally charged 
feelings in relation to a whole host of perceived injustices. The need for clarity is therefore 
essential as the boundaries between unintentional misuse and intentional abuse of the term 
genocide are becoming increasingly blurred. 
1 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 3. 2 Helen Fein, `Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity and War Crimes: The Care for Discrimination', in George J., 
Andreopoulos, (ed. ), Genocide. Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, pp. 95 - 107), p. 95. 3 Michael Freeman, `Never Again! Genocide and the International Community', CEIC PAPELES (vol. 1, March 
2007, pp 1-16), p. 2. Available at 
httn: //www ceic ehu es/y285-content/fr/contenidos/no icia/coic noticias 07/es notici/adjuntos/freeman27 gdf Accessed 22/09/07. 
4 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide Analyses and Case Studies (London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
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Yet as Martin Shaw implies in his statement above, with regard to the definition of genocide, 
there remains very little common ground amongst genocide scholars that can provide the 
clarity needed. In reality, the term's very existence was called into question within two years 
of the term genocide being coined by Raphael Lemkin. As Samantha Power explains, in 
1946 a New York Times reporter challenged Lemkin: "What good will it do to write mass 
murder down as a crime; will a piece of paper stop a new Hitler or Stalin? " To which Lemkin 
replied, "Only man has law. Law must be built, do you understand me? You must build the 
law! " 5 Whether right or wrong, the law was built and on the 9th December 1948 the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was 
endorsed. 6 It is this legal definition however that remains the source of contention. Since the 
discipline of genocide studies began to flourish in the 1960s and 1970s scholars have 
increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the legal definition on the grounds that it embodies 
certain moral deficiencies that need to be rectified. 7 This has essentially divided genocide 
scholars from across the interdisciplinary spectrum into two camps, those that uphold the 
legal definition and those that reject it. Significantly, the debate has real-life implications as 
scholars remain divided over whether events such as those in Darfur (2003 - present day) 
constitute genocide? To go back to the understanding set out in Chapter One, such a lack of 
clarity may help explain why policymakers often view genocide as just another humanitarian 
crisis. 8 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore straightforward in that it highlights the definitional 
debates to be found within the discourse. At present there is no universally accepted 
definition of genocide because there remains no universally accepted understanding of 
genocide. This central problem provides the context for this chapter, which will set out the 
Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide (London: Flamingo, 2003). p. 55. 
Whilst Power devotes four chapters to Raphael Lemkin, a more detailed accomplished overview has since been 
published, see John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (New York: 
Palgrave, 2008). 
6 The 1948 Genocide Convention and a host of related material can be found at, Prevent Genocide International, 
`Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide', 
h : //www. reventgenocide. ora/law/convention/text. htm Accessed 07/01/08. 
For an overview on the origins of the discipline we, Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, (ed. ), The Spectre of 
Genocide Mass Murder in a Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 
one, esp. pp. 5-9. George J., Andreopoulos, (ed. ), Genocide. Conceptual and Historical Dimensions. 
History introduction. Chalk and Jonassohn also illustrate this point well within their literature review, see The 
and Sociology of Genocide. chapter one. It should be noted that scholarly engagement with the definition of 
genocide somewhat dwindled in the 1990s, we, Shaw, What is Genocide? p. 8. 
This point is made explicit within Gerard Prunier's analysis of Darfur, see Pruner, Darfur. The Ambiguous 
Gemide (London: Hurst & Company, 2005). p. 124. 
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understanding embodied within the legal definition of genocide. It will go onto engage in a 
more specific analysis of four definitional themes to be found within the literature: i) intent, 
ii) destroy, iii) in whole or in part and iv) group identity. Whilst this author's initial intention 
was to provide a critical overview of the definitional debates - rather than present my own 
definition - the conclusion draws upon the understanding set out in each of these debates in 
order to put forward my own definition of genocide. This, of course, reflects the fact that I 
do not believe that the legal definition offers an accurate understanding of genocide. With 
this in mind, let us first of all turn our attention to the legal definition. 
3.1 The legal definition 
To understand the legal definition of genocide, one has to be aware of the drafting process 
that underpinned the 1948 Genocide Convention. The legal definition itself is often 
presented as a clear and concise development, yet in reality the legal draft became somewhat 
of a political `hot potato' as the relevant actors involved debated which UN body would 
oversee the drafting procedure. 9 
The drafting process took just under two years from the initial 1946 General Assembly 
Resolution 96 (I) on December 11`h 1946 to the final endorsement of the UN Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9th 1948.10 It is here 
that political complexities arise. For instance, in early 1947, the UN Secretary-General 
passed the issue of drafting the legal definition of genocide on to the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), who then passed it back to the Secretary-General. The Secretary- 
General then gauged the considerations of John Humphrey (Director of the Division of 
Human Rights) Professor Giraud (Chief of Research Section of Division of Human Rights), 
and Mr Klavia (representing the UN Legal Department), who themselves consulted three 
experts (including Raphael Lemkin). It was then that the Secretary-General produced an 
eighty-five page Secretariat draft that brought all these considerations together. " Since UN 
9 William Schabas spends sixty pages detailing this drafting process, see Genocide In International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). p. 51 - 101. See also, Matthew Lippman, `A Road Map to the 1948 Genocide Convention', Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 4, no. 2,2002, pp. 177 - 195). Pieter Nicolaas Drost, Genocide. United Nations Legislation on hilffnational Criminal Law (Leyden: Sythoff, 1959). 
10 This overview draws upon primary research carried out at the United Nations Archive (8s' June -11s' June 2009). With regard to the drafting of the 1948 Genocide Convention, much of it can be found on-line and can be accessed via the United Nations Bibliographic System. There have also been a number of publications on this drafting process reflecting alternative interdisciplinary perspectives. " UN Doc. E/447. The other two experts consulted were Professor Donnedisu de Vabres (Paris Faculty of Law) and Professor Pelle (President of the international Association of Penal Law). 
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member states had not commented on the draft, the Chairman of the Committee on the 
Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification was unable to express any 
opinion on the matter. As a result, on the 6t' August 1947, the ECOSOC (at its fifth session) 
instructed the Secretary-General to obtain member state observations. States responded in an 
ad hoc manner, with some states providing detailed reports and some providing no report at 
all. 12 It was around this time that a sense of urgency emerged. Following the 
recommendation of the Sixth Committee's sub-committee (that the ECOSOC oversee the 
drafting process), the General Assembly, in November 1947, requested that the ECOSOC 
continue the work they had begun without waiting for further member state input . 
13 
Ironically then, after nearly a year, the draft was passed back to the ECOSOC who then set up 
an ad hoc drafting committee. The committee drafted a legal convention which was 
subsequently reviewed by the Sixth Committee and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 
1949. In all then, the word genocide had only been in existence for four years, yet nearly two 
of them had been spent drafting what was to become the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
Amidst this confusion, political and economic problems arose. For example, the UN 
Secretary-General proposed that eight consultants spend ten days analysing the legal 
definition which in turn would cost an estimated $6,400 that needed to be raised. 14 Evidently, 
it was clear that the necessary budget requirements had not been considered which hindered 
the progress made in this time period. Moreover, political problems arose as states accused 
one another of committing genocide (within this two year time span), even though the 
concept itself had not been finalised. For example, in January 1948, the Pakistani 
government claimed that the state of India had carried out an "extensive campaign of 
`genocide"' directed against the Muslim population of East Punjab, Delhi, Ajmer (as well as 
a number of other places), in June 1947.15 Whilst the focus here is not on assessing the 
'2 For example the US submitted a detailed twenty-two page report) on the Secretariat proposal (30/09/ 1947). 
See UN Doc. A/401/Add. 2. 
" UN Doc. EICNAA6/ADD, I Available at 
bo: //daccess-dds-ny. un. org/d g&ag? OGMGEN/GL9/000/64/PDF/GL900064.12df? OnenElement 
Accessed/09/06/09. 
14 United Nations Archives. S-0991-0008-14. Economic and Social Council. Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. (11/02/1948). See note 30 regarding budget requirements. 15 United Nations Archives. S-0991-0008-14. Economic and Social Council Secretariat. Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide. Extract From Government of Pakistan's Document II Submitted to the Security 
Council. (15/01/ 1948). In further correspondence, the Pakistan government claimed that over one million 
Muslims had been killed in less than six months. See United Nations Archives. S-0991-0008-14. Economic 
and Social Council Secretariat - genocide. Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations. (04/02/1948). 
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validity of such claims, such economic and political issues highlight that the drafting 
procedure was not a neat little step-by-step process. This is an important point to consider 
when assessing the legitimacy of the final definition. 
The pressing question, therefore, remains what is the legal definition of genocide? Whilst 
Article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention sets out the legal obligation to prevent genocide 
(see Chapter Five), Article 11 defines the crime itself. 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the grou6p; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. ' 
To offer a brief overview of the UN Genocide Convention (UNGC) definition, if one or more 
of the acts listed (a - e) are carried out with an intent to destroy one of the protected groups, 
either in whole or in part, then this constitutes genocide. The acts (a) - (e) are subordinate to 
the intent to destroy a group. Intent, therefore, stands as the primary element which 
differentiates the crime of genocide from other crimes. For example, if someone killed 
members of one of the protected groups then this would constitute murder, or mass murder, 
but if it could be proven that the murder was carried out within the context of a broader intent 
to destroy the group in whole or in part, then this would constitute genocide. It is, therefore, 
at least at first glance, quite precise and straightforward. However, of central concern here is 
the wording of the UNGC definition and the implications that this holds for one's 
understanding of genocide. For example, the list of protected groups within the UNGC 
definition does not cover political groups and, therefore, if a political group was completely 
destroyed, then this would not constitute genocide. From this perspective, the legal definition 
sets extremely narrow definitional parameters regarding group identity. On the other hand, 
the list of acts includes forcibly transferring children which implies that genocide can be 
committed without any killing involved. From this perspective, the definition sets extremely 
broad definitional parameters regarding how a group can be destroyed. From this perspective, 
16 Article 11 of `The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide', Available at U: //www unhcbr ch/htmVmenu3/b/paenoci htm Accessed 12/11/07. 
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one can begin to see how debates arise out of pivotal issues such as intent and group identity, 
which will be discussed below. 
Despite such fundamental problems to be found in the legal definition of genocide, the 
majority of genocide scholars utilise the UNGC either implicitly or explicitly. The focus here 
is upon those that utilise it explicitly, in that they defend its use. Their stance is neatly 
summed up by Jacques Semelin: "Their position is fairly coherent, noting that scholars are 
unable to agree on a common definition of genocide, they feel justified in sticking to its legal 
definition". 17 The statement underpins the common ground to be found within what Semelin 
labels as the "UN school". 18 Advocates of this approach accept that the legal definition has its 
weaknesses yet continue to use the legal definition because it reflects an established 
international consensus. With no collective agreement on what should replace the 1948 legal 
definition, the UNGC offers much needed definitional guidance. This is put into context by 
Eric Weitz, whose use of the legal is justified on the following grounds: "Through its focus on 
intentionality, the fate of a defined population group, and physical annihilation, the Genocide 
Convention, despite its weaknesses, provides us with a fruitful working definition that can 
guide the study of past regimes and events". 19 The statement underpins the "UN school" 
defence of the legal definition from a social science perspective. Advocates claim that the 
legal definition embodies the central tenets needed to understand genocide such as intent, 
group identity, and methods of destruction. Despite its limitations, advocates claim that its 
usefulness lies in the fact that it provides common ground whereas there is no such common 
ground amongst those who reject the UNGC definition. 
Furthermore, the 1948 Genocide Convention has legal utility which should not be overlooked, 
even by those that reject the definition found within the Genocide Convention. This point is 
raised in William Schabas's pioneering work entitled Genocide in International Law. 20 As 
Schabas explains: "Most academic research on the Genocide Convention has been undertaken 
17 Jacques Semelin, pyfjf and Dest= the Political uses of Massacre and Genocide translated from the French 
by Cynthia Schoch (London: Hurst and Thompson, 2007), p. 321. 
Ibid. 
19 Eric D. Weitz, A Q100 of Genocide. Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), p. 10. 
m William A. Schabas, Genocide In International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The 
text has since been praised by Daryl Mundis (Senior Trial Attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Former Yugoslavia) as "the first treatise on the international law of genocide in more than two decades". Daryl 
A. Mundis', book review of Schabas' 'Genocide in International Law'. Available at 
ba; //www. ess. uwe. ac. uk/GENOCIDE/reviewsaenocide4. htm Accessed 26/11/2007. 
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by historians and philosophers. They have frequent ventured onto judicial terrain, not so 
much to interpret the instrument and to wrestle with legal intricacies of the definition as to 
express frustration with its limitations". 
21 Understandably, Schabas highlights that 
philosophical and historical inquiry into the UNGC definition often fails to come to terms 
with the legal utility of the Genocide Convention itself. It is the practical value therefore of 
the UNGC which drives Schabas to accept that the legal definition is both "adequate and 
appropriate". 22 From a legal perspective, its strength lies in the fact that it provides 
international lawyers with a matter-of-fact framework that can be implemented to prosecute 
those suspected of committing genocide. 23 Yet whilst one should not overlook the legal 
utility of the Genocide Convention, this in itself is not enough to justify the "UN school" 
approach amongst social scientists for as Frank Chalk correctly observes, "international 
lawyers and scholars in the social sciences have their own legitimate set of objectives when 
laying out the boundaries of the subject". 24 This statement aptly captures the interdisciplinary 
complexity involved within the definitional debate, as scholars in different fields have 
different, yet equally legitimate needs. For example, lawyers may claim that if a state 
systematically destroys a group not identified in the Genocide Convention then this still 
constitutes a "crime against humanity" and can be enacted upon accordingly. 25 Nonetheless, 
as Chapter One stated, the idea of a "crime against humanity" is built upon the assumption 
that humanity exists. It is questionable, therefore, whether social scientists should accept such 
categories as the basis of non-legal enquiry. 
To put this into context let us consider the work of aforementioned IR scholar Kenneth J. 
Campbell who actually goes much further than Weitz in his criticism of the UNGC definition, 
yet ultimately upholds the definition because of its legal usefulness. Addressing the fact that 
the Genocide Convention omits political groups within its definition of group identity, 
Campbell highlights that the Soviet Union representative at the time blocked any attempt to 
include political groups as they feared that Soviet leaders could become the target of criminal 
21 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, p. 7. 
22 Ibid, p. 9. 
23 Ibid, p. 4. 
u Frank Chalk, `Redefining Genocide', in George J. Andreopoulos (ed. ), Genocide Conceptual and Historical 
Dimensions. p. 47. 
For a relevant analysis see, Larry May. Crimes Against Humanity A Normative Account (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), esp., `Identifying International Crimes', pp. 5-8. 
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prosecution for their liquidation of the Kulaks. 26 Intriguingly, this leads Campbell to 
conclude that "the legal definition is therefore the product of political compromise, as well as 
justice and morality". 27 The important point to consider is that despite acknowledging that the 
final draft represents a compromise in justice and morality, Campbell utilises the legal 
definition because: "International law offers the one authoritative source for legitimate 
collective action". 28 The logic embodied within Campbell's approach perfectly illustrates the 
division to be found between those that uphold the legal definition and those that reject it. On 
the one hand, Campbell acknowledges the moral deficiency of the legal definition yet chooses 
to uphold this definition because of its legal utility. From this perspective, the legal utility of 
the UNGC is prioritised over all other concerns. Yet it is precisely the moral deficiency of the 
legal definition that leads many scholars to reject it. Ultimately, the analysis presented within 
this chapter concurs with the latter camp. 
As Chapter Four will discuss, legitimacy should not be seen as synonymous with law. If the 
case can be made therefore, that the UNGC definition is unjust and/or immoral (as Campbell 
states), then this opens the door for scholars to question the legitimacy of the legal definition 
on moral grounds. Moreover, it is important to stress here that if scholars reject the legal 
definition of genocide this does not mean that they reject the 1948 Genocide Convention 
itself, but the definition within it. By this I mean that scholars can reject Article II (outlined 
above) which defines genocide in the hope that a more informed definition can be 
constructed, yet this does not mean that scholars are at the same time rejecting the legal 
obligation to prevent genocide as set out in Article I. Quite obviously, international society's 
obligation to prevent and prosecute the crime of genocide stems from its definition of 
genocide, yet at the same time, those that reject the legal definition do not wish to hinder the 
prevention and punishment of genocide in the meantime. They simply hope that a more 
informed understanding . of genocide can 
be constructed through academic dialogue, which 
will ultimately help to provide a more useful legal framework. With this in mind, this chapter 
will now shift its focus to a more in-depth analysis of central terminology debates regarding 
26 Kenneth J. Campbell, Genocide and the Global Village (New York: Palgrave, 2001). p. 21. 
27 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p33. 
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"intent", "destroy", "in whole or in part", and "group identity", to put forward the case that 
the legal definition of genocide should be re-defined. 29 
3.2 The debate over "intent" 
Within the context of the UNGC definition the list of crimes (a - e) are themselves crimes. 
However, in order to constitute the crime of genocide it has to be proven that these crimes 
were conducted with "intent". The legal definition therefore is dependent upon international 
society's ability to establish "intent". This was put into explicit context within the debate 
over whether genocide had occurred in Darfur. After three months researching the atrocities 
in Darfur, in January 2005, the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
concluded that whilst the "crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed 
in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide", the crimes could not be classed 
as genocide because it could not be proven that the Government of Sudan (GoS) possessed a 
"genocidal intent". 30 The conclusion classically illustrated the UNGC's dependency upon a 
term that is extremely difficult to establish: how can we prove the intentions of individuals? 
This leads us onto the secondary problem of what "intent" actually means? At the root of this 
problem lies the seemingly simplistic relationship between "intent" and motive. Whilst the 
legal definition does not concern itself with motive, some scholars establish a motive-based 
understanding of "intent" which crucially reflects an alternative understanding of genocide. 
Let us first of all consider the debate regarding what "intent" actually means. To put this into 
context we can turn to Barbara B. Green's analysis of the famine within the Soviet Union in 
1932-1933.31 As Green notes, scholars have been divided over whether Stalin's Terror was 
genocidal and this division revolves around the central question of "intent" within the context 
29 There are grounds for a debate here over whether genocide scholars should try and engage with law or 
distance themselves from it. This approach upholds the former. For an example of the former see Helen Fein, 
`Defining Genocide as a Sociological Concept', CwTent Socioloav (vol. 38, no. 1,1990, pp. 8-31). For a debate 
over the latter see Semelin, Purify and Destroy, esp. pp. 320-322. 
30 United Nations. 'Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations 
Secretary-General' (25/01/2005), p. 4. Available at http: //www. un. org/News/dh/sudaWconk_inq_darfur. pdf 
Accessed 12/11/07. For an overview see Scot Straus, `Darfur and the Genocide Debate'. Foreign Affairs (vol. 
84. no. 1.2005, pp. 124-134). See also, Prunier's case study analysis which claims that the events fulfil the 
1948 definition upon genocide, even though it did not fulfil his own definition, Gerard Pruner Darfur. 
Am iguous Genocide (London: Hurst and Company, 2005). For the opposing stance see Alex De Waal, Famine 
that kills: Darfur. Sudan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Barbara, B. Green, `Stalinist Terror and the Question of Genocide: The Great Famine', in Alan S. Rosenbaum 
(ed. ), Is the Holocaust Uriaue? Perspectives on Compa ative Genocide? (Oxford: Westview Press, 2001). 
chapter nine. 
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of the 1932-1933 famine. 32 Green explains that on one side of the debate there are scholars 
such as Robert Conquest, James E. Mace, and Marco Carynnyk who argue that the famine 
was genocide, because the millions who died did so because Stalin had engineered a plan to 
crush the Ukrainian people. 33 Stalin was, in this explanation, specifically motivated by the 
"intent" to destroy Ukrainians. In sharp contrast, scholars such as Robert Tucker, Adam 
Ulam, and Martin Malia have focused upon the social and cultural motivation of Stalin. 
34 
Within this explanation Stalin was motivated by reasons other than that of Ukrainian 
destruction and as a result these scholars claim that the famine did not constitute genocide. 
Green aligns herself with the latter position as she states: "Unlike the Holocaust, the Great 
Famine was not an intentional act of genocide. The purpose was not to exterminate 
Ukrainians as a people simply because they were Ukrainians. Extermination was not an end 
in itself'. 35 The example illustrates the debate over "intent" perfectly, as whilst all the 
scholars involved agree on the same outcome, they disagree on whether this constitutes 
genocide. For Conquest, Mace, and Marco, the specific motive was the destruction of the 
Ukrainian people and therefore the crime was an end within itself and constitutes genocide. 
This is markedly different to Green's understanding of Stalin's motive as she views the 
famine as a means to an end, rather than an end within itself, which dictates that the crime 
does not constitute genocide. Thus the example highlights how such potential interpretations 
hold important implications when answering the question of what genocide is. 
Intriguingly, a motive-based understanding of "intent" was to be found within the drafting 
process of the 1948 Genocide Convention, yet this was omitted by the time the final draft was 
constructed. As Leo Kuper explains in his pioneering analysis: 
The draft of the Ad Hoc Committee had offered a more complex formulation of intent in its 
definition of genocide as `any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intent to 
destroy a national, racial, religious or political group, on the grounds of the national or racial 
origin, religious belief, or political opinion of its members'. 36 
Within this formulation there is a clear link between "intent" and motive as the "intent" to 
destroy had to be carried out "on the grounds of" national or racial origin etc. Evidently, the 
32 Ibid, p. 169. 
33 Thid, pp, 169-170. 
34 Ibid, p. 170. 
31 Ibid, p. 188. For further analysis on this issue we, Yaroslav Bilinksy, `Was the Ukrainian famine of 1932- 
1933 genocide? ' The Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 1, no. 2,1999, pp. 147 - 156). 
'Leo Kuper, Geenocide" Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 
32. Emphasis in the original. 
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legacy of the Nazi genocide looms large here as it was proposed that the intention to destroy a 
group had to constitute an end in itself rather than a means to an end. 
37 If, for example, a 
group is destroyed for economic reasons, then the crime may have the same outcome as 
genocide but does not constitute genocide. Thus, scholars such as Green uphold the view that 
the destruction of the Ukrainians was not genocide, because she believes that their destruction 
was a by-product of economic and cultural reforms -a means to an end - rather than a 
specifically motivated ethnic destruction - an end in itself. As Kuper explains, the complex 
formulation opened up a heated debate which saw the phrase "on grounds of' substituted 
within the final UNGC draft for the phrase "as such". 
38 In doing so, the final definition 
distanced itself from the motive-based understanding of "intent" to be found within the Ad 
Hoc Committee draft, yet the phrase "as such", remains highly ambiguous. 39 Scholars, 
therefore, remain divided over whether to uphold the motive-based understanding of "intent" 
put forward by the Ad Hoc Committee draft. 
The division over "intent" begins to illustrate just why legal scholars and non-legal scholars 
uphold alternative understandings of genocide. Whilst definitions of genocide are dependent 
upon "intent", what "intent' 'means in international law can be very different to the meaning 
upheld by many genocide scholars. As Ben Kiernan and Robert Gellately explain: 
What is "intent" to destroy a group? There are two different views on this. The everyday 
meaning tends to confuse intent with "motive". If a colonial power, motivated by conquest of 
a territory, or revolutionary regime with the aim of imposing a new social order, in the process 
destroys all or part of a human group, does that not constitute genocide? Not according to 
most popular definitions of intent. But in criminal law, including international criminal law, 
the specific motive is irrelevant. Prosecutors need only prove that the criminal act was 
intentional, not accidental-40 
The statement highlights that whilst the destruction of a group for territorial reasons -a means 
to an end - does not constitute genocide within most popular definitions, this does constitute 
genocide in international law, because international law does not look to establish motive. The 
understanding put forward within the UNGC therefore encompasses any group destroyed as a 
37 As Samantha Power notes, "The link between Hitler's Final Solution and Lemkin's hybrid term would cause 
endless confusion for policymakers and ordinary people who assumed that genocide occurred only when the 
perpetrators of atrocity could be shown, like Hitler, to possess an intent to exterminate every last member of an 
ethnic, national, or religious group", see Problem From Hell. p. 43. 
38 Ibid, p. 33. 
39 For further discussion on the term "as such", see Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions. Mass Killing and 
Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). p. 12. Kiernan and Gellately, 
The Svýctre of Genocide, pp, 15-16. 
4°Kiernan-and Gellately, The Spectre of Genocide. p. 15. 
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means to an end within the same understanding as a group destroyed as an end within itself. 
This is at odds therefore with Green's analysis on the Ukrainian famine, discussed above, as 
the economic motivation behind Stalin's "intent" would be irrelevant in international law and 
the crime would constitute genocide. However, as highlighted in the context of Darfur, the 
omission of motive in establishing "intent" does not make it any easier to prove that genocide 
has, or has not, taken place. 
In an attempt to provide clarity on this issue, Adam Jones puts forward a knowledge-based 
understanding of "intent" (as opposed to a motive-based understanding of "intent") which he 
claims represents a more "liberal interpretation" of "intent". By this Jones means: "regardless 
of the claimed objective of the actions in question, they are intentional if they are perpetrated 
with the knowledge or reasonable expectation that they will destroy a human group in whole 
or in part". 41 In essence, it would seem that in utilising this approach, Jones attempts to bridge 
the gap between destruction as a means to an end and as an end in itself, for as Jones explains, 
this knowledge-based understanding of "intent" combines specific "intent" with constructive 
"intent". 42 Interestingly, Jones cites the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's 
(ICTR) Akeyesu judgement to highlight how international law is moving in this direction: 
"The offender is culpable because he knew or should have known that the act committed 
would destroy, in whole or in a ". 43 part, group Whilst this knowledge-based approach has an 
appealing nature to it, it is difficult to see how defining genocide in these terms keeps 
genocide as something qualitatively different from other forms of mass violence such as war 
crimes. For example, the blanket bombings of German cities in the Second World War were 
carried out with the knowledge that Germans would be killed yet they were not carried out 
with the intention of destroying the group "as such" but with the intention of trying to end the 
war. Whilst there remains an intense debate over whether such bombing constitutes genocide, 
one cannot help but feel that the appeal to a knowledge-based understanding of "intent" does 
not resolve the problem of motive. 
41 Adam Jones, Genocide. A Conrorehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006). p, 21. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. The debate has also recently been raised in the context of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, `The Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasenovic'. The Appeals Chamber specifically looked at whether 
Hadzibasanovic had "reason to know" that his subordinates would commit certain acts. For an interesting 
overview of this in relation to command responsibility see UN General Assembly, `Annual Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the 
Secretary-General', Fundamental Standards of Humanity (A/HRC/8/14,03/06/08), p. 9. 
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In an effort to resolve the "intent"/motive dilemma, Helen Fein attempts to draw a clear line 
between motive and "intent". Having spent many years thinking about the subject matter and 
having studied much legal documentation, Fein concluded, "One can demonstrate "intent" by 
showing a pattern of purposeful action, constructing a plausible prima facie case for genocide 
in terms of the Convention" 44 The rationale put forward by Fein seems perfectly logical, in 
that a pattern of purposeful action would suggest the action committed was intentional rather 
than accidental or an accumulation of ad hoc acts. The problem arises as Fein shifts the 
grounding of her analysis to claim, "Critics who dwell upon the inability to prove "intent" do 
not understand the difference between "intent" and motive". 45 Attempting to illustrate this 
claim Fein cites Reisman and Norchi's discussion of the "intent" to destroy the Afghan 
people: "Intent is demonstrated on the prima facie grounds by deliberate or repeated 
(criminal) acts - acts violating laws of war or peace - with foreseeable results, leading to the 
destruction of a significant part of the Afghan people, regardless of the political motives 
behind intent". 46 The problem with Fein's rationale is that it is built upon the assumption that 
Reisman and Norchi's understanding of "intent" is somehow more objective than alternative 
understandings of "intent". As the example of the Ukrainian famine highlighted, scholars do 
not simply seek to establish motive because they misunderstand "intent". Conversely, many 
scholars see motive as playing a pivotal role in distinguishing between cases of mass violence 
and cases of genocide. It seems overly simplistic, therefore, to suggest that a clear line can be 
drawn between "intent" and motive and in turn argue that this approach is `right' and the 
other `wrong'. After all, this is not a scientific matter of fact. 
The intense debate over the meaning of "intent" naturally sees the question arise: should 
"intent" be included in a definition of genocide? This is precisely the point raised by Herbert 
Hirsch in his analysis as he claims one cannot use the term "intent" precisely because of the 
term's ambiguity. 47 Whilst the centrality of "intent" within defining genocide dictates that 
this approach is highly controversial, Hirsch offers a potential solution as he states: "instead 
of emphasizing an obscure and impossible-to-define psychological state of intent, the 
" Helen Fein, "Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity and War Crimes: The Care for Discrimination', in George J. 
Andreopoulos (ed. ), Genocide. Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, pp. 95 - 104), p. 97. "s Ibid. 
'6 Ibid. 
"Herbert Hirsch, Anti-Genocide Building An American Movement to Prevent Genocide (London: Praeger, 2002), p. 6. 
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Convention should focus on an easily identifiable action or behaviour and infer from that 
behaviour". 48 In essence, Hirsch attempts to overcome the endless debate that has arisen over 
"intent" by claiming that we should infer "intent" by focusing on behaviour. It would seem 
here that Hirsch offers a behavioural-based understanding of "intent" as opposed to the 
aforementioned motive-based and knowledge-based approaches. Intriguingly, this reiterates 
much of the sentiment to be found within Helen Fein's analysis as Fein claimed that "One can 
demonstrate intent by showing a pattern of purposeful action". Such understanding, therefore, 
is echoed within Hirsch's behavioural-based approach, but whereas Fein attempts to 
distinguish motive from "intent" in her understanding, Hirsch claims that one should focus on 
inferring "intent", by trying to establish behavioural patterns. Quite simply, since we can 
never know the psychological motives of the actors involved, it is more practical to infer 
"intent" by focusing on state policy. 
Notably, this approach also holds weight within the context of international law as recent 
legal developments have also upheld a behavioural-based understanding of "intent". The 
more traditional focus of international law, as William Schabas explains, has been to focus on 
the "mental element" or mens rea of genocide. 49 This "mental element" embodies two 
components, knowledge referring to an awareness of the circumstance or consequence, and 
"intent" which refers to the desire to commit the crime . 
50 However, in a more recent 
publication, Schabas brings this traditional legal understanding into question, asking: "can a 
State have a "mental element"? "51 Drawing upon the rulings of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well as the Darfur Commission, Schabas 
highlights: "In practice, what we look for is not a "mental element" but rather a "plan or 
policy". 52 Accordingly, Schabas highlights that in practice, actors such as the ICJ and/or the 
Darfur Commission have actually attempted to infer "intent" by focusing on state policy. 
From this perspective: "A State would commit genocide if there is evidence of a plan or 
policy indicating an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
" Ibid. 
49 Schabas, Genocide in International Law. chapter five. J0 Ibid. Knowledge was outlined in the Rome Statute, p. 207 whilst the definition of intent is taken from The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, p. 213. s1 William Schabas, 'Whither Genocide? The International Court of Justice finally pronounces'. Journal of (vol. 9, no. 2,2007, pp. 183-192), p. 188. 
Ibid, p. 188. 
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group as such". 53 Such understanding reiterates the sentiment expressed by both Hirsch and 
Fein. Significantly, Schabas takes this one step further as he highlights that this is not some 
abstract appeal to an alternative understanding of "intent" but reflects the fact that this is 
actually the way that recent decision-making has been conducted. The reality of international 
relations is that actors such as the ICJ and the Darfur Commission have not tried to establish 
the "mental element" of individuals but have instead sought to establish a behavioural-based 
understanding of "intent", in that "intent" is inferred by focusing on state policy. Whilst, as 
Darfur proves, this focus does not necessarily make it any easier to prove genocide is taking 
place, it does overcome the problem of trying to establish the psychological element of motive 
whilst also highlighting the role of the state which has to be factored into any understanding 
of genocide. 
For many genocide scholars, the omission of the state within the Genocide Convention 
dictates that the legal definition fails to capture the true nature of the crime. Although 
individuals often hate `other' groups, they cannot destroy `other' groups because they do not 
have the means. It is here that the centrality of the state is pivotal. Whilst concerns over the 
omission of the state were raised during the drafting process of the Genocide Convention, the 
final legal definition omitted any mention of the state and/or state policy in defining the crime 
of genocide. "' Consequently, the legal definition misrepresents genocide as a crime that can 
be committed by individuals alone. As genocide is a crime against a group, or a collective of 
groups, the role of the state has to be understood. 55 This was put into context in Irving L. 
Horowitz's work entitled, Taking Lives, Genocide and State Power in which the author 
defines genocide as, "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state 
bureaucratic apparatus". 56 The title of the book alone speaks volumes as it underlines the fact 
that if one is to destroy a group then one needs more than just motive, one needs power. 
Within contemporary international relations, states hold a monopoly on the use of violence, 
and it is this power-base that has to be factored into our understanding. Mark Levene makes 
this point well as he states: "whilst there is no prima facie case why the state has to be the 
genocidal agent", he goes onto accept Scott Straus's position that: "it is hard to imagine a 
53 Ibid, p. 190. 54 For an analysis on the reservations raised within the drafting process see, Schabas, Genocide in International 
hq, p. 79. 
For such analysis see, Larry May, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 146. 
Irving L. Horowitz, TWdn& Lives. (London: Transaction, 2002). 
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modern annihilation campaign without state involvement". 57 Whilst I uphold such 
understanding it seems clear that one has to also consider that genocide could occur within a 
weak and/or failed state in which alternative sources of authority may be able to carry out 
widespread destruction without the central government being able to stop them. With this in 
mind, the phrase, a "collective power" is utilised within the definition put forward at the end 
of this chapter as it is feasible that within certain contexts, such as a failed state, a collective 
power could commit genocide whilst not itself being a state. 
To summarise, the debate over "intent" will no doubt continue as the ambiguity of the term 
dictates that it is open to interpretation. One can, from this single debate alone, see why the 
concept of genocide is widely regarded as an essentially contested concept. Having surveyed 
a number of views on the issue, the idea of inferring "intent" from focusing on state policy 
seems to hold considerable merit. Whilst this does not provide an objective benchmark, the 
behavioural-based understanding of "intent" seems to provide a more accomplished 
understanding of genocide than that of the motive-based and/or knowledge-based alternatives, 
as it also highlights the role of the state whilst allowing us to infer the motives and/or 
knowledge base of the actors involved. 
3.3 The debate over "destroy" 
The debate over "destroy" essentially poses the question: how can a group be destroyed? The 
reader may be perplexed by the simplicity of the question as the obvious answer, and the 
answer that is actually upheld by the majority of genocide scholars, is that to "destroy" a 
group, one has to kill it. Those that uphold this view claim that just as homicide refers to the 
killing of an individual, genocide refers to the killing of a group. The mainstream use of 
"destroy", therefore, focuses purely upon the physical destruction of groups. Whilst this is 
quite simple and straightforward, a problem arises as one considers the fact that neither 
Raphael L. enikin, nor the 1948 Genocide Convention, views the destruction of a group as 
synonymous with mass killing. 58 On the contrary, both Lemkin and the UNGC put forward a 
much broader understanding of how a group can actually be destroyed. This section will 
provide an overview of the debate involved, before concluding that whilst mass murder is an 
57 Cited in Levene, Genocide in the AQe of the Nation State. vol. I: The Meaning of Genocide (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2005). p. 77. 
58 For such analysis we, Jones, Genocide. A Conwrehensive Introduction p. 21. 
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integral part of the genocidal process, it should be viewed as one element within a destruction 
process that embodies far more than mass killing alone. 
Let us first of all turn our attention to the understanding of genocide set out in Lemkin's 
original work. In a famous passage much cited amongst conceptual accounts upon genocide, 
Lemkin outlines his broad understanding: 
Genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when 
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the 
life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.... Genocide has two 
phases: one the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the 
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. 59 
The statement is critical for the simple fact that the man who invented the word genocide did 
not see genocide as synonymous with mass killing. In putting forward the idea that genocide 
should be understood as a "co-ordinated plan of different actions", Lernkin attempted to 
convey a multidimensional understanding of genocide that is very different from most 
contemporary uses. For Lemkin, anything that aimed to "destroy the essential foundations" of 
a group had to be factored into any understanding of genocide. A central concern of 
Lemkin's therefore was the idea that groups do not just exist in the physical sense as their 
existence is shaped by a whole host of other factors such as tradition, culture and identity. 
Whilst genocide is often used in a contemporary context as a short-hand for mass murder, it is 
imperative that one considers how the essential foundations of groups are constructed, and in 
turn how they can be destroyed, when one tries to understand genocide. 
Addressing the issue of what constitutes a "co-ordinated plan of different actions", Lemkin 
provides us with an insight into his multi-dimensional understanding of "destroy" within 
another key passage: 
Genocide is effected through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive 
peoples: in the political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a 
German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the social field 
(by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing elements 
such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual leadership-according to Hitler's statement in 
Mein Kampf, "the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is beaten to death with a 
rubber truncheon"); in the cultural field (by prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and 
cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for education in the liberal arts, in 
order to prevent humanistic thinking, which the occupant considers dangerous because its 
promotes national thinking); in the economic field (by shifting the wealth to Germans and by 
39 Raphael Leinkin, Axis Rule in Gccunied Europe: T aws of Occupation. Analysis of Government. Prop Redress (New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2005). p. 79 
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prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism 
"without reservation"); in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting 
procreation of Germans in the occupied countries); in the field of physical existence (by 
introducing a starvation rationing system for non Germans and by mass killings, mainly of 
Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious field (by interfering with the activities of 
the Church, which in many countries provides not only spiritual but also national leadership); 
in the field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement through 
promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures, and the excessive consumption of 
alcohol. 60 
The passage details eight ways in which Lemkin believed that the essential foundations of a 
group could be destroyed. The focus, not just on physical and biological destruction, but also 
on political, social, cultural, economic, religious and moral forms of destruction to be found 
within genocide highlights a much broader understanding of "destroy" than to be found in the 
majority of contemporary works. Quite obviously, the idea that the "promotion of 
pornographic publications" may be utilised to "destroy" the moral foundations of a group will 
undoubtedly not sit well amongst most contemporary scholars. However, it does illustrate the 
multi-dimensional understanding of genocide that was at the heart of Lemkin's approach. 
To gauge this it is important to consider the rationale that underpinned Lemkin's approach 
and to do this one has to be aware of the fact that Lemkin had spent decades thinking about 
this grave issue. As Samantha Power notes, Lemkin had become "oddly consumed by the 
subject of atrocity" from an early age. 61 In time, this would see Lemkin draft a legal proposal 
for the Madrid Conference in 1933 that claimed the acts of acts of "barbarity" and 
"vandalism" should be recognised as crimes in international law. As Power explains: 
Lernkin felt that both the physical and cultural existence of groups had to be preserved. And 
so he submitted to the Madrid conference a draft law banning two linked practices- 
"barbarity" and "vandalism". Barbarity he defined as the "premeditated destruction of 
national, racial, religious and social collectivities". "Vandalism" he classified as the 
"destruction of works of art and culture being the expression of the particular genius of these 
collectivities. 62 
Whilst Lemkin's efforts on this occasion were unsuccessful, it highlights the fact that Lemkin 
saw the physical and cultural destruction of a group as two sides of the same coin. On the 
one hand, the crime of "barbarity" refers to the physical destruction of a specified group and 
on the other hand "vandalism" refers to the social and/or cultural destruction of a group. 
Lemkin's rationale therefore was to link the two crimes together in his work upon genocide a 
60 mid, p. xi-xii 61 Lernkin cited in Power. A Problem From Hell. p. 20. For a more detailed look at Lemkin's childhood and 
background see Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention. chapters one, two and 
three. 
62 Power. A Problem From Hell. p. 21. 
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decade later. Contemporary uses of the term genocide have therefore abandoned the crime of 
"vandalism" within their understanding as scholars have chosen to focus purely upon the 
physical aspect of "barbarity". Yet as Mark Levene rightly points out, the concept of 
genocide constructed by Lernkin is entirely consistent with his earlier work on "barbarity" and 
"vandalism". As Levene states: "the crime of `barbarity', had its counterpoint in the crime of 
`vandalism', where the groups found themselves emasculated through the stifling of their 
culture, language, national feelings, religion and economic existence". 63 Indeed, when one 
juxtaposes the understanding of genocide set out in the two passages above with the 
understanding of "barbarity" and "vandalism" set out in his Madrid draft, one can see that 
these concepts are entirely compatible. It seems fair to say that whilst groups may live 
through genocide in the physical sense, they do not necessarily survive it, as a group that has 
been attacked from a political, economic, social and cultural perspective will have 
undoubtedly had its "essential foundations" eroded. However, as Levene points out the 
problem with Lemkin's understanding is that one is left somewhat unclear as to whether 
Lemkin meant that a synchronised attack which involved no physical or biological dimension 
could still be understood as genocide. 64 
It is here where the legal definition is of interest as it sets out an understanding of genocide 
that implies that genocide can be committed without any mass killing being carried out. As 
Kuper's analysis reveals, the commitment to the cultural rights of groups was refined within 
the drafting process as Western powers rejected the idea of including cultural rights. 65 
However, the final outcome still upholds a much broader understanding of "destroy" than that 
of present use. Whilst crimes (a) and (c) fit within the physical dimension of "destroy", crimes 
(d) and (e) broaden the definitional parameters to include a biological dimension. Whilst 
this in itself is broader in scope than the mainstream 'focus on mass killing, crime (b) defines 
an act of genocide as: "Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group". In 
doing so, the UNGC definition clearly states that if intent could be established, then imposing 
mental harm upon a protected group constitutes genocide. This suggests that in international 
Leven, Grano Genocide in the Aae of the Nation State. yd I" The mINgag of Genocide, p. 20. 64 
65 Kuper, Genocide p. 61. 
" To offer a reminder, the UNGC's list of crimes is as following, (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
72 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
law, genocide can be committed without any killing involved. To re-raise the question: can 
genocide be committed without any physical killing? The Genocide Convention does not 
suffer from the ambiguity found in Lemkin's analysis; the legal definition states that genocide 
can be committed without any physical or biological destruction being carried out. 
For many genocide scholars, both Lemkin and the Genocide Convention set the bar too low 
when it comes to this specific issue of "destroy". For example, in Barbara Hanf and Ted 
Gurr's seminal empirical study on cases of genocide and `politicide' between 1946 and 1987, 
the authors rejected crime (b) in their empirical identification. 67 In attempting to justify their 
position the authors claimed this would, "extend the definition to innumerable instances of 
groups which have lost their cohesion and identity, but not necessarily their lives, as a result 
of processes of socioeconomic change". 68 The statement captures the sentiment expressed by 
most contemporary genocide scholars. As Adam Jones notes, genocide scholars such as Fein, 
Charny, Horowitz, Katz, and Jones himself, all focus upon the physical dimension of 
"destroy" which reflects the more mainstream position. 69 Significantly, all of these scholars 
have actually rejected the legal definition and provided their own definitions which put 
forward a much narrower understanding of "destroy" than that to be found in the Genocide 
Convention. For example, Chalk and Jonassohn claim: "Genocide is a form of one-sided 
mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and 
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator". 70 As the authors go onto explain: "we hope 
that the term ethnocide will come into wider use for those cases in which a group disappears 
without mass killing". 71 The statement illustrates that Chalk and Jonassohn were sympathetic 
toward the fact that groups could be destroyed without mass killing taking place yet attempted 
to overcome this problem by claiming that the word genocide should be used for cases of 
physical destruction and the term ethnocide (a term which Lemkin rejected) should be used 
for cases of non-physical destruction. Problematically, the term ethnocide has taken on 
contradictory meanings since Chalk and Jonassohn's publication. 72 However, this does not 
detract from the fact that Chalk and Jonassohn felt that an alternative word was needed to 
67 Barbara Haff and Ted R. Guar, `Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and 
Measurement of Cases since 1945, International Studies Ouarterly (vol. 32, no. 3,1988, pp. 359-371). "Ibid. p. 360. 
'9 Jones, Genocide. A Comprehensive Introduction p. 21. 
70 Chalk and Jonassohn, Timmy and Sociology of Genocide. p. 23. 
71 Ibid. It should be noted that Lemkin did address the term ethnocide yet ultimately rejected this definition as 
appropriate for defining such crimes. 
See Shaw's short yet well framed analysis, What is Genocide. pp. 65-67. 
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capture non-physical group destruction. At the heart of the debate therefore lies the question 
of whether the destruction of a group's culture should be placed within the same comparative 
framework as the physical destruction of a group. 
It is here that the work of Martin Shaw is important as he vehemently opposes the narrow 
focus upon mass killing to be found within contemporary literature. Shaw's conceptual 
critique is formulated upon two key criticisms of the mainstream understanding, 
i) the focus 
upon mass killing neglects the "sociological foundations" of the crime, and ii) such 
definitions fail to address the relationship between genocide and war. 73 Attempting to address 
this problem, Shaw defines genocide as: "A form of violent social conflict, or war, between 
armed power organisations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and 
other actors who resist them ". 
74 With regard to Shaw's understanding of "destroy", Shaw 
utilises the phrase "violent social conflict" and in doing so seemingly brings the crime of 
"vandalism" back within the definitional parameters of genocide. 75 In an analysis which sets 
out to restate the importance of Lemkin's understanding of genocide within a contemporary 
context, Shaw reiterates Lemkin's belief that killing is just one of many ways in which a 
group can be destroyed. Killing therefore should not be seen as the "primary meaning" of 
group destruction. 76 However, as with Lemkin, there remains ambiguity surrounding the 
question of whether Shaw believes that genocide can be committed without mass killing 
taking place. For example: Shaw states, "Defining genocide by killing misses the social aims 
that lie behind it. Genocide involves mass killing but it is much more than mass killing". 7 
In attempting to restate the social aims that lie behind genocide, Shaw highlights that 
genocide should be understood as a process rather than an act. For example, Auschwitz 
represented the final step in the destruction of the Jews yet one cannot understand Auschwitz 
without understanding the road that led to it. The question is: when did the Nazi genocide 
start? Was it in 1933 as Hitler took power, in 1935 as the Nuremburg Laws were established, 
73 Ibid, chapter two. Shaw's discussion of genocide as a form of warfare is central within his work and extends 
upon his earlier work, War and Genocide (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). 
Shaw, What is Genocide, p. 154. Emphasis in the original. It is worth bearing in mind that Shaw's definition 
is presented in his final chapter and therefore draws upon a detailed conceptual analysis which cannot be 
discussed in full here. 
75 For an analysis of alternative terms such as eradicate, eliminate, exterminate, annihilate and nullify that could 
be used as an alternative substitute to the term "destroy", see Henry Huttenbach, `Towards a Conceptual 
Definition of Genocide', The Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 4, no. 2,2002, pp. 167-176). 
76 Shaw, What is Genocide. p33. Emphasis in the original. 
" Ibid, p. 34. 
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in 1939 as the Second World War broke out or in 1941 with the establishment of the `Final 
Solution'? The question provides the basis of a heated debate within both genocide and 
Holocaust studies and whilst it cannot be answered here it does highlight the problem of 
deconstructing the genocidal process. This is exactly the point raised within Levene's 
analysis of Lemkin as he highlights that Lemkin conflates the genocidal process - which may 
or may not - lead to genocide with genocide itself. 
78 As Levene explains, what matters is "the 
distinction between the process of genocide which is actually all too common and a 
consequence which, while all too frequent, is much less so". 79 Putting this into context 
Levene explains that this distinction "puts the 1999 events in Kosovo on one side of a divide 
and the Holocaust on the other, not because genocidal mechanisms were not at work in both 
cases or that those in Kosovo could not have led to genocide. But the point is that they did 
not". 80 The statement offers a profound insight into understanding genocide as it highlights 
that whilst all genocides involve a genocidal process, not all genocidal processes lead to 
genocide. This leads Levene to conclude that, "the study of genocide is nine parts the 
genocidal process and only one part that of a particular outcome". 81 The interesting aspect 
here is that Levene seemingly tries to disentangle the destruction process to be found within 
the genocidal process from an overtly broad focus on the genocidal process or an overtly 
narrow focus on the final act of destruction itself. Whilst boundaries are obviously blurred, it 
is important to consider the genocidal process as well as the destruction process to be found 
within it. This, in turn, helps us gain a more informed understanding of genocide than simply 
treating it as an act of mass murder, yet highlights the importance of mass murder within the 
genocidal process. 
As previously discussed, the majority of contemporary scholars refer to genocide as the 
physical destruction of a group, yet this can present genocide as an act, rather than a process. 
Whilst all genocide scholars would acknowledge that genocide is a process rather than an act, 
it is questionable whether the specific focus on mass killing conveys this underlying process. 
Contemporary scholars such as Levene and Shaw have been keen on restating the 
multidimensional understanding of destruction embodied within genocide; yet as earlier 
discussed questions still remain as to whether genocide can be committed without mass 
" Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State. vol. I: The Meaning of Genocide, pp. 46 - 47. 79 Ibid. p. 47. 10 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, p. 104. 
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killing - as stated in the Genocide Convention. To clarify my own position on this issue, I 
would stipulate that killing does have to take place yet at the same time it is important to 
remember that the state (which is usually the perpetrator of genocide), has a toolkit of 
measures that can be used to "destroy" a group; whilst mass murder is indeed the deadliest of 
tools available, it is not the only tool. In an attempt, therefore, to convey an understanding of 
the genocidal process yet differentiate this from the act of destruction within it, the conclusion 
put forward at the end of this chapter suggests the phrase the process of destruction which it is 
hoped conveys the multidimensional meaning of the term "destroy". 
3.4 The debate over "in whole or in part" 
The debate that revolves around the phrase "in whole or in part" refers to one's understanding 
of the scale of the crime. Whilst the legal definition stipulates that genocide refers to the 
destruction of a group "in whole or in part", many genocide scholars reject this aspect on the 
grounds that the destruction of a group "in part" may refer to an act of murder (just one 
person), or mass murder (an accumulation of ad hoc killings) rather than a systematic intent to 
destroy a group. For example, Schabas explains that within the drafting process a general fear 
arose as draftees questioned whether the phrase "in part" set the quantitative benchmark too 
low: if a group of hostages were executed would this constitute a group "in part? "82 From this 
perspective, the debate revolves around the understanding of genocide that can be inferred 
from this ambiguous quantitative measure. At the same time, as Leo Kuper explains, any 
such quantitative approach faces a more qualitative humanist challenge in that death and 
suffering cannot be measured quantifiably even though lawyers often need to implement such 
a quantitative approach when attempting to prove genocide. 83 In an attempt to overcome such 
problems, genocide scholars have attempted to narrow the definitional parameters in order to 
try and convey an understanding of genocide as a group crime rather than an act of murder or 
ad hoc mass killing. This has seen scholars put forward the idea that genocide refers to the 
intent to destroy a group "in whole or in substantial part", or at its most extreme, "in whole ". 
The implications of these perspectives are what is of interest in this section. It will be 
proposed that genocide should be defined as an intent to destroy a group "in whole or in 
substantial part" which differs from the present legal definition. 
82 See Schabas Genocide in International Law. pp, 230-240. 
83 Kuper, Genocide. p. 61. 
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The most controversial understanding of genocide is to be found within the definitions that 
define genocide as the intent to destroy "in whole". The classic illustration of this position is 
found in the work of Stephen Katz who claims that genocide should only be applied to: "the 
actualisation of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any 
national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups 
are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means". " From this understanding, any 
intentional destruction of a group "in part" or "in substantial part" does not constitute 
genocide. This actually leads Katz to conclude, after an extensive comparative study, that the 
Holocaust remains the only example of genocide in history. 85 The narrow parameters 
outlined by Katz has been criticised for upholding a 'Holocaust-centric' approach to genocide 
studies, in which the Holocaust is presented as the only example of genocide and in doing so 
sets the benchmark of genocide so high as to exclude all other examples. 86 This 
understanding is part of a broader debate over whether the Holocaust is unique? 87 Obviously, 
in claiming that the Holocaust is the only example of genocide, Katz upholds the view that the 
Holocaust is unique. However, as Levene explains, "this leaves us in the rather bizarre 
predicament where genocide exists minus the Holocaust, or alternatively, has to be squarely 
confronted as the only example of the phenomenon". 88 Such understanding has led seminal 
Holocaust scholars such as Omer Bartov to dismiss debates over its uniqueness as unhelpful. 89 
Quite simply, the view here is that one does not have to get bogged-down in debates over 
whether the Holocaust is unique in order to gauge the importance of the Holocaust. 
The scale of the Holocaust casts an evident shadow over the debate as understandably 
scholars attempt to distinguish between small scale and large scale destructions. In an attempt 
to establish a middle-ground between the overtly broad understanding of "in whole or in part" 
$4 Stephen Katz, The Holocaust in Historical Context. vol. 1. The Holocaust and Mass Death befi 
An (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 131. 
lbid, pp. 129 - 137. One should note that his work was published in 1994 prior to Rwanda which one may 
argue would fit within Katz definition. This is raised within Levene's discussion of Katz, Bauer and Friedlander 
as representative of the exclusivist camp of defining genocide, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State. vol. I: 
The Meaning of Genocide. pp. 39-41. 
"See Shaw's discussion of the Holocaust as the Maximal Standard, What is Genocide. pp. 37-45. Also 
Huttenbach's analysis which brings into question Katz research objective, `Towards A Conceptual', 
87 For a broad discussion upon this debate see Alan, S, Rosenbaum, Is the Holocaust Unique? (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 2001). 
's Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State. vol. I: The Meaning of Genocide. p. 39. Levene upholds the 
view that not all intellectual roads should lead back and forth from the Holocaust, pp. 3-4. 
89 Omer Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction. War. Genocide and Modern Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2000), p. 6. 
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and the overtly narrow understanding of "in whole", some scholars have chosen to utilise the 
phrase: "in whole or in substantial part". This is put into context within Leo Kuper's 
analysis as he states that the destruction of a group has to equate to a "substantial" or 
"appreciable number" of victims. 90 Kuper goes on to introduce the term "genocidal 
massacre" to refer to smaller scale destructions, such as the destruction of a village which 
may still reflect an intent to destroy\a group, hence "genocidal massacre", but should not be 
placed within the same comparative framework as the systematic destruction of 6 million 
Jews 91 For example, the extermination of an estimated 7,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica 
was legally classified as genocide, yet one cannot help but think that this should be considered 
as a "genocidal massacre" when compared to the extermination of 800,000 Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu that took place in Rwanda the previous year. Of course, the question that 
naturally arises here is where does one draw the line? To use Kuper's rhetoric: what 
constitutes "appreciable numbers"? This ambiguity is raised within Jones' use of the phrase 
"in whole or in substantial part", 
I prefer to leave "substantial" imprecise; I hope its parameters will expand over time, together 
with our capacity for empathy. It seems clear, though, that a threshold is passed when victims 
mount to the tens or hundreds of thousands - although relative group size must always be 
factored in. 92 
There are two key points here, the first being the "imprecise" nature of Jones' use of 
substantial and the second being that of "relative group size" which will be discussed below. 
The former point clearly illustrates the difficulty of attempting to negotiate the ambiguity of 
"in substantial part". It is once again underpinned by the rationale that the scale of the 
destruction holds implications for whether the crime should be defined as genocide, yet 
ultimately Jones leaves the phrase open for interpretation. 
The question therefore remains: is it possible to establish a clear boundary that distinguishes 
between a group "in whole and in part". This is addressed in Benjamin Valentino's 
comparative study, as the author puts forward his definitional understanding as: "at least fifty 
thousand deaths over the course of five or fewer years". 93 For Valentino, this benchmark 
does not only allow one to confidently state that mass killing did indeed occur, but also, that it 
90 Kuper, Genocide, p. 32. 
91 Ibid. 
'2 Jones, Genocide. A Comprehensive Introduction. pp. 22-23. 93 Valentino, Final Solutions. pp. 11-12. 
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occurred intentionally. 94 Accordingly, Valentino attempts to draw a clear line in the sand 
which overcomes the ambiguity to be found within the phrase "in whole or in substantial 
part", which in turn allows Valentino to address an extensive number of case studies within 
the definitional parameters he sets out. However, the problem with this definition is, as 
Valentino himself explains, "such a definition does not adequately capture the threat to human 
diversity posed by attacks against smaller groups". 95 For example if a group of exactly 
49,999 people were killed within five years, or alternatively a group of 50,000 people were 
killed in five and a half years, then according to Valentino's definition, neither would 
constitute genocide. The arbitrary nature therefore of Valentino's quantitative approach is 
problematic as it does not capture the qualitative implications of smaller groups being 
destroyed over shorter periods of time or larger groups being destroyed over longer periods of 
time. It is important, therefore, to return to the ambiguity within Jones' definition of "in 
whole or in substantial part" and the idea of "relative group size". 
Relative group size raises an extremely problematic area of consideration. On the one hand, 
Valentino's quantitative approach dictates that if a group smaller than the number proposed 
(whether that be 50,000 or any other number) is destroyed in its entirety then this cannot be 
classed as genocide. This is despite the fact that genocide refers to the destruction of a group 
rather than the mass killing of a certain number of people. On the other hand, Jones' 
"imprecise" definition leaves the scholar somewhat uneasy due to its dependency on 
interpretation. For example, can the destruction of a group of 50,000 people or less be 
compared with the destruction of six million group members? If we were to take this logic 
even further, if a smaller group, of say 2,000 people, were destroyed "in substantial part", 
then does this constitute genocide? The answer proposed here is yes, for the simple reason 
that genocide refers to the destruction of a group - no matter how large or small that group is. 
To consider this further let us turn to Schabas' analysis in which he states that Raphael 
Lemkin wrote to the Senate Committee in 1950: "claiming that the destruction in part must be 
of a substantial nature so as to affect its entirety". The statement underlines the fact that 
genocide is not dependent upon a specific number of people being killed but on a group in its 
entirety being affected by the destruction of a number of members within it (whatever that 
" Ibid, p. 12. . 95 Ibid, p. 13. 
"Quoted in Schabas, Genocide in International Law. p. 238. 
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number may be). If then, a group consists of 40,000 people and 20,000 of them are killed, it 
is difficult to see why this would not constitute genocide, as the extermination of fifty per cent 
of the group would undoubtedly affect its entirety. 
Essentially, this is what I am trying to convey when I utilise the term "in whole or in 
substantial part" in the definition put forward at the end of this chapter. In fact, I would argue 
that the ambiguity to be found within the phrase "in whole or in substantial part" offers 
flexibility which should be seen as a positive rather than a negative when attempting to make 
a judgement on a case by case basis. The view here is that relative group size is extremely 
important and if a group of two thousand is destroyed "in whole or in substantial part", then 
this does in fact constitute genocide. This is obviously problematic and controversial. 
Primarily, it is problematic in the sense that one can challenge this qualitative approach from 
a quantitative perspective to claim that if a government kills a family of 6, does this constitute 
genocide? Whilst there are no quantitative parameters within the phrase "in whole or in 
substantial part" to prove that this is not genocide, one hopes that a) the context of destruction 
has to be taken into account and the destruction of a family (no matter how tragic) should not 
be considered as genocide, b) further research will increase our understanding of what 
constitutes a substantial part and c) the concept "genocidal massacre" can be developed 
further and utilised more often when referring to small-scale destructions. Secondarily, it is 
controversial in the sense that scholars may reject the idea that the destruction of 2,000 can be 
placed within the same comparative framework as the Holocaust. The position taken here is 
that the study of genocide should not be dependent upon the scale of the Holocaust. Surely 
the primary focus of genocide scholars should be upon the relative threat posed to a group's 
very existence. Mass murder is about the quantifiable measure of deaths, whereas, genocide is 
about the destruction of a group. With this in mind this chapter shifts its attention to the final 
definitional theme of group identity: which groups should be protected? 
3.5 The debate over "national, ethnical, racial and religious" groups 
The UNGC definition defines genocide as the intentional destruction of "national, ethnical, 
racial and religious" groups. Controversially, this dictates that if any "other" group is 
destroyed in "whole or in part" then this cannot legally be classified as genocide. Thus, if a 
political, economic or gendered group is destroyed in whole, then this would not constitute 
genocide. With regard to group identity, therefore, the legal definition established extremely 
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narrow definitional parameters. This has in turn caused many genocide scholars to redefine 
genocide to include "other" groups such as political groups within their definition. In some 
cases, genocide scholars have gone as far as to suggest that the destruction of any group 
should constitute genocide. In sharp contrast, some genocide scholars have chosen to adopt 
alternative definitional parameters when studying the destruction of "other groups". This has 
given rise to conceptual proliferation as terms such as "gendercide", "politicide", and 
"classicide" have increasingly become the norm. Whilst such conceptual proliferation is 
controversial from a social science perspective, somewhat worryingly, this has not been 
challenged from a legal perspective, as the destruction of "other" groups in international law, 
are classified as a "crime against humanity". 97 From a legal perspective therefore, the 
perpetrators of such crimes are still being prosecuted. However, if one is part of a group that 
is destroyed "in whole or in substantial part", then one may feel aggrieved if the act 
constitutes genocide yet this cannot be classified as genocide in international law. The 
position therefore that one adopts within the debate reflects one's understanding of whether 
the four groups identified by the UNGC should be prioritised over other groups in 
international relations. This section will provide an overview of the debates involved prior to 
concluding that we should try and see how the perpetrators of genocide define the targeted 
groups as opposed to trying to uphold some sort of `objective' understanding of group 
identity. 
To understand why "national, ethnic, racial and religious" groups were prioritised in the first 
place it is important to go back to the drafting process that preceded the final definition. At 
the time, as Kuper's work highlights, the Ad Hoc Committee's draft debated extensively 
whether to include "political groups" in the final definition. 98 Kuper explains that the Russian 
representative led a "vigorous attack" as he claimed that "the inclusion of political groups was 
not in conformity `with the scientific definition of genocide"'. 99 The statement reflects the 
fact that many of the draftees at the time believed that the identity of a group could be 
established scientifically. Whilst the inclusion of religious groups within this `scientific' 
approach is troublesome, this was justified from a Russian perspective on the grounds that, 
"in all known cases of genocide perpetrated on the grounds of religion, it had always been 
9' For an analysis on the relationship between genocide and crimes against humanity see Schabas, Genocide 
"tmmaWig, chapter three. Kuper, Genes, pp. 24-25. 
Ibid. 
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evident that nationality or race were concomitant reasons". 100 Whilst the extermination of 
political groups within Russia raises questions over the motives expressed by the Russian 
representative, the Iranian representative at the time, raised a related moral argument that 
needs to be considered further: 
If a distinction were recognized, "between those groups, membership of which was inevitable, 
such as racial, religious or national groups, whose distinctive features were permanent, and 
those, membership of which was voluntary, such as political groups, whose distinctive 
features were not permanent, it must be admitted that the destruction of the first type appeared 
most heinous in the light of the conscience of humanity, since it was directed against human 
beings whom chance alone had grouped together. 1°' 
The Iranian perspective is extremely interesting in that it draws a divide between permanent 
and voluntary membership of a group. The critical difference is that individuals in voluntary 
groups can change their identity, yet individuals in permanent groups cannot. The question 
posed at the time therefore, was whether voluntary groups should be included in the same 
definitional bracket as permanent groups. Whilst the argument can be made that religious 
groups are not permanent, the final definition seemingly reflects the intention to cover 
permanent groups as opposed to voluntary groups. This will be returned to below. 
The prioritisation of "national, ethnic, racial and religious" groups in the legal definition has 
seen the destruction of "other" groups studied within alternative definitional frameworks. For 
example, in Hanf and Gurr's seminal empirical study upon State oppression since WWII, the 
authors coined the term `politicide' to specifically address the political destruction of 
groups. 102 It was the exclusion of political groups, therefore, within the Genocide Convention 
that caused the authors to construct an alternative term; whilst the destruction of "other" 
groups can be classified as a "crime against humanity" in international law, it would seem that 
for many social scientists this does not provide a suitable conceptual framework for the 
destruction of "other" groups. As Martin Shaw's analysis explains, this has seen "conceptual 
proliferation" arise as the other "-cides" of genocide have been studied as alternative 
concepts: "ethnocide, "gendercide", "politicide", "classicide", "urbicide" and 
"autogenocide". 103 The narrow definition of group identity in the legal definition, therefore, 
10° Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
101 Ibid, p. 26. 
102 Barbara Harff and Ted R. Gurr, `Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945', International Studies wrtenly (vo. 32, no. 3,1988, pp. 359 - 371). The author's study identified forty four examples of genocide and "politicide" between 1946 and 1987. The authors' 
, 
27 otional criteria explains that some episodes started prior to 1946. 
Shaw, What is Genocide. chapter five. 
82 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
has caused many group destructions to be studied from alternative conceptual perspectives, 
even though the case could be made that such groups deserve to be protected within the legal 
definition. Shaw highlights the absurdity of the situation when he explains that the term 
"auto-genocide" arose because the Khmer Rouge within the context of the Cambodian 
genocide, destroyed people within their own ethnic group which is not covered within the 
UNGC definition as it was drafted on the assumption that groups would not destroy 
themselves. 104 Rejecting the conceptual proliferation that has arisen (including the term 
ethnic cleansing), Shaw claims: "it is better to use genocide as the master-concept, accepting 
that its meaning has expanded from the narrower meaning of genos as a nation or ethnic 
group, to cover the destruction of any type of people or any group". los The statement 
underlines the stark reality that genocide refers to the destruction of a group. It seems logical 
therefore to infer from this central meaning that the destruction of a group - no matter what 
that group is - should be classified and subsequently studied as a form of genocide. The 
problem is that in studying the destruction of "other" groups within alternative frameworks, 
scholars have helped legitimise the UNGC definition as they have failed to challenge the 
moral and scientific rationale that underpins it. 
Since 1948, our understanding of how group identities are constructed has come a long way, 
which helps provide us with a more informed understanding of how groups should be defined 
in any definition of genocide. It is here that the work of anthropologists in the discipline of 
genocide studies is important as they highlight that the scientific rationale that underpinned 
group identify in 1948 is anything but scientific. As Alexander Hinton explains: 
From an anthropological perspective, the UN definition is highly problematic because it 
privileges certain social categories - race, ethnicity, religion and nationality - over others. 
While the making of social difference is a human universal, the categories into which we 
parse the world are culturally constructed. 106 
The statement challenges the `scientific' rationale embodied within the Genocide Convention 
as Hinton utilises the idea that identity is culturally constructed, thus the idea that there is an 
`objective' understanding of identity embodied within the legal definition is flawed. Since 
identities are culturally constructed, to suggest that racial, ethnicity, religious or national 
identities are permanent and fixed is inaccurate. Whilst Lemkin envisaged an objective 
104 Ibid, p. 76. pos Ibid, p. 78. Emphasis in the original. 
106 Alexander Hinton, (ed. ), Genocide. an Anthropological Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p. 5. 
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element in his hybrid term, as Shaw stated above, our understanding of group identity has 
developed since the 1940s. It seems obvious that a contemporary definition of genocide 
should reflect our contemporary understanding of group identity. This was put into explicit 
context as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found it difficult to 
establish whether the Tutsi and Hutu could fit within the definitional parameters of the 
UNGC. 107 As Schabas explains, in the end the ICTR concluded that the Tutsi were an ethnic 
group simply because they had government issued identity cards stating as much. 1°8 The legal 
ruling reveals that lawyers could not appeal to any `objective' benchmark in assessing the 
identity of the Hutu and Tutsi. This reinforces the idea that the `scientific' understanding set 
out in 1948 is now out of date and the definition of genocide should be altered accordingly. 
This naturally leads us onto the question of which groups should be included in a redefined 
definition of genocide. It is here that a highly seminal understanding of group identity is set 
out by Chalk and Jonassohn as they claim that scholars should focus on the identity of the 
group as defined by the perpetrator. 1°9 Such understanding has gained considerable currency 
as seminal scholars within the field have upheld such an approach. For example, to return to 
the definition of Katz who narrowed the parameters of "in whole or in part" down to a focus 
on "in whole", Katz notably broadens the parameters of group identity to include "any 
national, ethnical, racial religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these are 
defined by the perpetrator". 11° This in turn reinforces the idea that the perception of the 
perpetrator is vital to our understanding of group identity. Mark Levene explains this point 
well when he states: "The targeted group is the product of the perpetrators assemblage of 
social reality". ' 11 The statement underlines the central role of perception within the 
perpetrators construction of an enemy group. This again supports the idea that genocide 
scholars should focus on the identity of the group as defined by the perpetrator. This is not to 
say that this approach does not have it critics. Such a radical alternative to the present legal 
approach has led some to claim that this broadens the parameters of group identity too much. 
For example, Schabas states that whilst he finds such an approach appealing, it ultimately acts 
107 See Schabas's discussion, Genocide in International Law p. 109. 
106 Ibid, p. 110. 
109 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide p. 23. "0 Katz, The Holocaust in Historical COMM p. 131 
111 Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation Stau vol. I: The Me nin2 of GenocidL p. 88. 
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to protect groups that have no "real objective existence". ' 12 Whilst one may question 
Schabas's appeal to `objectivity' one understands his concern that the meaning of genocide 
may be debased if its definitional parameters are expanded exponentially. However, to return 
to the idea that genocide refers to the destruction on a group (which I would argue lies at the 
very heart of the concept), then is it not the responsibility of international society to protect 
that "other" group, no matter what that "other" group may be? 
When we elevate the importance of any group, over that of any other group, and then attempt 
to justify it, do we not appeal to the very same logic that is often manipulated by the 
perpetrators of the genocide within the genocidal process? To consider this let us turn to 
Chalk and Jonassohn's extensive comparative study on genocide which encompasses 
historical examples of genocide dating from Carthage right up until East Timor. '' 3 
Significantly, the in-depth case study analysis leads the authors to conclude: "We have no 
evidence that a genocide was ever performed on a group of equals. The victims must not only 
not be equals, but also clearly defined as something less than fully human". 114 The statement 
highlights the central role of dehumanisation within the genocidal process, for as stated, in all 
the cases studied: equals were never the victim. The point to consider here is that a defining 
feature of genocide is the elevation of one group over another. To utilise the central ideas put 
forward by the anthropologist Alexander Hinton: "Manufacturing Difference" acts as a pre- 
cursor for "Annihilating Difference". 115 Without this it is difficult to see how genocide 
would take place. The critical problem, therefore, is that in prioritising "national, ethnic, 
racial and religious" groups in the legal definition, the Genocide Convention actually 
embodies the very same logic that perpetrators appeal to as it elevates the importance of four 
groups over all other groups in international society. 
To consider this further let us take the idea of race which, as discussed, was included in the 
legal definition of genocide on the grounds that race can be identified scientifically. Such 
understanding has been challenged vehemently since, and is perhaps best summarised in J. K. 
Roth's analysis on the "Logic of Racism" as he states: 
112 Schabas, Genocide in International Law. p. 110. 
13 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, part H. 
14 Ibid, p. 28. 
"s I am drawing upon two works by Hinton as I make this point. For a discussion upon the Manufacture of 
Difference see Hinton's, introduction in Genocide. an Anthropological Reeder. esp. pp, 9-12. For a discussion 
upon Annihilating Difference see Alexander, L. Hinton, (ed. ), Annihilating Difference. The Anthropology of 
Genocide (London: University of California Press, 2002). 
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Racial differentiation, usually traceable ultimately to physical differences such as skin color, 
has typically entailed distinction between superiority and inferiority. Attempts to justify such 
distinctions have often appealed to "nature" or to allegedly corroborations, but deeper inquiry 
into their origins indicates that such appeals have been rationalizations and legitimations for 
conceptual frameworks that have been constructed to ensure hegemonies of one kind or 
another. Far from being neutral, far from being grounded in objective and scientific analysis, 
racial differentiation has promoted division and advanced the interests of those who want to 
retain prerogatives and privileges that otherwise might not be theirs. 116 
The statement highlights that whilst the logic of race is often constructed upon an appeal to 
notions of science and objectivity, when one deconstructs this logic, one does not find a 
scientific basis. The statement challenges the assumptions to be found within group identity 
in the same way that Hinton's aforementioned anthropological work does. Yet critically, 
Roth goes one step further in that he claims that when one deconstructs the logic of race one 
finds that the idea of race has been constructed upon appeals to a superior "we" which takes 
priority over an inferior "other". This is important when we consider the Russian 
representative's appeal to science and objectivity as one has to bear in mind that not only is 
such understanding flawed, but that in failing to challenge such understanding we fail to 
challenge the racial undertones embodied within the legal definition. Far from being 
objective, the legal definition attempts to legitimise the superiority of four groups over all 
other groups in international society and it is for this reason that the moral deficiency of the 
legal definition can be challenged on the issue of group identity. 
The legal understanding of group identity is rejected on the grounds that no group should be 
prioritised over another. Whilst the question of permanent and voluntary membership raises 
intriguing questions, if one upholds such logic then one walks a dangerous path as it is the 
very same logic that is manipulated by perpetrators of the crime when implementing the 
process of destruction. It is proposed that, just as every individual is equal, every group is 
equal. Group identities are not fixed and static but flexible and the construction of the "other" 
within the genocidal process is dependent upon the perpetrators perception of reality. 
Individuals within the context of genocide are attacked because of their perceived group 
identity; quite simply, their individual worth becomes dependent upon their perceived group 
worth. It is imperative therefore, that any definitional loopholes, such as the one present 
within the UNGC regarding group identification, are closed. 
"b John, K. Roth, `Genocide and the "Logic" of Racism', in J, K. Roth, (ed. ), Genocide and Human Rights. a ph, losovhical Guide (New York: Paigrave, Macmillan, 2005), p. 255. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Having reviewed the central definitional themes to be found within the relevant literature, I 
now draw upon the key points raised to put forward my own definition of genocide: 
When a collective source of power (usually a State), utilises its power base to implement a 
process of destruction aimed at destroying a group (as defined by the perpetrator), in whole or 
in substantial part, dependent upon relative group size. 
To offer an overview, by using the phrase a collective source of power, the definition aims to 
capture the role of the state which tends to hold a monopoly of power in the majority of 
countries. In doing so, it aligns itself with scholars such as Levene and Horowitz, who 
highlight that the UNGC definition is flawed in its omission of the state. However, it differs 
slightly in that it does not exclusively focus upon the state and instead accommodates the 
potential threat posed by an alternative power base, for example in a failed state. Within the 
context of the definitional debate outlined above, the focus upon a collective source of power 
and its utilisation of its power base to implement a process of destruction, aims to infer 
"intent" within a broader understanding of "destroy". Whilst further discourse is essential, 
through focusing upon the process of destruction it is hoped that scholars can begin to 
consider how the destruction process arises within the broader context of a genocidal process 
which may, or may not, culminate in mass killing. Quite simply, states utilise a variety of 
measures when destroying a group and whilst I claim that mass murder has to take place for it 
to be considered genocide, our understanding of genocide should reflect this destruction 
process as argued by Lemkin, Shaw, and Levene. The final themes of the definition, regard 
the debate over the scale of the crime, which is addressed as "in whole or in substantial part, 
dependent upon relative group size" and group identity, which is approached from the 
viewpoint of the perpetrator. In doing so the definition upholds Lemkin's belief that the 
destruction should be substantial and Chalk and Jonassohn's seminal claim that the group 
should be identified from the perpetrator's viewpoint. 
Whilst no definition can provide an `objective' understanding, it is unacceptable, for the 
reasons discussed above, to accept the definition of genocide as set out in Article II of the 
1948 Genocide Convention. At the same time, the intention here was to provide an overview 
of the definitional debate rather than present my own definition. Indeed, this author's initial 
feeling was: "there must be one definition `out there' that reflects my understanding of the 
crime". Yet it seems there is not. Perhaps this reflects the need for more interdisciplinary 
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analysis. As an IR scholar, it seems unthinkable to omit the central role of the state. This, in 
turn, dictates that every definition that does not rectify this UNGC omission cannot be 
accepted either. At the same time, those that do include the role of the state do not seem to 
have catered for the potential of genocide in failed and/or weak states, which in turn dictates 
that these cannot be accepted. Since this thesis does not engage with case study analysis it 
may seem odd to include a definition of genocide, yet it is clear that in bringing genocide into 
an IR framework one has to be aware of the debates that have been raised. The definition, 
therefore, is more of a by-product. Having reviewed the literature it seems that there is a 
lacuna with regard to presenting the understanding embodied within the definition above, 
which is obviously heavily indebted to the discourse itself. However, it has to be stressed 
that in rejecting Article II, this author does not reject the 1948 Genocide Convention itself for 
the Convention embodies other critical aspects such as the legal obligation to prevent 
genocide. Whilst one's obligation to prevent a crime is obviously dependent upon how one 
defines the crime, this thesis will discuss how the 1948 Genocide Convention represents a 
collective understanding of genocide prevention as rightful conduct in international relations 
(see Chapters Four and Five). It is Chapter Four then that takes the idea of bringing genocide 
into an IR framework one step further as it addresses the relationship between genocide and 
international legitimacy in international relations. 
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4 Genocide and International Legitimacy 
Having established an understanding of genocide, the reader may still be left thinking, so 
what? If I am not a member of the group being targeted, then why should I care about their 
destruction? It is here that the next two chapters focus on understanding the impact that 
genocide has upon the ordering structure of international society. Essentially, it will be 
claimed that when states fail to confront the crime of genocide, states actually increase the 
likelihood of international instability. The focus, therefore, is on the moral value of order 
rather than the value of humanity. It is hoped that this approach highlights that there is more 
to genocide prevention than `just' saving strangers. This novel approach utilises the English 
School's focus on how order and justice is facilitated through the process and practice of 
international legitimacy. Accordingly, this chapter will put forward an understanding of what 
is meant by international legitimacy prior to exploring the relationship between international 
legitimacy and genocide. It will be argued that genocide holds a special relationship with 
international legitimacy because it is internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from 
both a legal and moral perspective. This is important because it begins to highlight that 
genocide has an important impact on the institutional structure of international society as well 
as the groups being targeted. This point will be explored further in the next chapter as the 
impact of genocide upon the secondary institution of the UN will be addressed. This chapter, 
therefore, focuses on the relationship between genocide and international legitimacy from a 
theoretical perspective which will lay the foundations for Chapter Five. 
4.1 International legitimacy: essential yet under-theorised 
Prior to tackling the complexities involved in defining the term international legitimacy, it is 
important to touch upon the point that despite the term's importance, the concept of 
international legitimacy remains under-theorised in IR. 1 As Ian Clark explains, "Legitimacy 
is much the most favoured word in the practitioner's lexicon, but one that remains widely 
ignored in the academic discipline of international relations". 2 This is important because it 
feeds into the complexities surrounding the term's meaning. If the concept had been studied 
more, one would expect that there would be a broader agreement over what the term means. 
This is not to detract from the fact that many scholars acknowledge international legitimacy 
For a recent overview of the literature produced on the topic, see Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud, 
Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), introduction. 
Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). p. 2. 
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as an `essentially contested concept', but to highlight that the lack of scholarly research into 
this area has undoubtedly hindered clarity on the subject matter. 
3 A large part of the problem 
stems from the fact that legitimacy has predominantly been analysed in the context of the 
domestic sphere rather than the international sphere. As a result, the concept of international 
legitimacy has remained under-theorised. 
This, of course, is not to say that the concept of international legitimacy has been completely 
ignored. As a number of scholars have highlighted, there has been an increasing amount of 
academic interest in the concept of international legitimacy since the end of the Cold War. 
4 
Intriguingly, in Hurrelmann, Schneider, and Steffek's study of legitimacy, the scholars note 
that academic interest in the study of legitimacy tends to occur in phases of intense political 
conflict or massive changes From this perspective, it would seem that events such as the end 
of the Cold War and 9/11 help explain why academic interest in international legitimacy has 
become more popular. This was perfectly illustrated in the aftermath of 9/11 and the US-led 
response to it. Primarily, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought questions regarding 
legitimate authority and legitimate conduct to the centre of international relations. A surge of 
academic interest began to emerge as IR scholars discussed both an American crisis of 
legitimacy, 6 as well as a broader legitimacy crisis in international relations. 7 Scholars 
highlighted that many of the post-9/11 questions being raised, regarding legitimate conduct 
and legitimate authority, were evident in the debates surrounding the Kosovo crisis in 1999. 
As is well documented, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo report 
(published in 2000), concluded that the NATO airstrikes were "illegal but legitimate". 8 This 
apparent clash between legality and legitimacy implied that international law was somehow 
3 For a discussion upon legitimacy as essentially contested concept see Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider 
and Jens Steffek, (eds. ), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 
229 - 232. 4 For such analysis see Jean-Marc Coicaud, `Deconstructing International Legitimacy', in Charlesworth and 
Coicaud, (ed. ), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy. chapter two. 
s Hurrelmann. Schneider and Steffek, (eds. ), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics. p. 229. 
6 "For a sharp overview see the debate that occurred in Foreign Affairs, Robert Kagan, `America's Crisis of 
Legitimacy', Foreign Affairs (vol. 83, no. 2,2004, pp. 65-87). Robert W. Tucker and David, C. Hendrickson, 
`The Sources of American Legitimacy', Foreign Affairs (vol. 83, no. 6,2004, pp. 18-32). See also, their 
responses, Robert Kagan, `A Matter of Record. Security', Foreign Affairs (vol. 84, no. 2,2005, pp. 170- 174). 
Robert W. Tucker and David, C. Hendrickson, 'The Flip Side of The Record', Foreign Affairs (vol. 84, no. 2, 
2005), pp. 139-141. 
7 For overview see the, Review of International Studies, `Force and Legitimacy in World Politics', Review of 
in ter national Studies, special edition (vol. 31. supplement Si. 2005). 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p. 4. 
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deficient. The obvious question being: if international law is broken, what broke it, and how 
can it be fixed? 
Significantly, the debate surrounding international legitimacy was not some abstract 
philosophical debate: wars were being fought and people were dying whilst the world 
debated the legitimacy of the actions being taken. With this in mind, it was clear that a more 
informed understanding of international legitimacy, and the legitimacy crisis, was urgently 
needed. It is here that a critical problem arose as whilst the question of what is international 
legitimacy took centre stage, the question of how international legitimacy should be studied 
seemed to become somewhat overlooked. This is understandable as the tragic events of 9/11 
and the subsequent `War on Terror' created an air of intellectual urgency. Scholars felt that 
they had a responsibility to help provide answers to the profound questions being raised. 9 
However, this reality seemingly created an environment in which the question of what is 
international legitimacy, took priority over the more mundane methodological question of 
how international legitimacy should be studied. 
This was put into context in Corneliu Bjola's related analysis in which the author provides a 
literature overview of the approaches to be found on the study of international legitimacy-10 
The author highlights that seminal scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Ian Clark, Richard 
Falk, and Andrew Hurrell have all put forward alternative approaches to the study of 
international legitimacy, which, it is claimed, reflect their epistemological position. " 
Attempting to provide some much needed clarity, the author suggests that this stems from 
scholars adopting a Weberian (descriptive), or Kantian (prescriptive), type of reasoning and 
that this has to be addressed in order to overcome the analytical-normative divide identified 
by Bjola. '2 Whilst this Weberian Kantian divide, would, in itself, provide enough food for 
thought, in Ian Clark's more recent publication, Clark goes beyond the two-fold framework 
provided by Bjola. Addressing the reluctance amongst IR scholars toward the study of 
international legitimacy, Clark states: 
9 Steh sentiment is to be found in David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, `Force and Legitimacy in World Politics', 
Review of International oie, special edition (vol. 31, supplement S 1,2005, pp. 3- 13). 
See Corneliu Bjola, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Bridging the Analytical-Normative Divide', Review of 
International Studies (vol. 34, no. 4,2008, pp. 627-644). 
Ibid, p. 629. 
12 Ibid. 
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This reluctance was no doubt reinforced by the bewildering variety of competing categories 
for conceptualizing legitimacy: empirical/normative; descriptive/prescriptive; a form of 
compliance, distinct from coercion, or self interest; input/output; substantive/procedural; 
representational/deliberative; legitimacy/legitimation/legitimization, and so on. When this 
entire spectrum of approaches is considered, we soon realize that legitimacy is less a single 
concept, and more a whole family of concepts, each pulling in potentially different 
directions. 13 
The statement underlines the two-fold problem in that the complexity involved in framing the 
study of legitimacy has in turn hindered scholarly research into the concept of international 
legitimacy. Those that have sought to engage with the concept have been faced with the 
challenge outlined here by Clark as it is clear that there are a number of different starting 
points for analysis. Noticeably, these competing approaches pull in different directions and 
one has to bear this in mind when engaging in a study of the concept. Despite the fact that 
such ontological, epistemological, and methodological debates go beyond the parameters of 
this chapter, they do help illustrate David Beetham and Christopher Lord's claim that the 
starting point in understanding international legitimacy should be to acknowledge the 
complexities involved. '4 
The challenge here is made even more problematic as this thesis aims to explore the 
relationship between two `essentially contested concepts' (genocide and international 
legitimacy). Having set out an understanding of genocide, I now utilise the understanding of 
international legitimacy put forward by Ian Clark in his work Legitimacy in International 
Society. '5 The work is of relevance because it approaches the study of international 
legitimacy from an English School perspective which notably aids this project's attempt to 
incorporate the study genocide into IR, via the English School. Moreover, the author 
provides a conceptually rich theoretical analysis that incorporates an in-depth empirical study 
on the evolution of international society from Westphalia right up until the post-9/11 
legitimacy crisis. To return to the array of conceptualisations presented above, Clark's study 
predominantly focuses on the `substantive' and `procedural' approaches to understanding 
international legitimacy. This distinction is outlined as Clark draws upon the understanding 
put forward by Beetham and Lord to explain that "rules may be deemed appropriate either 
because they emanate from a `rightful source of authority' (procedural), or because they 
14 Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 17. 
1s 
David Beetham and Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (New York: Longman, 1998), p. 5. Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford, 2005). 
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embody `proper ends as standards' (substantive)". 16 Whereas the former judges the 
legitimacy of a claim by assessing the procedure that underpins the outcome forged, the latter 
judges the legitimacy of a claim by assessing the claim's inherent worth. For example, in the 
context of debates over morality, a substantive approach would more commonly be 
associated with an appeal to natural law and the value of the claim made being judged on its 
perceived moral worth. However, a procedural approach would tend to focus more on how 
the claim made was procedurally constructed, for example, which actors were involved and 
what sort of consensus was forged on the claim being advanced. 
The intention here therefore, is not to engage in a more in-depth analysis of such debates as 
the focus of this thesis is not on international legitimacy as such, but on using international 
legitimacy as a conceptual tool for understanding the impact of genocide on international 
society. Unlike Chapter Three's focus on the concept of genocide this conceptual analysis 
does not attempt to deconstruct the concept of international legitimacy thereby engaging in a 
critical analysis of the "bewildering variety of competing concepts" listed by Clark. This is 
not to say that one can ignore the conceptual implications that arise from where one positions 
themselves in the relevant debate. For example, one cannot simply bracket one approach off 
from the others listed above in the hope of placing one's approach within a conceptual 
vacuum. As Clark explained above, all the approaches listed seem to have something in 
common, yet pull in different directions. Accordingly, one is seemingly left with a multi- 
dimensional approach to a multi-faceted concept. '? Within this complexity the relevant 
question still stands: what is international legitimacy? 
4.2 What Is International legitimacy? 
According to Clark, international legitimacy should be understood as a process rather than as 
a property. 18 It draws its value from a collective understanding being forged (which reveals 
the role of consensus), amongst the relevant actors involved (which reveals the role of 
power), over the role of legality, morality, and constitutionality in international society. 19 
16 Ibid, p. 18. '7 The idea of international legitimacy being a multi-faceted concept is taken from Andrew Hurrell, `Legitimacy 
and the Use of Force; can the Circle be Squared? ' Review of International Studies. special edition (vol. 31, 
supplement Si, 2005, pp. 15-32) p. 18. 
'" The brief overview here draws extensively on Clark; certain issues will then be addressed in more detail 
below. 
19 The norm of constitutionality refers to political expectations & mutual understandings in a more informal 
sense. This will be discussed below. 
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Significantly, Clark does not see international legitimacy as synonymous with either norm 
and instead claims that international legitimacy sits in a hierarchical position above the three 
norms. 20 As one would expect, morality, legality, and constitutionality are not fixed 
principles as the understandings that underpin these norms change over time. It is here that 
the role of power and consensus are of direct relevance. Since the anarchical realm is dogged 
by competing legal, moral, and constitutional claims, power and consensus play a pivotal role 
in that they help establish a collective understanding of these norms at the international level. 
With no world government, the reality of international relations is that those states with more 
power have more sway in shaping the international agenda. This does not mean that power, 
in itself, is enough as states still have to appeal to the legal, moral, and constitutional 
understandings that have been forged in order to gain a reasonable level of support for their 
actions. These collective understandings are therefore dependent not only on power, but on a 
"tolerable consensus" (to use Clark's phrase) being forged amongst the relevant actors 
involved (whoever they may be). A sufficient level of consensual support reflects a sufficient 
level of recognition between the actors involved, that the understanding being forged 
constitutes what Clark refers to as "rightful conduct" and "rightful membership". 21 The 
fulfilment of these two principles signifies that the relevant actors involved have been 
recognised as legitimate rights holders (rightful membership), and that a collective 
understanding of what constitutes legitimate practice has been forged (rightful conduct). 
Whilst this brief overview will be fleshed out in more detail below, it provides a framework 
for understanding international legitimacy and the idea of a legitimacy crisis. For example, if 
the relevant actors involved fail to forge a consensus over what role the three norms of 
morality, legality, and constitutionality, should play, international society is left with no 
collective understanding of what constitutes rightful conduct. As a result, states may voice 
opposing understandings of rightful conduct which, as one would expect, may see instability 
and conflict arise in international society. The problem, therefore, is not so much a tension 
arising between the three norms (this is to be expected), but the failure of the actors involved, 
to resolve the tension that arises. If states fail to resolve such tension then there remains no 
collective understanding to guide the conduct of states in the anarchical realm. The 
implications of which, can see conflict arise between states as they perceive each other's 
20 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society esp. chapter eleven. 21 Ibid, pp, 26-29. 
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conduct to be unjustifiable. Whilst this will be discussed in more detail throughout this 
thesis, it is clear that understanding and resolving any legitimacy crisis that emerges is 
therefore critical if international society is to increase the likelihood of long-term 
international stability. To return to the English School focus on the moral value of order in 
international relations, international stability is in the national interest of all states. 
4.2.1 The three norms 
Perhaps the most attractive quality to be found in Clark's understanding of international 
legitimacy is his idea that international legitimacy sits in a hierarchical position above the 
three norms of morality, legality, and constitutionality. International legitimacy draws its 
value from these three norms, yet should not be seen as synonymous with either one. At 
present, the discourse on international legitimacy continually refers to tensions arising 
between international legitimacy and morality and/or international legitimacy and legality. 
According to Clark, such understandings are misguided as international legitimacy does not 
have any independent value in its own right and therefore cannot `clash', as it were, with 
morality, legality or constitutionality. The approach here upholds the idea that international 
legitimacy should not be seen as synonymous with either norm. With this in mind, let us first 
consider the relationship between international legitimacy and the three norms of morality, 
legality, and constitutionality prior to analysing how power and consensus play a role in 
accommodating the understanding of these norms into international relations. 
The most common misuse of the term international legitimacy sees its meaning become 
synonymous with legality to the point that legal positivists marginalise the role of morality. 
However, scholars such as H. L. A. Hart have countered this legal positivist logic by 
highlighting the `internal aspects' of law, thereby referring to the normative motivations that 
underpin the construction of law which in turn help create its perceived moral value within 
society. 22 From this perspective laws endure precisely because they have a compliance pull 
in that people value the perceived standard of behaviour that the law promotes. 23 This is not 
to suggest that laws have causal power as it is evident that states, just like individuals, will 
break the law at times. The point is that actors usually abide by the rule of law because they 
22 H. L. A. Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). " Ibid, p. 56. For a relevant analysis of Hart's position within the broader context of international legitimacy 
we, Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
chapter eleven. 
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perceive that these rules embody a legal and moral value. As Armstrong and Farrell explain, 
"individuals do not obey law simply because they are compelled to do so but because they are 
persuaded of its necessity, utility or moral value". 24 Such logic highlights the interrelated 
nature of legality and morality and helps explain why laws are constructed, changed, and 
abolished. To take this latter point, it is clear that laws are often abolished, not because they 
are illegal, but because they are perceived to be immoral. Such understanding helps explain 
why international legitimacy should not be viewed as synonymous with international law and 
instead should be viewed as a collective understanding that draws its value from more than 
just international law. As Clark explains, "legitimacy is one vehicle for redefining legality, 
by appeal to other norms". 25 It is here that we have to consider the other norms of morality 
and constitutionality in the construction of international legitimacy. 
If legality and morality cannot be divorced from one another, then just as with legality, one 
cannot attempt to prioritise morality to the point that it becomes synonymous with 
international legitimacy. To explain this I raise the recent revival of the just war tradition. 
Whilst the theory can be used in many ways, 26 Michael Walzer's analysis of the recent Iraq 
War is of specific relevance: 
So, is this a just war? The question is of a very specific kind. It doesn't ask whether the war 
is legitimate under international law or whether it is politically or militarily prudent to fight it 
now (or ever). It asks only if it is morally defensible: just or unjust? I leave law and strategy 
to other people. 27 
The marginalisation of legality in Walzer's analysis seemingly implies international 
legitimacy can be constructed on legal grounds as well as moral grounds, or alternatively, 
morality should be prioritised to the point that it becomes synonymous with international 
legitimacy. The limitation of this approach is that in Walzer's construction of justice, the 
author fails to acknowledge the morality embedded in existing laws. In marginalising the 
role of law, Walzer's understanding of justice is constructed upon a false narrative. 28 One 
has to factor in, not just legality, but also constitutionality in order to gain a more informed 
I David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, `Force and Legitimacy in World Politics', Review of International 
Studies , special edition (vol. 31, supplement S1,2005, pp. 3- 13), p. 5 2 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society. p. 211. Emphasis in original. I See an excellent discussion of Paul Ramsey's, Michael Walzer's and the United States Catholic Bishop's 
alternative use of the theory in James, T. Johnson, Morali and Contemporary W rfar . (Londo n: Yale University Press, 2001) pp. 76-96. 
27 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 160. 28 Clark makes a similar point here as he questions the mainstream view that tends to treat just war and legitimate war as synonymous with each other, see Clark, LeQitimacy in International Society, p. 209. 
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understanding of the international context in which morality operates. This latter point is 
raised by Corneliu Bjola: "the just war theory faces a serious problem - its standards of 
evaluation of the legitimacy of military interventions are conspicuously disconnected from 
the political context in which decisions about the use of force are taken". 29 By drawing on 
the political context of the anarchical realm, Bjola rightly claims that the political sphere can 
have an impact upon the norm of morality within the legitimacy process. It seems clear that 
morality cannot be simply bracketed off from legal and political considerations. In raising 
how the political context helps shape standards of international legitimacy, Bjola brings us 
aptly on to the norm of constitutionality raised by Clark. 
The norm of constitutionality refers to the political context in which international society 
operates at any given time. Again, constitutionality should not be seen as independent from 
the norms of legality and morality but intertwined within the legitimacy process. The term 
itself is somewhat ambiguous and needs clarification. As Clark explains: 
This third norm to be considered is the most overtly political, that of constitutionality. This is 
the realm neither of legal norms, nor of moral prescriptions. Instead, it is the political realm 
of conventions, informal understandings, and mutual expectations. 30 
Clark's use of the term constitutionality is less formal than conventional understandings of 
constitutionality. Within an ever changing security environment, what is deemed to be 
politically acceptable at the international level is not just a product of morality or legality but 
also of circumstance. Essentially, Clark utilises the norm of constitutionality to capture how 
morality and legality do not fully account for how states construct a shared understanding of 
international legitimacy. Attempting to illustrate this point, Clark states: "Russia found itself 
accepting things in the 1990s-such as a unified Germany within NATO-that would have been 
inconceivable a few years earlier". 31 The norm of constitutionality, therefore, draws on the 
implications that can arise out of the day-to-day developments in international relations. One 
is reminded here of Robert Jackson's analysis of norms in international relations: "foreign 
policy must always operate within what Edmund Burke termed `the empire of 
29 Corneliu Bjola, `Legitimating the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action 
Perspective, ' European Journal of International Relations (vol. 11, no. 2,2005, pp. 266-303), p. 270. For an 
overview on the current state of just war theory see Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars. From Cicero to Iran 
Cambridge: Polity, 2008), esp. pp. 117 - 135. 
Clark, timacy in International Society. p. 220. 
31lbid, p. 221. 
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circumstances"9.32 The norm of constitutionality seemingly to captures this sentiment as it 
draws on the formal and informal realities of the anarchical realm which play an integral role 
(along with morality and legality) in shaping the construction of international legitimacy. 
This is not to say that the three norms in themselves are enough and it is here that the roles of 
power and consensus have to be factored in. 
4.2.2 Power and consensus 
In their simplest form, power and consensus can be thought of as factors which help the 
transition from the process to the practice of legitimacy. Clark provides a succinct overview 
of the legitimacy framework outlined above and to be discussed below when he states: 
Normatively, legitimacy can be most helpfully thought of as that political space marked out by 
the boundaries of legality, morality, and constitutionality. At any point in time, it is 
constrained by the prevailing conceptions drawn from these three areas. However, since these 
often `pull' normatively in incompatible directions, there needs to be an accommodation 
struck amongst them. The practice of legitimacy describes this process, as the actors reach for 
a tolerable consensus on how these various norms are to be reconciled and applied in any 
particular case. 33 
The statement reiterates much of the understanding already discussed whilst going one step 
further to highlight the role that power and consensus play in reconciling the differences that 
arise between the three norms. Since the collective understandings that underpin the three 
norms change over time, power and consensus play a pivotal role in accommodating the 
different legal, moral, and constitutional perspectives into an internationally agreed code of 
conduct. This is evident as the two principles of rightful conduct and rightful membership 
are fulfilled. Prior to analysing these, let us consider the role of power in the construction of 
international legitimacy. 
With regard to the role of power it is important to address the state-centric approach 
embodied within English School theory. Accordingly, when international legitimacy is 
discussed in this context, states are identified as the most relevant actors in the construction 
of international legitimacy. Conversely, those that approach IR from a more revolutionary 
perspective may claim that it is illegitimate to consider states as the relevant actors in 
international relations. For example, Richard Falk clams that such state-centric approaches 
do not take into account the rise of non-state actors both as participants of, and challengers to, 
32 This citation is taken from Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant. Human Conduct in a World of States. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 20. 
33 Clark, `Legitimacy in International Society', pp. 19-20. 
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the current world order. 34 The point made by Falk is valid in that non-state actors certainly 
have relevance in international relations. The question remains however, how much 
relevance do they have to the formulation of international legitimacy? To use Falk's claim 
regarding the participation of non-state actors, it seems that whilst non-state actors such as 
the World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum may help shape international 
society's understanding of rightful conduct, they do so by going through states. States may 
listen to such non-state actors which highlights that they do not act exclusively of other 
actors, but ultimately they take the hands on role in constructing international legitimacy. 
Essentially, despite the challenges made by non-state actors, states remain in the driving seat 
and whilst they may take on board the opinion of passengers, they determine the direction 
that international relations are steered in. Of course, this may change in the future (notably 
Falk rightly points out the role of non-state actors in challenging the current world order), yet, 
it seems clear that states remain the more powerful actors in international relations and 
therefore remain the most relevant actors in the construction of international legitimacy. 35 
The focus here is on the `top down' construction of international legitimacy by states in 
international society rather than the `bottom-up' construction of international legitimacy by 
non-state actors in world society. 36 
At the same time it is important to note that the focus on power within the legitimacy process 
does not lead this analysis to marginalise the role of morality, legality, and constitutionality. 
Classically, the focus upon power in realism and neo-realism has seen the role of norms given 
little causal significance; in this sense, international legitimacy can often be seen as a product 
of power politics. 37 The problem with such understanding is not that power is not important, 
but that power in itself is not enough. For instance, in Vassilis Fouskas's and Bulent Gokay's 
critique of US imperialism, the authors state, "asserting a claim to power in itself has no 
34 Richard Falk, Achieving Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 17. For further such analysis see, John 
S. Dryzek, Deliberative Den cracv And Beyond. Liberals. Critics. Contestations (New York: Oxford, 
University Press, 2000), esp. chapter four. 
's For example, lean-Marc claims that states are the primary right holders whilst acknowledging that there are 
other actors with a voice which dictates that one should not see the primacy of the state as a given, see Jean- 
Marc Coicaud, `Deconstructing International Legitimacy', in Charlesworth and Coicaud, (ed. ), Fault Lines of 
jorm&IW giiimucy, p. 53. 
Ian Clark has produced an entire volume dedicated to this latter aspect and in doing so highlights that 
international society does not necessarily exercise fall control over its own legitimacy agenda, see Clark 
bternational Leery and World Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
For an analytical overview upon the role of norms within the study of international relations see Thomas 
Ward, The Ethics of Destruction. Norms and Force in International Relations (London: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), chapter one. 
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power if circumstances make it plain that such power does not exist". 38 Essentially, the 
authors underline the role of constitutionality as they highlight that even the most powerful 
state has to accept that its power operates within the aforementioned "empire of 
circumstance" (to us Burke's phrase). Intriguingly, Barak Obama put this into the context 
when he claimed that without legitimacy, America would lack the power it needed to renew 
American leadership. 39 From this perspective, legitimacy is not borne out of power alone 
because for authority to be recognised as legitimate, other factors such as morality, help 
shape how that power is perceived 40 This feeds back into the understanding set out in 
Chapter Two in that English School scholars place the centrality of power within a normative 
framework to highlight that power can be both enabled and constrained by norms such as 
morality and legality. As Nicholas J. Wheeler's boldly asserted: "state actions will be 
constrained if they cannot be justified in terms of plausible legitimate action" 41 The term 
plausible is pivotal here as implies that states have to appeal to the norms of morality, 
legality, and constitutionality in order to justify their actions. If, for whatever reason, states 
fail to justify their actions, then their actions will be constrained as they will fail to win over 
enough support at the international level. 
This aptly brings us onto the final aspect of consensus, which is perhaps the most complex 
and problematic dimension. As Clark questions, does legitimacy spawn consensus or is the 
other way round? 42 Whilst these polarities stand in sharp contrast to each other, they are 
nonetheless both plausible. Within this complexity, Clark identifies three approaches. 
Primarily, the more substantive position advocates the idea that legitimacy spawns consensus. 
Appealing to ideas such as natural law or jus cogens, the premise here is that the legitimacy 
of the claim made is dependent upon its intrinsic value. Any agreement forged merely 
reflects the `truth' that existed prior to the agreement being struck: "From this point of view, 
'a Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay. The New American Imperialism: Bush's War on Terror and Blood for O, (London: Praeger Security International, 2005), p. 13. 39 Barack Obama, Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (Edinburgh: Cannongate 
Books, 2007), p. 371. This would obviously tie in with Joseph Nye's seminal focus on "soft power", see Nye, 
40 
0 Power. The Means For Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
For such analysis see, Habermas discussion of in Juergen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis translated by 
Thomas McCarthy, (London: Heinemann, 1976). pp. 95-102. Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, `Power and 
Security', in Brown with Ainley, Understanding International Relations. third edition (New York: Palgrave, 
2005), chapter five. Andrew Hurrell, `Legitimacy and the use of Force', p. 22. 41 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 2000), p. 4. ., 
42 Clark, Legitimacy in International_ p. 3. 
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the international political process is tantamount to a seminar in which truth will eventually 
out, and become the foundation of international policy". 43 This sees international legitimacy 
as something that is "teased out" rather than something that is "worked in". 44 The idea that 
legitimacy has to be "worked in" to the legitimacy process brings us onto the second 
perspective as it suggests that legitimacy is forged not by appealing to some external `truth' 
but the procedural reality that an agreement has been struck amongst the relevant actors 
involved. Finally, Clark offers a third perspective, which is that of the political and overtly 
more pragmatic stance in that advocates believe that consensus should be privileged because 
of the procedural benefit it offers international society. 45 
To put this into context, let us consider the fable of the man who was laughed at because he 
believed the world was round. The story suggests that at some point in history, one man 
claimed that the world was round rather than flat and in doing so he challenged the 
mainstream consensus. Let us take it for granted that this person was the only person in the 
world that believed the world to be round: was his claim legitimate? From a substantive 
perspective, one may claim that the value of the claim depended not on the level of support 
gained, but on the value of the claim itself. In sharp contrast, from a procedural perspective, 
one may argue that unless this claim is supported by some procedural process then this 
cannot be considered as legitimate. Finally, the more pragmatic stance would tend to claim 
that since the vast majority considered the claim to be illegitimate, then the claim should be 
understood as illegitimate because of the pragmatic benefit that consensus offers international 
order. The interesting point to this fable is that the claim made was a matter of empirical fact 
(although not known at the time). As a result, one would expect that the man could have 
scientifically proven his claim which would validate the substantive approach as well as 
increase the likelihood of a consensus emerging which would have supported the claim made 
from a pragmatic -stance. The more pressing problem, therefore, arises when international 
society is faced, not with scientific claims, but with moral ones. If one person claimed that 
their position was the moral position, would this claim have any legitimacy? 
Now quite obviously, the fable does not answer the question of whether legitimacy spawns 
consensus or consensus legitimacy. Yet it does begin to highlight complexities involved, for 
43 Ibid, p. 192. 
µ Ibid, pp. 191-192. 
45 Ibid, p. 194. 
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example, Clark notes that "consensus touches upon legitimacy in both the substantive and 
procedural senses". 46 It would seem that the relationship between international legitimacy 
and consensus cannot be addressed from purely a substantive, procedural, or pragmatic 
perspective. With regard to the former, one is reminded of the realist fear that moral claims 
in themselves cannot be the guiding force of international relations. With no world 
government to make a judgement on competing moral claims then it seems evident that one 
cannot rule out the role of consensus. However, it also seems clear that consensus in itself is 
not enough. For instance, it is quite plausible that the permanent five members of the UN 
Security Council (P5) could use their power to manipulate a political consensus that other 
states believe to be immoral. In such a context, the states that oppose the political consensus 
forged may appeal to the three norms within the legitimacy process in order to try and gain 
further support at the international level. Again, an array of complexities arise in such 
circumstances. One could perhaps make the point that the debate over intent within the 
concept of genocide and the debate over consensus within the concept of international 
legitimacy highlight just why these two concepts are regarded as essentially contested 
concepts for it is difficult to perceive how such debates can ever be resolved. The 
overarching point is that whilst the debate regarding consensus and legitimacy will continue, 
one has to acknowledge the interplay between consensus, power, morality, legality, and 
constitutionality in the construction of international legitimacy. 
4.2.3 Rightful conduct and rightful membership 
When the norms of morality, legality, and constitutionality are entrenched at the international 
level, this signifies that Clark's two principles of "rightful conduct" and "rightful 
membership" have been fulfilled. The fulfilment of these two principles signifies that a 
collective understanding has been forged amongst the relevant actors involved. For example, 
the Geneva Conventions act as the procedural face that embodies the legal, moral, and 
constitutional understanding of what constitutes rightful conduct in the context of war. 
Whilst the fulfilment of such principles should not be considered as some sort of final stage 
(international legitimacy is an on-going process), they indicate that "global standards of 
legitimacy" (to use Linklater's phrase) have been established. The fulfilment of these 
46 Ibid, p. 191. 
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principles is therefore extremely important as it is through establishing such collective 
understandings that the likelihood of international stability is increased. 
The principle of rightful conduct is relatively straightforward in its meaning. As raised in 
Chapter Two, international society constructs collective understandings of what constitutes 
rightful conduct which are expressed via norms, values, principles, and institutions in 
international relations. Going back to the idea put forward by Linklater, states establish 
global standards of legitimate behaviour through communicative dialogue. States appeal to 
such understandings when attempting to justify their behaviour, which in turn, underpins the 
English School belief that such collective understandings work to enable and/or constrain the 
behaviour of states within the anarchical realm, thereby creating a high level of international 
order. It is from this perspective that we see how international legitimacy increases the 
likelihood of international stability as such collective understandings help shape (rather than 
cause) state behaviour. 47 As will be discussed in Chapter Five, the UN Charter plays a central 
role in international relations as the understandings embodied within it, play an integral role 
in shaping international society's contemporary understandings of rightful conduct. 
To put this principle into practice let us consider the legitimacy of the 19th century slave 
trade. At least from a procedural perspective, the slave trade was at some point deemed to be 
legitimate in that it was recognised as lawful, constitutional, and morally acceptable. Whilst 
those being traded may not have shared this view, they had no power to question the 
consensus forged amongst the powerful actors involved. Yet it is clear that at some point in 
time, the legitimacy of the slave trade came under intense scrutiny. 48 Essentially, a tension 
arose within the legitimacy process between the norms of morality and legality as the actors 
involved questioned the moral value of a law that permitted the trade of human beings. As 
the norms of legality and morality clashed it was imperative that a new consensus was forged 
that could establish whether the law could be altered accordingly. The subsequent abolition 
of the slave trade signified that what had previously been thought of as rightful conduct was 
now deemed to be wrongful conduct. A tolerable consensus had been forged amongst the 
relevant actors involved. This consensus embodied a new legal, moral, and constitutional 
perspective. The example therefore illustrates the transition between the process and practice 
47 As discussed in Chapter Two, the English School does not focus on the causal power of norms. " For an analysis which highlights the relationship between international and world society see, Clark, 
International Legitimacy and World Society. chapter two. 
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of international legitimacy. A consensus had to be struck amongst the relevant actors 
concerned in order to fulfil the principle of rightful conduct which in turn permitted an 
alternative international practice to be deemed legitimate. Consequently, such understanding 
highlights how international legitimacy could touch upon both substantive and procedural 
elements. With regard to the latter one could highlight how the slave trade was deemed to be 
legitimate and then illegitimate because the relevant actors involved deemed it to be so. 
However, one could also question why the actors involved altered their views in the first 
place in an attempt to highlight the inherent moral value of abolishing the slave trade. 
This brings us onto the second principle of rightful membership which essentially acts to 
reveal who is, and who is not, accepted as a rightful member of international society. Within 
Clark's historical study, it is clear that polities, states, and empires have had to pass certain 
tests to gain membership status. 49 This underlines the relationship between rightful conduct 
and rightful membership as states are accepted into the `family of nations' when their conduct 
is considered to be rightful. Since the Second World War, for example, the number of UN 
members has increased from 51 in 1945, to 159 by the end of the Cold War and 192 by the 
time of writing. Amidst this expansion of international society, states have increasingly 
`signed up' to the codes of conduct set out by states, for example, in the UN Charter. The 
willingness of states to adhere to such codes of conduct reiterates the idea that states are 
willing to be bound by certain rules of co-existence, which for Clark, reflects the fact that an 
international society does exist. 
However, the use of the term rightful membership in this thesis is notably different. 
Primarily, Clark's use of the term stems from his attempt to study the historical evolution of 
international society as it has undergone noticeable changes in the post-Westphalian era. 
Whilst this study does not dispute this focus, it is clear that the focus of this thesis is 
noticeably different as the objective here is to solely study the impact of genocide on the 
current world order. What is of specific interest here then is the two circles of rightful 
membership that were established within the construction of the UN. As will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter, international society is indeed made up of states; however, 
five of these members have been granted a privileged status in international relations. Of 
course, here I am referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
49 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society p. 27 
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(UNSC). Essentially, the establishment of these five elite members has seen a hierarchy 
established within the principle of rightful membership as whilst there are now 192 states 
recognised as rightful members of international society, only five are rightful members of the 
UN Security Council in the permanent sense. These five rightful members notably stand as 
the rightful authority with regard the use of force in international relations. It is the tension 
therefore that can arise between these two membership circles within the present construction 
of international society that is of specific interest to this thesis. 
Notably, there is scope for taking Clark's understanding as it is with its focus on the 
membership of international society as a whole unit and the tests that states pass in order to 
achieve rightful membership status. For example, a study could be done on whether 
perpetrator states and/or bystander states should be marginalised from international society. 
To use the idea of a test, then a `genocide test' could be used to discredit a state's right to 
have rightful membership status. Essentially, such rationale underpins the present debate 
over the potential establishment of a league of democracies as it is claimed that membership 
of international society should be restricted to those states that pass the `democratic test'. 
From a legitimacy perspective, the problem with such an approach is that it tends to place too 
much focus on morality, which remains a highly subjective concept. Within this democracy 
debate, it seems clear that China and Russia cannot be simply left out of the decision making 
process when the reality is that the relationship between the US and China will be one of the 
determining features of 21 `t century international relations. Again, with genocide, there is no 
consensus regarding the attempt to implement a `genocide test' whereby perpetrator states 
would be excluded from international society. Complexities would naturally arise regarding 
the question of bystander states. Whilst such an approach has potential, this is not the focus 
of this thesis. To be clear then, when the term rightful membership is used, its use here refers 
to the two membership circles that were established within the construction of the UN. The 
point of interest for the study of genocide is the tension that can arise between these two 
membership groups with regard to who acts as the rightful authority overseeing the legitimate 
use of force in international relations. 
These two principles will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter as the chapter will 
start with a focus on the role of the UN in relation to the principles of rightful conduct and 
rightful membership. In essence, it will be claimed that genocide exposes the tension to be 
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found in international society's understanding of rightful membership and rightful conduct. 
In failing to confront the crime of genocide, international society fails to resolve the tension 
that arises and in doing so undermines the authority of the UN and the UNSC which 
destabilises the ordering structure of international society. Whilst a more in-depth study of 
the UN will be addressed in the next chapter, at this point the reader may be rightly asking 
the question: why is genocide so important? Quite clearly, the UN fails to fulfil many of its 
duties, responsibilities, and obligations in international relations. To gauge this it is important 
to address the relationship between genocide and the three norms that help make up 
international legitimacy. 
4.3 Genocide and international legitimacy 
Having set out an understanding of international legitimacy let us now re-engage with the 
claim that genocide holds a special relationship with international legitimacy. To gauge this, 
it is important to address the relationship between genocide and the three norms of morality, 
legality, and constitutionality. As stated, international legitimacy draws its value from these 
three norms, which can change over time and even clash with each other on certain 
occasions. The intention here therefore is to make the case that genocide is internationally 
regarded as the "crime of crimes" from a legal and moral perspective, yet critically remains a 
low priority in policymaking which highlights the problematic relationship between genocide 
and constitutionality. In turn, political expectations do not meet the legal and moral 
expectations of international society, the impact of which will then be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
4.3.1 Genocide and morality 
On first consideration, the idea that genocide is immoral seems obvious. Indeed, it seems 
frustrating to even contemplate that one has to justify just why genocide is bad, yet it is clear 
that one has to. As Jonathan Glover explains, the 20th century has seen a crisis emerge over 
the authority of morality and the idea of moral progress. S° With the legacy of Nietzsche, and 
his foretold `death of God' looming large, it seems that the Hobsbawm "age of extremes", 
has been accompanied by an age of increasing amoralism and moral relativism. 51 The crime 
S0 
51 
Jonathan Glover, Humanity A Moral History of the Twentieth Cent (London: Pimlico, 2001). 
The title was famously used to refer to the crises that emerged within the modem state system between 1914- 1991. Eric Hobsbawm, The A¢e of Extremes The Short Tarenbeth Century. 1914 1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994). 
106 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
of genocide has not escaped such challenges as critics question how we can validate any 
moral judgements made - even toward events such as the Holocaust. 
52 In his attempt to 
answer Nietzsche, Glover accepts that the prospect of reviving the belief in moral law is dim 
as he questions the external validation of moral claims. 
53 Without external validation, the 
author proposes that we can either abandon morality or re-create it. 
54 Adopting the latter 
position Glover intriguingly uses case studies of genocide and mass violence to support his 
argument. It would seem that there is something about genocide that fundamentally 
challenges moral relativism. Perhaps this is best illustrated as Glover recalls that he was part 
of a group of British philosophers that once travelled to Auschwitz on a bus. He claims that 
on the way there a philosophical discussion arose regarding issues such as the rationality of 
such acts. Intriguingly, Glover goes onto state that on the journey back from Auschwitz: "we 
were silent". 55 Summarising the state of mind that many must have felt when confronting the 
reality of genocide the author concludes: "No ethical reflections, no thoughts, seem 
adequate". 56 
One gets the impression here that Glover struggles to comprehend the scale of horror 
embodied in Auschwitz. In essence, there is no easy way to convey the something about 
genocide that disturbs us so much. This is a common problem as both scholars and survivors 
have struggled to represent the horror to be found within genocide. This point is raised in 
Martin Gilbert's analysis of the Holocaust entitled `The Most Horrible of All Horrors', as the 
author explains that neither words, nor statistics, nor examples, can adequately convey the 
suffering involved in the Holocaust. 57 Within just months of leaving Auschwitz, Primo Levi 
was all too familiar with this problem as he struggled to bear witness to the events that he 
himself had witnessed: 
Then for the first time we became aware that our language lacks words to express this offence, 
the demolition of man. In a moment, with almost prophetic intuition, the reality was revealed 
to us: we had reached the bottom It is not possible to sink lower than this; no human 
condition is more miserable that this nor could it be conceivably so. " 
s= Glover recalls the work of Jean Amory to highlight that those who personally witnessed the Nazi "festival of 
cruelty" often felt that they had a responsibility to answer Nietzsche directly, may, p. 40. 
"' Ibid. p. 41. 
54 Obviously the idea of re-creating an understanding of morality is nothing new. For such analysis, see John. L. 
Mackie, Ethics: JLySg ins Right Kid Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977). 
ss Glover, EWMxWj% p. 398. ss Ibid. 
"See Martin Gilbert; The Holocaust The Jewish Tragedy (Glasgow: William Coning, 1987), p. 419. so Primo Levi, If This is A Man (London: Abacus, 2009), pp. 32-33. 
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Primarily the statement touches upon the limitations of language which remains a common 
feature within the discourse on genocide. 59 Yet the idea put forward by Levi, regarding "the 
bottom", offers a highly interesting take on genocide from a moral perspective. Whilst one 
can find an abundance of terms and phrases utilised within the discourse to describe 
genocide, the description of genocide as "the bottom" seems to provide an apt portrayal. 
From a moral perspective, can we, as human beings, sink any lower? 
The problem with such rationale is that it is built upon the premise that there is `a bottom'. 
For moral relativists, Glover's aforementioned acceptance that the revival of moral law is 
doubtful highlights that even the act of genocide cannot escape the debate surrounding moral 
relativism. As John W. Cook explains, the principal advocates of the moral relativist doctrine 
have tended to be anthropologists who claim that "their studies of various cultures have 
enabled them to show that morality is relative to culture, which implies, amongst other 
things, that we cannot rightly pass moral judgements on members of other cultures except by 
our own cultural standards, which may differ from ours". 
60 Moral relativists claim that the 
foundations of morality stem from one's cultural experiences rather than any universal moral 
law. As a result, the question, who are we to judge?, naturally arises. Any attempt to judge, 
leads the moral relativist to claim that those seeking to judge are behaving in an ethnocentric 
manner. By this it is meant that those who judge, use their cultural understanding of 
morality, as the benchmark by which to assess the moral behaviour of others. 61 It is here that 
it is worth noting that the moral relativist doctrine reflects the ontological and 
epistemological perspectives that knowledge claims regarding morality cannot be constructed 
in the same manner as knowledge claims regarding science. 62 Moral relativists claim that it is 
impossible to discover objective moral facts. The foundations, therefore, that underpin 
universal moral claims are seen to be highly subjective rather than universal. From this 
perspective, moral relativists come to the somewhat stark conclusion that pain, distress, 
59 The validity of knowledge claims within this field is a highly interesting yet controversial topic. Mark Roseman notably presented an excellent paper on aspects related to the validity of survivor knowledge claims 
and the narrative produced by such knowledge claims. Mark Roseman, "Can Victims Make Sense of their 
Perpetrators? Narratives from the Holocaust", at The Centre for the Study of Genocide and Mass Violence, The 
University of Sheffield, (11/04/2010). For an insightful analysis see Alan Rosen Sounds of Defiance: The 
Holocaust. Multilira uA ' the Problem of Eng sh (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005 ). 60 John, W. Cook, Morality and Cultural Differences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3. 61 For a discussion of relativism and ethnocentrism, see Ibid, chapter eight. 62 Cook draws upon the seminal work of Melville Herskovits to claim that the empirical knowledge claims made by cultural relativists underpins the 'Fully Developed Argument' of moral relativism, see p. 11. 
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misery, agony, and other forms of such suffering, are acceptable when they are part of an 
established way of life. 
Within this discourse, Cook emphasises that the debate regarding moral relativism is not just 
some abstract philosophical argument, but that people have to make practical moral choices 
and therefore judge each moral claim on a case by case basis. 63 An important point here is 
that Cook differentiates between cases of practice that involve willing participants as opposed 
cases of practices against unwilling participants " With regard to the former, the author uses 
the well known example of Eskimos leaving their elders outside to freeze to death. Although 
this, at first, seems strikingly immoral, when one learns that the elders are willing participants 
in this practice, it becomes harder to judge this as an immoral practice. 65 Now obviously one 
could invoke ideas such as positive and negative freedom to discuss the issue of willing 
participation within such contexts further. However, the more pressing point here regards 
those that practice acts against unwilling participants as it is clear that genocide stands as a 
benchmark example, in the extreme, of such action, as states impose their collective will 
upon unwilling participants. The term participant in this latter context seems somewhat 
misplaced as unwilling participants in the context of genocide surely qualify as victims. 
Drawing upon much of the sentiment to be found in just war theory, Cook goes onto pose the 
point that if we have the capacity to intervene (militarily or otherwise) and reduce the amount 
of suffering involved then do we not have a moral duty to do so? 
This line of thinking is familiar in the debate over humanitarian intervention as scholars 
debate whether there is a moral threshold at which the legality of sovereignty can be 
overridden in international society. As Michael Walzer succinctly stated: "How much human 
suffering are we prepared to watch before we intervene? "66 Notably, Walzer first posed this 
question in 1977, the subsequent Rwandan genocide that took place in 1994 demonstrated 
that international society is quite prepared to watch a genocidal level of suffering unfold. 
63 It would seem here that Cook is adopting what Steven Lukes would describe as an internal approach. Lukes 
stipulates that there are two ways of thinking about morality, internal and external. The internal approach is to 
view morality in the first-person perspective; one judges what is moral in the practical sense by claiming what 
would constitute an immoral act against oneself. The external position, which is more commonly associated 
with anthropology, is to try and view morality from a third person perspective. See Steven Lukes, Moral 
(London: Profile Books, 2008), pp17 - 19. 64Ibid, p. 165-166. 
65 Ibid 
66 Michael Walzer, Just and Uniust Wars. a moral arawnent with historical illustrations. third edition (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000), p. xii. 
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From this perspective, Walzer's line of inquiry should be reformulated: How much suffering 
should we not be prepared to watch before we intervene? Michael Walzer famously set the 
benchmark as those crimes which "shock the conscience of humankind", as he advocated 
intervention that prevented or put a stop to any "supreme humanitarian emergency". 
67 In 
doing so, Walzer upheld a minimalist approach as he reduced the debate over absolute 
morality and universal human rights down to a discussion of absolute immorality and 
universal human wrongs. 
68 In Walzer's analysis of a supreme humanitarian emergency, it is 
clear that genocide represented a benchmark example as the author claimed that even the 
violation of innocent lives was justified within the context of stopping Nazism 
69 It would 
seem, therefore, that there is something about a state destroying a group, not because of 
anything they have done, but because of whom they are, that represents a quintessential 
violation of a universal moral minimalism. 
70 
Of interest here is the fact that even moral relativists have struggled to apply their doctrine to 
the behaviour of genocidal regimes. 7' This is put into stark context in Robert Redfield's 
analysis, which was notably published in 1953: 
I am persuaded that cultural relativism is in for some difficult times. Anthropologists are 
likely to find the doctrine a hard one to maintain.... It was easy to look with equal benevolence 
upon all sorts of value systems so long as the values of unimportant little people remote from 
our own concerns. But the equal benevolence is harder to maintain when one is asked to 
anthropolgize the Nazis. 72 
The statement seemingly turns moral relativism in on itself as it highlights how a moral 
relativist position may actually embody an ethnocentric ethic. The statement implies that the 
67 Such understanding has been reiterated since, see Wheeler, Saving Strangers. p. 50. 
" The idea of human wrongs is put forward by Ken Booth, `Human Wrongs and International Relations', 
International Affairs (vol. 71. no. 1.1995, pp. 103 - 126). Human rights minimalists claim that the debate over 
universal human rights has suffered from `rights inflation' in that people think "if rights are good more rights 
must be even better". See, Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. the impoverishment of Political Discourse (New 
York: The Free Press, 1991), p 16. 
" Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chapter sixteen, esp. p. 253. 
70 The idea of moral minimalism is taken from Michael Walzer., Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and 
Abroad (Notra Dame: University of Notra Dame Press, 1994). Berel Lang states that the one of the two facets 
of evil embodied in genocide stems from the intent to destroy a group not because of anything they have done 
but simply because of who they are, see Berel Lang, `The Evil in Genocide', in John K. Roth, (ed. ), Genocide 
_UWMAZiA% 
chapter one. 
7' In is of Melville Herskovits, James Fernandez explains that whilst the Nazi atrocities towards the 
Jews, didn't cause Herskovits (who was a Jew) to abandon his intent to 'psychologically distance' himself from 
judging other civilisations, Herskovits never condoned Nazism and denounced it on many occasions. See James 
W. Fernandez, 'Tolerance in a Repugnant World and Other Dilemmas in the Cultural Relativism of Melville J. 
Herskovitz', Ethos (vol. 18. no. 2.1990, pp. 140 - 164), p. 148. 72 Cook, Morali and Cultural Differences, p. 184, footnote 2. 
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author viewed the suffering of Europeans as something qualitatively different from the 
suffering felt by "unimportant little people". Such a perspective poses a direct challenge to 
the moral relativist as it implies that when moral relativists study what they perceive to be 
`alien' cultures, they are more willing to accept `alien' behaviour, yet when these `alien' 
actions arise in a culture that they perceive to be less `alien' to them, the moral relativist 
struggles to come to terms with their own doctrine. Although the cultural relativist may 
claim that Redfield falls into the trap of making a habitual response that stems from cultural 
conditioning, the statement captures the reality that the author was shaken, as millions across 
the world were, by the horrors embodied within the Holocaust. 73 To use the moral relativist 
idea of each culture establishing its own unique understanding of `the good life', it is brutally 
evident that groups such as the Jews were experiencing `the good life' in Germany until the 
Nazis came along. The horror of genocide seemingly holds qualitative significance for the 
debate surrounding moral relativism as it turns the question of who are we to judge?, on its 
head - within such grave circumstances: who are we not to judge? 
It is with such understanding in mind that Stephen T. Davies claims "genocide is the reductio 
ad absurdum of moral relativism". 74 In essence, the author is making the assertion that there 
is something about genocide that is so inherently immoral that genocide proves moral 
relativism to be wrong. As the author goes onto explain, the strongest position that the moral 
relativist can take against genocide is to claim: "I hold genocide is morally wrong. Or 
perhaps, I hold, and my community holds, that genocide is wrong. But the problem is that 
such a position allows the perpetrator of genocide (a Nazi, perhaps) to reply: Sorry, but my 
community holds that genocide is morally right". 75 Significantly, Davies points out that if 
one takes moral relativism to its logical end, then the perpetrator of the genocide could utilise 
moral relativism to justify their policy of destruction. A point of interest worth noting here, is 
that genocidal perpetrators never actually utilise a morally relativist position to justify their 
actions. For example, the Nazis went to great lengths to cover up their destruction policy, 
which implies that they knew that their actions were morally indefensible within the broader 
73 For an insightfiil analysis into how people responded at the time to the Nazi horrors, see Joanne Reilly, 
Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Cantu (London: Routledge, 1998). 
74 Stephen T. Davies, `Genocide, Despair and Religious Hope', in John K. Roth, (ed. ), Genocide and Human. p. 
41. 
's Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
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context of international relations. 
76 Such a reality only goes to strengthen the conclusion 
drawn by Davies, that anyone upholding the doctrine of moral relativism within the context 
of genocide is "badly confused, malicious, or insane". 
77 The conclusion drawn by Davies 
brings us back to the idea of consensus as it is clear that those who uphold moral relativism 
within the context of genocide stand on the margins of world opinion. The role of consensus 
brings us back to the point that morality in itself is not enough to underpin international 
legitimacy. The relationship therefore between morality and consensus has to be considered. 
To consider this let us turn to Jack Donnelly's seminal study on Universal Human Rights, in 
which the author analyses the "anti-genocide norm" within the context of the debate 
surrounding humanitarian intervention. 
78 Re-iterating much of the sentiment raised above, 
the author claims, "Whatever one's moral theory-or at least across most of today's leading 
theories and principles- this kind of suffering cannot be morally tolerated". 
79 Again, in 
accepting that "most leading theories" denounce genocide (rather than all leading theories), 
the author leaves the door open for counter moral arguments to be raised. However, what is 
interesting about this analysis is that the author goes one step further as he raises the 
relationship between morality and consensus within the context of the debate over genocide 
and humanitarian intervention. In a striking passage, Donnelly explains: 
The interdependence of all human rights, and the underlying idea that human rights are about 
a life of dignity and not mere life, makes acting only against genocide highly problematic. We 
place ourselves in a morally paradoxical position of failing to respond to comparable or even 
greater suffering so long as it remains geographically or temporally diffuse. As 
uncomfortable as this may be, though, it seems to me the least indefensible option when we 
take into account the full range of moral, legal, and political claims in contemporary 
international society. In absence of a clear overlapping consensus-which I think exists today 
only for genocide-the moral hurdle of respect for the autonomy of political communities is 
very hard to scale 80 
The statement places genocide firmly within the understanding of international legitimacy 
presented above. Essentially, the author believes that there may be times when an amount of 
suffering, equal or greater to that of genocide occurs. This is his personal view, yet critically 
76 See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), pp. 621 - 624. 
This attempt to conceal was most explicit with the Nazi implementation of Operation 1005 from mid-1942 
onwards, in which, for example, special units were set up to destroy mass graves so that the evidence of 
extermination was also destroyed. See, Shmuel Spector, `Aktion 1005- Effacing the Murder of Millions', 
Ilocaust and Genociddies (vol. 5, no. 2,1990, pp. 157 - 173). 
77 Davies, `Genocide, Despair and Religious Hope', p. 41. 
78 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights. In Theory and Practice (London: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 
251. 
" Ibid. 
80 Ibid, p. 252. 
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(albeit reluctantly), he acknowledges the role that consensus plays in the construction of 
rightful conduct in international relations. It is here that genocide is of specific relevance as 
Donnelly claims that in a world dogged by competing moral, legal, and political claims, there 
exists an overlapping consensus only for genocide prohibition. 
The role of consensus raised by Donnelly brings us back to the idea of international 
legitimacy as it is clear that we can appeal to more than morality alone to dismiss the claims 
made by moral relativists. Whilst it may not be possible to disprove moral relativism in a 
scientific manner, it is possible to re-engage with the understanding of international 
legitimacy presented above to prove that moral relativism, at least within the context of 
genocide, is illegitimate and outside of common moral belief. The relationship between 
morality and consensus reflects the fact that genocide is internationally regarded as the 
benchmark of what constitutes a universal human wrong. It was the universal moral 
abhorrence felt toward the Nazi atrocities that led to international society accepting the term 
genocide and subsequently codifying this new moral and constitutional expectation into 
international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention embodies a clear legal, moral, and 
constitutional consensus that genocide constitutes wrongful conduct. However, genocide 
should not, and is not, viewed as just another example of wrongful conduct. The reason 
being that genocide is recognised as the quintessential violation of a universal moral 
minimalism. This brings us onto the idea that genocide is internationally recognised as the 
"crime of crimes" from both a moral and legal perspective. 
4.3.2 Genocide and legality 
Just as moral philosophers have constructed an understanding of a universal moral 
minimalism, international lawyers have constructed an understanding of a universal legal 
minimalism. The point of relevance here is that genocide is internationally accepted as the 
quintessential violation of both. 
To gauge international society's perception of genocide from a legal perspective, it is 
necessary to go back to the drafting of the 1948 Genocide Convention. 81 Intriguingly, the 
aforementioned relationship between morality and law was put into stark context within the 
drafting procedure. For instance, in 1946 the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Crime 
11 For a general overview see Jeffrey S. Morton and Neil V. Singh, 'The International Legal Regime on 
Genocide', Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 5, no. 1,2003, pp. 47 - 69). 
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of Genocide stated that genocide: "shocks the conscious of mankind" and went on to claim 
"The General Assembly, therefore affirms that genocide is a crime under international law 
which the civilized world condemns". 
82 The statement underlines the fact that it was the 
moral revulsion felt toward the Nazi genocide which lies at the heart of the international legal 
movement. The universal moral revulsion expressed in the 1946 General Assembly 
Resolution was reiterated throughout the subsequent drafting process as state representatives 
regularly spoke with a universal moral tongue when condemning the crime. For example, the 
Dominican Republic representative stated: "the moral tribunal of the world demanded the 
denunciation of genocide". 83 From a legitimacy perspective, therefore, it is clear that it was 
the moral revulsion felt toward the Nazi genocide that acted as the catalyst needed to alter 
international society's legal, moral, and constitutional expectations. Accordingly, the 1948 
Genocide Convention represents the procedural face of rightful conduct and in doing so 
highlights that genocide constitutes wrongful conduct. However, it is also clear that 
international legal perspectives toward genocide have gone much further than simply 
recognising genocide as wrongful conduct as they have sought to establish genocide as the 
"crime of crimes" in international law. 
To judge this it is important to go back to November 1950, when the UN General Assembly 
first approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ) amidst concerns over the ratification 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention. As Caroline Fournet explains, the ICJ ruled, "the 
principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations 
as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation". TM In doing so, the ICJ 
sought to give the crime of genocide a higher status than other crimes in international law as 
its ruling implied that genocide violates international peremptory norms (jus cogens). As 
Fournet explains, this has been reiterated in a series of judicial rulings including those made 
by the ICTY, ICTR and ICJ. 85 The theory ofjus cogens stipulates that there are peremptory 
norms in international relations, these exist whether states recognise them or not, and in turn 
B2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 (I). 'The Crime of Genocide'. (12/11/1946) 
httD: Hdaccessdds un. org/doC/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/03/47/IMG/N 003347 udfft iElement (Accessed 
15/08/08). 
83 For such primary analysis see Matthew Lippman, `A Road Map to the 1948 Genocide Convention', Journal of gjaQgI (vol. 4, no. 2,2002, pp. 177 - 195), esp. pp. 178-179. 
Caroline Fournet, 'The Universality of the Prohibition of Genocide, 1948-2008', International Criminal 
justice Review (vol. 19, no. 2,2009, pp. 132-149), p139, emphasis by Fournet. 8 Ibid, pp. 137 -141. 
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states cannot derogate from them. 86 For that reason, the idea of jus cogens does not sit 
comfortably with the idea that international law is constructed by states as it implies that 
states cannot evade the international legal arm of jus cogens, even if they were to try to 
through constructing specific treaties and/or conventions. As Fournet explains, despite the 
fact that the idea ofjus cogens was recognised in Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute and Article 
53 of the 1969 ' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, there remains little clarity 
regarding the sources and identity of these "supernorms". 87 This lack of clarity causes 
concern, especially for legal positivists, as it seemingly leaves the door open forjus cogens to 
be grounded on such notions as natural law, divine law or laws of humanity. 
The point here is not to engage in this unresolved legal debate, but to simply highlight the 
fact that the recognition ofjus cogens in international law, whether right or wrong, reflects 
the fact that international law has been constructed in a manner to suggest that there exists a 
hierarchy of norms in international law. 88 Writing in 1996, M. Cherif Bassiouni (who has 
served the UN in a number of legal capacities), stated that there is sufficient legal basis to 
conclude that "aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery 
and slave related practices and torture" are part ofjus cogens. 89 Whether right or wrong, the 
recognition of such crimes as holding greater legal resonance than others, underlines the point 
that international law has sought to establish a hierarchy of international crimes. Within this 
hierarchy, the increasing acceptance of pre-emptory norms reflects an attempt to construct a 
universal legal minimalism, from which no state can derogate (jus cogens). Such 
acknowledgement underlines the point that just as moral philosophers have constructed an 
understanding of a universal moral minimalism; international lawyers have constructed an 
understanding of a universal legal minimalism. Significantly, genocide is internationally 
accepted as the quintessential violation of both. 
"For a relevant overview see, Christian Tomuschat and Jean Marc Thouvenin. (eds. ), The Fundamental Rules 
of the International Leal Order. Jus Cogens and obligations &= Omnes (Leiden: Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2006). Alexander Orekhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University press, 
2006). 
87 Fournet, 'The Universality of the Prohibition of Genocide', p. 134. b° Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 'American Journal of International Law (vol. 100, 
no. 2,2006, pp. 291-323. See also, Lee M. Caplan, 'State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A critique 
of the Normative Hierarchy Theory', American Journal of International Law (vol. 97, no. 4,2003, pp. 741- 
781). 
s' M. Cherif, Bassiouni, 'International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes', Law and Contemporary 
Problems , (vol. 59, no. 4,1996, pp. 63 - 75), p. 68. 
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The legal acknowledgement of genocide as standing atop of the legal hierarchy was most 
forcibly recognised by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In 1998, in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda ruled that genocide is the "crime of crimes". 90 Essentially, the gravitas of this 
heinous crime drove the trial chamber to declare that in their opinion, genocide represents the 
gravest crime in international law. Whilst such a ruling does not represent international 
society as a whole, it has set a precedent that has since been upheld by seminal scholars in the 
field, as William Schabas explains: 
Human rights law knows many terrible offences: torture, disappearances, slavery, child 
labour, apartheid and enforced prostitution to name a few. For victims, it may seem appalling 
to be told that while these crimes are serious there are more serious crimes. But in any 
hierarchy, something must sit at the top. The crime of genocide belongs at the apex of the 
pyramid. It is, as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has stated so appropriately 
in its first judgements, the `crime of crimes' "91 
The statement highlights the somewhat tragic reality, that even within the context of human 
suffering, a hierarchy exists. Whist the intention here is not to overlook the horror embodied 
in these other crimes; when one juxtaposes the legal understanding put forward here, and the 
moral understanding outlined above, it is clear that genocide is internationally regarded as the 
"crime of crimes" from both a legal and moral perspective. 
It is worth pausing here to consider the four crimes identified by the 2005 Responsibility to 
Protect as the R2P stipulates that states have a responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Such crimes are 
omitted within the hierarchy presented by Schabas above, yet it is clear that these crimes have 
to be taken into consideration. Notably, all these crimes (apart from ethnic cleansing, which 
is not identified in international law) represent state crimes that are legally recognised as a 
violation of jus cogens. Essentially, they all signify a violation of a universal legal 
minimalism and many perpetrators have been charged on grounds of committing genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The point of interest here is that even within this 
90 UN Doc, `Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994', (A/54/315 
S/1999/943,07/09/1999), Available at http: //www. ictr. org/ENGLISII/annualreports/a54/9925571e. htm 
Accessed 23/08/2009. 
91 William, A. Schabas, Genocide and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 9. 
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grave context, it seems clear that genocide is still internationally regarded as the "crime of 
crimes" in that it sits in a hierarchical position above these other crimes. 
To put this into context, let us consider the conclusion put forward by the International 
Commission of Inquiry in to the events of Darfur. In January 2005, the Commission 
famously concluded that genocide had not been committed in Darfur but that crimes against 
humanity had. 92 As William Schabas explains, the conclusion drawn (that the Government of 
Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide), led to suggestions that the report was some kind 
of "whitewash or betrayal". 93 The suggestions of a whitewash or betrayal are quite 
fascinating as the Commission had ruled that crimes against humanity were occurring in 
Darfur. It would seem that the international outcry that followed the Commission's 
conclusion arose because it was generally felt that the recognition of crimes against humanity 
was not enough. Indeed, the Commission felt it necessary to qualify its ruling as it stated: 
"Depending upon the circumstances, such international offences as crimes against humanity 
or large scale war crimes may be no less seriousness and heinous than genocide". 94 Whilst 
the Darfur Commission had been set up to make a judgement on genocide, it is clear that the 
Commission, and the international response toward it, upheld the idea that genocide acts as 
the benchmark of human wrongs by which other human rights violations are measured by. 
This reaffirms the idea that genocide is internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from 
both a legal and moral perspective. It also reaffirms the relationship between morality and 
law as it is clear that it is the universal moral abhorrence felt toward genocide that drives the 
legal need to place genocide at the apex of the aforementioned legal pyramid. 
At this point the reader may be rightly asking the question, if genocide is internationally 
regarded as the "crime of crimes", then why do states fail to confront the crime of genocide? 
This line of questioning naturally brings us back to the sentiment raised in Chapter One as it 
is clear that genocide is not internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from a political 
perspective. This point is neatly raised in Thomas W. Simon's normative inquiry into 
international law. Intriguingly, Simon acknowledges that since the events of 9/11, 
' UN Doc, SG8191, `Security Council declares Intention to Consider Sanctions to Obtain Sudan's Full 
Compliance with Security, Disarmament Obligations on Darfur', (18/09/2004). Available at 
httn: //www. un. orMLNews/Press/docs/2004/sc8191. doc. htm Accessed 21/11/2009. 
William A. Schabas, `Has Genocide Been Committed in Darfur? The State Plan or Policy Element in the 
Crime of Genocide', in Ralph Henham and Paul Behrens, (ed. ), The Criminal Law of Genocide. International 
Comparative and Contextual Aspects (Surrey: Ashgate, 2007), p. 39. 
Iid. 
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international terrorism (which according to Simon's fits within the context of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity) has been prioritised over genocide. 95 According to Simon, the 
prioritisation of other crimes such as international terrorism over genocide represents a 
"backward step on the road of humanitarian progress" which has to be remedied for genocide 
represents the gravest crime international society. 96 Such logic seems perfectly 
understandable as it is clear that whilst international terrorism poses a serious problem in 
international relations, unless terrorists acquire nuclear arms, then they cannot bring about the 
level of destruction that states can, and indeed do, toward unarmed innocent groups. Quite 
simply, states continue to hold more power than terrorists do. It is with such rationale in 
mind, therefore, that Simon's places genocide prohibition at the fore of constructing 
international law upon universal normative standards: "If we cannot find a widespread global 
agreement on an ethic that prohibits genocide, then the prospects for the world seem indeed 
dismal". 97 The bleak statement captures the seriousness of the issue as the author questions 
how international society can have a body of international law that incorporates ethics if this 
law cannot confront the crime of genocide. It seems policymakers overlook such arguments 
and it is here that the relationship between genocide and the norm of constitutionality comes 
to the fore. 
4.3.3 Genocide and constitutionality 
It is important to note that Clark identified this as the most overtly political norm of the three. 
In turn, the political nature of constitutionality dictates that the collective understanding 
underpinning this norm has a tendency to change more rapidly than the norms of morality 
and legality. The relationship therefore between genocide and the norm of constitutionality is 
perhaps the most complex as international society's understanding of constitutionality has a 
tendency to alter more frequently than that of law or morality. The reason being, that 
political expectations are often dependent upon circumstance which can change rapidly in 
international relations. For example, international political expectations on September 10th 
2001 were radically different from those that emerged in the aftermath of 9/11. To put this 
into the context of this thesis, it is clear that in 1948 there was in international constitutional 
95 mid, p. 3, the author states terrorist attacks fit within the remit of crimes against humanity and terrorist strikes 
within the remit of war crimes. 96 Ibid, p. 3. 
"Thomas W. Simon, The Laws of Genocide. scrintiona fora rust World (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2007), p. 32. 
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expectation that genocide should be prevented. Significantly, this expectation radically 
diminished within the extreme political context of the Cold War yet re-emerged in the post- 
Cold war era. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. However, it is 
important here to touch upon one critical point. Whilst there is an international expectation 
that genocide should be prevented, to go back to the understanding put forward by Andrew 
Hurrell in Chapter One, it is also clear that there is an international acceptance that genocide 
will not be prevented. 
To explain this, it is necessary to differentiate between the national and international political 
expectation toward genocide prevention. This analysis utilises the political rhetoric of "never 
again" to illustrate this difference as this phrase has become synonymous with the 
expectation that genocide should be prevented. The phrase "never again" litters the discourse 
on genocide studies and refers to international society's vow (made in the aftermath of the 
Second World War), that genocide would "never again" be allowed to occur in international 
relations. As Samantha Power explains, the Genocide Convention "embodied the moral and 
popular consensus in the United States and the rest of the world that genocide should "never 
again" be perpetrated while outsiders stand idly by". 98 The statement highlights that the 
Genocide Convention does not just represent a legal and moral expectation, but also a 
constitutional expectation that genocide should "never again" be allowed to take place. 
Essentially, the rhetoric of "never again" was built upon the understanding that international 
society had failed in its responsibilities to protect those targeted by the Nazis and that the 
1948 Genocide Convention provided a solution to this failing. Accordingly, there was a clear 
international expectation that genocide should be prevented in international relations, for, as 
stated in the preamble of the Genocide Convention, genocide is: "contrary to the spirit and 
aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world". 99 Obviously, one does 
not have to be a genocide scholar to figure out that this expectation was flawed. Whilst 
international society does not permit genocide, it does allow it to occur. It is here that this 
international expectation that genocide should not occur tragically collapses into the national 
9" Samantha Power, `Never Again: The World's Most Unfulfilled Promise', Frontline Magazine. on-line (no 
date of publication given). Available at 
httn: Hwww. pbs. org/wgbh/pa es/frondjw shows/karadz ýaenocide/nevera¢ain. html Accessed, 01/04/10. 
See the preamble, UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (A, RES/260 
(III), 09/12/1948). 
119 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
expectation that states should not get involved in such "complex and dangerous" foreign 
policy agendas (to use Hurrell's phrase). 
This is perfectly illustrated by looking at the US. Perhaps more than any other country, the 
US has routinely invoked the vow to "never again" let genocide occur. As Samantha Power 
notes, Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton have all 
expressed the "never again" rhetoric when addressing the need to prevent genocide. 1°° For 
instance, in 1979, President Carter boldly claimed: "never again will the world fail to act in 
time to prevent this terrible crime of genocide". 101 Drawing upon the exact same sentiment 
expressed in the aftermath of the Nazi genocide, President Carter utilised the political rhetoric 
of "never again" to suggest that the genocide that had just taken place (Cambodia), was a 
tragedy that the world would never allow to happen again. Of course, it did. President Carter 
simply paid `lip service' to the international expectation that genocide should be prevented. 
It is here that the reality of such `lip service' lies, for the truth is: the US did not once 
acknowledge genocide in the 20th century - whilst genocide was actually occurring. 102 The 
vows therefore made by the Presidents listed above, were made in the aftermath of genocide, 
whether that be "Cambodia (Carter), northern Iraq (Reagan, Bush), Bosnia (Bush, Clinton) 
and Rwanda (Clinton)". 103 None of these Presidents were strangers to war and/or 
intervention, yet none wanted to intervene to prevent genocide, hence they stayed silent until 
it was over. 
Responding to the silence of the US administration over the genocide in Rwanda, President 
George W. Bush famously vowed that he would never allow genocide to occur under "his 
watch". 104 This campaign pledge was then reiterated once Bush took office. '°5 To his credit, 
the Bush administration became the first US administration to acknowledge genocide as it 
10° Samantha Power, 'Never Again: The World's Most Unfulfilled Promise'. tot Jay Carter, cited in, Niall Ferguson, Colossus: Thee and Fall of the American Empire (London: 
Penguin, 2005), p. 142. 
'o2 The seminal work on this topic remains Samantha Power's, A Problem From Hell. See also, Eyal Mayroz, 'Ever again? The United States, Genocide suppression, and the crisis in Darfur', The Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 10, no. 3,2008, pp. 359 - 388). Mayroz utilises Power's work to highlight that the term was wrongly used over Kosovo to try and stir domestic support within the US. 103 This is taken from Power, `Never Again: The World's Unfulfilled Promise'. 
104 For a brilliant analysis of the US involvement in Darfur, in which the author's utilise the report put together by the US government in 2004, see John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Cnocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
10 American National Committee of America, 'Bush Reaffirms Genocide Pledge', (27/03/2001), Available at bo: //www. anca. org/nress releases/press releases u7prida60 Accessed 12/04/2010. 
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occurred (Darfur). 106 Yet, as is well documented, this promise did not see President Bush 
lead any sort of US attempt to prevent the genocide in Darfur, despite the fact that it occurred 
on "his watch". Whilst one can raise the valid point that the US was heavily engaged in two 
wars at the time (Afghanistan and Iraq), the track record of the US in relation to genocide 
does not fill one with hope that the administration would have attempted to catalyse an 
international effort. To bring this up to date, in January 2008, Barak Obama stated that 
genocide threatens our "common security and our common humanity" . 
107 Since taking 
office, President Obama responded to the sixteenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide by 
stating, "It is not enough to say "never again. " We must renew our commitment and redouble 
our efforts to prevent mass atrocities and genocide". 108 Whilst it is perhaps too early to judge 
the present US Administration, its role in Darfur and President Obama's refusal to 
acknowledge the Armenian genocide since taking office (even though he had promised to do 
so1°), suggests there is little "change" to be found in Obama's approach toward genocide. In 
an attempt to gain some clarity on this point, I asked a Press Officer from the Embassy of the 
United States of America if they could explain the current US Administration's position on 
the Responsibility to Protect, to which I was informed, "I am not sure of President Obama's 
views on this policy, but I do know that Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, does care about 
children in Africa". 110 The answer speaks volumes in that it illustrates that the Press Officer, 
whose job is to keep up to date with US Foreign Policy thinking and who had just spoken on 
human rights, humanitarianism and America's relationship with the world, simply did not 
know what the Responsibility to Protect means. 
These examples illustrate the vast chasm between reality and rhetoric. Perhaps this is 
summarised best in the conclusion drawn by Samantha Power: 
106 Ibid, see the Prologue, which is aptly entitled, `On Our Watch'. '07 Organizing for America, `Barack Obama on the Importance of US-Armenia Relations' (19/01/2008). 
htto: //www. barackobama. com/2008/01/19/barack obama on the importance. ohu Accessed 22/05/20 10. 
105 The White House, office of the press secretary, 'Statement made by President Obama on the 16* Anniversary 
of the Genocide in Rwanda', (07/04/ 2010), httn: //www. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/statement-president- 
16th-anniversary-genocide-rwanda This sentiment was reiterated by President Obama four days later on the 
Holocaust Remembrance Day , see The White House, office of the press secretary, `Statement by the President 
on Holocaust Remembrance Day', (11/04/2010) ba: //www. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/statement- 
nresident-holocaust-remembrance-day Both Accessed 23/05/20 10 
log Obama stated, "As a senator, I strongly support passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution (H. Res. 106 
and S. Res. 106), and as President I will recognize the Armenian Genocide", Organizing for America, `Barack 
Obama on the importance of US-Armenia Relations' (19/01/2008). 
"0 BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group, `Understanding America and Understanding its Relationship with 
the World', De Mont-fort University, Leicester, (June 11*, 2010). 
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Before I began exploring America's relationship with genocide, I used to refer to U. S. policy 
as a "failure". I have changed my mind. It is daunting to acknowledge, but this country's 
consistent policy of non-intervention in the face of genocide offers sad testimony not to a 
broken American political system but to one that is ruthlessly effective. No U. S. president has 
ever made genocide prevention a priority, and no U. S. president has ever suffered politically 
for his indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no coincidence that genocide rages on. III 
The statement goes right to the heart of the matter regarding the relationship between 
genocide and constitutionality. Quite simply, the US, as every other state does, pays `lip 
service' to the international expectation that international society should prevent genocide. 
But then upholds a realist foreign policy ethic that genocide prevention is not within the 
national interest of states. As Power highlights, the reality is that states do not fail to prevent 
genocide; because essentially, they are not trying to prevent it. At the same time, this 
national policy should not detract us from the point that there remains an international 
expectation that genocide cannot be tolerated in international society. As Kofi Annan stated 
in 2004: "There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, than the 
prevention of genocide". ' 12 The complexity therefore lies in the fact that whilst there is an 
international expectation that states should prevent genocide, there remains a clear national 
expectation that states should not engage in such "complex and dangerous" foreign policy 
agendas because states have little to gain (to use Andrew Hurrell's phrase). Whilst saving the 
lives of millions may feed one's conscience, it doesn't fuel one's cars. 
This brings us back to the understanding put forward in Chapter One. There is no long-term 
collective security strategy being forged amongst states regarding genocide prevention 
because states do not see the prevention of genocide within the national interests of states. 
This is the real problem. If genocide is to be prevented, there has to be a long-term collective 
effort forged as no state can oversee the prevention of genocide alone. At present, the lack of 
any international collective effort represents the fact that the impact of genocide is not felt 
amongst policymakers world-wide. They understand that the genocide is morally abhorrent 
but view genocide as just one of many insoluble problems. As Power highlighted, the truth is 
that policymakers do not see a political problem arising from adopting such a position. It is 
'! I Power, Problem from Hell. p. xxi. 
112 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Keynote speech to The Stockholm International Forum. (26/01/ 2004). 
Available at 
httn: //www. rventQenoide. ors/vreven docs/Kof nnan tockhohn nocideProposals26Jan2004 htm Accessed 02/06/08. 
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here that the next chapter challenges such mainstream understanding as it addresses the 
impact that genocide has upon the ordering structure of international society. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The understanding of international legitimacy set out above is bound to raise controversy as it 
is clear, that just as with the concept of genocide, no understanding will ever please everyone. 
Significantly, the rejection of natural law, at least in theory, opens the door for genocide to be 
considered as legitimate practice. If, (and yes this is a big if), all the relevant actors (whoever 
they may be), in international relations deemed genocide to be morally, legally, and 
constitutionally acceptable then this would constitute rightful conduct and in turn genocide 
would be deemed a legitimate practice. Although one may be horrified at the potential 
implications of such an understanding, and in turn uphold an appeal to ideas such as natural 
law, it is important to consider two things. First of all, the primary fact of international 
relations is that there is no world government. With no world government to make a ruling 
on which moral claim international society should adhere to, it is imperative that competing 
moralities are not allowed to dictate international relations for this may create a state of 
international chaos. It is here that the moral value of international order re-emerges as it is 
clear that a constant state of chaos could potentially lead to unprecedented levels of violence 
and suffering. The importance therefore of international legitimacy cannot be overstated as it 
acts to increase the likelihood of international stability within the anarchical realm. 
Secondarily, one has to consider that such an outcome would mean that international 
society's legal, moral, and constitutional understanding would have to alter to the point that 
we would accept genocide as rightful conduct. Despite that there is a theoretical possibility, 
in practice, such an outcome would suggest constructing a world so alien to the present that it 
is almost impossible to comprehend. 
As discussed, genocide holds a special relationship with international legitimacy as it is 
internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from both a legal and moral perspective 
(even if it is not considered in the same light form a political perspective). To return to the 
understanding of "the bottom" presented by Primo Levi, it would seem that international 
society has constructed an understanding that there is a bottom -a universal legal and moral 
minimalism - and that genocide stands as the paradigmatic violation of both. As J. K. Roth 
succinctly explains: "Genocide is a primary instance of horror or nothing could be. An abyss 
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of horror, then, would be a reality so grim, so devastating, so full of useless pain, suffering, 
death and despair that it fractures the world - perhaps forever. Genocide is an abyss of 
horror or, again, nothing could be". 113 This is important because it begins to highlight that 
genocide should not be considered as just another insoluble problem (as stated in Chapter 
One). This needs to be considered carefully, for at present, it is clear that states do not even 
try to forge a collective security strategy aimed at preventing genocide. This raises questions 
regarding what this says about international society and what impact that the occurrence of 
genocide has upon international society as it, fails to confront the "crime of crimes". It is this 
latter point that this thesis now shifts its attention toward as Chapter Five address the impact 
of genocide on international order. 
113 John K. Roth, `Genocide and the Logic of Racism', in John K. Roth, (ed). Genocide and Human Rights. p. 262. 
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5 Genocide as a Threat to International Stability 
"If the collective conscience of humanity cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave 
danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice. " Kofi Annan. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, genocide is internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" 
from both a legal and moral perspective yet it remains a low priority issue in foreign policy 
making. Despite the fact that there have been many persuasive moral arguments put forward 
with regard to saving strangers, the will of the politically unwilling has remained unaltered. 
As discussed in Chapter One, policymakers do not think that genocide poses a threat to their 
national interest in the same way that crimes such as nuclear proliferation, piracy, and drug 
tracking do. It is here that this chapter challenges such mainstream thinking as it claims that 
in failing to prevent genocide states increase the likelihood of international instability in 
international relations. 
To validate this central claim this chapter will focus on how genocide impacts upon the 
secondary institution of the UN. Despite the idea that international legitimacy is not a 
property and therefore no institution can claim to own it or produce it, international society's 
contemporary understanding of international legitimacy is indebted to the legal, moral, and 
constitutional agreements that were institutionalised into the architecture of the UN in the 
post-Second World War era. 2 This explains why the origins of the post-Cold War legitimacy 
crisis have been traced back to the construction of the UN system. It is here that crime of 
genocide, and its relationship with international legitimacy, is of relevance as it will be 
argued that genocide erodes both the legitimate authority of the UN (which acts as the 
cornerstone of international legitimacy) and the UN Security Council (which acts as the 
Cited in the International Commission on intervention and State Sovereignty, Reponsibili , to 
Protect. 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), paragraphl. 6, available at 
h : //www. iciss. ca/renort2-en. asu#dilenm a Accessed 09/05/09. 
Whilst there is an extensive amount of literature available of the UN, for a relevant overview see Adam 
Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, (ed. ), United Nations. Divided World. The UN's Roles in International 
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Donald J. Puchala, Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Roger 
A. Coate, United Nations Politics. Interna ti onal Ora n+zation ma Divide World (New Jersey: Pearson, 2007). 
Paul Kennedy, 11c Par lament of Man: The Past. Present and Future of the United Nations (London: Random 
House, 2006). Juergen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). Michael Barnett and 
Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World. International n»gtions in Global Politics (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). Adam Roberts, 'Order/Justice Issues at the United Nations', in Rosemary Foot, John 
Lewis (caddis and Andrew Hurrell, Order and Justice in international relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen (ed. ), The Leggy of International Organization 
(New York: United Nations University Press, 2001). Ins L. Claude Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems 
and Progress of International QMwjjzA tion (New York: Random House, 1971). 
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stabilising function in international relations) more than any other crime. 3 This point was 
aptly illustrated by the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis that unfolded in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide (see section IV). To draw on the sentiment expressed by Kofi Annan 
above, if the UN cannot oversee international society's most profound moral commitments, 
then there is a grave danger that states will look elsewhere for justice. Whilst the UN does 
not own international legitimacy, international society's collective understandings of order 
and justice have been institutionalised within this organisation. In failing to prevent 
genocide, therefore, the UN and the UNSC run the risk that states will look elsewhere to 
address this justice deficit within the current ordering structure of the UN. The real problem 
being, not that unilateral action may lead to genocide prevention, but that the UN and the 
UNSC's authority may become eroded to the point that international instability arises as 
states fail to forge clear understandings of what constitutes rightful conduct and rightful 
authority (with regard to the use of force). 
This chapter will therefore be structured as follows. Section one will place the idea of 
genocide prevention into international society's understanding of rightful conduct. In doing 
so, it will address the tensions to be found in the UN Charter and also explain how the 1948 
Genocide Convention impacts upon the legal, moral, and constitutional understanding to be 
found within the post-Second World War construction of rightful conduct. Section two will 
look at the impact that genocide has upon the UN from a theoretical perspective. It will be 
argued that genocide poses a threat to international order because it erodes the authority of 
the UN and the UNSC more than any other crime. This theoretical perspective helps us 
understand why the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis arose in the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide. Section three offers an analysis of why genocide did not have a profound impact 
on international society in the Cold War era as states regressed upon their solidarist 
commitments to international justice. Section four brings us onto the post-Cold War era to 
highlight the empirical reality of how the Rwandan genocide eroded the authority of the UN 
' The idea that the UN Security Council acts as the stabilising function in international relations is taken from 
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University press, 
2000), p. 174. The idea that the UN is the cornerstone of international legitimacy is not taken from anything 
specifically yet one can find such understanding evident within the discourse itself, for example, Ramesh 
Thakur, Inter tional Peacekeeping in Lebanon-, United Nations Authority and Multinational Force (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1987), p. 259. It should be noted however that Thakur implies that the UN dispenses legitimacy 
yet to use the English School approach I would claim that it is better to understand it as an institution in the 
second-order sense that contributes more than any other institution to the process and practice of international legitimacy. 
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and the UNSC and in doing so played an integral role in creating the subsequent legitimacy 
crisis within international relations. If, to go back to the understanding of international 
legitimacy set out in Chapter Four, one accepts that international legitimacy increases the 
likelihood of international stability and one accepts that genocide played an integral role in 
the legitimacy crisis then one must accept that genocide poses a threat to international order. 
This is important because it helps explain that there is more to genocide prevention than just 
dimply saving strangers. 
5.1 Rightful conduct 
In discussing the language of human rights, Ken Booth stated: "We inherit scripts, but we 
have the scope - more or less depending upon, who, when and where we are - to revise 
them' .4 It is proposed that such rationale was embodied in the international consensus forged 
in the aftermath of the Second World War as state representatives attempted to rewrite the 
three hundred year old Westphalian script they had inherited. The UN Charter, therefore, 
acts as the procedural face of what was to constitute rightful conduct in the post-Second 
World War era of international relations, for it embodied international society's legal, moral, 
and constitutional expectations. 
As is well documented, the UN Charter embodies a problematic commitment to both human 
rights and state sovereignty which has caused an endless debate over the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention. 5 James Mayall places this debate within an English School 
framework when he states that the UN Charter's appeal to both human rights and state 
sovereignty left international society constructed upon a commitment to both English School 
pluralism and English School solidarism. 6 In essence, there is, and remains, a fundamental 
4 Ken Booth, `Three Tyrannies', in Tim Dunne and Nicholas, J. Wheeler, (ed. ), Human Rights in Global 
blitigs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 33. 
For an overview of the relevant debates, we Thomas, G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007). Jennifer M. Welsh, (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). D, K, Chatterjee and D, E, Scheid. (eds. ), Ethics and foreign intervention in 
International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). J, L. Holzgrefe and Robert, 0, Keohane, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). Richard B. Lillich, (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1973). For a more genocide specific focus on the idea of humanitarian intervention we Dieter 
Janssen, `Humanitarian Intervention and the Prevention of Genocide', Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 10, 
no. 2,2008, pp. 289-306). Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, `The Complexities of the Prevention and 
Intervention of Genocide', in Totten and Bartrog, The Genocide Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2009), 
part IV. Neal Riemer, (London: Praeger, 2000). 
James Mayall, (ed. ), The New Interventionism 1991-1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
Obviously this point has been raised by more than just English School scholars, for instance Thierry Tardy 
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tension within the UN Charter as through Articles 2,2 (4), and 2 (7), the UN Charter 
espouses a pluralist commitment to the minimal rules of co-existence (state sovereignty, non- 
use of force and non-intervention). ' However, the UN charter also sets out a broader 
solidarist agenda in its commitment to human rights within its pre-amble as well as Article 55 
and 56.8 This latter aspect was expanded further via the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its two related covenants-9 A tension therefore arises between order and 
justice as the script that was written in the post-Second World War era seemingly tied the UN 
to two contradictory commitments. Whilst it should be noted that the architects of the UN 
Charter never intended to provide a rigid set of guidelines that would be interpreted literally 
in a word by word fashion, 1° the potential benefits of any flexibility are hindered by this 
problematic understanding of rightful conduct. As Ian Clark explains "many of the 
contradictions in the post-1945 discussion of international legitimacy are thus thought to 
derive from this basic inconsistency". " 
In committing itself to both human rights and state sovereignty, the UN Charter's 
understanding of rightful conduct seemingly embodies a dual commitment. This dual 
commitment has critical implications at the international level as states can, at least attempt 
to, construct a legitimate case for action, or inaction, based on a commitment to either state 
sovereignty or universal human rights. This dual commitment has been explicit in the debate 
over humanitarian intervention as advocates and critics have been divided over whether the 
UN Charter permits the right of humanitarian intervention in international relations. 
Problematically, the dual commitment embodied within the UN Charter dictates that states 
can interpret the UN Charter in a way that favours their particular view of what constitutes 
writes a sharp analysis upon the liberalism and realism to be found within the dual nature of the UN, see Thierry 
Tardy, `The UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage Against Nature', Security Dialogue (vol. 38, no. 1,2007, pp. 
49-70). 
7UN Doc, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
b=: //www. un. orii/en/documents/chafter/index-shtlW Accessed 09/05/09 Simon Chesterman aptly 
demonstrates that the preamble alone highlights all the basic inconsistencies of the present debate, see Just War 
or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and Internationa Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
chapter two. 
For a relevant analysis see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of World Order Politics. third 
in' (London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 83-90. 
The 1966 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and The International Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights 
10 For a brilliant analysis see, Edward C, Luck., `A Council For All Seasons: The Creation of the Security 
Council and its Relevance Today', and Christine Gray, `Charter Limitations on the Use of Force' in Vaughan 
Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jenifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, The Unite Nations Security Council and War. The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chapters two and three. Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). p. 138. 
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rightful conduct. 12 This idea of a dual commitment was put into context in Kofi Annan's 
famous analysis on "The Two Concepts of Sovereignty"'. 
13 Writing within the context of the 
crisis in Kosovo and East Timor, Annan notably put forward the idea that there existed two 
types of sovereignty in international relations, that of the state as well as that of the 
individual. Explaining his position on the latter, Annan explained that by individual 
sovereignty he meant, "the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter 
of the UN and subsequent international treaties-has been enhanced by a renewed and 
spreading consciousness of individual rights". 14 In doing so, Annan seemingly placed the 
understanding of state sovereignty and individual sovereignty on a level playing field thereby 
implying that the UN Charter embodied a dual commitment to both types of sovereignty. As 
Gareth Evans notes, whilst Annan's intention was to help resolve the debate regarding 
humanitarian intervention, he did nothing more than simply restate it. 15 This led Annan to 
later concede (in a private conversation with Evans) that he wished he had phrased this 
argument in a less antagonistic manner. 16 It is important therefore to understand that 
although the UN Charter embodies a dual commitment to both state sovereignty and human 
rights, in attempting to extend the UN Charter's commitment toward human rights into a 
commitment toward humanitarian intervention, Kofi Annan put forward a contemporary 
interpretation of the UN Charter that differed substantially than that set out in 1945. 
To understand this let us consider a piece of primary research found within the UN archive. 
In 1946, John P. Humphrey (the Director of Division of Human Rights Division in the UN 
Secretariat), addressed the issue of UN responsibility regarding human rights violations 
within states. 17 In an interoffice memorandum to M. Henri Laugier (Assistant Secretary- 
General in charge of Social Affairs), Humphrey raises the point: "As you undoubtedly know, 
a number of communications from individuals and non-governmental organisations have 
been addressed to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Secretary-General which 
12 One has to qualify this point in that one would expect at least some consistency in interpretation. States 
cannot oppose humanitarian intervention one day and favour it the next. 
13 Kofi Annan, `Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist (18/09/1999) Available at, 
ham: //www. un. ora/News/ossa/sg/stroies/kaecon. htnil Accessed 12/06/08. 
14 Ibid. 
11 Gareth Evans, The ibility to Protect Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 38. 
16 Ibid. 
"United Nations Archive, S- 0544 - 0004 - 12. Human Rights Commissions Defence. 28th August 1946 - 
2816 October 1947. Interoffice Memorandum from John P. Humphrey, Director of Division of Human Rights to 
M. Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Social Affairs. 3016 August 1946. 
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relate to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some of these allege violations of human 
rights within specific member states". 18 The communication explicitly raised the question of 
what the UN should do when the human rights violations occur within states. To which John 
Humphrey replied: 
But these communications which allege violations of human rights within specific Member 
States give rise to difficulties of the first magnitude. For while the Secretariat must hand them 
on to the Commission, the latter does not appear to have any right under the Charter to make 
recommendation to the States in question in regard to them. The facts and circumstances 
described in the communications are "matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction" of the Member States, with the result that, under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, all 
intervention (and even a recommendation might and probably would be considered 
intervention by the Member State envisaged) by the United Nations is excluded. As I 
understand the situation, no recommendation can be made with regard to a matter "essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" unless the recommendation is made by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, i. e. when the situation constitutes a threat 
to peace. '9 
Now whilst one cannot extrapolate an understanding of the 'UN perspective' at the time, 
from just one source, Humphrey's was the Director of the Human Rights Division and a 
subsequent draftee on both the 1948 Genocide Convention and Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Hence it seems fair to say that the statement provides us with an insight into 
the 'UN perspective' on humanitarian intervention at the time. Significantly, the statement 
clearly implies that there was a real fear that simply making a recommendation to the relevant 
member state, regarding human rights violations within their state, may be considered as 
intervention, thereby violating the UN Charter. 
From a legitimacy perspective, at least according to such understanding, it is clear that the 
idea of military intervention was certainly not considered to constitute rightful conduct (from 
a legal and constitutional perspective). Although times have changed, and as discussed, 
international legitimacy is a process not a property and therefore actors can put forward 
contemporary interpretations of how they think the UN Charter should be understood, I 
would go as far as stating that in 1946, sovereignty was understood as absolute. The 
understanding therefore set out by Humphrey, supports the conclusion drawn by the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo: "human rights were given a subordinate 
and marginalised role in the UN system in 1945". 20 To go back to the understanding of a 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, emphasis added. 
20 See, The Independent International commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Reno (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 168. 
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dual commitment set out above, one has to recognise that this reflects a contemporary 
understanding of the UN Charter as it has been re-interpreted and re-evaluated through sixty 
years of human rights discourse. From a legitimacy perspective, actors such as Kofi Annan 
try and forge the tolerable consensus needed to alter collective understandings of what 
constitutes rightful conduct. Yet at the same time, it is evident, at least from the 
understanding set out by Humphrey above, that the UN system as constructed in 1945 did not 
legitimise the idea of humanitarian intervention as we know it today. Whilst its commitment 
to human rights embodied a solidarist ethic of international justice, this stopped short of 
legitimating humanitarian intervention. 
The interesting aspect therefore, with regard to genocide, is that international society felt it 
necessary to take its commitment to human rights one step further. It would seem that states 
did not feel that the UN Charter, or the Nuremburg principles, did enough to provide the 
necessary legal framework needed to prevent the crime of genocide. To go back to the 
legitimacy process, the moral abhorrence felt toward the Holocaust altered international 
society's moral, constitutional and legal expectations to the point that state's established the 
1948 Genocide Convention which acts as the procedural face for the legal, moral, and 
constitutional norms embedded within it. Thus, it is important to gauge how the 1948 
Genocide Convention fits within the post Second World War understanding of rightful 
conduct. 
5.1.1 The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 
The 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was 
unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly on the 9th December 1948. This led the 
then President of the General Assembly, Mr. H. V. Evatt to boldly declare the: "supremacy 
of international law has been proclaimed and a significant advance had been made in the 
development of international law". 2i A key point to consider therefore is how this significant 
advance in international law altered international society's understanding of rightful conduct. 
As discussed, the solidarist aspirations that were embodied within the UN Charter were 
essentially grafted onto a pluralist framework in that the minimal rules of co-existence: 
sovereignty, non-use of force, and non-intervention, underpinned the foundation of the UN 
217lds is cited in Matthew Lippman, `A Road Map to the 1948 Genocide Convention', Journal of Genocide 
$ (vol. 4, no. 2,2002, pp. 177-195), p. 179. 
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Charter. Yet when one places the 1948 Genocide Convention within this pluralist-solidarist 
context, it is clear that the understanding of justice to be found in the Genocide Convention's 
understanding of rightful conduct, challenges the pluralist norms of absolute sovereignty and 
non-intervention. 
Whilst Article 2. (7), of the UN Charter states that the UN cannot intervene in matters of a 
"domestic jurisdiction" it is clear that the draftees of the Genocide Convention never viewed 
genocide as a matter of "domestic jurisdiction". This can be traced back to the 1946 General 
Assembly Resolution as it stated: "The punishment of the crime of genocide is of 
international concern". 22 It went on to state: "The General Assembly, therefore affirms that 
genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns". 23 The 
universal tone embodied within this statement is important as it highlights that whilst 
genocide may be committed within a state's territorial boundary, it was perceived to be a 
matter of international jurisdiction. Notably, state representatives spoke with a universal 
moral tongue throughout the drafting process which highlights how the draftees viewed 
genocide as a matter of international jurisdiction. As Matthew Lipmann's analysis explains, 
Mr Villa Michael of Mexico proclaimed that genocide prevention was a matter of "the 
greatest importance" that poses a "direct and serious threat to the welfare of the human 
race". 24 At the same time, Mr Henriquez Urena of the Dominican Republic stated that even if 
the Convention was not ratified, its moral and legal weight was needed because "the moral 
tribunal of the world demanded the denunciation of genocide as a `crime against 
humanity"'. 25 Whilst Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter (regarding the rights of states to control 
their own domestic jurisdiction), was not discussed explicitly in the drafting process, it is 
evident that the draftees of the Genocide Convention did not foresee that Article 2 (7) of the 
UN Charter would pose a legal barrier to genocide prevention as genocide was not a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction. 
This naturally brings us onto the controversy surrounding the sovereignty-intervention 
debate. With regard to the former, it seems evident that the 1948 Genocide Convention is 
22 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 (I). `The Crime of Genocide'. (A/RES/96(I), adopted at the 55 plenary meeting, Dec 11 , 1946). This can be found using the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, httn: //doccessdds. un ore/doc/RR GLUTION1GEN/NRO1033/47/IMG/NR003347 pdVOpenElement Accessed 09/06/2009. 
23 Ibid. 
u This is cited in Lippman, `A Road Map to the 1948 Genocide Convention', p. 178. 75 Ibid. 
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constructed upon a conditional understanding of sovereignty. This goes back to the 
Nuremburg trials themselves, just as sovereign immunity had not served those on trial at 
Nuremburg (who claimed that they were simply following orders); the right of sovereignty 
did not grant states the right to destroy a "national", "ethnical", "racial" or "religious" group 
in a post-1948 world. 26 As a result, the Genocide Convention places a clear constraint on the 
idea of sovereignty. As Gareth Evans has explained, for three hundred years, the 
Westphalian principles underpinning international relations acted to "institutionalize 
indifference" in international society. 27 Leaders were not only indifferent to the suffering of 
others, but also held the so-called right of sovereign immunity as they were not held 
accountable for their actions within their domestic sphere of control. Evans's point being that 
this Westphalian commitment to indifference and immunity changed in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust. Sovereignty, at least in a post-1948 world, was not to be understood as absolute 
as it was conditional on the fact that genocide was not a legitimate practice. As Bruce Cronin 
explains: "The conclusion of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) created a legal framework for states to override the rights of 
sovereignty whenever genocide was committed". 28 Whilst advocates of the 2005 R2P claim 
that this legal barrier to mass atrocity prevention has been overcome via the endorsement of 
conditional sovereignty embodied in the R2P, it is apparent that such understanding was 
established within international law in 1948.29 
Of course, the idea of conditional sovereignty does not, in itself, justify the right of military 
intervention. This remains the most controversial aspect of any debate over humanitarian 
intervention. This reservation was raised by the UK representative (and former British 
prosecutor at Nuremberg), Sir Hartley Shawcross in the 1947 Sixth Committee, Discussion 
26 This idea of sovereign immunity is taken from Henry T. King Jr., 'Genocide and Nuremburg', in Ralph 
Henham and Paul Behrens, `The Criminal Law of Genocide. International. Comparative and Contextual 
, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2006), chapter three. See also, Bernard D. Meltzer, `The Nuremburg Trial: A Prosecutor's Perspective', Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 4, no. 4,2002, pp. 561 -568). 27 See Gareth Evans analysis, `From Westphalia to the Holocaust: Institutionalizing Indifference', Evans 1bg 
Responsibility to Protect. Endinn Mass Atrocity Crimes. Once and For All (Washington: Brookings, 2008), pp. 
15-19. 
" See Bruce Cronin's analysis, `The Tension between Sovereignty and Intervention in the Prevention of 
Genocide', in Samuel Totten (ed. ), The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide. Genocide: A Critical 
Bibliographic Review, volume six (London: Transaction Publishers, 2008), p. 147. 
For example, Louise Arbour claims that at the "legal core" of the R2P, lies the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
See, Arbour, `The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law & Practice', Review of 
International Studies (vol. 34, no. 3.2008, pp. 445-458), p. 450. This will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
133 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
on the Draft Convention of the Crime of Genocide. 30 At the time, Shawcross was concerned 
by a number of things to be found within the Draft Convention (such as the idea of non- 
physical genocide which was discussed in Chapter Three). Of relevance here is his concern 
regarding implementation and intervention. This stemmed from the fact that "under article 
XII of the convention, the high contracting parties agree to call upon the competent organs of 
the United Nations to take measures for the suppression or prevention of the crime committed 
in any part of the world" 31 The concern, therefore, was one of implementation as Shawcross 
perceived that the international court would act as the necessary organ, yet since genocide is 
committed by state officials, it is impractical to think that the same state officials would give 
themselves up to any international judicial process. 32 This makes perfect sense as one has to 
only look at the fact that Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir refuses to give himself up to the 
International Criminal Court. 33 Such a reality underpinned Shawcross's central reservation 
that "the only real sanction against genocide was war". 34 Intriguingly, this led Shawcross to 
claim that the Convention was unrealistic in that the majority of states would not accept it, 
yet as history tells us, states unanimously endorsed the 1948 Genocide Convention, even if 
they then did not ratify it (as of 2010, there are a 140 state parties to the UNGC). 
It took nearly forty years for the US to ratify the 1948 Genocide Convention and notably, it 
was the debate over military intervention that remained a central obstacle that hindered 
ratification. In a fascinating piece written in 1949, George A. Finch (the then Editor in Chief 
and Vice-President of The American Journal of International Law), reflects on the American 
Bar Association's recommendation that the Genocide Convention (as submitted) should not 
be ratified by the US. 35 For Finch, the omission of the state in the drafting of the convention 
30 UN GAOR 42'" meeting, `Discussion on the Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide', UN Doc's, A/362, 
A/401, A/401. Add. 1, A/C. 6/147, A/C. 6/149. A/C. 6/151, A/C. 6/155, A/C. 6/159 and A/C. 6/160. (1947). This 
can be found using the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 
htp"//daccess-dds-ny un orgidoc/UNDOC/GEN/NL4/700/98/PDF/NIA70098pý_OpenElement 
Accessed 09/06/2009. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 UN News Centre, 'ICC Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President for War Crimes in Darfur', 
(04/03/2009). hhttp: //www un org/apps/news/story. asp? NewsID=30081&Cr=darfur&Crl=icc Accessed 
03/11/2009. It should be noted here that the ICC did not include the charge of genocide in its initial 2009 
warrant; however, in February 2010 the ICC Appeals Chamber ruled that the Pre-Trail Chamber must revisit 
their decision not to include genocide on the arrest warrant. At the time of writing, this remains unresolved. 34 UN GAOR 42" meeting, `Discussion on the Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide'. 35 George, A, Finch, `The Genocide Convention', The American Journal of International Law (vol. 43, no. 4, 
1949, pp. 732 - 738). Finch recalls that the Genocide Convention came before the American Bar Association in 
"two channels", the Association's Special Committee on Peace and Law, through the United Nations, and the 
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has critical implications regarding implementation. 36 Reiterating the exact same sentiment 
expressed by Shawcross above, Finch states: "In the debate at St. Louis the question 
remained unanswered: How is an international tribunal or foreign national court to obtain 
custody in time of peace of an accused genocidist? "37 Again, the conclusion drawn echoes 
the reservation raised by Shawcross as Finch claims: "To take the accused by force would 
mean an act of war". 38 Essentially, this leads Finch to claim that the role of the state has to be 
placed at the heart of the Genocide Convention and that in such circumstances states should 
be held accountable in international law. 39 Controversially, it is claimed, that such an 
approach would not involve war. 40 Yet this latter point seems misconstrued as it fails to 
answer the previous unanswered question of how international society gets genocidal regimes 
to cooperate with any international judicial process in the first place? Although, as discussed 
in Chapter Three, the omission of the state within the drafting of the Convention is a mistake, 
it is difficult to see how its inclusion would make genocide prevention any easier. It is highly 
doubtful that this would have any profound impact on the political will of genocidal 
perpetrators or bystanders. 
The stark reality is that the draftees of the 1948 Genocide Convention at the time explicitly 
discussed the issue of sovereignty-intervention and proceeded to put forward a legal 
obligation to prevent and punish the crime at the international level. Despite the fact that it 
took the US nearly forty years to ratify this obligation, the reality is that they did accept it and 
are therefore obligated under international law. Yet as William Schabas explains, whilst the 
UNGC places an obligation on states to prevent genocide, the question of whether this 
dictates that states have a duty to intervene remains unanswered. 41 Intriguingly, Schabas 
reflects upon Professor Hersh Lauterpacht's analysis of the 1948 Genocide Convention 
(written in the 1950's) which set out the understanding that states have an obligation to 
prevent genocide and the right to intervene to fulfil this obligation. 42 Although the 
complexities of war dictate that states should not necessarily be obligated to intervene 
Association's Section on International and Comparative Law, both of which were discussed by the Association 
at its 72nd Annual Meeting, September 5-9,1949, at St. Louis. 36 Ibid, p. 733. 37 Ibid, p. 734. 
3 ibid. 
39 Ibid, p. 737. 
40 Ibid. 
41 William A. Schabas, Genocide In International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000)., 
491-502, 
42Ibid p. 498. 
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militarily, it would seem, as the United States Ambassador for War Crimes, David Scheffer 
stated: "No government should be intimidated into doing nothing by the requirements of 
Article II [sic]; rather, every government should view it as an opportunity to react responsibly 
if and as genocide occurs". 43 The statement in many ways underlines the central paradox to 
be found within the 1948 Genocide Convention as on the one hand international society has a 
clear obligation to prevent genocide, yet on the other hand, there remains a serious lack of 
any implementation strategy. Essentially, this is a problem that has never been resolved, for 
as will be discussed in Chapter Six, the R2P also fails to address this critical issue. 
To go back to the very first stage of the drafting process, the 1946 General Assembly 
Resolution made the recommendation "that international co-operation be organised between 
States with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and punishment of the crime of 
genocide". 44 The statement aptly summarises the ambiguity surrounding implementation. 
Whilst upholding the view that the General Assembly wanted speedy prevention and 
punishment of genocide, the draftees seemingly left the question of how this speedy 
prevention would be implemented, unanswered. One can only assume that they put their 
faith in the hope that ad hoc willing coalitions would take on this responsibility. By the time 
the 1948 Genocide Convention had been finalised, a little more clarity had been provided, but 
not much. Article VIII states: "Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of 
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of genocide or any other acts 
enumerated in Article III". 45 The competent organ is generally understood to be that of the 
UN Security Council, which dictates that the prevention of genocide is placed under the 
responsibility of the UNSC 46 This did little to aid the idea of genocide prevention as there is 
no preventative strategy embodied within the UNGC itself, despite the Convention being 
built upon a commitment to prevent. 
43 Ibid, p. 496. 
µ UN General Assembly, `The Crime of Genocide', (AIRES/96(I), adopted at the 55th plenary meeting, Dec 11*, 1946). This can be found using the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 
ho: //daccess-dds-nv. un. or2/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/033/47/IMG/NR003347 ndf? enElement Accessed 09/06/2009. 
45 UN General Assembly, 'UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide', (A, RES/260 (III), 09/12/1948). 
46 For such analysis see, John Quigly, The Genocide Conýenti n. en International Law Analy (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), p. 86. It should also be remembered, as Pau Kennedy explains, that the term may, was used throughout the drafting of the UN Charter instead of the word shall, as this is less obligatory in nature, see The Parliament of Man. p. 34. 
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It is important here to explain that the ambiguity surrounding implementation should not lead 
one to think that the Genocide Convention does not address the issue of obligation. For 
example, in Henry Shue's analysis on Limiting Sovereignty, the author utilises the crime of 
genocide (rather than the Convention) to highlight that certain rights are universal and 
therefore place limitations on the right of sovereignty. 47 Such understanding aligns itself 
with Chapter Four's view, that genocide violates a universal moral minimalism. This in itself 
is not problematic. However, when the author shifts his attention to the Genocide 
Convention, he dismissively states: "it is strictly permissive concerning implementation, 
merely inviting any state that should take a notion to do something in order to prevent 
genocide to approach the International Criminal Court of Justice, but binding no one to 
nothing". 48 The statement touches upon an important point as despite the ambiguity 
surrounding implementation, the fact is that the Genocide Convention embodies a legal 
obligation. Shue's claim, therefore, that the Convention binds no one to nothing is 
inaccurate. Article I of Genocide Convention states: "The Contracting parties confirm that 
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish" 49 The statement reflects 
two important points. The first is that the Genocide Convention recognised that genocide can 
be committed in times of peace as well as war and in doing so went beyond the Nuremburg 
principles (which only recognised genocide in times of war). The second is that it clearly sets 
out the premise that in endorsing the Convention states did in fact bind themselves to this 
cause. Although the reality may be that there is little anyone can do if states do not fulfil this 
obligation, this does not detract from the fact that this legal obligation exists. 
The obligation to prevent genocide juxtaposed with the lack of an implementation strategy 
brings us back to the understanding first set out in Chapter One: state leaders' fear that 
genocide prevention may lead states into "complex and dangerous" foreign policy agendas 
and therefore do not fulfil their obligation (to use Andrew Hurrell's phrase). Yet the critical 
point is that state representatives at the time were aware that the 1948 Convention infringed 
upon sovereignty and would involve intervention; indeed they discussed it, yet they 
proceeded to put forward a legal obligation to prevent and punish the crime at the 
"Henry Shue., 'Limiting Sovereignty', in Jennifer M. Welsh, (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention in International 
gglations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter two. 
Ibid, p. 19. 
49UN General Assembly, 'UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide', 
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international level. From a legitimacy perspective, not only was the practice of genocide 
judged to constitute wrongful conduct, but the obligation to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide was deemed to be rightful conduct. Now that this legal obligation has been created, 
states can, as they have done, ignore it. However, the critical point here is whether right or 
wrong, the 1948 Genocide Convention dictated that the authority of the UN and the UNSC 
was to become intrinsically linked with genocide prevention. It is this aspect that this chapter 
now turns its attention toward as this helps us understand the broader impact of genocide on 
international relations. 
5.2 The impact of genocide on the UN 
At least in theory, the UN draws its authority from the premise that it is an intergovernmental 
organisation that works in the collective interest of all member states. With its rule of one 
vote one state, the UN stands as the cornerstone of international legitimacy as it acts as the 
main arena for international public reason formation. States will be more willing to accept a 
decision, or indeed the failure to make a decision, if the deliberation has occurred within the 
UN because as UN member states, they perceive themselves to be part of the process. Whilst 
the UN cannot hold states to account in the same way that a world government potentially 
could, it aids international stability by overseeing the codes of conduct embodied in 
international agreements such as the UN Charter. The establishment of treaties and 
conventions therefore signify the procedural face of international legitimacy as they represent 
international society's understanding of what constitutes rightful conduct. States utilise such 
collective agreements to hold each other's actions to account, which in turn helps constrain 
the practice of wrongful conduct thereby aiding the likelihood of international stability. 
Essentially, this is the power of the UN. Whilst this leads critics to claim that the UN has no 
power at all, they fail to gauge the role that the UN plays in facilitating the practice of 
international legitimacy which aids the likelihood of international stability. 
It is important to qualify the point that the UN stands as the cornerstone of international 
legitimacy for it is clear, in a classic Orwellian sense, that within the UN: all states are equal 
(Article 2.4), but some states are more equal than others (P5). 50 This latter point is explicit 
in the context that there are two circles of rightful membership within the UN itself: the UN 
so This draws upon the classical statement made by George Orwell in his analysis of communism amongst the 
animals of Manor Farm: "All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others", see Orwell, Animal Farm (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 90. 
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General Assembly and the permanent five members within the UN Security Council. 
Against the backdrop of the failed League of Nations, the Allied Powers became the self 
appointed overseers of collective security in international relations. To all intents and 
purposes they granted themselves a privileged status within the UN Security Council on the 
grounds that this would enable rather than constrain the UN from fulfilling its collective 
security function. 5' The `P5 club', if you will, became the international equivalent of a 
V. I. P., club whose members were to hold privileges that non-members would not. Of course, 
non-members were not overtly happy with this hierarchical element. As Plano and Riggs 
explain, Australia and other middle powers challenged the great power position in an effort to 
limit the absolute veto, reject the idea of permanent membership and enlarge the Security 
Council, yet they were ultimately defeated. 52 This defeat however, did not prevent these 
middle powers from joining the UN, which would imply that they ultimately accepted, or at 
least acquiesced, into the fact that the Allied powers would hold a privileged status in 
international relations. This, it would seem, has been the case ever since for as whilst UN 
membership expanded rapidly since its conception, states remain willing to uphold the `geo- 
political order' that is to be found within the UN. 53 (See section 5.3). 
To gauge why this is the case it is important to bear in mind two things, the first being the 
fact that the Great Powers of the P5 are `great' in the sense that they have great military 
might, the second and related point being the role that the Security Council plays in 
international relations. With regard to the first point, the reality of the situation is not that 
states then, or indeed now, believe the P5 to be noble but instead they accept that the P5 
remain the most dangerous actors in international relations. As Ian Clark explains, states 
were willing to accept the "institutionalized inequality" embodied in the UN, because, as one 
Norwegian delegate at Dumbarton Oaks explained, they could not "risk not to do it". M The 
51For as near a definitive account as one can get on this subject matter see, Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, 
Jenifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, The Unite Nations Security Council and War. The Evolution of Though 
Practice Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also, Clark, Leggy in International 
Shy, chapter seven. Andrew Huffell, On Global Order. Power. Values and the Constitution of International 
6js (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter seven. 
Jack C. Plano and Robert E. Riggs, Forging World Order. The Politics of International Organisation (New 
York: Ilk Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 46. 
53 For an excellent analysis see Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States. Unequal Sovereigns in the 
Iptontional gal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
54Clark, Len y in International Society p. 148. Equally, Paul Kennedy notes that when a Mexican 
representative questioned the inequality the UN, they were told that they could have an unequal UN or no UN at 
all, see Kennedy, The Parliament of Man. p. 27. 
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consensus, therefore, that emerged at the time implied that states perceived that this 
institutionalised inequality was a price worth paying if it managed to institutionalise the 
power of the P5. As John G. Inkenberry demonstrates, even the US, at the height of its 
hegemonic power in the post-Second World War era, was willing to institutionalise its 
power. 55 In essence a trade-off occurred as small powers, middle powers, and Great Powers 
attempted to institutionalise order within the post-Second World War era. The perception 
was that it was better to have all states around the 'UN table', than to have no table at all. 
Even if this meant that in practice there would be two tables, one for the members of the 
General Assembly and one for the Permanent and rotating Non-Permanent members of the 
UN Security Council (the non-permanent membership quota has changed over time). 56 
The idea of institutionalised order brings us onto the second point regarding the role of the 
UN Security Council as it took on the mantle of overseeing the maintenance of order in 
international relations. As a result, the UNSC formed a great power club that was, and still 
is, seen to provide a stabilising function in international relations (this was the conclusion 
drawn by The Independent International Commission on Kosovo in 200157). To gauge why 
this is the case one has to only go back to the logic put forward by Hedley Bull, in that the 
hope was that the Great Powers of the P5 would help maintain international order by 
managing their relations with each other via the UNSC, whilst also steering international 
relations in a common direction. 58 This would help facilitate the likelihood of international 
stability as the P5 utilise their power to help steer international relations in a common 
direction, toward order and stability and thus away from anarchy and chaos. Yet as Hedley 
Bull rightly explains, whilst Great Powers can and sometimes do fulfil such responsibilities, 
they often do not. In sharp contrast they "frequently behave in a way as to promote disorder 
rather than order; they seek to upset the general balance, rather than to preserve it". 59 
As a result, the understanding of rightful membership is constructed upon an inherently 
problematic relationship between the membership of the UN at large and the membership of 
ss John G Inkenberry After Victory Institutions. Strategic Resin and the Rebuilding of Order and Maims 
Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
56 For a relevant analysis that touches upon the historical evolution as well as the question of reform, see 
Thomas G. Weiss, `The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform', The Washings Qujagly (vol. 26, no. 4, 2003, pp. 147-161). 
s' The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report. p. 174. 58 Bull, The Anarchical Society. p. 200. 
59 Ibid, pp. 200 - 201. This obviously reflects a Cold War perspective. 
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the P5 as an elite group within the UN. Whilst all states are members of the UN and can 
have their voice heard around the 'UN table', the words spoken by members of the P5 
simply carry more weight. Whilst non-permanent members may get to sit at the `UNSC- 
table', they have to wait their rotational turn and even then they do not have the same 
privileges that the P5 have. If, for whatever reason, the P5 perceive that the UN's pursuit of 
the collective interest clashes with their national interest then they may use their veto power 
to prevent the UN from acting. At times therefore, the UN's pursuit of the collective interest 
can be overridden by the P5's pursuit of the national interest. 60 This can cause a crisis within 
the principle of rightful membership as the interests of the elite group (P5) clashes with the 
collective group of the UNGA. To return to the norm of constitutionality, it seems clear that 
on the one hand no one expects P5 members to support a UN action that undermines their 
own vital national interests, however, it is also clear that within certain circumstances the 
P5's pursuit of their national interest can actually undermine the authority of the UN itself 
and more specifically the authority of the UNSC. In essence, the stabilizing function of the 
UNSC can be destabilized by the actions of the P5. 
The important point to consider therefore is the impact that the P5's actions can have upon 
the authority of the UNSC and the UN itself. To put this into context let us consider D. D. 
Caron's analysis, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council. 61 Caron 
raises the point that the spirit and the integrity of the UN is integral to its perceived 
legitimacy: "yet sometimes - and I would assert this is the case with the veto-the potential to 
betray the promise is built directly and tragically into the organisation. 962 By raising the 
integrity of the UN, Caron implies that the perceived authority of the UN is dependent upon 
its ability to fulfil its obligations, act in a consistent manner, uphold its values and generally 
meet the expectations of international society. This makes sense from a legitimacy 
perspective as one would expect that the UN would need to act in a consistent manner in 
order to hold onto its moral, legal, and constitutional authority. In practice then, as Caron 
explains, the P5 can prevent the UN from functioning as it should, which can, at times, erode 
the perceived authority of the UN itself. Although no one expects that the interests of the P5 
60 For a thorough analysis on this theme see Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations. Peace and Security. from 
o lective Security to the Resnonsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
David. D. Caron, `The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', The American Journal 
f International Law (vol. 87, no 4.1993, pp. 552-588). 
62 Ibid, p. 560. 
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and the UN will coincide on all issues, it is clear that on certain issues (I would put genocide 
prevention as the primary example of this) international society expects and demands that the 
P5 do their best to address the issues at hand. When they do not, they do not just undermine 
the perceived authority of the UN, but their own authority as the overseer of the use of force 
in international relations. It is within such specific circumstances that the actions of the PS 
destabilize the stabilizing function of the UNSC. Significantly, this can cause a crisis within 
the principle of rightful membership as states question the authority of the UNSC as the 
`rightful' overseer of force in international relations (this will be discussed below within the 
context of the Rwandan genocide). 
It is here that the crime of genocide and the 1948 Genocide Convention is of relevance. In 
recognising genocide as a crime, and placing the responsibility of its prevention upon the 
shoulders of the UN and the UNSC, international society entrenched a legal understanding 
that cannot simply be ignored if the UN and the UNSC is to hold onto its perceived legal, 
moral, constitutional authority. Despite the fact that the UN has many duties and obligations, 
the 1948 Genocide Convention differs in that it represents the "crime of crimes" in 
international relations (Chapter Four). Genocide therefore, more than any other crime, erodes 
the legitimate authority of both the UN (which acts as the cornerstone of international 
legitimacy) and the UN Security Council (which acts as the stabilising function in 
international relations). It is hoped that such rationale helps provide a more informed 
understanding of the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis in international relations. Yet 
obviously, if such understanding is accurate, then one has to answer the question: why did the 
occurrence of genocide in the Cold War not have such an impact on international society? 
5.3 The Cold War 
It is quite striking how genocide prevention was so prominent in the international conscience 
of 1948, yet was immediately marginalised in the context of the Cold War. As William 
Schabas explains: "Some may have legitimately questioned, in the 1970's and 1980's, 
whether the Genocide Convention was no more than an historical curiosity". 63 The 
unwillingness of states to acknowledge the Convention went hand in hand with the lack of 
63 Ibid, p. 8. 
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state ratification and accession. 64 Whilst as discussed in Chapter Four, the ICJ ruling of 1951 
stated that genocide was a matter of jus cogens and therefore binding on states as part of 
customary international law, the fact that only twenty-five states ratified the Genocide 
Convention when it came into force on the 11th January 1951 highlights the point that with 
the outbreak of the Cold War, the prevention of genocide took a back seat. In this section 
then, it is important to consider why the solidarist ethic embodied in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention faded within the context of the Cold War period. 
To explain why the solidarist commitment to prevent genocide became so marginalised 
within the context of the Cold War, one has to understand that the extremity of the security 
environment that emerged radically altered international society's understanding of rightful 
conduct. With regard to the concept of international legitimacy, international society's 
understanding of the three norms altered to the point that humanitarian intervention; even 
within the context of genocide prevention, was deemed to be illegitimate. This is put into 
context within Donnelly's analysis upon humanitarian intervention in the Cold War: 
Despite the strong moral case, the political and legal environments were so uncompromising 
that giving priority to the danger of partisan abuse seemed the best course. There was a clear international normative consensus, across the First, Second, and Third Worlds, that 
humanitarian intervention was legally prohibited. 65 
The statement goes right to the heart of the matter as it highlights the relationship between the 
three norms of constitutionality, morality, and legality in the Cold War period. When one 
looks at the Cold War period, one sees a striking paradox in that the Cold War represented a 
time of increasing human rights violations, yet at the same time an international normative 
consensus emerged upon the prohibition of humanitarian intervention. Yet as Donnelly 
states, one has to put this within the context of the time. To gauge this it is important to 
consider the impact of a paralysed UNSC, the threat of a nuclear holocaust, and the 
emergence of newly forged sovereign states upon the sovereignty-intervention debate by 
considering their impact upon the three norms in the legitimacy process. 
64 Notably the US Senate did not consent to ratification until 1988, which actually resulted from Senator 
Proxmire making a personal plea on the floor of the Senate every day for nineteen years! For an overview of 
ratification see Ibid, pp 505- 508. 
65 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights. In Theory and Practice (London: Cornell University Press, 2003). p. 
248. 
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The extremity of the Cold War security environment was captured in Lester Pearson's dictum 
that a "balance of terror" had replaced the "balance of power" in international relations 66 
The terror that Pearson referred to, was the potential human catastrophe that could arise if the 
US and Russia engaged in nuclear war. As Peter J. Kuznick's analysis explains, within just 
twelve days of President Truman's first full day in office, two of his leading scientific 
advisors on nuclear weapons warned that "modem civilisation might be completely 
destroyed". 67 The sentiment expressed underpinned their concern that the atomic bomb 
should not be viewed merely as a weapon but as "a revolutionary change in the relations of 
man to the universe". 68 Such fear became the mainstream position. In 1949, Carlos Romulo 
the President of the UN General Assembly bluntly declared: "The choice before us is the 
survival or extinction of the human race and human civilisation. The stake is not merely 
high; it is total and final and, if we lose it, irretrievable. Fear can never be banished from the 
earth so long as the split atom threatens the very existence of mankind". 69 The statement was 
made less than twelve months after the President of the General Assembly, Mr. H. V. Evatt, 
stated that the Genocide Convention signified a significant advance in international law. The 
problem being that, twelve months on, the threat of a nuclear war dictated that the fear 
gripping international society was not that a group could be destroyed, but that the group of 
humankind could be destroyed. As the scientific advisors at the time warned, such 
technology could be used as a "weapon of genocide". 70 The threat, therefore, of omnicide, by 
which I mean the destruction of humankind itself, saw the threat of genocide subordinated. 
From a legitimacy perspective, the morality embodied within genocide prevention is difficult 
to justify if one considers that any such military intervention could trigger a nuclear war. It 
was not until the end of the Cold War therefore, when the threat of omnicide lifted, that 
international society began to reengage with the threat posed by genocide. 
A second point to consider is how the Cold War impacted on constitutional views at the time. 
Quite simply, the US and the Soviet Union divided international relations up into their 
relative spheres . of influence which dictated that the UN itself had very little influence at all. 
66 Cited in Martin Wight, International Theory The Three Traditions edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New York: Holmes ad Meir, 1992), pp. 164 - 165. Pearson made this statement on 24th June, 1955. 6' Peter J. Kuznick, `Prophets of Doom or Voices of Sanity? The Evolving Discourse of Annihilation in the 
First Decade and a Half of the Nuclear Age', Journal of Genocide Research (vol. 9, no. 3,2007, pp. 411- 441), 
414. 
Ibid. 
6' Ibid. 
70 Ibid, p. 420. 
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As explained by Knight, the clash of political, ideological, and strategic interests between the 
superpowers of the US and the Soviet Union dictated that the UN Security Council was 
paralysed within a heightened "climate of mistrust ". 71 The paralysis of the UNSC dictated 
that the UN could not fulfil its collective security role in international relations, thus dictating 
that the UN could not fulfil its legal obligation to prevent genocide. To return to the norm of 
constitutionality, it seems self-evident that the extremity of the Cold War security 
environment had a profound impact on shaping formal and informal expectations. With 
regard to genocide prevention, the stark reality is that no-one expected the UN to oversee 
genocide prevention within this period. The truth being that the UN did not have enough 
power to prevent, what Donnelly refers to as: "a pattern of superpower antiliumanitarian 
intervention in places such as Guatemala, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Nicaragua". 72 The 
two so-called superpowers knowingly supported oppressive, violent and genocidal regimes 
within this period. 73 However, many states seemingly accepted the actions of the US and the 
Soviet Union as they provided somewhat of a security umbrella for those within their relative 
sphere of influence. 74 As a result, the UN's failure to prevent genocide in the Cold War 
period did not have a profound impact on the UN because states accepted that the UN did not 
have the power to prevent genocide without the collective support of the P5. 
A final point to consider from a legitimacy perspective, is how legal views toward 
sovereignty altered during the context of the Cold War. Significantly, the decolonisation 
process radically altered the membership of the UN and international society as a whole. 
Events, such as, `The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples' significantly increased the number of UN member states to 150, which grew further 
71 See Andy, W. Knight, `The Future of the UN Security Council: Questions of Legitimacy and Representation 
in Multilateral Governance', in Andrew F. Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur, (eds. ), Enhancing Global 
Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 2002, chapter two), p. 20. 
72 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights. p. 248. Emphasis in the original. As Gellately and Kiernan right point 
out, much more research needs to be doe into the role of great power support for genocidal regimes in the Cold 
War era. See Gellately and Kiernan, `Investigating Genocide, ' in Gellately and Kiernan (ed. ), The ft care of 
Genocide. Mass Murder in a Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 
eighteen. 
7' As Gellately and Kiernan right point out, much more research needs to be doe into the role of great power 
support for genocidal regimes in the Cold War era. See Gellately and Kiernan, `Investigating Genocide, ' in 
Gellately and Kiernan (ed. ), The Spectre of Genocide. Mass Murder in a Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter eighteen. 
74 For an authoritative analysis of UN Security Council interventions in the Cold War and post-Cold War era see 
Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations S20M Council and 
War. The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (New York: Oxford, 2008), pp. 265 - 515. 
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to 175 by 1990.75 This rapid expansion had significant implications for the debate 
surrounding humanitarian intervention as these newly formed states upheld the view that state 
sovereignty should be understood as absolute. This is understandable as they sought to 
protect the very sovereignty that they fought so long and hard to establish. 76 Capturing the 
mood of the time, the 1965 UN General Assembly Declaration on the "Inadmissibility of 
Intervention" stated: "No state has the right to intervene, directly, or indirectly, for any 
reason, whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state". 7 The sentiment 
encapsulates the explicit resentment felt toward the idea of humanitarian intervention within 
this period. 78 When one juxtaposes this `north south' development, with the `bi-polar' 
context of the Cold War, one see's how international society's legal, moral, and constitutional 
views toward genocide prevention altered during the Cold War period. This was perhaps 
most tragically illustrated in the context of the humanitarian intervention in Cambodia. 
Whilst not defended in humanitarian terms, the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia 
brought about an end to the Khmer Rouge - one of the worst genocidal regimes of the 20 
century. 79 Yet, as Wheeler explains, this was met with moral revulsion from the US and its 
allies, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as neutral and non- 
aligned states. 80 This revulsion reflected the broad international consensus forged over the 
75 The Declaration can be read at http: //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu3/b/c coloni. htm Accessed 26/07/08. For an 
analysis on UN membership see, United Nations, 'Growth in United Nations membership: 1945 to present', 
htti): //www. un. org/en/members/&Eowth. ghWd#2000 Accessed 26/03/2010. 
76 For example, in the Organisation for African Unity's Charter, the overwhelming sentiment to be found in the 
Charter's principles is the inalienable right of sovereignty. See http: //www. africa- 
union. orgfroot/aulDocuments/Treaties/text/OAU Charter 1963. pdf Accessed 04/06/08. 
77 UN General Assembly Declaration on the `Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty', (A/RES/20/2131,21/12/1965), http: //www. un- 
documents. net/a20r2131. htm Accessed 21/11/2008. 
78 Obviously, one could also add the point that many of the political elites within these countries were 
responsible for grave human rights violations such as genocide and therefore opposed any measure that would 
make them accountable for their actions. 
" In R J. Rummel's quantitative comparative analysis, the author argues that, "In proportion to its population. 
Cambodia underwent a human catastrophe unparalleled in this century". Rummel goes onto to detail that an 
estimated 2,035,000 were murdered out of a population of around 7,100,000. Death By Government sixth 
edition (London: Transaction Publishers, 2008), chapter nine. Whilst debates continue over whether the term 
genocide can be applied to the entire destruction, Ben Kiernan's seminal study underscores the point that within 
this broad destruction, certain groups such as the Cham were destroyed with specific intent see Ben Kiernan, 
The Pol Pot Regime Race. Power. and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. 1975 -79 (London: Yale University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 460 - 465. For a case study analysis of Cambodia which highlights the 
aforementioned definitional need to utilise the perpetrator viewpoint, see Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The 
History and Sociology of Genocide Analyses and Case Studies (London: Yale University Press, 1990). pp. 398- 407. 
8o Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Hu an Intervention in nLý++Attonal Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University press, 2000), pp. 78-110, esp. pp, 89-100. 
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norm of non-intervention in the Cold War period. Not only was the conduct of the 
Vietnamese denounced but the UN General Assembly continued to recognise Khmer Rouge 
government when it had been ousted. As Kuper explains: "In September 1979, a majority of 
71 (against 35, with 34 abstentions) voted to continue the assignment of the Cambodian seat 
to the ousted government... One can only ask - is genocide a credential for membership in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations? s81 The question posed by Kuper is interesting in 
that it ties back in with Clark's understanding of rightful membership as obvious questions 
can be raised over the morality of such procedural decision making. This morally bleak 
reality leads Kuper into a vehement attack upon the UN in which it is claimed that the UN 
provided no more than a "deaf ear" to the genocides in Burundi, Uganda, Bangladesh and 
Cambodia not to mention the massacres of the Ibo in Northern Nigeria, the Arabs in 
Zanzibar, war crimes in Vietnam, mass violence in East Timor as well as Equatorial New 
Guinea. 82 The "deaf ear" therefore shown toward the genocide in Cambodia is representative 
of a broader UN paralysis with regard to confronting the crime of genocide in the Cold War 
era. However, despite Kuper's scathing assessment of the UN, he concludes: "the United 
Nations is the most appropriate body for the protection against, and punishment of, 
genocide". 83 The statement brings us back full circle as despite the fundamental problems 
embodied within the UN, it remains the cornerstone of international legitimacy and the best 
chance, at least at present, for preventing genocide in international relations. 
In summary, the Cold War saw the legal obligation to prevent genocide banished on 
conception. The ideas of conditional sovereignty and genocide prevention did not sit well 
within the Cold War context. Perhaps this helps explain why the post-Cold War debate over 
humanitarian intervention focused on the UN Charter to the point the 1948 Genocide 
Convention was grossly overlooked. The UN Charter had stayed with international society 
throughout the Cold War, by which I mean it had stayed in the active conscience of state 
leaders and policymakers. This was simply not the case with the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
If it were any other legal convention, may be it would have been simply forgotten, however, 
as discussed, the Genocide Convention signifies more than just a legal obligation in that 
genocide is internationally regarded as the "crime of crimes" from a legal and moral 
a' Leo Kuper, Genocide and its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982), p. 173. 82 1bid, chapter nine. 83 1bid, p. 183.. 
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perspective. It was the moral abhorrence felt toward the Rwandan genocide therefore that 
brought the crime of genocide back in from the Cold. 
5.4 Genocide and the post-Cold War legitimacy crisis 
The end of the Cold War brought an end to the balance of terror that had plagued 
international society. The subsequent radical shift in the distribution of power heralded a 
new era in which international society's legal, moral, and constitutional expectations 
changed, thereby altering its collective understanding of international legitimacy. This was 
put into context on the 27th September 1991, as the Foreign Ministers of the P5 issued a joint 
declaration committing to a revitalised role for the UN within the context of a `new world 
order'. 84 Problematically, the ambiguity of the US-led `new world order' left fundamental 
questions unanswered regarding what would constitute rightful conduct and rightful 
membership in the post-Cold War era? 85 This helps explain why, within less than a decade, a 
legitimacy crisis arose in international relations. Although much has been written on the 
legitimacy crisis that arose in relation to the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, it is proposed 
here that the occurrence of genocide in the post-Cold War era had a profound impact on the 
legitimacy process and in doing so created a sovereignty-intervention-authority dilemma. It 
was international society's failure to resolve this dilemma that saw a legitimacy crisis unfold 
within the context of Kosovo and ultimately spill over into Iraq. From this perspective, the 
impact of genocide upon the legitimacy crisis has to be factored into our current 
understanding in order to help further international society's ability to resolve the legitimacy 
crisis (this will be discussed in Chapter Six). Yet prior to analysing the impact of genocide 
upon the legitimacy process, it is important to address the problems embodied in the post- 
Cold War `new world order'. 
To understand how tensions arose within the legitimacy process let us first of all consider the 
sovereignty-intervention debate within the context of right, ful conduct. Primarily, a tension 
arose as international society became divided over the potential role for humanitarian 
" For a discussion upon the revitalised role of the UN see Boutros, B. Ghali `Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century' in Olara, A. Otunnu, and Michael Doyle, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), chapter one. There has been much written on the post-Cold War `new world order', for a relevant overview of the debates involved see Michael Barnett's review essay, `Bringing in the New World Order, Liberalism, Legitimacy and the United Nations', World Politics (vol. 49, no. 4 1997, pp. 526 - 551). 8ý It is worth stressing here that Ian Clark provides a detailed analysis of international legitimacy in 
contemporary international society and in doing so addresses many aspects that go beyond the parameters of this analysis, see Clark, Leery nternational Society pp. 155 - 256. 
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intervention in a post-Cold War era. To put this into context let us consider the historic 
consensus forged over the plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq. UN Resolution 688 seminally 
authorised Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, which as Alex Bellamy explains: 
"marked a revolutionary moment in international society because it implied that human 
suffering could constitute a threat to international peace and security and hence warrant a 
collective armed intervention by the society of states". 86 In essence, the flexibility of the 
post-Second World War script allowed the P5 to weave the thread of collective interest 
between the UN Charter's commitment to international peace and security, with the issue of 
human rights violations within states. Yet as Bellamy states, the Resolution only implied that 
human suffering could constitute a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 
688's potential therefore for establishing the norm of humanitarian intervention in 
international relations remained unfounded, for as Wheeler explains, the threat of a Soviet 
veto upon the resolution signalled consensus through "acquiescence" rather than "tacit 
legitimation". 87 
The example illustrates how a deep-seated problem began to arise as the `new world order' 
embodied a highly ambiguous understanding of rightful conduct. Resolution 688 masked an 
underlying tension as the P5 upheld alternative legal, moral, and constitutional views of what 
should constitute rightful conduct in the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, China and 
Russia adopted a more pluralistic commitment to absolute sovereignty and non-use of force 
in international relations. 88 The legal right of sovereignty was therefore seen to be absolute. 
On the other hand the US, the UK and France tended to espouse a more solidarist 
commitment to conditional sovereignty and the morality of humanitarian intervention. 89 
Thus, there was a clash of norms within the legitimacy process as the legality of sovereignty 
clashed with the morality of intervention. At the same time, constitutional expectations 
altered as it was evident that something had to be done about the increasing number of 
16 Alex Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society', Review o 
International Studies (vol. 29, no. 3,2003, pp. 321-340) p. 325. Emphasis added. 
Wheeler, Saving Strangers. pp. 154-155. 
sý For a highly relevant analysis of the Chinese and Russian perspectives on this matter see, S. Neil MacFarlane, 
'Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice' and Rana Mitter, 'An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global 
Order and Justice in Historical Perspective', both in Rosemary Foot et all., (ed), Order and Justice in 
international relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chapters seven ad eight respectively. 'For such analysis see, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Justine Lacroix, 'Order and Justice Beyond The Nation-State: 
Europe's Competing Paradigms' and John Lewis Gaddis, 'Order versus Justice: An American Foreign Policy', 
both in Rosemary Foot et al., (ed. ), Order and Justice in international relations. chapters five and six 
respectively. 
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conflicts within states. This was explicit within the context of Somalia as the UN authorised 
intervention signified an agreement amongst the P5 that certain internal matters warranted 
international intervention. Yet once again, the intervention masked an underlying tension 
regarding sovereignty-intervention, for as Wheeler highlights, the intervention in Somalia 
gained support precisely because the UNSC agreed that since Somalia was a failed state it did 
not qualify as a sovereign state. 90 Accordingly, the right of sovereignty was not seen as an 
applicable legal obstacle that could hinder the morality of intervention. The division amongst 
the P5 therefore reflected a deeper division international society regarding the compatibility 
of order and justice in the post-Cold War era. This ultimately hindered international society's 
ability to forge a common understanding of rightful conduct. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider how the debate over rightful conduct began to impact 
upon the authority of the UN itself. Thomas G. Weiss puts this relationship into context when 
he claims that the expansion of the Chapter VII remit in the early 1990s had a detrimental 
impact upon the authority of the UN and the UNSC. 91 Primarily, Weiss criticises the 
ambiguity to be found within post-Cold War UN Resolutions as it is claimed that such 
uncertainty fuelled conflicting interpretations which ultimately undermined "the substantive 
provisions of the UN Charter's collective security system". 92 Thomas M. Franck puts such 
understanding into the context of international legitimacy when he claims that rules lose their 
determinacy, or in other words, their compliance pull, when they become unclear. 93 
Problematically, states constructed a vague, ever-expanding, normative agenda that the UN 
simply did not have the capacity to fulfil. This had a detrimental impact upon the perceived 
authority of the UN itself. 94 With the wisdom of hindsight it seems clear that the `new world 
order' needed to embody a clear understanding of what would constitute rightful conduct in a 
post-Cold War era, yet tragically, it did not. Perhaps the UNSC should have `triggered' the 
1948 Genocide Convention retrospectively to address the Kurdish crisis within Iraq, rather 
than attempt to make the link between human rights violations within states and international 
90 Wheeler, Saving Strangers. 182 - 188. 91 Thomas G. Weiss, Mili - Civilian Interactions (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). p. 198. 92 Ibid. 
93 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 71. 
" Weiss, Military - Civilian Interac 'ons pp. 198 -199. 
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peace and security. 95 The point here is not to suggest that a case cannot be made for such 
interventions, but that the legal foundations of such interventions were largely 
unsubstantiated. 96 Such legal ambiguity did nothing to resolve the tension that was arising 
regarding the legality of sovereignty versus the morality of intervention which as Weiss noted 
above only acted to erode the authority of the UN system. 
It is here that the Rwandan genocide is of relevance as it acted as a catalyst that brought the 
sovereignty-intervention-authority dilemma to the fore of international relations. To put this 
into the broader context of the post-Cold War era let us consider Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore's analysis, Genocide and the Peacekeeping Culture at the United Nations. 7 The 
authors notably set the pretext for the UN [in]action in Rwanda as they explain that by mid- 
1993 many actors inside and outside the UN were aware that the UN was "trying to do too 
much, too fast" which ultimately undermined the moral authority of the UN. 98 This led the 
Security Council and the Secretariat to re-evaluate the role of the UN. As the authors explain, 
"the UN was already returning to the classic rules of peacekeeping when the U. S. Rangers 
died in Mogadishu on October 3,1993". 99 The event seemingly reinforced the idea that the 
UN's rules of engagement should be constructed upon a commitment to peacekeeping rather 
than peacemaking. Since it was having difficulty doing the latter, it was running the risk of 
having its authority increasingly scrutinised. It is here that the paradox lies. Quite simply, 
UN's inaction over Rwanda represented a misunderstanding of the rules as there was a clear 
legal obligation to prevent genocide and in failing to fulfil this legal obligation, the UN and 
the UNSC's legitimate authority was eroded to the point that a justice deficit arose within the 
ordering structure of the UN. 
" Within the legal definition the Kurds would be considered an ethnic group and the intentional extermination 
of between 50,000 and 100,000 would surely qualify "as in whole or in part". Human Rights Watch, The Anfal 
Campaign against the Kurds', (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 
h tp ///hrw. org/reports/1993/anfaiianfalint. htm Accessed 28/05/08 This would also fit within Chapter Three's 
understanding of genocide as 50,000 would certainly fall within the remit of what constitutes a substantial part 
according to the understanding laid out in Chapter Three. "This was put into explicit context as the link between democracy and international stability was put forward in 
an attempt to justify the UN authorised, US-led intervention in Haiti. For a comprehensive overview see, John 
R. Ballard., Upholý, g Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti. 1994-1997 (Westport, 
Praeger, 1998). 
97 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules For The World. International Organizations in Global Politics 
g ondon: Cornell University Press, 2004), chapter five. 
Ibid, p. 131. 
Ibid, p. 133. 
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5.4.1 The impact of genocide 
In 2006 Richard Falk addressed the issue of International Law and the Future, in which he 
stated, "The world precedent associated with using military force non-defensively in Kosovo, 
as well as, without a UN Security Council mandate, created a unilateralist momentum that 
culminated in the Iraq war of 2003". 100 Although this is undoubtedly true, there are two 
points to consider. The first being that whilst the discourse is littered with unilateral rhetoric, 
what is actually meant here is a UN unauthorised momentum as it is clear that in the context 
of Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003), interventions were made by unauthorised coalitions rather 
than unilateral actors (albeit US-led and grounded upon an appeal to existing UN 
Resolutions). This underpinned the authority crisis to be discussed below. The second point 
to consider is the question: why did this unauthorised momentum emerge in the first place? 
The answer proposed here is the Rwandan genocide: as it is extremely difficult to imagine 
that any such unauthorised momentum (by which I mean UN unauthorised) could have 
occurred without the Rwandan genocide first of all eroding the perceived authority of the UN 
system. For example, the US quite clearly had the power and interest to intervene in Kosovo 
without UN authorisation, yet critically, it could not have gained the level of consensual 
support that it did, without the Rwandan genocide first of all eroding the perceived legitimacy 
of the UN and the UNSC. 101 This is not to suggest that NATO's intervention gained universal 
support but that Rwandan genocide eroded the authority of the UN to the point that a tolerable 
consensus emerged in favour of unauthorised intervention. 102 This analysis, therefore, sets 
out an understanding of how the Rwandan genocide played an integral role in the legitimacy 
crisis that subsequently unfolded. 
Reflecting upon the failure of the failure of the UN to prevent the Rwandan genocide, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) report claimed: "The politics were simple enough: In 
October 1993, at the precise moment Rwanda appeared on the agenda of the Security 
Council, the US lost 18 soldiers in Somalia!. 103 The statement has to be read with caution as 
10° Richard Falk, 'International Law and the Future', Third World QuAgIdy (vol. 27, no. 5.2006, pp. 727 - 737), p. 731. 
101 For a critical take on the US motives for intervening in Kosovo, see Vassilis K. Fouskas, Zones of Conflict. US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East (London: Pluto Press, 2003). 102 For a discussion on the level of consensual support over Kosovo see Wheeler, Saving Strangers, chapter eight and conclusion. Obviously the NATO members at the time appealed to existing Resolutions to try and authorise the intervention. 
103 Organisation of African Unity, `OAU Report Regarding Rwandan Genocide', The American Journal of International Law (vol. 94. no. 4.2000, pp. 692-695), p. 693. 
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the OAU sought to distance itself from any significant level of accountability. However, in 
its analysis it does underline the UN's overdependence upon the US whose unwillingness to 
intervene was echoed by the rest of the P5 and the UN Secretariat, who as discussed, wanted 
to reduce the humanitarian remit of the UN. However, to go back to the understanding of 
genocide presented in Chapter Three, the Rwandan genocide did not represent an ad hoc 
accumulation of human rights violations but a process of destruction that was instigated, 
aided, and abetted by the Rwandan state. 104 In other words, the state became the very 
architect of the life it had classically been envisaged to prevent: "poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short". los As is well documented, around eight hundred thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
were killed in less than one hundred days. 106 Whilst the focus here is on the impact of the 
genocide, rather than the genocide itself, it seems fair to suggest that if there was ever a cause 
for humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, this was it. To return to the 
relationship between genocide and morality raised in Chapter Four, the Rwandan genocide 
acted as the 1990s paradigm example of an "abyss of horror" (to use J. K. Roth's phrase), or 
nothing did do. 
If the Rwandan genocide was not bad enough in itself, one cannot overlook the genocide that 
took place in Srebrenica in 1995.107 The timing could not have been worse as the UN was 
still recovering from the impact of the initial Rwandan extermination and still critically 
failing to deal with its consequences. The tragedies in Rwanda and Srebrenica illustrated 
perfectly the vast chasm between UN rhetoric and reality. This was explicit within the 
context of Srebrenica as UN Peacekeepers failed to prevent an estimated 7-8,000 Bosnian 
Muslims from being murdered within the "safe area" of Srebrenica between July 13`h and 
July 19th 1995.108 The UN's empty promise of safety was to have a profound impact upon 
104 The Rwandan state is widely accepted to have orchestrated the genocide, in Michael Mann's seminal work, 
Mann identifies six levels of perpetrator, five of which made up the state which then utilised their position to 
mobilize the last level of perpetrator - the majority of Hutu. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. 
lp]aining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 449. 
Thomas Hobbes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 84. 
106 Such statistics are obviously very difficult to calculate, for a discussion see Linda Melvern's analysis upon, 
'the world's worst statistics', in Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 
2004), pp. 250 - 253. 107 The events at Srebrenica have since and I would argue rightly so, been recognised as genocide. The Guardian 
Unlimited. 'Hague Rules Srebrenica was an act of Genocide'. (20/04/04) 
/www. guardian. co. uk/vugo4rticle/0.2763.1195525.00. htm1 Accessed 23/06/06. 
10As part of Operation Joint Endeavour, Srebrenica was declared a "safe area" by the UN in 1993 in Resolution 
819. United Nations Security Council Resolution 819, S/RES/819, (16/04/1993). 
ha: //www. nato. int/ifor/un/u930416a. htm This promise was then extended to towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Sarajevo, 
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the authority of the UN. This was put into context in the UN Secretary-General's subsequent 
report, The Fall of Srebrenica, in which it is claimed: 
They were neither protected areas nor safe havens in the sense of international humanitarian 
law, nor safe areas in any militarily meaningful sense. Several representatives on the Council, 
as well as the Secretariat, noted this problem at the time, warning that, in failing to provide a 
credible military deterrent, the safe area policy would be gravely damaging to the Council's 
reputation and, indeed, to the United Nations as a whole. 109 
The statement supports Finnemore's and Barnett's aforementioned logic as it implies that the 
UN Secretariat warned that if the UNSC did not fulfil the promises it made then its credibility 
would be gravely damaged. Whilst such logic is understandable, it is also important to 
qualify such understanding. For example, ff the UNSC had promised not protect the people 
of Srebrenica and then fulfilled this promise, this would not have somehow helped save the 
authority of the UN and the UNSC. Any such talk therefore of saving the credibility of the 
UN by promising to do less should be put into context. Although no one expects the UN to 
prevent all human rights violations, the UN has a legal obligation to prevent genocide. This 
legal obligation is not like other legal obligations because genocide is international regarded 
as the "crime of crimes" from both a legal and moral perspective. In essence, the promise to 
protect the victim groups in both Rwanda and Srebrenica was set out in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention and it was the failure of the UN therefore to fulfil this promise in the post-Cold 
War era that had a detrimental impact upon the authority of the UN and the legal rules that 
underpin it. 
The impact of these genocides on the authority of the UN begins to illustrate why an 
authority crisis began to emerge in international relations. The UN's objective, of scaling 
back its humanitarian remit in order to help save its authority, quite simply, backfired. Within 
just weeks of the genocide in Srebrenica, David Reiff captured much the sentiment that has 
dominated the discourse ever since in his piece: `Overhaul the U. N. or Retire It'. "° 
Reflecting on the failure of the UN in Rwanda and Srebrenica, Reiff righty states, "The 
Gorzade and Bihac in May 1993. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 824, S/RES/824, 
(06/05/1993). United Nations Security Council Resolution 819, S/RES/819, (06/05 1993). 
http: //www. nato. int/ifor/un/u930506a. htm Both accessed 02/09/08. 109 UN Doc., Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55, 'The Fall of Srebrenica', UN Doc. A/54/549 (15/11/1999), p. 107. 
htty: //daccess-ods. un. ora/TMP/7822729 34913635 html Accessed 02/09/08. 
110 David Reiff, 'Overhaul the U. N. or Retire It', Los Angeles Times (22/087/1995), p. B9. See also, Adam Lebor, "Conmlicity with Evil" The United Nations it the Ade of Modem Genocide (London: Yale University Press, 2006). 
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legitimacy of the United Nations does not derive from God, nor should the international 
security arrangements concluded in San Francisco 50 years ago be viewed as immutable. 
Perhaps the United Nations should be retained as is. Perhaps it can be improved. But 
perhaps it has outlived its usefulness". " 1 The statement aptly captures the relationship 
between the second-order institution of the UN and the first-order institution of international 
legitimacy as it is important to remember that the UN is a product of international legitimacy 
rather than a producer of it. Whilst it is claimed here that the UN stands as the cornerstone of 
international legitimacy (for the reasons discussed above), international legitimacy is not a 
property and no institution can therefore claim to own it. To go back to Hedley Bull's 
understanding of institutions set out in Chapter Two, if the UN fails in its role of helping to 
facilitate the practice of international legitimacy then its legitimacy as a secondary institution 
will ultimately come into question. 
At the same time, it is important to remember that the UN is only as powerful as the 
collective will of its member states. As Richard C. Holbrooke succinctly explained: 
`Blaming the U. N. for Rwanda is like blaming Madison Square Garden when the Knicks play 
badly". ' 12 Utilising such logic, General Romeo Dallaire (the Canadian head of UN forces in 
Rwanda) claimed: "All the member states of the UN have Rwandan blood on their hands". 113 
Although this may be true, it is also clear that some states had more blood on their hands than 
others. As discussed, the power and privileged position of the P5 within the UNSC gives 
them a key role in steering international relations in a specific direction. Critically as the 
genocide unfolded in Rwanda, the PS famously denied that genocide was even taking place in 
Rwanda, thus attempting to distance themselves from their legal obligation. 114 This had a 
detrimental impact on the authority of the UN, and more specifically the UNSC, as it was 
evident that the P5 utilised their position in 1994 to steer international relations in a specific 
direction: away from genocide prevention. 
"' Reift `Overhaul the U. N. '. 
112 Cited in Evans, Responsibility to Protect. p. 175. 
113 Cited in Elizabeth Neuffer, Key to My Neighbours House. Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda. (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2002), p. 4. See also, Romer Dallaire, Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in 
R (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004). 
For a range of views see, Karen E. Smith, Genocide and the Europeans (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (London: Zed 
Books, 2009). Andrew Wallis, Silent Aecoamliee. The Untold Story of France's Role in Rwandan Genocide 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2006). Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell. America and the Age of Genocide 
(London: Flamingo, 2003). 
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Such understanding helps explain why an authority dilemma arose within the context of 
Kosovo as the genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica saw the authority of the UN eroded to the 
point that a tolerable consensus was forged regarding unauthorised NATO intervention. To 
explain this let us return to D. D. Caron's analysis in which he makes the point that the end 
of the Cold War saw the UNSC begin to function as many of its founding fathers had 
envisaged. 115 However, Caron goes onto explain that somewhat ironically, it was in this 
period that concerns arose regarding the power of the P5 and the unfairness of the veto. 116 
The important point to consider is that this piece was published in 1993 and at the time these 
concerns were raised by peripheral actors in international society. The authority of the 
UNSC consequently remained a peripheral issue, for as Caron explained: "although there will 
potentially always be actors on the periphery alleging illegitimate governance, the allegation 
and resonance of significance depends upon the power of the actor to be influential". ' 17 The 
understanding set out by Caron helps us understand the legitimacy crisis that unfolded as it is 
evident that in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, concerns regarding the authority of 
the UN and the UNSC were no longer a peripheral issue. In sharp contrast, key actors in 
international relations began to question the morality of the legal system that underpinned the 
UN and the UNSC. 
This could not have been any more explicit as the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
asked those who opposed NATO air strikes in Kosovo (on the grounds that they had no 
Security Council mandate), not to think of Kosovo but of Rwanda: 
Imagine for one moment, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had 
been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of the Tutsi populations, but the 
council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood 
idly by while the horror unfolded? I Is 
The statement captures the unauthorised momentum that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide as Anna questioned whether rightful conduct dictated rightful authority. 
By framing the problem within the context of Rwanda rather than Kosovo, Annan sought to 
underline the moral deficiency of a legal system that can act to prevent the [legal] prevention 
of genocide. From a legitimacy perspective, Annan put the clash of norms within the 
115 Caron, `The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', p. 566. 16 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. p. 559. 
'is Kofi, Annan, 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist (18/09/1999) 
ho: //www. un. or¢/News/ossstroies/kaecon I-' Accessed 12/06/09. 
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legitimacy process into stark context as he appealed to the moral and constitutional 
expectation that the P5's right of veto should not act as a legal barrier to genocide prevention. 
Such sentiment was famously reiterated in Tony Blair's seminal speech on the "The Doctrine 
of the International Community". ' 19 Such examples highlight just how questions regarding 
the authority of the UN (with regard the use of force) took centre stage in international 
relations in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Actors, such as the UK Prime minister 
and the UN Secretary-General, questioned the moral virtue of the legal rules that underpinned 
the UN, despite the fact that these legal rules served their personal interest. The Rwandan 
genocide, therefore, helps illustrate the theoretical point made in section 5.2: when states fail 
to fulfil their obligation to prevent genocide, the authority of the UN and the UN Security 
Council is eroded. That is unless, as within the context of the Cold War, international 
society's legal, moral, and constitutional expectations alter to the point that the UN is not 
even expected to prevent genocide. 
Having outlined how an authority crisis arose in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, it is 
important to juxtapose this development with the sovereignty-intervention crisis that also 
arose following the Rwandan genocide. With regard to this latter point, quite simply, the 
Rwandan genocide highlighted the moral bankruptcy embodied within the idea of absolute 
sovereignty. In doing so, it raised both moral and constitutional questions regarding how 
international society should view the legal right of sovereignty in a post-Rwandan era. This 
was put into context in 2000 as Kofi Annan asked: "If humanitarian intervention is indeed an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity? s120 Perhaps somewhat tragically, Annan understated the issue at hand as he failed 
to acknowledge the legal obligation to prevent genocide embodied in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. As a result, he failed to highlight that the draftees of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention never viewed genocide as a domestic issue. However, the statement does capture 
the tension that had arisen between the norms of legality, morality and constitutionality as it 
seemed both morally and politically indefensible to suggest that sovereignty could act as a 
barrier to genocide prevention. In many ways, it seems that the Rwandan genocide re- 
119 Tony Blair, `The Doctrine of the International Community', (24/09/1999), available at 
hhtp: //www. numberl O. Sov. uk/Page 1297 Accessed 23/07/08. 
120 Cited in Gareth Evans, The Resoonsibility to Protect. p. 31. 
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sensitised international society to the horror of genocide. As discussed, the issue of genocide 
had been marginalised within the context of the Cold War as the pluralist rules of sovereignty 
and non-intervention were prioritised, this notably changed in the aftermath of Rwanda and 
Srebrenica. 
To assess this change in international attitudes toward the idea of intervention let us consider 
the establishment of the African Union (AU) and the "right to intervene" embodied within its 
Constitutive Act of 2000.121 This regional development is important from an international 
perspective because more than any other continent, Africa upheld an absolute understanding 
of sovereignty following the de-colonisation process, yet this radically altered in the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Significantly, the establishment of the AU, in 2000, 
signified a `u-turn' in African attitudes toward humanitarian intervention as the AU rejected 
the ideas of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention that had been enshrined within the 
Organisation of African Unity's Charter. 122 This was explicit as the African Union's 
Constitutive Act set out an understanding of sovereign equality, yet went onto state: "the 
right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity". 123 Because of this, the AU's Constitutive Act became the first international treaty 
to formally recognise the "right to intervene" in international law. ' 24 Obviously, the AU's 
lack of capacity dictates that a functioning African collective security system remains a 
distant objective. However, the point to consider here is how this regional change in attitudes 
affected the sovereignty-intervention debate. As discussed in section three, newly formed 
sovereign states upheld a commitment to absolute sovereignty which dictated that 
humanitarian intervention, even within the context of genocide prevention, was denounced. 
12' African Union, `African Union in a Nutshell'. Emphasis added. Available at 
ho: //www. africaunion. org/root/au/AboutAu/au in a nutshell en htm Accessed 26/06/06. For such analysis 
see Fantu Cheru, African Renaissance. Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2002) 
pp. 203-204. See also, The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Building an African Union for the 21" century 
(Policy Seminar Report, August 2005). 
122 For a relevant overview that places this development within the context of the R2P see Adele Brown, `Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect? ' House of Commons Research Paper (17/06/2008). Available at 
httn: //www parliament uk/comnions/lib/research/rp2008/ 8 055 $f Accessed 10/12/09. 123 African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4, principle (h), available at htt ): //www. africa-union. ora/root/au/Abou u/Constitutive Ach en htm Accessed 21/05/2010. 124 For such analysis see Evarist Bainiu and Kathryn Sturman. `Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene'. African Security Review (vol. 12, no 2.2003), available at httD: //www. iss. co. z-a-/Ip-u-bs/ASR/12No2/AfWat. html Accessed 14/06/06. 
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The Rwandan genocide therefore had a profound impact in that it altered the attitudes of 
many newly formed states in Africa and indeed around the world. When one recalls that 
international legitimacy is dependent upon a tolerable consensus being forged, the pro- 
interventionist stance of African leaders in the post-Rwandan era is significant. Moreover, it 
seems fair to suggest that this regional development reflects the broader pro-interventionist 
movement that arose following the Rwandan genocide which ultimately culminated in the 
2005 UN endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (see Chapter Six). 
Of course, this is not to say that every state in international society favoured the idea of 
humanitarian intervention in the post-Rwandan period. As T. G. Weiss notes, within the 
context of Kosovo, China, Russia and much of the third world remained hostile not only to 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo but also to Kofi Annan for raising the debate in the UN 
General Assembly. 125 The division therefore is central in our understanding of the 
legitimacy crisis as it highlights that by the time the events within Kosovo unfolded, 
international society had not managed to forge a collective understanding of rightful conduct. 
This was put into context as advocates of intervention in Kosovo argued that UN Resolution 
688 had established the rule of intervention in international law, 126 yet this was refuted by 
Moscow. '27 Such understanding neatly brings us back to the relationship between rightful 
conduct and rightful authority. 128 It is important therefore to juxtapose the impact that the 
Rwandan genocide had upon the idea of absolute sovereignty (thereby creating a sovereignty- 
intervention dilemma) with the impact the genocide had upon the authority of the UN 
(thereby creating an authority dilemma). It is from this perspective that one can see how the 
Rwandan genocide laid the blueprint for the legitimacy crisis that unfolded as it created a 
sovereignty-intervention-authority dilemma in international relations that international 
society failed to resolve by the time the Kosovo crisis took centre stage in 1999. Critically, 
125 Thomas. G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 97. For a specific 
overview from a `developing' perspective see, Ramesh Thakur, `Developing Countries and the Intervention- 
Sovereignty Debate', in Richard M. Price, and Mark, W. Zacher, The United Nations and Global Security (New 
York: Palgrave, 2004), chapter twelve. 
126 See a discussion of Baroness Symons claim in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Blair's retain: a force 
for good in the world? ' Karen E. Smith, and Margot Light, (ed. ), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 176. 
... Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay, The New American lnmerialism. Bush's War on Terror and Blood 
(London: Praeger Security International, 2005), p. 174. 
It is to be reminded here that when I speak of a crisis within the principle of rightful membership I mean that 
the legal rules underpinning the elite membership status of the P5 within the UN came under intense moral and 
constitutional scrutiny. 
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the Rwandan genocide exposed the failings of the UN system which, as discussed, led actors 
such as Annan to question whether rightful conduct ensured rightful authority. Famously, 
Annan left this question unanswered, the problem is, as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
it remains unanswered. 129 
A final point to consider is the conclusion drawn by The Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK) in 2001. As stated in Chapter Four, the IICK notably 
concluded that NATO's intervention was "illegal yet legitimate". ' 30 At face value, the 
conclusion drawn suggests that there is a tension between legality and legitimacy; however 
from the understanding of legitimacy presented in Chapter Four, since legitimacy cannot 
exist independently of law, it is more accurate to understand the report's findings as a clash 
between legality and morality. Within Clark's analysis of the Kosovo report, he explains: 
"the term legitimacy needs to be transcribed as a coded word for morality, thus capturing the 
tension between morality and legality". 13' The sentiment expressed by Clark is supported by 
the reports rationale, as it states: "The Commission considers that the intervention was 
justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention had 
the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of 
oppression". 132 The statement underpins the Commission's rationale, that because the 
military intervention was deemed to be a last resort that brought an end to a humanitarian 
catastrophe, it was seen as illegal, yet just. The Report upheld the sentiment found within the 
solidarist wing of the English School as it subscribes to the idea that within such extreme 
circumstances, the morality of intervening should trump the legality of sovereignty. 133 
From this perspective, one could argue that the report answers the question posed by Annan. 
In stating that within such grave circumstances, morality trumps legality, the report implies 
that rightful conduct does indeed dictate rightful authority. Yet to draw such a conclusion is 
misleading as the report goes onto explain: 
129 This is a central concern discussed within, Review of International Studies, `Force and Legitimacy in World Politics', Review of International Studies special edition, (vol. 31, supplement S 1.2005). º30 Independent International Commission for Kosovo, Kosovo Rebort. p. 4. 131 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, p. 212. º32 Independent International Commission for Kosovo, Kosovo Report. p. 4. º33 For such analysis see Wheeler, Saving SIgn g, p. 41. Of course it is not just English School scholars who uphold such as view, see, James T. Johnson. M_ orality and Contemporary Warfare (London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 117. 
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If the Kosovo war is employed as a precedent for allowing states, whether singly or in a 
coalition, to ignore or contradict the UNSC based on their own interpretation of international 
morality, the stabilizing function of the UNSC will be seriously imperilled, as will the effort to 
circumscribe the conditions under which recourse to force by states is permissible. 134 
The statement explains that the unilateral intervention should not set a precedent in 
international relations because the stabilizing function of the UNSC remains the best way of 
ensuring international stability within an anarchical realm dogged by competing moral 
claims. Although this is true, the Commission failed to acknowledge that the UNSC is a 
product of international legitimacy, not a producer of it. Its value is therefore dependent 
upon its ability to fulfil its function. To return to the relationship between genocide and 
international legitimacy, it is evident that in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide many 
actors felt that the UNSC was not fit for purpose. The Commission, which focused on 
Kosovo rather than Rwanda, therefore failed to address how genocide impacts on the 
secondary institution of the UN. 
5.5 Conclusion 
To paraphrase Winston Churchill: the United Nations is the worst form of international 
organisation apart from all those others that have been tried before. 135 The statement 
attempts to convey the message that whilst the UN has its problems it remains the 
cornerstone of international legitimacy for the simple fact that international society has failed 
to forge a more legitimate alternative. In the post-Second World War era, international 
society institutionalised its collective understandings of order and justice into the UN via a 
process of legitimacy. Despite its flaws, the UN stands as the cornerstone of international 
legitimacy and the UNSC acts as the stabilising function in international relations. 
Problematically, the success of the UN and the UNSC is largely dependent upon the actors 
involved, yet it is evident that at times the actors involved hinder the UN more than they help 
it. It is here that concerns arise regarding rightful conduct for it is evident that when states do 
not establish a clear understanding of rightful conduct, conflicting interpretations and 
tensions arise within the legitimacy process. As stated, the post-Second World War script 
embodies certain fundamental problems that were exposed by the post-Cold War debate over 
humanitarian intervention. International society's failure to answer these questions resulted 
"' Independent International Commission for Kosovo, The Kosovo Report. p. 174. Emphasis added. 
13$ Winston Churchill is said to have stated, "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time. " (From a House of Commons speech on 11/11/1947). This 
was taken from bo: /Iwais. stanford. edu/l)emocmcyL&raocracy ]2emocracyAndChurchill(090503). html 
Accessed 06/06/2009. 
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into a crisis emerging as states divided over what constituted rightful conduct in a post-Cold 
War era. This ultimately saw questions arise regarding the authority of the UN and the 
UNSC itself. 
It is here that the crime of genocide is of specific relevance. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
genocide holds a special relationship with the institution of international legitimacy because it 
is internationally recognised as the "crime of crimes" from both a legal and moral 
perspective. Such understanding helps us see how genocide does in fact pose a transnational 
threat to international society for as discussed, genocide, more than any other crime, erodes 
the authority of the UN (which acts as the cornerstone of international legitimacy) and the 
UNSC (which acts as the stabilising function in international relations). Accordingly 
genocide poses a threat to international order as it erodes the legitimate authority of the 
ordering principles that underpin international relations. This is exactly what happened within 
the context of Rwanda as the international society's failure to fulfil its legal obligation eroded 
the authority of the UN and UNSC to the point that NATO could challenge the authority of 
the UN (with regard to use of force) within the context of Kosovo. Whilst the actors involved 
did not explicitly reject the UN, the level of consensual support that arose in international 
society, did so, because the Rwandan genocide had first of all eroded the perceived authority 
of the UN and UNSC. 
It is important therefore to consider that anything that undermines the authority of the UN to 
the point that other sources of power can, at least attempt, to challenge its authority, poses a 
threat to international stability. This takes us back to the understanding raised by Kofi Annan 
at the start of the chapter: "If the collective conscience of humanity cannot find in the United 
Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and 
for justice". 136 Although Annan's appeal to the idea of humanity does not mean that 
humanity actually exists, it is clear that states see the UN as a vehicle in which international 
codes of legitimate practice can be established and adhered to. If, for whatever reason, states 
perceive that the UN is hindering rather than helping the practice of international legitimacy 
then there is a genuine risk that states will begin to look elsewhere. The worry here is not that 
unilateral intervention will lead to genocide prevention, but that a weakened UN increases the 
16 Cited in the International Commission on intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibili to Protect. (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), available at http: //www. iciss. ca/report2- en. asp#dilemma Accessed 09/05/09. 
162 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
likelihood of ad hoc challenges to its authority, which may cause a more systemic breakdown 
of international order. It is from this perspective that we can see genocide as a threat to 
international stability, precisely because it undermines the legitimate authority of the UN 
more than any other crime. 
To understand genocide as a transnational threat, is important to consider that in 
acknowledging that the UN only contributes to international legitimacy, the UN acts as 
somewhat of a red herring. It is the special relationship between genocide and international 
legitimacy that is of relevance. For example, let us contemplate the idea that international 
society decided to abandon the UN. Although this may seem highly unlikely, it is 
nevertheless feasible. However, what is less feasible is the thought that international society 
could then go on to forge an alternative understanding of order and justice in a post-UN 
world without having a commitment to genocide prevention embodied within it. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, whilst this is theoretically possible, in practice, such an outcome 
would mean international society constructing a legal, moral, and constitutional world so 
alien to the present that it is practically impossible to comprehend. In other words, it is 
extremely difficult to conceive that in a post-Holocaust era, international society could 
construct a collective understanding of order and justice that does not embody a commitment 
to genocide. prevention. From this perspective, genocide prevention is about more than `just' 
saving strangers; it is about saving the perceived value of international law, morality, and 
politics. This is something that policymakers need to consider carefully. 
To put this into the broader context of international relations, the unauthorised momentum 
that arose in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide ultimately spilled over into Kosovo and 
then Iraq. Therefore, we can see how the erosion of the UN's authority in the context of the 
Rwandan genocide had broader implications as this paved the way for states to challenge the 
authority of the UN in an ad hoc manner. Whilst France, Russia, and China opposed the 
2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, and the US itself subsequently opposed the 2008 Russian 
intervention in Georgia, in attempting to justify their opposition, the P5 appealed to the same 
rules that they themselves continually fail to uphold. Although no-one expects the P5 to be 
able to prevent all human rights violations, it is clear that genocide cannot be seen as just 
another policy option that should only be opted for when there are national interests at stake. 
Because of the relationship that genocide holds with international law and international 
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morality, when genocide occurs in international society, the value of these ideas is eroded. 
Accordingly, genocide prevention is very much within a states national interest, that is, if 
states value international stability. 
With this in mind, this thesis shifts its attention to the 2005World Summit's endorsement of 
the Responsibility to Protect as it is evident that international society endorsed the R2P in an 
attempt to address many of the questions that were raised by the legitimacy crisis. The 
problem being that since genocide was not factored into its understanding of the legitimacy 
crisis, many fundamental questions remain unresolved which suggests that it may only be a 
matter of time before another legitimacy crisis emerges. 
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6 The Responsibility to Protect: Resolving the Legitimacy 
Crisis? 
"With the possible exception of the prevention of genocide after World War II, no idea has moved faster 
or farther in the international normative arena than the Responsibility to Protect. ", Thomas G. Weiss. ' 
The World Summit in 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations. Set 
against the backdrop of the 'UN Millennium Development Goals', `9/11' and the 'War on 
Terror', the Summit saw questions surrounding UN reform at the centre of international 
relations. Although the Summit failed to address many critical aspects of UN reform, the 
UN General Assembly did forge a consensus regarding the need to endorse the Responsibility 
to Protect principle (R2P). The concept is of specific relevance to this analysis as it 
attempted to address the sovereignty-intervention-authority dilemma that underpinned the 
legitimacy crisis over Kosovo. Initially conceived in 2001 by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the R2P concept was subsequently endorsed by the 
UN General Assembly within just four years. As explained by Weiss above, the R2P shares a 
common ground with the 1948 Genocide Convention in that both ideas were endorsed within 
four years of their conception. In essence, both reflect international normative 'knee-jerk' 
reactions to the mass atrocity crimes of the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. However, 
unlike the 1948 Genocide Convention, the R2P was born into a more hospitable security 
environment than that of the Cold War period. As a result, the momentum that was forged in 
the years that preceded the endorsement of the R2P did not get marginalised in the same way 
that the anti-genocide norm did nearly sixty years earlier. Despite certain difficulties, the 
R2P has emerged as the `master concept' (with regard to mass atrocity crimes) over the last 
five years. 3 As a result, the R2P has played a significant role in shaping international 
society's understanding of rightful conduct and rightful authority, yet as one would expect, 
problems naturally arise as the R2P consensus was forged in such a hurried manner. 
It is here that that the crime of genocide is of relevance. Problematically, international 
society failed to factor genocide into its understanding of the legitimacy crisis and therefore 
' Thomas G. Weiss `R2P, After 9/11 and the World Summit', Wisconsin International Law Journal (vol. 24, no. 
3.2006, p. 742-760), p. 742. 2 Kofi Annan described the Summit as a San Francisco moment, see Kofi Annan, "In Larger Freedom": 
Decision Time at the UN', Foreign Affairs (vol. 84, no. 3,2005, pp. 63-74). 
3 For and relevant overview see Alex J. Bellamy, `The Responsibility to Protect-Five Years One', Ethics and 
International Affairs (vol. 24, no. 2.2010, pp. 143-169). 
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failed to address certain fundamental issues which will undoubtedly cause tensions to arise in 
the legitimacy process in the future. In other words, not enough consideration was given to 
the relationship between the R2P, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the issue of genocide 
prevention, and the legitimacy crisis. For example, Jan E. Mendez (former UN Special 
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide), stated: "I consider that the current debate on the 
concept of the so-called `responsibility to protect' must not obscure the existing international 
legal obligation to prevent genocide". 4 The statement reflects the fact that the R2P 
movement failed to specifically engage with the crime of genocide. This grave omission 
leaves us questioning: to what extent does the R2P aid and/or hinder the prevention of 
genocide? 
This is important, not just from a genocide perspective, but also from a legitimacy 
perspective, for as discussed in Chapter Five, the occurrence of genocide in the post-Cold 
War era had a profound impact on the legitimacy crisis that developed. The problem 
therefore is that because the impact of genocide on the sovereignty-intervention-authority 
dilemma was not factored into understandings of the legitimacy crisis, the R2P failed to 
resolve the legitimacy crisis because it failed to address certain pivotal issues relating to 
genocide and how these expose tensions in the legitimacy process. It should be noted that the 
purpose of this chapter is not to offer a prescriptive remedy as such, but to highlight that a 
more informed understanding of the relationship between the R2P, the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, genocide prevention, and the legitimacy crisis is needed in order to help create 
long-term international stability. With this in mind, the chapter will be structured as follows. 
Primarily, the chapter sets out an understanding of what the R2P means and then shifts its 
focus onto analysing the R2P from a legitimacy perspective. This approach will assess the 
positive and negative impacts of the R2P on shaping international society's understanding of 
rightful conduct (section 5.7) and rightful authority (section 5.8), prior to offering a final 
overview of the R2P in the chapter's conclusion. With this in mind, let us turn to the most 
pressing question. 
4 Juan. E. Mendez, `The United Nations and the Prevention of Genocide', in Ralph Henham and Paul Behrens (ed. ), The Criminal Law of Genocide International. Comparative and Contextual Aspects (Surrey: Ashgate, 2007), p. 228. 
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6.1 What Is the Responsibility to Protect? 
In its initial conception, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) presented the R2P concept in a 90 page report entitled the Responsibility to Protect 
in December 2001.5 In its subsequent transitional period the R2P concept was then 
reanalysed and reaffirmed within the 2004 UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel Report: 
A More Secure World, Our Share Responsibility, as well as the 2005 UN Secretary-General 
Report: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, prior 
to being endorsed by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit 6 Critically, by 
the time it had been endorsed by the UN General Assembly, the R2P concept had been 
stripped down to just two paragraphs. Primarily, paragraph 138 sets out the first dimension 
of the R2P: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and act in accordance with it. The international 
community should as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and 
support the United Nations in establishing an early warning system. 7 
The statement underlines a two-fold domestic responsibility: states have to protect their 
populations (not just citizens), from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity and also prevent these crimes from arising (including their incitement). The 
R2P principle, therefore, clearly constrains the idea of absolute sovereignty as the right of 
sovereignty is bound with this twofold responsibility to prevent and protect populations from 
these specific four crimes. As a result, the principle embodies a solidarist ethic whereby 
sovereignty is seen to be conditional. As Weiss explains: "If a state is unwilling or unable to 
exercise its protective responsibilities for the rights of its own citizens, it temporarily forfeits 
its moral claim to be treated as legitimate"! In addition to this domestic responsibility, the 
paragraph also stipulates an international responsibility. Quite simply, it is feasible that 
some states may be unable (rather than unwilling) to prevent these crimes from occurring and 
s Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). httn: //www. iciss. ca/revort-en. asp Accessed 
23/09/09. 
6 See Report of the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More 
Secum World. Our Shared Responsibility (United Nations Foundation, 2004) http: //www. un. org/secureworld/ 
Report of the Secretary-General, In i Freedom. Towards Security. Human Ri¢hts and Development 
(United Nations, 2005), http: //www. un. org/largerfreedom/ Both Accessed, 23/09/09. 
1üN General Assembly, `2005, World Summit Outcome Document' p. 30. 
° Thomas, G. Weiss, M'1 - Civilian Interactions (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 214. 167 
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it is here that the "international community" has a responsibility to "encourage and help states 
exercise this responsibility". Accordingly, the endorsement of the R2P holds significant 
implications for sovereignty-intervention dilemma and the debate over rightful conduct. 
Yet, critically, this is only one side of the coin, as paragraph 139 extends the international 
dimension of the R2P further: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters 
VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared, to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner through the Security Council in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to 
continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the 
principles of the Charter under international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations for 
genocide war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 9 
Whilst paragraph 138 stipulated the international responsibility to help states protect and 
prevent, paragraph 139 brings in the international responsibility to react and in doing so 
provides a framework for humanitarian intervention. As one would expect, paragraph 139 
remains the most contested. States remain hostile to the idea of humanitarian intervention for 
fear that powerful states will speak with a moral tongue whilst pursuing ulterior motives. ' 0 As 
Gareth Evans explains, in 2008, such hostility saw a number of Latin American, Arab, and 
African delegates take to the floor at the UN to declare that the "World Summit rejected the 
R2P in 2005". 11 The declaration was a straightforward denial of fact, yet this underlines the 
resentment that many states still feel toward the idea of humanitarian intervention. For 
example, as stated in Chapter Four, many African states boldly adopted the idea of 
humanitarian intervention in the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act of 2001. This 
development has since been identified as a major stepping stone toward forging the 
consensus needed to pass the R2P. However, it is also clear that this African pro- 
9 UN General Assembly, `2005, World Summit Outcome Document', p. 30. 10 The leading text on the alternative IR positions within this debate remains, Nicholas, J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (O ord: Oxford University Press, 2000). Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). p. 52. _ 
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interventionist stance has waned over the last five years. 12 This reflects a broader R2P 
`backlash' in international society as some states have tried to backtrack on their R2P 
commitments. Obviously, this suggests scope for tensions to arise within the legitimacy 
process in the future. 
Louise Arbour provides us with insight into why such tension may have arisen as she 
explains that the international pressure to operationalise the R2P arose despite the concept not 
being fully understood. 13 To gauge this further it is important to consider how the R2P has 
`snowballed' since its endorsement in 2005. To offer a brief chronological overview, the 
R2P was unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, before being endorsed 
by the UN Security Council in 2006 and invoked regarding Darfur in Resolution 1706.14 In 
2006 after a co-ordinated effort led by many leading NGO's, `The Responsibility to Protect- 
Engaging Civil Society' project (R2PCS) was established at the Institute for Global Policy in 
New York. In December 2007, the UN appointed Edward Luck as the first UN Special 
Advisor on the R2P who works alongside the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of 
Genocide whose position was established in 2004 and reaffirmed as part of the R2P concept 
in 2005.15 In 2008 the R2PCS then advanced the R2P concept worldwide with seven 
informative global consultative roundtables. 16 In 2009, the first academic journal on the R2P 
came into publication, The Global Responsibility to Protect (edited by Alex Bellamy) whilst 
the `Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect' at the Ralph Bunche Institute for 
International Studies in New York (which has seen further affiliations arise since) was also 
established. 17 The multitudes of actors listed here highlights the fact that R2P advocates do 
12 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, `The Ambivalence of the African Union Leaders to Punish Impunity', paper presented 
at the International Network of Genocide Scholars, Second Global Conference on Genocide at the University of 
Sussex, England, 28th June -1" July 2010. The panel was chaired by Nigel Eltringham. 13 This is taken from a panel set up by the Council on Foreign Relations, `Preventing Mass Atrocities', 
(12/06/2007) in which Louise Arbour, the then UN Commissioner for Human Rights, answers questions from 
specialists such as Lee Feinstein and Roberta Cohen. 
: //www. cfr. org/publication/13580/preventing mass atrocities rush transcript federal news service. html? b 
readerumb7%2Fmedia%2Ftranscripts Accessed 10/01/09. 
14 The UNSC endorsed the principle first: UN Security Council Resolution 1674, `Protection of civilians in 
armed conflict' (S/RES/1674, August 2006). The UNSC then raised the R2P in the context of a Resolution on 
the events in Darfur: UN Security Council Resolution 1706, `Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', 
(S/RES/1706, August 2006). Both can be accessed at http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/unsc resolutions06. htm Both 
accessed 09/02/09. 
15 UN General Assembly, 12005, World Summit Outcome Document', p. 30. 
16 Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society Interim Report, 'Global Consultative Roundtables on the 
Responsibility to Protect: Civil Society Perspectives and Recommendations For Action' (New York: World 
Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, 2008), p. 2. 
"The Centre can be found at hW: // obalr2p. org/ See also, the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to 
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not want the R2P to succumb to the same fate that the 1948 Genocide Convention. This is to 
be commended as the R2P as it has been linked to the crises in Zimbabwe, Burma, Georgia, 
the Dominican Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Guinea, Niger, and most recently 
Kyrgyzstan. 18 However, as stated, concerns arise as the R2P has `snowballed' to the point 
that it has become the `master concept' (in relation to mass atrocity crimes), yet there seems 
to have been little consideration given to how the R2P impacts upon international society's 
[in]ability to prevent genocide. This holds implications for international society's [in] ability 
to resolve the legitimacy crisis. 
It is here that the importance of international legitimacy comes back to the fore. At the heart 
of the R2P discourse lays the central question: what kind of responsibility does the R2P 
entail? As Louise Arbour explains, although the R2P may say a lot, "there are lots of things 
it doesn't say. First of all, it doesn't say what kind of responsibility it is, the responsibility to 
protect. Is it a moral responsibility? Is it a political responsibility? Or is it a legal one? "19 
This line of questioning is highly intriguing as it explicitly reflects the three norms set out by 
Ian Clark in his analysis of international legitimacy. Indeed, the R2P discourse itself 
seemingly reaffirms the theoretical strength of Clark's approach from an empirical 
perspective. To return to Clark's analytical framework and the norms of legality, morality, 
and constitutionality, one cannot help but feel that the real question at the heart of the R2P 
debate is whether the R2P is legitimate? Whilst actors have discussed the nature of the R2P 
and its impacts from a legal, moral, and political perspective, a more informed understanding 
can be achieved by bringing such perspectives together within a legitimacy framework. The 
focus here is on analysing the R2P from a legitimacy perspective which, it is hoped, will 
provide a richer conceptual analysis. Quite simply, the R2P embodied international society's 
attempt to resolve the sovereignty-intervention-authority dilemma that underpinned the 
legitimacy crisis. The question, therefore, is to what extent did the R2P resolve the tensions 
in the legitimacy process, thereby aiding the likelihood of international stability. 
Protect', httn: //www. r2uasiapacific. ore/index php? option=com content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=6 Both 
accessed 12/02/2009 
" For such analysis see The International Coalition For The Responsibility to Protect, `R2P Crises' httn: //www. responsibilitytoprotect or index php/Cij s Accessed 23/06/2010. 19 Louise Arbour, `Preventing Mass Atrocities', 
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6.2 Rightful conduct 
Despite the fact that the R2P failed to address certain fundamental issues regarding genocide 
prevention (to be discussed below), it did address some of the key problems to be found in 
the post-Cold War debate over humanitarian intervention. Addressing the positive aspects 
that can be drawn from the R2P endorsement, this section will highlight how the R2P eased 
the debate over sovereignty-intervention by appealing to ideas such as a universal moral 
minimalism, high threshold, non-military force, and conditional sovereignty. However, the 
chapter then shifts its focus to a more critical analysis of how the R2P failed to engage with 
issues surrounding implementation and legality whilst adding the potentially highly 
problematic R2P pre-requirement of a "manifest failure". As a result, careful consideration 
needs to be given to how the R2P impacts, in both positive and negative ways, on 
international society's understanding of rightful conduct. 
Let us first of all consider the victim-based focus embodied in the R2P concept. 
Significantly, the R2P set out to emphasise the rights of the victims rather than the rights of 
the interveners. This approach became an integral part of the language used in the 
phraseology "the responsibility to protect", as Gareth Evans explains: 
This turned the "right to intervene" language on its head, focusing not on any rights of the 
great and powerful to throw their weight around but rather on the responsibility of all states to 
meet the needs of the utterly powerless. In the first instance, the responsibility to protect a 
country's people from mass atrocity crimes lay with its own government; but if it proved 
unable or unwilling to do so, a wider responsibility lay with other members of the 
international community to assist preventatively and, if necessary, react effectively. 20 
The statement underpins the conceptual shift that lies at the heart of the R2P as its focus is 
not on the rights of the powerful (states) but on the rights of the powerless (victims). The 
language used was seen to be less divisive than the language used in the debate over 
humanitarian intervention. Just as the Brundtland Commission used the phrase "sustainable 
development' 'to navigate a middle-ground between environmentalists and developers, Evans 
hoped that the R2P terminology would provide the conceptual framework for allowing a 
common ground to emerge. 21 With regard to the construction of international legitimacy, it is 
evident that the R2P attempted to establish a clear moral foundation with its victim-based 
20 Evans, Tim IRCMonsibL to Protect Enänc Mass Atrocity Crims, p. 4. 
21 Gareth Evans, `The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come ....... and Gone? ' International 
Relations (vol. 22, no. 3,2008,283-298), p. 286. 
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approach. What is interesting here is that the 1948 Genocide Convention embodied the very 
same logic as it focused on the rights of groups rather than the rights of interveners. Thus, it 
would seem that the post-Cold War debate over humanitarian intervention seemingly lost its 
way in relation to this critical point. As we shall see, the R2P managed to overcome many of 
the problems found in the post-Cold War debate over humanitarian intervention by going 
back to the ideas embodied in the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
This R2P's victim-based approach invoked a universal moral minimalist approach which had 
important implications for the debate surrounding threshold. Since the R2P focused on the 
rights of victims rather than interveners, it had to answer the difficult question: what do 
people have the right to be protected from? In stating that people have the right to be 
protected from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, the R2P 
set the threshold of responsibility high. For some critics, the R2P has set the threshold of 
responsibility too high. For example, there remain those in international relations who feel, 
that where possible, democratic states should use force to spread democracy in international 
society. 22 Conversely, critics of this position claim that this approach would see the threshold 
for military intervention set too low. The critical point is that, either way, such debates 
problematically acted to prevent any threshold from being established in the post-Cold War 
debate over humanitarian intervention. Whether right or wrong, the R2P did at least set a 
threshold. The R2P stipulated that if international society is to use force, then this should 
only be used to bring about an end to the very worst crimes in international relations, which it 
identifies as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The R2P 
therefore distanced itself from the ambiguity to be found within the debate over humanitarian 
intervention, which as discussed in Chapter Five, had a detrimental impact on international 
relations in the post-Cold War era. Providing much needed clarity upon this issue, the R2P 
saw international society express its collective view, that states, both domestically and 
u For a legal discussion on the "Right of Pro-Democratic intervention', see Christine Gray, International Law 
and the Use of Force (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 55 - 59. Whilst it seems fair to say the 
pressure to change the nature of regimes has eased somewhat in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, it is evident 
that such views persist, see Senator John McCain's untitled speech to the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. 
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (09/11/2009) 
ho: //mccain. senate goy/public/index cfm? FuseActi n-_-Pressoffice Speeches&ContentRecord id D9E96B7C 
A8DO-2425-C43D-046EC72CE0E2 Accessed 12/05/2010. The R2P concept has also been stretched to discussions on pre-emptive security strikes, see Lee Feinstein and Mary-Ann Slaughter, `A Duty to Prevent', Foreign Affairs (vol. 83, no. 1,2004, pp. 136 - 150). 
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internationally, should not deviate from their R2P as the crimes of genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing violate a universal moral minimalism. 
It important to stress that the R2P concept focuses on more than just military intervention 
alone. This was one of the biggest problems to be found in the post-Cold War debate over 
humanitarian intervention. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon explained this point well as 
he stated: "Humanitarian intervention posed a false choice between two extremes: either 
standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coercive military force to 
protect the vulnerable and threatened populations". 23 The statement highlights that the 
humanitarian intervention debate of the 1990s embodied an over simplistic dichotomy: war or 
nothing. 24 Distancing itself from this simplistic dichotomy, the R2P upheld a broader 
operational scope. Addressing this point, Gareth Evans explains that many R2P critics hold a 
misguided view that the R2P is just another word for humanitarian intervention. Instead, 
Evans claims that the R2P should be viewed as a multi-faceted concept which upholds a 
three-fold commitment to: prevent, to react, and to rebuild 25 As discussed above, paragraph 
138 embodies a clear preventative element whilst paragraph 139 sets out a more reactionary 
element. Accordingly, the R2P concept should not be stripped down to a debate over 
humanitarian intervention alone for this is only one aspect. This relates to a secondary point 
in that international society has more at its disposal than military power alone. As Evans 
rightly notes, a broad range of legal, political and economic measures that can be utilised to 
help fulfil the R2P. 26 Although this is undoubtedly true, it is also important to remember the 
fact that the 1948 Genocide Convention is actually called the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In many ways therefore, the R2P 
made positive steps, but actually achieved this normative progress by reiterating the ideas 
embodied in the Genocide Convention. 
This is again evident as we consider the impact of R2P on international society's 
understanding of sovereignty. As stated, the R2P established a threshold, which in turn holds 
2' Report of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, `Implementing the Responsibility to Protect' (A/63/677,12th 
January 2009). 
u Alex J. Bellamy claims that overcoming this dichotomy is one of the most important features of the R2P as 
world leaders should be faced with more of a choice than simply sending in the Marines or doing nothing, see 
Bellamy. Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), p. 199. 
u Evans, The Responsibility to Protect ending mass atrocity crimes. pp. 56-59. Notably, the commitment to 
rebuild to be found within the original ICISS report has been tragically stripped out of the 2005 consensus. 
26 Ibid. p. 56. 
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implications for how international society views sovereignty. The consensus forged over the 
R2P implies that international society forged a collective understanding that the right of 
sovereignty should be viewed as conditional. It is conditional in the sense that sovereignty in 
a post-R2P world is bound by a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. If states "manifestly fail" in this 
responsibility then international society has a responsibility to take collective action. As a 
result, it is difficult to see how states can make the case that sovereignty should be 
understood as absolute in a post-R2P world. This holds implications for humanitarian 
intervention, for as Alicia L. Bannon's legal analysis explains: "If nations have no sovereign 
right to commit or passively permit atrocities against their own populations, then they cannot 
object on sovereignty grounds to coercive actions halting the commission of those atrocities. 
Sovereignty simply does not extend that far". 27 Of course, this does not mean that the 
sovereignty-intervention debate is resolved but it does highlight that states cannot necessarily 
appeal to the right of sovereignty; if it has been proven that they have failed in their domestic 
responsibility to protect. This reiterates the point that the R2P embodies a solidarist ethic: 
"States that massively violate human rights should forfeit their right to be treated as 
legitimate sovereigns, thereby morally entitling other states to use force to stop 
oppression ,. 28 Quite simply, in a post-R2P world, it is extremely difficult to see how a state 
can reject the idea of an `R2P-intervention' by appealing to the right of sovereignty. Again 
such understanding was evident in the 1948 Genocide Convention, the significant 
development being that this has now been extended to cover the crime of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 
This is a significant development as the R2P does not just cover genocide. This may seem an 
obvious and simple point, yet it remains very important. As Arbour explains: "outside the 
Genocide Convention, no firmly established doctrine has been formulated regarding the 
responsibility of third-party States in failing to prevent war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, let alone ethnic cleansing - which, it should be remembered, is not as such a legal 
27 For such analysis see Alicia L. Bannon, `The Responsibility to Protect: The U. N. World Summit and the 92U estion of Unilateralism', Yale Law Journal (vol. 115, no. 5,2006, pp. 1157-1165), p. 1162. Wheeler, Saving Strangers. p. 12. Emphasis in original. 
174 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
term of art". 29 The R2P notably acts to broaden third-party responsibility beyond that of 
genocide. This is to be welcomed. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 1948 Genocide 
Convention only protects national, racial, ethnic and national groups. As a result, if political, 
economic or gendered groups are destroyed in whole, then this does not constitute genocide 
in the legal sense which dictates that the Genocide Convention cannot be invoked. 30 The R2P 
makes a progressive step in protecting these groups, even though, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, the case could equally be made that these groups should also be protected in the legal 
definition of genocide. However, a key problem remains in that the R2P never established a 
legal definition of ethnic cleansing, for as Arbour highlights, the term ethnic cleansing is not 
recognised in international law. 31 In an attempt to provide some clarity on this point, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated: "Ethnic cleansing is not a crime in its own right 
under international law, but acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute one of the other three 
crimes". 32 Problematically, Ban Ki-moon provided a quantitative answer to a qualitative 
question. The idea that a quantitative accumulation of ethnic cleansing acts may constitute 
one of the other crimes does nothing to address the qualitative question of where the 
conceptual boundaries between these crimes should be established. 
The statement made by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is symbolic of the central problem to 
be found in the R2P, as the push to operationalise the R2P left certain fundamental issues 
remain unresolved. It is here that I raise three specific areas of concern regarding 
implementation, legality and the R2P requirement of a "manifest failure", all of which feed 
into the sovereignty-intervention debate and international society's understanding of rightful 
conduct. 
6.2.1 Implementation 
With regard to the issue of implementation, the R2P reiterates the same problem to be found 
in the 1948 Genocide Convention: both lack an implementation strategy. As a result, 
29 Louise Arbour, 'The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law & Practice'. Review of 
iternational Studies (vol. 34, no. 3,2008, pp. 445-458), p. 450. 
See Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
httn: //www. rentgenocide. or$/law/convention/text. htm Accessed 12/09/09. 
" For a relevant analysis we, Walling, C. B., `The History and Politics of Ethnic Cleansing', in Ken Booth (ed. ) 
The Kosovo Tragedy: the Human Rights Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2001). Martin Shaw notably claims 
that the term only adds confusion to the subject matter of mass violence, see Shaw, What is Genocide? 
cCambridge: Polity, 2007), chapter four. 
2 Ban Ki-moon, `Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', p. 5. 
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international society is left with two documents that embody bold aspirations yet offer little in 
the way of suggesting how these aspirations can be met in practice. 33 
As previously stated, paragraph 138 of the R2P 2005 Outcome Document sets out the R2P's 
preventative commitment. Its preventative element arises as it stipulates the national and 
international responsibility that states have to protect populations (not just citizens) from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Yet despite the fact 
that everyone wants prevention rather than intervention, paragraph 138 offers little in the way 
of grounding this objective as it merely states that the "international community" should 
support the UN in "establishing an early warning system". 34 Primarily, this is problematic 
because it is built upon the assumption that early warning systems work. Secondarily, it also 
fails to distinguish between the fact that different preventative strategies may be needed to 
prevent the different crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing. Quite simply, the causes of these four crimes will undoubtedly differ and as a 
result the measures needed to prevent such crimes from arising will also undoubtedly differ. 
With regard to genocide prevention, the R2P offers nothing more concrete than the 
preventative aspiration set out in the 1948 Genocide Convention which it should be 
remembered is actually entitled, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. Whilst Article III of the Genocide Convention goes as far as stating that 
contracting parties should prevent and punish the incitement of genocide, this preventative 
measure is not supported with any implementation strategy. Without a collective 
preventative security strategy being properly formulated it is difficult to see how genocide 
can be prevented. Thus, international society remains faced with a profound question: how 
does international society prevent the state becoming the very architect of the life it has 
classically been envisaged to prevent: "poor, nasty, brutish, and short" ? 3S Unfortunately, the 
R2P offers little in the way of answering this, thus nearly sixty years on from the Genocide 
Convention, international society failed to address this fundamental problem. 36 
33 This criticism could also be laid at the door of the aforementioned African Union Constitute Act regarding the AU's "right to intervene". 
34 UN General Assembly, 12005, World Summit Outcome Document', p. 30. 35 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 84. ' It should be noted that there is some excellent work being done on this issue, Stephen McLoughlin and Deborah Mayersen, `Risk and Resilience to Mass Atrocity in Africa: A Comparison of Rwanda and Botswana', 
paper presented at the International Network of Genocide Scholars, Second Global Conference on Genocide at 
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The question therefore naturally arises: what happens if prevention fails? It is here that 
paragraph 139 of the R2P is of particular relevance as it states that the "international 
community" and the UN have a responsibility to react in accordance with Chapters VI, VII, 
and VIII of the UN Charter. In doing so, paragraph 139 seemingly places the option of 
humanitarian intervention on the table as it states: "we are prepared, to take collective action, 
in a timely and decisive manner through the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis". 37 The pro-active sentiment embodied 
within this statement implies that the UN Security Council will react in a timely and decisive 
manner. Although this is in itself not a bad thing, one has to remember that the 1948 
Genocide Convention expresses the same bold mantra yet again offers little in the way of 
suggesting how such timely and decisive action can be implemented. This was illustrated 
perfectly in the 1946 General Assembly Resolution on `The Crime of Genocide', as it made 
the recommendation "that international co-operation be organised between States with a view 
to facilitating the 38 g speedy prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide". The 
statement bears a striking resemblance to the R2P rhetoric regarding timely and decisive 
action as it recommends speedy prevention. The problem being that neither document 
explains how such bold aspirations can actually be implemented. 
In January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attempted to address this problem as 
he set out his `"Three Pillar" strategy for advancing the R2P agenda of implementation in 
international relations. 39 The thirty-one page document sets out his three pillar approach: i) 
the protection responsibilities of the state, ii) international assistance and capacity-building, 
iii) timely and decisive response. Essentially, the document fits within what has been 
described as a "R2P-Plus" approach, by which it is meant that R2P advocates set out to help 
operationalise the ideas embedded in the R2P 40 For example, in discussing the idea of a 
timely and decisive response, Ban Ki-moon claims that the bilateral, regional, and global 
the University of Sussex, England, 28* June -1" July 2010. See also, Sheri P. Rosenburg, `Responsibility to 
Protect: A Framework for Prevention', Global Responsibility to Protect (vol. 1, no. 4,2009, pp. 442 - 477). 37 UN General Assembly, `2005, World Summit Outcome Document', p. 30. 
38 UN General Assembly, `The Crime of Genocide' (A/RES/96(1), adopted at the 55* plenary meeting, 
11/12/1946). This can be found using the United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 
ja: //daccess-dds-p3+ utLorg, /doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/033/`47/1MG/NRO03347 pdf? ODenElement 
Accessed 09/06/2009. 
39 UN Secretary-General Ban ICi-moon, `Implementing the Responsibility to Protect' (A/63/67,2009). 
40 The idea of a R2P-Plus approach is taken here from Mely Caballero-Anthony and Belinda Chng, `Cyclones 
and Humanitarian Crises: Pushing the Limits of R2P in Southeast Asia', Global Responsibility to Protect (vol. 
1, no. 2,2009, pp. 135-155), pp. 145- 146. 
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efforts made to reduce the outbreak of violence in Kenya in early 2008 brought about a 
successful outcome and in doing so highlighted that there is a middle way between the use of 
force and simply doing nothing. 41 The example illustrates the aforementioned point that 
international society has more options available at its disposal than military force alone. 
Although there is nothing wrong, as such, with this "R2P-Plus" movement (further debate on 
this concept is essential), the simple fact is that UN member states have not agreed to any of 
these subsequent proposals. In 2009, nearly five years on from the endorsement of the R2P, 
the UN General Assembly merely proposed that it will "continue its consideration of the 
Responsibility to Protect" 42 The tragic reality therefore being that the victims of genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing remain dependent upon the will of 
the politically unwilling. 
The lack of clarity regarding implementation brings in a related concern regarding the issue 
of military intervention. As odd as it may sound, the problem is that R2P advocates 
continually view the use of military force as a last resort. 43 Yet whilst everyone wants to see 
mass atrocity prevention become a reality, the concern here is that the military dimension of 
the R2P has been wrapped up in conceptual bubble-wrap in order to gain international 
support. Although the principle of last resort within just war theory was never intended to be 
interpreted as a `final option', the idea that international society should exhaust all non- 
military measures is problematic 44 As T. G. Weiss explains: `By the time that all the 
alternatives to military force have been explored, many of the people whom humanitarian 
intervention is intended to save are dead". 45 Weiss underlines the point that when 
international society is reacting to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide: time is of the 
essence. Weiss goes on to note Stanley Hoffinan's warning that exhausting every other 
option first makes "a necessary military response politically less likely and practically more 
lethal . %A6 This is important as it highlights that the mainstream view toward military 
intervention may actually be counter-productive. To return to the understanding of genocide 
presented in Chapter Three, genocide is a process that culminates in mass killing. Of course, 
41 Ban Ki-moon, `Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', p. 9. 42 UN General Assembly, `The Responsibility to Protect' (A/Res/63/308, October 2009), p. 1. 43 See Evans, The Responsibility to Protect p. 4. 
44 For example, in Jean Elshtain's use of just war theory, Elshtain expands the principle of last resort to the point 
that pre-emptive warfare could be considered as just, see Jean B. Elshtain, Just War Against Terror. The Burden 
of American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
45 Weiss, Military - Civilian Interactions. p. 201. 46 Ibid. 
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international society should do everything it can to prevent this process from flourishing, but 
once mass killing has started taking place then military intervention is needed to bring the 
genocide to an immediate halt. In order to achieve such a goal, greater consideration needs to 
be given into how any potential use of force can be accommodated into an implementation 
strategy. Without this, it is difficult to see how the UN can fulfil its paragraph 139 
commitment to react in a "timely and decisive" manner. 
Tragically, sixty years after the Genocide Convention, international society remains grossly 
underequipped to implement this legal obligation. It would seem that the R2P has also failed 
to advance international society's ability to prevent genocide or indeed war crimes, crimes 
against humanity or ethnic cleansing in any significant manner. The lack of progress on this 
issue provides an apt context for considering the legal foundations of the R2P as it is evident 
that the R2P has also made very little progress in altering international law. 
6.2.2 Legality 
Despite both the UNGA and the UNSC endorsing the R2P, its legality remains contested. 
The importance of language is evident here as advocates and critics debate the obligatory 
nature of responsibility, in the R2P. This was actually put into context in 2005, as Hugh 
Bailey of the International Development Committee (IDC) questioned the then Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Triesman upon the R2P's 
obligatory nature: "The UN World Summit approved the Responsibility to Protect. Is that 
Responsibility obligatory on the UN Member States, or just advisory? "47 To which Lord 
Triesman replied: "My understanding is that it has become a charter obligation and it should 
be binding upon all Member States". 48 The answer provided by Lord Triesman reflects his 
personal view, and whilst he believes the R2P carries with it a legal obligation, it is evident 
that such understanding is not universal. 9 In what has now become a famous letter in the 
47 House of Commons. 'Darfur, Sudan: the Responsibility to Protect'. Minutes of Evidence taken before 
International Development Committee. (08/10/05). Question 47. (From now on IDC. Minutes of Evidence). 
hba: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm/200506/croselect/ctWintdev/uc657-i/uc65 
It should be noted that this is taken from an uncorrected transcript and permission is granted on the basis that 
and use makes clear that neither witnesses nor members have had an opportunity to correct the transcript. 
Accessed 01/12/05. 
4s Ibid. 
4' Triesman's view does not even represent the UK's view as it is evident that alternative UK perspectives have 
been raised. As Adele Brown notes in June 2007, the UK government stated that the R2P was a political 
commitment rather than a legal responsibility, yet in a 2008 World Tonight interview, the UK foreign secretary 
stated that the responsibility to take action in an R2P case is a "legal requirement". See Adele Brown, 
`Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention, Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect? ' House of Commons 
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R2P debate (notably written just prior to the R2P Summit Outcome), U. S. Ambassador John 
Bolton made the US position very clear when he stated that the US would "not accept that 
either the United States as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual states have an 
obligation to intervene under international law". 50 The two opposing understandings 
therefore help illustrate why the obligatory nature of the R2P remains so contested. 
To understand the ambiguity surrounding the legal foundation of the R2P it is important to go 
back to the ICISS report of 2001. The ICISS stated that the R2P is "grounded in a miscellany 
of legal foundations (human rights treaty provisions, the Genocide Convention, Geneva 
Conventions, International Criminal Court statute and the like), growing state practice - and 
the Security Council's own practice". 51 The statement provides some insight into why 
questions regarding the legal foundations of the R2P have arisen since its 2005 endorsement. 
The miscellany of legalities embodied in the R2P foundation makes it difficult to pinpoint the 
exact legal nature of the R2P. One is reminded of the phrase, "throw enough mud at the wall 
and some of it will stick", as it seems that R2P advocates sometimes simply raise a multitude 
of legalities in an attempt to justify the legality of the R2P. This complexity is accentuated as 
each of the R2P drafting stages actually framed its legal foundation in a slightly different 
light. This is raised in Carsten Stalin's comparative legal analysis, in which Stalin specifically 
addresses the legality of each document and concludes that each report "embodies a slightly 
different vision of the responsibility to protect. This divergence explains part of its success. 
The notion became popular because it could be used by different bodies to promote different 
goals". 52 Again Stahn's analysis implies that the R2P has many legal faces. Although this 
may have helped the R2P gain its required level of international consensual support, it does 
not help clarify the R2P's legal foundation. For example, in Ban Ki-moon's analysis, the UN 
Secretary-General defended the legality of the R2P by stating that it is built upon existing 
Research Paper, (17/06/2008), p. 52. Available at 
httu: //www. garliament. uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2008/ 8-055 pc f 
Accessed 17/01/2009. 
". he letter written by John R. Bolton can be read at 
http: //www. responsibilitytoprotect. org/files/US_Boltonletter R2P 30Aug05%5B1%5D. pdf Accessed 10/01/2009. 
S' International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, `Responsibility to Protect', p. 50. 52 Stahn, `Responsibility to Protect, Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? ', p. 118. 
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international law, yet failed to explain whether the R2P contributes anything new to 
international law. 53 
Responding to such controversy, Louise Arbour has claimed that the "legal core" of the R2P 
"rests upon an undisputed obligation of international law: the prevention and punishment of 
genocide". 54 Whilst the ICISS raises a miscellany of legal foundations, Arbour specifically 
focuses on the 1948 Genocide Convention to highlight the legal obligation that lies at the 
heart of the R2P. Essentially, Arbour explains that the R2P has not brought anything new to 
table regarding international law, yet implies that the R2P is a positive step in that it may help 
shape international law in a way that helps prevent mass atrocity crimes such as those 
identified by the R2P. It is from this perspective that Arbour then considers the question of 
non-compliance through an analysis of the 2007 International Court of Justice ruling on 
Bosnian and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro. Arbour, who views the ruling of the 
ICJ to be "earth shattering", states that the Court ruled that Serbia was responsible for the 
prevention of genocide in Bosnia - Herzegovina, and therefore had a responsibility to prevent 
genocide outside its own territory. " Accordingly, Arbour raises a series of judgements to 
highlight that the Court invoked a notion of "due diligence" in that states have a positive 
obligation to "do their best" to prevent genocide. 56 To gauge this one has to understand the 
reasoning that underpinned the Court's ruling. Notably, the Court raised three key aspects in 
analysing the capacity of a state to discharge its obligation to prevent genocide: influence, 
proximity, and information. 57 Within the Serbian case, Serbia was found to have breached its 
obligation because it had strong political, military, and financial links with the agents guilty 
53 See Moon, `Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', esp., paragraph 55. A similar sentiment is also found 
in Ekkehard Strauss, `A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush-On the Assumed Legal Nature of the 
Responsibility to Protect', Global Responsibility To Protect (vol. 1, no. 3,2009, pp. 291-323). 
54 Arbour, `The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care', p. 450. 
ss 1bid, p. 452. 
Ibid. pp, 451- 452, Arbour details a series of judgement rulings, for example, "If the State has available to it 
means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of 
harbouring specific intent, it is under duty to make use of these means as the circumstances permit". Also, "The 
obligation of States is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide as far 
as possible". Thus, responsibility is incurred "if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent 
genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing genocide". The Court 
ruled that "the duty to act arise[s] at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the 
existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed". 
57 Ibid, pp. 452 - 455. 
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of genocide (influence); it was a neighbouring state (proximity) and finally, knew of the high 
risk of genocide (information). 58 
Such understanding is important as it highlights that the ICJ's legal ruling regarding genocide 
may have unintended implciations for the implementation of the R2P. Arbour claims that, in 
principle, the ICJ ruling could hold significant legal implications for international society, 
and especially the P5, who often have the strongest capacity to prevent genocide. 59 Indeed, 
Arbour cites Jose E. Alvarez's claim that the establishment of the R2P has opened up a legal 
conundrum regarding the responsibility of states and the UN. 60 In theory, if the P5 utilise 
their power of veto to counter the best efforts of the UN to prevent one of the four crimes, 
then they could be held legally accountable. Despite the fact that this is purely theoretical at 
present, one would not have to look far for practical comparisons. In Ban Ki-moon's 
analysis, the UN Secretary-General notes that the threat of legal accountability against Cote 
d'Ivoire in 2004 and Kenya in 2008 (on the grounds that they were inciting hatred), saw the 
states stop their actions abruptly. 61 When one juxtaposes this legal threat with the ICJ's legal 
ruling one could be forgiven for thinking that the P5 may think twice in the future before 
attempting to use their veto power to prevent the prevention of an R2P crisis. As everyone 
knows, none of the P5 will actually be `put on trial'; however, such legal action would 
certainly not help their moral image on the international stage. States, therefore, may be wary 
of being seen in such an immoral light which feeds back into the English School belief that 
states operate within a normative framework which enables and constrains their actions. 
So what can be drawn from such legal analysis? It would seem that the R2P has not altered 
international law in any significant way. It is more appropriate to think, as Arbour does, that 
the R2P may help shape the implications of existing international legal obligations. Rulings 
such as that of the ICJ upon mass atrocity crimes will undoubtedly be shaped by the R2P, yet 
will also shape the operationalisation of the R2P concept. Despite the fact that I uphold such 
thinking wholeheartedly, a cause of concern remains. If the debate over genocide prevention 
becomes subsumed by the broader debate over whether the R2P represents a new legal 
58 Ibid, pp. 453 - 455. 59 Ibid, p. 453. 
60 Ibid, p. 454, footnote. 
61 Moon, `Implementing the Responsibility to Protect'. 
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development, this may see international society forget about its legal obligation to prevent 
genocide. Although the reader may claim that it is foolish to think that international society 
could forget about its legal obligation to prevent genocide, to go back to William Schabas's 
point in Chapter Five, it is evident that the Genocide Convention was completely 
marginalised in the context of the Cold War. It is therefore imperative that international 
society does not let the Genocide Convention once again become marginalisd within the 
context of the R2P debate. At present, it does not seem that the R2P discourse has given 
enough consideration to this legal quandary and how it impacts upon international society's 
legal obligation to prevent genocide. It is also evident that international society has not given 
enough consideration to the final aspect of concern here: the R2P requirement of a "manifest 
failure". 
6.2.3 "Manifest failure"? 
Paragraph 139 stipulates that collective action can only be taken when a state "manifestly 
fails" in fulfilling its responsibility to protect. It is the phrase "manifest failure" therefore that 
is the cause of apprehension here as the R2P offers no guidance on what exactly constitutes a 
"manifest failure"? 
The phrase "manifest failure" did not appear in any of the R2P precursory documents yet it 
boldly appears in paragraph 139 of the 2005 Outcome Document. In an attempt to gain some 
clarity on where the phrase came from, this author contacted the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect (based at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies in 
New York) and was subsequently informed: 
There will be no documents on this point. At the final days of negotiation, all was done very 
very informally with no official drafts but through discussions of a few of the key drafters. 
Manifest failure was a Canadian suggestion, trying to remove the subjectivity of "unable or 
unwilling" that had appeared in previous drafts, and insert what they believed to be a more 
evidence-based standard. It was accepted without difficulty-62 
The statement clearly sets out the case that the phrase "manifest failure" was included to 
overcome the subjective problems that the draftees felt may arise over international society's 
ability to prove that a state is "unable or unwilling" to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity or ethnic cleansing. The phrase "unable or unwilling" did feature 
throughout the precursory documents and it would seem that the term "manifest failure" was 
62 Personal email correspondence with the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect based at the Ralph 
Bursche Institute for International Studies in New York. 25/05/2009. 
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seen as a more appropriate eleventh hour substitute. There are two problems here. The first 
problem is the fact that much of the R2P discourse still refers to original rhetoric regarding 
"unable or unwilling" which causes understandable confusion on the subject matter. For 
example, the 2010 US National Security Strategy discussion of the R2P utilises the rhetoric, 
"unable or unwilling", whilst making no reference to the idea of a "manifest failure". 63 
Secondarily, the "very very informal" nature of this debate, which took place in the final 
days, leaves one questioning whether the draftees realised that they were perhaps creating an 
unnecessary additional obstacle? 
Quite simply, states are not going to admit that they have "manifestly failed" to fulfil their 
R2P. This dictates international society has to prove this to be the case. As Carsten Stahn's 
legal analysis explains: "the requirement of a manifest failure may be used as an additional 
means to challenge the legality and timing of collective security action". 64 The statement 
logically explains that the criterion of a "manifest failure" seemingly creates an unnecessary 
additional obstacle. From a R2P perspective, international society has to not only prove that 
one of the four crimes are being committed, but that a state has "manifestly failed" in its 
responsibility to prevent these crimes from occurring. Although all genocide scholars would 
surely accept that the practice of genocide constitutes a "manifest failure", one can easily 
imagine that genocidal regimes will exploit the ambiguity to be found within the term. For 
example, if the R2P had existed in 1999 and had been invoked over the Kosovo crisis, it does 
not take a great leap of imagination to envisage that the Russian ties with Serbia at the time 
could have led the Russian representative on the Security Council to argue that whilst 
Slobodan Milosevic had committed crimes, he had not "manifestly failed" in his 
responsibility to protect. The disturbing aspect therefore is that one can easily imagine that 
geo-politics will lead to such an important ambiguity being exploited. Thus, as critics such as 
Stahn and former UN advisor Juan E. Mendez have highlighted, in certain fundamental ways 
the R2P may actually hinder the prevention of crimes such as genocide. 
Moreover, it would seem that the inclusion of this term "manifest failure" actually 
undermines the victim-based approach that underpins the R2P. As stated above, the R2P 
6' United States, `National Security Strategy' (May 2010), p. 48. 
httu: //www. whitehouse. gov/sites/default/files/rss viewer/national security strategy pdf Accessed 24/06/2010. 64 Carsten Stalin, `Responsibility to Protect, Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? ' American Journal of International Law (vo 1.101. no. 1 2007, pp 99-120), p. 117. 
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made progress through its focus on the rights of victims rather than the rights of interveners, 
thus, turning the humanitarian intervention debate on its head. However, in placing the 
"manifest failing" qualification into the R2P equation, its draftees seem to have, 
unintentionally, shifted the focus back onto the rights of states rather than the rights of 
victims. For example, the 1948 Genocide Convention focused on the rights of groups to be 
protected from the intention of the state to destroy them in whole or in part. Whilst this is 
problematic, the focus at least is on the victim group being destroyed. Thus, the Genocide 
Convention seemingly bypassed the rights of states and placed the focus on the rights of 
national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. Yet when one juxtaposes the Genocide 
Convention understanding with the R2P "manifest failing" qualification, it would seem that 
international society has to not only prove that genocide is taking place but also that a state 
has "manifestly failed" in its R2P. This seemingly grants states a licence to destroy a group 
up until the point that it has "manifestly failed"! A key R2P battle ground therefore may be 
the technicality embodied in the R2P's phrase "manifest failure" as it undoubtedly leaves an 
important ambiguity embodied in the "case-by-case" decision to implement the R2P. Again, 
this may have critical implications for the R2P's intention to react to these crimes in a "timely 
and decisive" manner (as stated in paragraph 139). 
From this perspective, one can see how these three areas of concern begin to overlap. The 
lack of an implementation policy combined with the R2P's ambiguity surrounding its 
"manifest failing" criteria, and legal foundation, dictates that the R2P may not have aided 
international society's ability to prevent genocide in any substantial way. Furthermore, this 
raises questions regarding how the R2P has impacted on the principle of rightful conduct as 
one attempts to gauge the advantages and disadvantages of the R2P, from a legal, moral, and 
constitutional perspective. Prior to analysing the R2P's impact on the question of rightful 
authority therefore, it is important to draw these points together and consider the R2P's 
impact on the sovereignty-intervention debate and the principle of rightful conduct. 
6.2.4 Rightful conduct: summary 
To summarise, it is important to go back to the central question: to what extent did the R2P 
endorsement resolve the sovereignty-intervention dilemma that underpinned the crisis of 
rightful conduct? As discussed in Chapter Five, in the post-Cold War era a tension arose as 
international society failed to resolve the clash of norms relating to the morality of 
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intervention versus the legality of sovereignty. The unanimous endorsement of the R2P 
principle therefore, implied that this tension had been eased somewhat as the R2P managed to 
distance itself from the overly-simplistic dichotomy to be found within the humanitarian 
intervention debate regarding: war or nothing. To return to the norm of constitutionality, it is 
difficult to see how a state could appeal to the idea of absolute sovereignty in a post-R2P 
world as expectations surrounding the `right of sovereignty' have been bound with the R2P. 
Whilst, as discussed, the R2P merely reiterates many of the ideas embedded within the 1948 
Genocide Convention, the importance of re-establishing the post-Second World War 
consensus (1948), in a post-Cold War World (2005), cannot be overstated. With regard to 
rightful conduct, it is evident that international society recognises the practice of genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing as wrongful conduct in that they 
are morally, legally and constitutionally unacceptable. Thus, the prevention of these crimes 
represents rightful conduct in a post-R2P world. 
At the same time, it is evident that one has to tread cautiously. The consensus forged did not 
represent some utopian shift in foreign policymaking. Fundamental issues surrounding 
implementation, legal obligation and the R2P pre-requisite of a "manifest failure" remain 
unresolved. With this in mind, it is difficult to see how the R2P has advanced international 
society's ability to prevent genocide in any substantial way. Within the context of the 
Rwandan genocide is was not that states such as the P5 thought the Rwandan government had 
the sovereign right to do what they were doing but that they saw no national interest at stake. 
Accordingly, it was issues relating to political will and the implementation of the Genocide 
Convention, rather than the right of sovereignty, that was the central problem. In failing to 
address such issues, the R2P upheld the status quo despite the fact that the status quo 
facilitated a legitimacy crisis in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. It is here that the 
question of rightful authority is relevant as somewhat tragically, the World Summit upheld 
the status quo regarding the issue of who has the right to use force in international relations. 
This latter point is important therefore as we analyse the authority dimension to be found 
within the aforementioned sovereignty-intervention-authority crisis. 
6.3 Rightful authority 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the post-Cold War debate over humanitarian intervention saw 
the question of rightful authority (regarding the use of force), become a significant point of 
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contestation. 65 Problematically, the 2005 Outcome Document side-stepped the question of 
rightful authority as it upheld the status-quo. As a result, the R2P failed to address the 
authority dilemma by which I mean: a potential political deadlock within the UNSC 
juxtaposed with an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. Although international society is to 
be credited for at least attempting to resolve the sovereignty-intervention debate, it is quite 
clear that in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, the question of legitimate authority with 
regard to the use of force was simply side-stepped. 
Prior to coming onto an analysis of 2005 World Summit Outcome Document it is important 
to note that the initial ICISS report did specifically address this issue. Significantly, the 
ICISS stated that in its global consultations, the overwhelming consensus had been that the 
Security Council had to remain at the heart of any decision-making process regarding the use 
of force in international relations. 66 Therefore, whilst the ICISS acknowledged the "the many 
reasons" for being dissatisfied with the Security Council, it upheld the status quo. 67 As the 
report explains: 
The authority of the UN is underpinned not by coercive power, but by its role as the applicator 
of legitimacy......... Those who challenge or evade the authority of the UN as the sole 
legitimate guardian of international peace and security in specific instances run the risk of 
eroding its authority in general and also undermining the principle of a world order based on 
international law and universal norms " 
The statement attempts to illuminate the relationship between the UN, international law and 
universal norms to argue that the unauthorised use of force in international relations has a 
detrimental impact upon all three. The rationale is built on the notion that the UN does not 
draw its power from its military strength but from its legitimate right to authorise and oversee 
the use of force in international relations. Although this is more of an overview of the UN 
rather than the UNSC in particular, the ICISS boldly supported the UNSC in their claim: 
"The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to 
65 For a specialised overview we, James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Resoonsibili to Protect: 
Who Should Intervene? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
" International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect. p. 50. 
67 See, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, chapter 
six, `The Question of Authority', notably, the ICISS raises the problem of broadening the permanent structure of 
the Security Council, yet whilst acknowledging that African, Latin American and Asian representation "would 
help build its credibility and authority" the ICISS states that the debate is beyond the purpose of the report. 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protem p. 48. 
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make the Security Council work much better than it has". 69 The rationale is quite straight- 
forward in that whilst the UN and the UNSC have their limitations, they remain the best 
decision making body in international society. 
This does not detract from the fact that the ICISS did address the moral deficiency embodied 
in the legal system that underpins the UNSC. This is fleshed out in the report's sub-section 
entitled, "legitimacy and the veto" as the report states: "As has been said, it is unconscionable 
that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern". 70 
The tone and context of the statement emphasises the gravitas of the authority problem in that 
the legal system permits the P5 to utilise the right of veto in circumstances that undermine 
"humanity" as a whole. Acknowledging this cause for concern, the ICISS recommends a P5 
"code of conduct", whereby the P5 agree to refrain from using their veto when significant 
humanitarian crises unfold. 7' Stating that it is unrealistic to expect a UN Charter amendment 
any time soon, the ICISS recommends that this P5 "code of conduct" be a voluntary mutually 
agreed understanding. 72 The analysis is troubling in that whilst the ICISS acknowledges that 
the legal system permits unconscionable vetoes to arise, it only advises that a voluntary 
agreement is established. In theory, this would signify a constitutional change, in that a 
mutual understanding would arise, that in the context of mass atrocity crimes the P5 refrains 
from using their veto. However, it is questionable whether any such informal agreement 
would be any more moral than the present legal system? When one considers that this would 
leave the millions of victims of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity dependent upon an informal P5 thumbs up or thumbs down, it seems profoundly 
immoral. Quite simply, states should not deviate away from their obligation to uphold the 
universal moral minimalism expressed in the 1948 Genocide Convention and the R2P. 
This obviously leads us into the question of what would happen (even if such a voluntary 
code of conduct was established), if the UNSC found itself in a political deadlock. 
Intriguingly, the ICISS re-iterated the existing legislation regarding the Uniting for Peace 
I International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibili to Protect p. 49. This understanding was reiterated word for word in the UN Secretary-General's 2004 report, see Report of the S 
10 
ecretary-General's High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World. p. 61. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Res oi'1 Protect p. 51. Emphasis added. 
" Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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Resolution established in 1950 (UN Resolution 377). 73 The point is that although the UNSC 
has "primary responsibility", it does not have "exclusive responsibility" under the UN 
Charter for peace and security matters. 74 UN Resolution 377 stipulates that if the UNSC 
reaches a political deadlock over a certain issue then the issue can be referred to UNGA 
which can then make recommendations. 75 Whilst the ICISS acknowledges that any decision 
regarding the use of force ultimately lies with the UNSC, from a legitimacy perspective, the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution would seemingly allow for a tolerable consensus to be 
potentially forged in the UNGA without explicit UNSC consent. As the ICISS stated, "an 
intervention which took place with the backing of a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly 
would clearly have powerful moral and political support". 76 The statement highlights that 
whilst the UNGA does not have legal authority, if there were enough moral and political 
support, then this would help overcome this legal deficit from a legitimacy perspective (as it 
did in Kosovo). This underlines the ICISS's point that the P5 is not the exclusive source of 
authority in international relations. For example, Dominik Zaum's analysis reveals that since 
1950, eleven emergency sessions have been invoked as part of the Uniting for Peace 
procedure. 77 However, as Zaum explains, this has not seen the UNGA significantly improve 
the collective security capacity of the UN and has actually seen the UNSC become 
increasingly hostile to the Uniting for Peace Resolution as the UNGA has invoked the 
Resolution more often than the UNSC. 78 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution raises many interesting questions. However, the important 
point to consider is that by the time of 2005 World Summit agreement, all traces of the 
ICISS's recommendations regarding the "Question of Authority" had been removed. 
Evidently, the 2003 invasion of Iraq looms large here as the unauthorised momentum that 
was forged over Kosovo and carried on into Iraq was, for many, a clear violation of 
73 See Dominik Zaum, `The Security Council, The General Assembly, And War: The Uniting For Peace 
Resolution', in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations 
Securi Council and War. The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (New York: Oxford, 2008), 
chapter six. 
74 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 48. 
75 For an interesting legal analysis which captures the mood at the time, stating that the Resolution awoke the 
dormant powers of the General Assembly, see L. H. Woosley, `Uniting For Peace Resolution of the United 
Nations', American Society of International Law (vol. 45, no. 1,1951, pp. 129-137). 
76 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Re onsibility to Protect. p. 48. 
" Zaum, 'The Security Council, The General Assembly, And War', pp. 163- 168. 
78 Ibid. pp 173 - 174. For a brief general overview see Mike Billington, 'UN `Uniting for Peace' Resolution 
Could Demand an End to U. S. War in Iraq', Executive Intelligence Review (11/04/2003), 
hhttp:: //www larouchenub com/other/2003/3014uA res 73 7 html Accessed 22/02/09. 
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international legitimacy. 79 Critics the world over saw the invasion of Iraq as a quintessential 
`Trojan Horse' whereby human rights motives were put forward to disguise a war fought to 
further the US/UK national interest. 80 The impact on the question of rightful authority was 
evident when in 2005, Kofi Annan stated: "The task is not to find alternatives to the Security 
Council as a source of authority but to make it better". 81 The sentiment embodied in the 
statement was in sharp contrast to the position adopted by Kofi Annan in 1999, for as 
discussed in Chapter Five, Annan had left the question of unauthorised intervention 
unanswered. In the aftermath of Iraq, it would seem that questions of serious UN structural 
reform regarding the use of force were deemed to be far too controversial. The much dreaded 
debate over unauthorised force was marginalised to the point that it was banished as Annan 
strove to gain the consensus needed to simply pass the PUP through the final drafting 
process. 82 
In an analysis of the 2005 Outcome Document, Alicia Bannon claims that one should not be 
surprised by the Outcome's omission of this discussion: "The Summit's failure to consider 
unilateralism is not surprising. The agreement articulates a clear responsibility for the United 
Nations to act. The need for unilateral or regional action would therefore become an issue 
only if the United Nations failed to fulfil its duties, something that the drafters may have 
preferred not to countenance". 83 Whilst problematic, the analysis does embody certain logic. 
It is claimed that the UN does not address questions that specifically stem from the UN 
failing in its functional capability. When one juxtaposes this argument with the consensus 
forged amongst the P5 over rightful conduct then this logic carries even more weight. Since 
the P5 had struck a common understanding over what should constitute a rightful use of force 
in a post-R2P world, one may expect less tension to arise over when the use of force should 
79 See Robert Kagan, 'America's Crisis of Legitimacy, Foreign Affairs (vol. 83, no. 2,2004, pp. 65-87). Robert W. Tucker and David, C. Hendrickson, 'The Sources of American Legitimacy', Foreign Affairs (vol. 
83, no. 6,2004, pp. 18-32). Francis Fukuyama, 'After Neoconservatism', New York Times (19/02/2006). For 
overview see, Review of International Studies, 'Force and Legitimacy in World Politics', view of International Studies, special edition, (vol. 31. supplement S 1,2005). 80 The idea of a Trojan Horse is taken from Gareth Evans, Resnonsibility to Protect Ending Mass Atrocities. p. 54. Obviously there are those that see the intervention in a more favourable light, see Fernando, R. Tesön, `Ending Tyranny in Iraq', Ethics and International Affairs (vol. 19, no. 2,2005, p. 1-20). Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror. The Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 
pp. 182 - 207). 
31 Report of the UN Secretary-General. In Larger Freedom pp. xii. See also, Report of the UN Secretary- General, A More Secure World. p. 61. 82 For such analysis see, Brown, `Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention', p. 35. 83 Alicia L. Bannon, `The Responsibility to Protect: The U. N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism". Yale w Journal (vol. 115,2006, pp. 1157 - 1165 ), pp. 1159 - 1160. 
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be authorised. However, when one considers that the Uniting for Peace Resolution was 
formulated precisely because of the potential for political deadlock then it seems simplistic to 
suggest that UN member states do not formulate policies designed to reduce the potential 
failure of the UN. As Bannon goes onto acknowledge, the failure to make progress on this 
issue will undoubtedly see another authority dilemma almost certainly emerge as none of the 
structural issues have been resolved. 84 Quite simply, it is only a matter of time therefore 
before the issue of a deadlocked UN Security Council and a pending humanitarian 
catastrophe will arise once again. 
It is here that the role of power is of relevance as we strive to understand why the status quo 
was upheld despite the fact that the status quo underpinned an authority crisis in the context 
of Kosovo. Offering a more realistic explanation than that to be found in Bannon's analysis, 
Chris Abott highlights that the idea of a veto limitation was actually discussed yet omitted 
from the 2005 Outcome Document: 
Unfortunately, an important paragraph relating to the use of the veto in the Security Council 
did not make it into the final document. This paragraph asked the five permanent members of 
the Security Council to refrain from using their veto in cases of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. This proposal had received widespread support 
from the European Union and Latin America, however it was reportedly removed as a result 
of pressure from the USA, Russia and China (who all hold veto power). This means that 
despite the widespread acceptance of the general principle of a `responsibility to protect', 
there will still be political hurdles to overcome in the Security Council in implementing this 
principle if and when military intervention is required. 85 
The statement underlines the reality of Great Power in that despite a general consensus 
emerging amongst small powers (Latin America) and middle powers (EU), the US, Russia 
and China held onto their right of `absolute veto', by which I mean it can be used in any 
circumstance - even to prevent genocide prevention. As Abbott rightly points out, the 
implementation of the R2P remains dependent on "the domestic and global imperatives of the 
Permanent Five". 86 It is this political obstacle - the political will of the P5 - that remains the 
decisive factor and it is difficult to see how the R2P has altered this in any way. This is also 
reflected in the fact that the P3 of Russia, China, and the US remain hostile toward the ICC. 
Accordingly, the R2P did not represent some utopian solidarist shift in international relations 
84 lbid,. p. 1160. 
Is Cluis Abos 'Rights Responsibilities, Resolving the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention'. From a 
speech given at the International Seminar on the Future of the UN (Oxford Research Group, 2005). Available at 
httn: //www. oxfordresearcharoup. org. uk/publications/briefings/ri ahtsandresuonsibil ities. htm Accessed 26/04/06. 
86 Ibid, p. 5. 
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as the prevention of mass atrocity crimes remains just another policy option - one that should 
only be opted for when there are national interests at stake. 
This bleak reality seemingly gives weight to the realist claim that Great Power cannot be 
constrained in anyway. With no world government, there remains no `hard law' that can 
push through any structural change or indeed punish the P5 when they utilise their veto- 
power in such grave circumstances. However, at the same time, the ICISS did raise an 
interesting point that relates to the role of norms in international relations: 
Those states who insist on the right to retaining permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council and the resulting veto power, are in a difficult position when they claim to be entitled 
to act outside the UN framework as a result of the Council being paralyzed by a veto cast by 
another permanent member. That is, those who insist on keeping the existing rules of the game 
unchanged have a correspondingly less compelling claim to rejecting any specific outcome 
when the game is played by those very rules. 8 
At its most fundamental level the statement implies that the P5 cannot continue to alter the 
"rules of the game" in an ad hoc manner without bringing the "rules of the game" into 
question. For example, when Russia invoked the R2P principle in an attempt to justify its 
intervention in Georgia in 2007, the US appealed to the very same rules that it had violated in 
its invasion of Iraq in 2003.88 From this perspective, the US's overtly unilateral approach in 
2003 did not help serve its long-term security strategy as it eroded the value of the rules that 
it then appealed to in order to try and constrain Russian aggression within the context of 
Georgia. At the same time, it is now extremely difficult to see how Russia could uphold its 
more traditional anti-interventionist stance within the context of a future R2P crisis when it 
has invoked the R2P itself. Although the P5 often act in such a way as to challenge the 
authority of the UN (this has been identified as a key component of the US action in Iraq89), 
such action does not only destabilise the stabilising organ of the UNSC but also undermines 
the rules that provide the P5 with their privileged position in international society. Thus, as 
the ICISS rightly points out, such action is counter-productive and does not serve the national 
interest of the P5 in the long-term. 
The understanding set out by the ICISS gives weight to the English School view that even in 
the context of the anarchical realm, Great Power will be constrained. It is here that a further 
87 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibili to Protect. p. 51. 88 For such analysis see, The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, `The Georgia Russia Crisis', 
available at http: //globalr2p. org gdf/related/Geor iaRusssia pdf Accessed 19/01/09. 89 This point is taken from Robert Jervis, `Understanding the Bush Doctrine', Political Science Quarterly 
(vol. 118, no. 3,2003, pp. 365 - 386), p. 375. 
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consideration needs to be taken into account regarding the moral justification that the P5 may 
utilise if they chose to oppose humanitarian intervention in a post-R2P world. This was 
raised by Andrew Mitchell (the former Shadow Secretary of State for International 
Development), 
Membership of the Security Council involves a set of obligations: there must be consequences 
for states that decline to take seriously their international responsibilities to promote peace and 
security. At the very least, Council members with a clear conflict of interest should agree to 
withhold their veto in situations of grave humanitarian need. Let them publically explain why 
their national interests put them on the side of genocidal regimes. 90 
The statement aptly captures the role of both morality and constitutionality as it highlights 
that in the present climate (unlike the Cold War era), the P5 would have great difficulty in 
explaining why they have chosen to block an `R2P intervention'. As discussed, the legal 
defence of sovereignty does not extend to cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This leaves the P5 in a `tight spot', as it is difficult to see 
how they can justify an anti-R2P stance on political grounds without it coming under intense 
international moral scrutiny. This may not make the P5 any more willing to actively fulfil 
their responsibility, but it does hinder their ability to deny their responsibility in the first 
place. For example, other than appealing to the ambiguity to be found in the phrase 
"manifest failure", on what grounds could a P5 member states oppose UN intervention? 
Whilst they may not provide the troops to enable the intervention, if the UN does manage to 
put together a willing coalition, it is difficult to see how a P5 member could oppose such 
intervention in a post-R2P world. Such unintended consequences may have positive 
implications for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing in a post-R2P world. 
6.3.1 Rightful authority: summary 
The problem remains that despite the gravitas of the authority dilemma outlined in the 
context of Kosovo, the 2005 R2P Outcome Document reads as though there is nothing wrong 
in upholding the existing UNSC system. Essentially, no attempt has been made to resolve 
what Tesön refers to as `The Vexing Problem of Authority'. 91 Instead, the R2P report upheld 
the status quo and offers no guidance to states on the best course of action to be taken if the 
90 Adele Brown, `Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention', p. 50. 
91 Fernando Tes6n, 'The Vexing Problem of Authority', Wisconsin International Law Journal (vol. 24, no. 3, 
2006, pp. 761- 772). Notably, Tes6n favours the idea of creating a newly formed body, "The Court of Human 
Security" with independent judge's ruling on issues such as intervention. 
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UNSC finds itself deadlocked. 92 One is reminded here of Woodrow Wilson's naivety when 
questioned whether the League of Nations would work, as he replied: "It if won't work, it 
must be made to work". 93 At no point did the R2P process make progress on this central 
issue. Actors such a Kofi Annan seemingly built their faith on the assumption that somehow 
the UNSC would start to function as it should, despite the fact that it has never functioned in 
a way that has supported the prevention of R2P crimes such as genocide. Addressing the 
issue of political deadlock, Nicholas J. Wheeler rightly points out: "it is not evident that the 
UN is any better places to cope with a future Kosovo where the Council is divided on the 
merits of preventative action". 4 This is true as at no point does the R2P attempt to address 
the moral deficiency of the legal system that underpins the privileged status of the P5. The 
status quo has been upheld despite the fact that the status quo was the source of an authority 
crisis. 
However, it is clear that because of the relationship between rightful conduct and rightful 
authority certain implications have arisen somewhat unintentionally. Whilst this author 
accepts that the P5 tend to act in self-interested ways, it seems clear that the P5 are in an 
increasingly `tight spot' in attempting to prevent the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. This 
is not to suggest that the UN has the capability to prevent such crimes without P5 support but 
that it is difficult to see how P5 members can oppose R2P prevention by appealing to 
morality, legality, or constitutionality. If, therefore, an unauthorised, willing coalition does 
emerge within the context of an R2P crisis, it is difficult to see how the P5 can oppose such 
intervention in a post-R2P world. Yet the problem remains that without a discussion over 
UN unauthorised action, international society is faced with no set of legal rules or guidelines 
to judge and/or guide such intervention. 95 The battle ground therefore may be the 
technicality embodied in the R2P's phrase "manifest failure" as undoubtedly this leaves a real 
ambiguity embodied in the "case-by-case" decision to prevent, react, and rebuild. 
92 For such analysis see, Andrew Hurrell's `Legitimacy and the use of Force; can the circle be squared? ' R 
13 
eview of International Studies. special edition, (vol. 31, supplement Si, 2005, pp. 15-32), p. 30. Cited in Edward. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis- 1919 -1939 (London: Macmillan, 2001). p. 8. " Nicholas J. Wheeler, `A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit', a paper presented to a conference on the 'The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake? ' at the University of Toronto in October 2005, p. 12. Available at 
htty: //cadair. aber. ac. uk/dsoace/bitstreani/2160/1971/1/a%20vic ry%10for0/o20comm %20humanity%20Whe 
eler. j? d f Accessed 19/01/09. 
95 For such analysis see Ramesh Thakur, 'The United Natio a Peace and Securit. From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), conclusion, esp. pp, 362-364. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
Five years on from the endorsement of the R2P one is reminded of Martin Wight's claim that 
in the history of ideas there are not many new ideas, just old ideas presented with different 
accents. 96 In many ways the R2P seems to illustrate this point beautifully in that it is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly what new ideas the R2P brought to the table? As discussed, many of the 
legal, moral, and constitutional ideas embodied in the R2P were embodied in the 1948 
Genocide Convention. 97 When one considers the sovereignty-intervention-authority debate 
that underpins the discourse it is difficult to see how many new ideas can be thought or. The 
R2P therefore demonstrates just how difficult it is to make any significant progress at the 
international level (a point that Wight himself was all too aware of). On the one hand, we can 
look at the R2P and celebrate the fact the R2P movement significantly helped re-establish a 
post-Second World War (1948) consensus in a post-Cold War world (2005). Quite simply, 
the world of 2005 was very different from that of the post-Second World War era in that in 
1945 there were 51 UN member states whereas in 2005 there were 192 UN member states. 
This is an important point to consider from an international legitimacy perpsective. On the 
other hand, we could pause and question: what sort of world do we live in when we need 
state leaders to acknowledge that they do not have the right to commit genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing? The fact that we need the R2P in the first 
place does not say something wonderful about the state of international society. 
To link this back into the broader discussion on the legitimacy crisis, it may strike the reader 
as somewhat odd, five years after the R2P was endorsed, and over ten years after the Kosovo 
crisis, to claim that the legitimacy crisis has not been resolved. To explain this I would like 
to turn to the work of Jean-Marc Coicaud whose analysis of international legitimacy in 
international relations speaks not of a legitimacy crisis but of legitimacy "fault lines" by 
which it is meant "areas of friction". 98 Essentially, Coicaud does not accept that international 
relations has experienced a legitimacy crisis, for as he states, there has been no "systemic 
% Martin Wight, International Theory. The TI ree Traditions edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (New 
York: Holmes ad Meir, 1992). p. 5. It should be noted that Wight draws upon A. P. d'Entrbves, "Men have kept 
on repeating the old slogans again and again. The novelty is very often only a question of accent". " Ideas such as responsible sovereignty obviously pre-date the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
's Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud, (ed. ), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). Whilst the title of the book reflects the view that more than just Jean-Marc 
Coicaud subscribe to this view, the understanding of "fault lines" is taken here from Jean-Marc Coicaud's, 
introductory chapter, see p. 4. 
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breakdown" of international order in which, for example, one or more great powers have left 
the United Nations (as was the case when the League of Nations failed). 99 Quite obviously, 
this reflects Coicaud's personal view of what constitutes a legitimacy crisis, and here I would 
disagree with the author's view as I, like many others, feel that the crisis that emerged over 
Kosovo and spilled over into Iraq did constitute a legitimacy crisis. However, I do feel that 
over a decade on from the Kosovo crisis it is understandable to see why Coicaud speaks of 
legitimacy "fault lines", by which he means "areas of friction" rather than a legitimacy crisis 
and it is here that I feel the 2005 World Summit is important. 
Essentially, the World Summit provided international society with an opportunity to reconcile 
its differences through deliberation which helped ease the legitimacy crisis. Even though it 
left certain fundamental questions unanswered, it acted to restate the purpose of the UN and 
the UNSC in the aftermath of events such as the unauthorised invasion of Iraq and the 
genocide in Darfur. With regard to this latter aspect, it is important to consider why the 
genocide in Darfur did not have the profound impact that the Rwandan genocide had upon 
the authority of the UN and the UNSC and to explain this I would like to raise four points. 1), 
the UN did not prove that genocide was occurring in Darfur. 2), the African Union took 
primary responsibility for resolving the crisis which helped eased the legal, moral, and 
constitutional expectations placed upon the UN itself. 3), despite the 2004 US 
acknowledgement of genocide in Darfur, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq 
constrained `the West's' ability to intervene. 4), it was hoped that the R2P initiative would 
see Darfur become an R2P `test-case' as suggested by Lord Triesman above. From a 
legitimacy perspective, such developments help explain why a constitutional expectation 
arose, that the AU (with the support of the UN), would take on the responsibility for 
resolving the Darfur crisis. As a result, the genocide in Darfur did not erode the authority of 
the UN and the UNSC in the same way that the Rwandan genocide did. Yet at the same time, 
the fact that Darfur did not see an R2P initiative come into fruition illustrates the central point 
that the World Summit critically failed to address questions regarding implementation and 
political will. 
99 Ibid. 
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It is here that international society's failure to address the question of rightful authority and 
the idea of legitimacy "fault lines" is interesting. Although the tension surrounding rightful 
conduct has been somewhat eased, when it comes to the question of rightful authority, by 
simply holding up the status quo international society seems to have created an unresolved 
legitimacy "fault line", by which it is meant that there remains unresolved "area of friction". 
To go back to Kofi Annan's line of questioning in 1999: 
Imagine for one moment, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had 
been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of the Tutsi populations, but the 
council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood 
idly by while the horror unfolded? '°° 
Annan famously left the question unanswered; the problem is that it remains unanswered. 
This unresolved question illustrates the idea of a legitimacy "fault line" beautifully. In 
essence, the tension that can arise between the morality of intervention versus the legality of 
UN authorisation has not been resolved. Whilst this legitimacy "fault line" may lay dormant 
at present, it seems obvious that it is only a matter of time before this legitimacy "fault line" 
becomes more active. There are two points worth noting here. Primarily, one could imagine 
another genocide unfolding as that legal right of veto is utilised to prevent genocide 
prevention. Whilst this is in itself tragic, the second point to consider is how this "area of 
friction" could lead to a more "systemic breakdown! 'in international order (to use Coicaud's 
understanding). To go back to the understanding set out in Chapters Four and Five, if the P5 
do not confront their legal obligation to prevent genocide then it is difficult to see how the 
UNSC, and perhaps even the UN, will continue to hold onto its perceived legitimate 
authority. If this occurs, states, including members of the P5 may (as opposed to will), walk 
away from the UN, thereby, creating more of a systemic breakdown. 
Quite simply, genocide, more than any other crime exposes the legitimacy deficiency within 
the present ordering structure of the UN. Just as the Nazi atrocities highlighted the moral 
deficiency of the Westphalian ordering principles, the Rwandan genocide exposed the 
failings of the UN ordering principles. This brings us back to the central problem of political 
will. Over sixty years on from the Nazi genocide, and sixteen years on from the Rwandan 
genocide, it is highly unlikely that international society is any more willing, or able, to 
10° Kofi, Annan, `Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist (18/09/1999) 
htte"//www. un. ora/News/ossglsQ/stroies/kaecon. htm1 Accessed 12/06/09. 
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prevent genocide occurring in international relations. It is here that the next chapter re- 
engages in a more theoretical discussion of whether international society should progress or 
regress upon its commitment to genocide prevention. To do this, the chapter re-engages with 
the three traditions outlined in Chapter Two to address the legitimacy of such views toward 
genocide prevention in a post R2P world. 
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7 The Three Traditions Revisited 
There is nothing in international relations that dictates international society will naturally 
progress from one generation to the next. To understand such thinking, one has only to go 
back to the scepticism to be found within Martin Wight's view of progress in international 
relations. For Wight, the anarchical realm dictated that progress in the international sphere 
was inherently more problematic than in the domestic sphere. ' As a result, the reality is that 
just because the R2P was unanimously endorsed in 2005, does not mean that the R2P is here 
to stay. Moreover, to return to Gareth Evans' understanding set out in Chapter One, the truth 
is that the R2P has not addressed the issue of political will and has in turn failed to frame the 
issue of mass atrocity crimes in a way that policymakers will now act as part of a "global 
reflex action" (to use Evans' phrase). 2 In sharp contrast, the divisive nature of the R2P, will 
see, and indeed has seen, a variety of actors challenge the legitimacy of the R2P over the last 
five years. Problematically, policymakers will not only be confronted with the real life 
challenge of mass atrocity crimes, such as genocide, but will also be challenged by a variety 
of voices offering alternative ways for framing the problem of genocide. As discussed in 
Chapter One, this may lead policymakers to treat genocide as just another insoluble problem. 
It is precisely because of this point that this penultimate chapter re-engages with the three 
traditions. To return to the idea of theoretical pluralism, the English School views IR as a 
three way conversation between the traditions of realism, rationalism and revolutionism. 3 As 
raised in Chapter Two, each tradition conceptualises the issue of genocide prevention in a 
different light. The aim of this chapter is to utilise the understanding that has been developed 
over previous chapters to re-engage with the realist, rationalist, and revolutionist perspectives 
regarding genocide prevention in a post R2P world. 
7.1 The realist voice 
Addressing the lessons to be learnt from the US engagement in Somalia, Senator John 
McCain aptly summarised the realist perspective when he stated: "the lesson of Somalia is 
' Martin Wight, International Theory. The Three Traditions Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (ed. ), (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1992), esp. pp - 5-6. 2 Gareth Evans, `Preventing Maas Atrocities: Making the Responsibility to Protect a Reality', Keynote address 
to the UN University and International Crisis Group Conference 10/10/2007. 
: //www. crisis¢rouv. ori/home/index. cfm? id=5116&1=1 Accessed 01/04/2008. 
The idea of a theoretical pluralism representing a conversation is taken from Tim Dunne, Inventing 
International Society. History of the English School (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 1995), p. xiii. 
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simple: it is clearly not in the interests of the US to subject US decision making on grave 
matters of state or the lives of American soldiers to the frequently vacillating, frequently 
contradictory, and frequently reckless collective impulses of the United Nations" .4 Although 
Senator McCain is regarded as more of a neo-con than a realist, the statement underlines the 
realist belief and/or fear that the pursuit of the collective interest can seriously undermine that 
of the national interest. There is an attempt therefore to draw a clear distinction between the 
national and collective interest, especially within the context of such "dangerous and 
complex" (to use Andrew Hurrell's phrase) foreign policy problems as Somalia. This 
naturally leads back into the realist claim that genocide prevention should be considered as 
just another policy option, one that should only be opted for when there are national interests 
at stake. 
To put this into context let us consider Steven Groves' position in his piece entitled: `The U. S. 
should reject the U. N. "Responsibility to Protect" Doctrine'. 5 Although Groves 
acknowledges the noble goals of the R2P, he dismisses the R2P on the grounds that it serves 
the interests of the "international community" rather than the national interest of the US. 6 The 
sentiment expressed by Groves embodies a clear realist ethic. Groves' scepticism toward the 
R2P is part of a broader problem that Groves has with the idea of international law and 
international institutions. The fear being that such legal obligations will undermine the 
national interest of the US and more specifically its right to "maintain freedom of action" 7 
For Groves, it is imperative that the US "maintains a monopoly on the decision to deploy 
diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, political coercion, and especially its military 
forces". 8 As a result, the R2P should be rejected as it erodes the political independence won 
Cited in Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 213. 
Steven Groves, The U. S. should reject the U. N. "Resn ibility to Protect" Doctrine (Heritage Foundation, 
no. 2130,2008). htttp: //www. heritaRe. ore/Research/Internationalorgganizations/bg2130 cfm Accessed 01/04/09. 
As of March 2010, this was available at htto: //www. heritage_orý/Research/Rehorts/2008/05/The-US-Should- 
Rej ect-the-UN-Responsibility-to-Protect-Doctrine 
6 In a subsequent co-authored piece in which Groves replies to President Obama's claim that the UN is 
"indispensible", Groves sets out a clear position that goes beyond merely reforming the UN as Groves urges President Obama to work with the UN in a new way, yet critically also develop ways in which the US can work 
outside the UN. See Brett D Schaefer and S Groves, `Reforms needed for a more effective United Nations: A 
memo to President Elect Obama', (Heritage Foundation, Special Report 41,19/01/2009), available at httn: //www. heritaae. org/Researh/InternationalOrttanizations/sr0041 cfin Accessed 11/05/2010. 7This is taken from Martin Wight who identifies this to be the basic national interest according to realists, see Wight, International eo y p. 112. 
8 Groves, `The U. S. should reject the U. N. "Responsibility to Protect"' 
200 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
by America's Founding Fathers and compromises the consent of the American people. 9 Such 
understanding reiterates much of the sentiment expressed by McCain above, for it is claimed 
that international institutions and international law tend to erode US sovereignty and power, 
thus undermining US interests. 10 The realist fear being that just like in Somalia, the US will 
find itself embroiled in an R2P crisis that has little to do with the interests of the US. 
Accordingly, the R2P signifies an erosion of US control and it is from this perspective that 
Groves sets out his five point prescriptive plan of what the US should do following its 
endorsement of the R2P. 
Maintain its current official position, as set forth in Ambassador Bolton's letter regarding the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, that the R2P doctrine does not create a binding 
legal obligation on the United States to intervene in another nation for any purpose. Affirm 
that the United States need not seek authorization from the U. N. Security Council, the U. N. 
General Assembly, the international community, or any other international organization to use 
its military forces to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other atrocities occurring in 
another country. Base its decisions to intervene in the affairs of other nations -- including 
punitive economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures -- on U. S. national interests, 
not on criteria set forth by the R2P doctrine or any other international "test. " Scrutinize 
ongoing efforts by certain actors within the international community to operationalize and 
otherwise promote the R2P doctrine in the United States, the United Nations, the international 
NGO community, and other international forums. Reject the notion that the R2P doctrine is 
an established international norm' 1 
The statement provides a classical example of how realism embodies a normative argument 
(despite what realists may sometimes claim). One has to only juxtapose point one and point 
five in order to see how Groves attempts to persuade readers that the US should reject the R2P 
on both legal and moral grounds. 12 It is important therefore to deconstruct this normative 
argument as it is clear that whether right or wrong, such rationale has had a profound impact 
on foreign policy making. 
9 Ibid. With regard to this latter point, one could raise the point here that Groves reflects a common 
misconception that the US public do not favour military intervention for the prevention of genocide, see Herbert 
Hirsch, 'Genocide and Public Opinion: A Comparison of the Policy Making Elite and the General Public', in 
Hirsch, Anti-Genocide. Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide (London: Praeger, 2002), esp. 
chapter two. 
10 Notably, Michael Byers offer a strong and stark counterargument to the US rejection of international law. He 
claims that institutions such as the UN embody principles that are more consistent with the founding principles 
of the US that the policy advocated by the Bush administration. See Michael Byers, `Terror and the Future of 
International Law', in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, (eds. ), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global 
QWU (London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 118-127. 
Groves, `The U. S. should reject the U. N. "Responsibility to Protect'. Emphasis in original. 
Groves reiterates $he aforementioned legal position put forward in 2005 by former US Ambassador John 
Bolton who stated that the US would `not accept that either the United States as a whole, or the Security 
Council, or individual states have an obligation to intervene under international law'. 
http: //www. responsibilitftoprotect. org/files/US Boltonletter R2P_3OAugOS%5B1%5D. pdf 
Accessed 10/01/2009 
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Unfortunately for Groves, the reality is that the US did endorse the R2P and has since 
reaffirmed its commitment to the R2P principle. 13 This point is worth considering as it is 
clear that Groves attempts to create a false dichotomy. This is evident in point four of the 
plan as Groves claims that the US needs to reject the `norm creating behaviour' espoused by 
actors such as the UN and NGO's. 14 If one takes this point at face value, one is left with a 
distinction between R2P advocates that serve the needs of the `international community' on 
one side of the divide and those that serve the national interest of the US on the other. Groves 
attempts to entrench this division further as he questions how the UN Secretary General can 
create the R2P `assistant secretary-general position' when the Outcome Document contains 
`only three paragraphs'. 15 For Groves, such action further illustrates the `norm creating 
behaviour' of those that serve the international rather than the national interest. Accordingly, 
readers are presented with a choice, one can either support those work in favour of the 
`international community' or alternatively, support those that work in favour of the US 
national interest. Yet the problem with this dichotomy is that Groves fails to acknowledge 
that the through endorsing and reaffirming its commitment to the R2P, the US itself, is guilty 
of such `norm creating behaviour'. Therefore, to suggest that the US is on one side of the 
R2P divide and R2P advocates on the other is flawed. The relationship between the national 
and the international interest is not as black and white as Groves implies and critically, he 
lacks the consensual support that he evidently desires. 
Prior to addressing the complexities surrounding the national interest, it is important to pause 
and consider why Groves holds such evident contempt for international law and international 
institutions. It is here that Groves puts forward a legitimate concern as he holds a genuine 
fear that the collective security regime of the UN cannot protect the US. Obviously, in a post- 
9/11 world, this is a valid point and is actually raised in Justin Morris and Nicholas J. 
Wheeler's analysis of the UNSC's legitimacy crisis. As the authors explain, whereas 
traditionally Great Powers were less vulnerable to attack, the paradox today is that: "the most 
powerful state in the world - and the symbol of the prevailing conception of global order - 
13 As part of the UN Security Council, the US endorsed the following in 2006. UN Security Council Resolution 
1674, `Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict' (S/RES/1674, August 2006). The UNSC then raised the R2P 
in the context of a Resolution on the events in Darfur: UN Security Council Resolution 1706, `Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan', (S/RES/1706, August 2006). Both can be accessed at htty: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/unsc resolutions06 htm Both accessed 09/02/2010 14 Groves, `The U. S. should reject the U. N. "Responsibility to Protect'. 
ºs Ibid. 
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perceives itself to be uniquely vulnerable". 16 Now whilst one can debate the accuracy of this 
US perception, one cannot escape the reality that the US has as much right as any other state 
to be protected by the collective security system of the UN. If, therefore, the US has more 
power than the UN, and it perceives that it is under threat from the emergence of `new 
threats', then is it not justified in making the demand that it should be exempt from the 
constraint that is the UN in times when such threats emerge? '7 Although Morris and Wheeler 
accept this concern, they go on to claim that the US cannot bear the cost of acting outside the 
`rules of the game' and therefore must work within the framework of international legitimacy. 
This brings us back to the understanding raised in Chapter Six, as the ICISS report 
highlighted that the P5 undermine their own privileged position in international society when 
they violate the rules of the game that serve them well. 
From this perspective, the hard-line realist stance advocated by Groves does not only work 
against the interests of the "international community" but also the US itself. 18 For example, 
Morris and Wheeler juxtapose the unilateral stance taken by the US over Kosovo with that 
taken over Iraq to highlight that in the latter case, because the US forged such a limited 
coalition, the US had to carry much more of the political, economic, and military burden than 
it did over Kosovo. 19 Although one can equally argue that in the context of Somalia the US 
maybe carried too much of the international burden, the point is that in attempting to shed 
some of the burden, the US should not revert to simply dismissing international norms. This 
only accentuates the burden placed on the US in the long-run. For instance, to return to 
Groves' second point, he stipulates that the US should affirm that the US "need not seek 
authorization" from the U. N. or any other relevant body with regard to using its military 
16 Justin Morris and Nicholas J. Wheeler, `The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force', 
International Politics (vol. 44,2007, pp. 214 -231). Available at bp: //www. palgraveioumals. com/ip/journaVv44/n2/fu1U8800185a html Accessed 21/04/2009. The burden of 
US unilateralism was obviously heightened due to the willingness of the post 9/11 Bush administration to go it 
alone, for a sharp overview of this position see, Ralph G. Carter, `Leadership at Risk: The Perils of 
Unilateralism', Political Science and Politics (vol. 36, no. 1,2003, pp. 17-22). "For such analysis see, Morris and Wheeler, `The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of 
Force'. 
's This line of thinlöng is nothing new, for an overview see, Jean-Francois Drolet, 'Containing the Kantian 
Revolutions: A Theoretical Analysis of the Neo-Conservative Critique of Global Liberal Governance', Review 
of International Studies (vol. 36, no. 3,2010, pp. 533 - 556). Shashi Tharoor, `Why America Still Needs the 
United Nations', Foreign Affairs (vol. 80, no. 1,2001, pp. 67 - 80). Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: 
American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets', Foreign Affairs (vol. 29, no. 6,200, pp. 9-15). 
19 Morris and Wheeler, `The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force'. 
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forces to prevent mass atrocity crimes in other countries. 20 Yet the reality is that the US does 
not have the power to become the mass atrocity police officer of the world. If the US is to 
stand against such crimes occurring, then why reject the R2P in the first place? Why not 
accept the R2P and try to forge a long-term collective security strategy that will aid this 
objective rather than placing any more of a unilateral burden on the US. 
Such understanding is critically overlooked by realists who dismiss the UN. As stated in 
Chapter One, genocide prevention may lead states into "complex and dangerous" foreign 
policy agendas. Groves, therefore, makes a contradictory point as it is clear that the US 
would benefit by not going it alone in such "complex and dangerous" foreign policy matters. 
Since no state can carry the burden of genocide prevention unilaterally, it is imperative that 
this burden is carried forth on the shoulders of international society as a whole. Andrew 
Hurrell explains this point well when he states: "To a much greater extent than realists 
acknowledge, states need multilateral security institutions both to share the material and 
political burdens of security management and to gain the authority and legitimacy that the 
possession of crude power can never on its own secure". 21 Primarily, the statement reiterates 
the point that states need institutions such as the UN to help share the burden of security in an 
anarchical realm. Secondarily, the statement brings us back to the central idea of international 
legitimacy, as Hurrell claims that power in itself is not enough. Whilst the US may have the 
power to intervene unilaterally, it does not have the authority to intervene unilaterally. 
Without forging a tolerable level of consensual support, the perceived abuse of such crude 
power will only go to add to the unilateral burden of the US. 22 Within Groves analysis there 
seems to be the assumption that international legitimacy can be constructed upon power 
alone, yet as discussed in Chapter Four, this is simply not the case. 
International legitimacy, it should be remembered, not only constrains power, but also enables 
power at the international level. This is the power of legitimacy. 23 Power therefore, in itself 
is not enough. Indeed, Hurrell raises Martin Wight's point: "The fundamental problem of 
20 Groves, 'The U. S. should reject the U. N. "Responsibility to Protect"". 21 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order. Power. Values and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p. 192. See also Christian Reus-Smit, `The Constructivist Challenge after September 11', in Alex J. Bellamy, (ed. ), International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), esp. pp. 88-90. 
'2 Obviously such thinking can be traced back to Joseph Nye., The Paradox of n rican Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 23 See Nicholas J. Wheeler's take on Iris Claude original statement, Saving Strangers Hummitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2000). p. 4. 
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power politics is the justification of power... . Power is not self-justifying: 
it must be justified 
by reference to some source outside or beyond itself, and thus be transformed into 
"authority"". 24 Wight captures the heart of the matter when he highlights the difference 
between power and authority. In order to transform power into authority one needs to achieve 
legitimate status. 25 To return to Clark, in order to gain authority at the international level one 
has to bring in the other central tenets of international legitimacy in order for that authority to 
be perceived as legitimate. This has been put into explicit practice as US President Barack 
Obama has attempted to reconstruct American leadership in a post-George W. Bush world by 
appealing to the need for more US power as well as more US legitimacy which it is claimed 
can only come through establishing a more multilateral approach. 26 Crucially, this represents 
a more informed understanding of the relationship between power and authority as the latter is 
dependent upon international legitimacy rather than power alone. 27 It is this stance, rather 
than the one put forward by realists, that will ultimately serve US interests. 
To return to the premise of the ICISS report raised in Chapter Six, the permanent position that 
the US has within the UNSC is a privilege and it is not in the long-term interests of the US to 
violate the very rules that provide the US with its privileged status. For example, when 
Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008, Russia utilised a human rights rationale and raised the 
R2P in an attempt to legitimise its unilateral intervention. In sharp response the US 
condemned the intervention, with former vice President Dick Cheney stating that the 
intervention represented an "illegitimate unilateral attempt" to change Georgia's borders. 28 
Although the intervention clearly violated international law and failed to fulfil the pre- 
requisite of an R2P intervention (namely that Russia didn't gain UNSC approval) it is difficult 
to see how the US can justify its condemnation without turning to the very rules that it itself 
Andrew Huffell, Global Order. p. 39. 
u For such analysis, see Chris Brown with Kirsten Ainley, 'Power and Security', in Understanding International 
Relations. third edition (New York: Palgrave, 2005), chapter five. 
See Barack Obama, 'Renewing American Leadership', Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2007, pp. 1-16. ). See 
also, M. J. Williams, The Coming Revolution in Foreign Affairs: rethinking American National Security', 
International Affairs (vol. 84. no. 6.2008, pp. 1109 -1130). 
The divisive positions adopted within the US have also been evident in the debates over the closure of 
Guantanamo Bay as critics such as former Vice President Dick Cheney imply that US power and moral beliefs 
are enough, yet this fails to take into account any understanding of international law and international consensus 
over the issue. See Tom Baldwin and Tom Reid, 'Barak Obanna and Dick Cheney Clash over Guantanamo 
Closure', Times On-line available on-line 
httn"//www dmesonline. co. uk/tolnews/world/us andamericas/article6337947. ece Accessed 22/05/09. 
28 David Pallister, 'Dick Cheney warns Russia over regional bullying tactics', The Guardian (04/09/2008) 
Available at hW: //www. guardian. co. uk/"l/2008/sep/04/Qeorai 6russin Accessed 21/05/09. 
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violated in the context of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Such violations, unless supported by a 
tolerable consensus of UNGA support, ultimately undermine the authority of the rules and the 
UN itself. At the same time, the P5 set a precedent that those who have the power to act 
unilaterally can do so. Ultimately this does not serve the vested interest of any P5 member in 
the long-run. 
7.1.1 Summary 
Despite its limitations, the UN stands as the cornerstone of international legitimacy because it 
acts as an arena for international deliberation. This is not to say that the UN is perfect, but 
that its critics should reform it from the inside rather than the outside. 29 For example in 
Blair's famous speech on `The Doctrine of the International Community', Blair stated "being 
pro EU does not mean we are content with the way it is. We believe it needs radical 
reform". 30 The sentiment can also be applied to the UN. To return to Groves' point that the 
UN may not provide US security in a post 9/11 world, it is clear that the US cannot carry the 
burden of fighting international terrorism on its own. Although pre-emptive strikes are not 
permitted in the UN Charter, if the US feels that that are justified then they have to make their 
moral case within the UN in an effort to forge the tolerable consensus needed to alter the 
existing legal framework. Whilst many in the US are critical of the UN, one is reminded of 
Richard Gardener's point made back in the 1960's: "Those who deplore the United Nations as 
a "debating society" appear to have little confidence in the capacity of the United States to 
present its case successfully in the council of nations" 31 Quite simply, the US needed to 
make its case at the UN in order to gain the level of consensual support needed from the 
relevant actors in order to legitimate such action. Any fundamental change in international 
policy with regard to the use of force has to come from inside rather than outside the UN as it 
stands as the sole arena of international deliberation. This is precisely the point made in 
Morris and Wheeler's prescription for a long-term solution to the legitimacy crisis as they 
argue that the ambiguity surrounding Article 39 of the UN Charter has to be addressed to re- 
29 Obviously there is a large amount of literature on this issue. For a more pragmatic approach see T. G. Weiss, 
What's Wrong with the United Nations (and How to Fix it) (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). For a more 
cosmopolitan perspective see Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward 
Qos olitan Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), esp. chapter six. 30 Tony Blair, `The Doctrine of the International Community', (24/09/1999), available at 
httn: //www. numberlO. gov. uk/Pa eg 1ý Accessed 23/07/08. 
31 Richard N. Gardener, In Pursuit of World Order. U 
. 
S. Foreign Policy and International Organisations 
(London: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 22. 
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empower the UNSC as the cornerstone of a revitalised collective security regime. 32 This 
reaffirms the understanding set out in Chapter Five that international society failed to forge a 
post-Cold War consensus over what would constitute rightful conduct, which ultimately 
brought the authority of the UN into question. 
Realists have to consider the question, if states turn their back on international law and 
multilateral institutions whenever its suits them, what message does this send to other states? 
To return to the premise of Groves' position, the UN may constrain the power of the US with 
regard to its right to "maintain freedom of action", but critically, it also constrains the misuse 
of power in international relations as a whole. If the US supports international law and 
international institutions on an ad hoc basis, then how can it challenge (other than militarily, 
which would create a continuous state of tension) other states upholding the same distain for 
international law and institutions? It is in the vital national interest of the US to have as much 
of a civilised, stable, and ordered international environment as possible and it is therefore 
imperative that policymakers acknowledge the power that international legitimacy plays in 
facilitating a more stable anarchical realm. With this in mind, states cannot overlook the 
importance of confronting genocide. If international law and international institutions, such 
as the UN, are to have any perceived legitimate value, states have to formulate a long-term 
collective security strategy in order to address their legal and moral obligation to prevent 
genocide. 
7.2 The rationalist voice 
Unlike realists, English School pluralists have a more optimistic view regarding the potential 
for progress and cooperation at the international level. As a result, English School pluralists 
place more value in international institutions such as the UN and international law than is to 
be traditionally found in realism. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, English School 
pluralists unlike English School solidarists oppose the idea of humanitarian intervention in 
international relations as they claim international order is best served by the rules of 
sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force. The pursuit of international justice, 
therefore, embodied in the principle of humanitarian intervention is seen to represent a clear 
violation of the English School pluralist rules. Accordingly, the 1948 Genocide Convention 
and the 2005 R2P remain a solidarist step too far. From this perspective, English School 
32 Moms and Wheeler, `The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force'. 
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pluralists would tend to put forward the idea that any responsibilities and/or obligations 
toward humanitarian intervention should be rejected as international society should be 
ordered on the fundamental rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
The clearest endorsement of such a pluralistic doctrine can be found in Robert Jackson's 
publication The Global Covenant, Human Conduct in a World of States. 33 The work 
represents a groundbreaking piece of contemporary English School scholarship in that it 
utilises the interdisciplinary classical approach to address issues such as "peace and security, 
war and intervention, human rights, failed states, territories and boundaries, and democracy" 
in a post-1945 world. 34 Obviously the scope of this work cannot be addressed in full here. 
Instead, this analysis will focus on Jackson's rejection of humanitarian intervention as a 
legitimate practice in international relations. Although this work was published in 2000 
(prior to the endorsement of the R2P), its theoretical defence of absolute sovereignty, non- 
intervention, and non-use for force provides an apt framework for this analysis as it is 
grounded upon a moral, political, and legal defence of English School pluralism. Notably 
this intellectually enriching text offers great insight into English School pluralism, however, 
when one places the crime of genocide within this pluralistic framework, the internal 
coherence of Jackson's thesis comes under intense scrutiny. 
First of all, let us gauge the moral defence put forward as Jackson believes that the rules of 
sovereignty and non-intervention serve humanity. By this it is meant that sovereignty allows 
for "unity in diversity", in that alternative ways of living can be constructed within states yet 
at the same time this still allows for a normative dialogue to exist between states. 35 The 
premise is neatly summed up in Jackson's commitment to normative pluralism as a moral 
basis for sovereignty: 
Normative pluralism is the morality of 'tending your own patch' and that means having a 
patch and being free to occupy it and cultivate it in your own way. A core human value of the 
global covenant is the opportunity it affords to people the world over to make of their local 
political independence whatever they can without having to be unduly concerned about 
unwarranted interference by neighbours or other outsiders. The global covenant provides a 
33 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant. Human Conduct in a 
Press, 2000). 
World of S At a (Oxford: Oxford University 
34 Ibid, p. vii. 
35 Jackson, The Global Covenant, chapter one: `The Normative Dialogue of International Society'. 
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normative guarantee of political independence. However, it offers no guarantees, normative 
or otherwise, that international freedom will be used wisely or effectively. 36 
The statement embodies Jackson's unshakable moral commitment to normative pluralism as 
Jackson believes that it serves the imperfection, diversity, and commonality to be found in 
humanity. The highly interesting point is that whilst English School solidarists advocate 
humanitarian intervention to prevent crimes against humanity, the understanding put forward 
by Jackson implies that humanitarian intervention, could in itself, constitute a crime against 
humanity as it violates the very rules that serve humanity best. Whilst Jackson also shares the 
realist fear that humanitarian intervention may become a doctrine that is exploited by 
powerful states, here we see a more developed normative argument in that Jackson puts 
forward a normative link between sovereignty and humanity. 
This commitment to normative pluralism, in the defence of humanity, also underpins 
Jackson's political defence of sovereignty and non-intervention. As Jackson boldly 
proclaims: "Sovereignty is not a political arrangement only for fair weather and good times. 
It is an arrangement for all political seasons and for all kinds of weather". 37 Such rationale 
aligns itself with the normative pluralism outlined above, for Jackson views the state as a 
"framework of independence". 38 Although this does not guarantee that state leaders will not 
abuse their political autonomy, this commitment to autonomy, offers the only framework in 
which independence can prosper. Without such political independence states cannot flourish 
in an independent way. Fearful of outside intervention states will be constantly `watching 
over their shoulder' which will ultimately hinder their ability to evolve as they would without 
external influence. As a result, this will hinder humanity's ability to evolve in a diverse and 
imperfect manner. On reading Jackson's central thesis, one cannot help but be reminded of 
the expression `short-term pain for long-term gain' as sovereignty is advocated in the absolute 
sense (despite its flaws), for it remains the only viable option for ensuring that states and 
humanity flourish. 
This brings us onto the third and final dimension of legality. Jackson defends his position 
from a legal perspective by appealing to the understanding set out in Article 2 of the UN 
Charter. For example Jackson boldly claims: "The most important procedural norm- 
36 p. 410. 
37 Ibid, p. 308. 
39 Ibid. The idea that sovereignty acts as a "framework of independence" is taken from p. 308. 
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grandnorm -of the global covenant is clearly expressed by Article 2 of the UN Charter. 
Article 2(4) lays down the most important principle of state sovereignty `All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial 
integrity of political independence"'. 39 This interpretation of the UN Charter is common 
amongst critics of humanitarian intervention. Article 2 is interpreted in an absolutist sense to 
infer that the UN Charter upholds the idea of absolute sovereignty. This paves the way for 
Article 2 (7) which as Jackson notes: "proclaims the principle of non-intervention: `Nothing 
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state "'40 Accordingly, the "grandnorm" 
status that Jackson attributes to Article 2 of the UN Charter, seemingly overrides the legal 
status of alternative norms to be found in the UN Charter's commitment to inalienable rights 
and other such pro-interventionist legal treaties, conventions, and declarations. Although one 
can understand the Jackson's appeal to Article 2 to defend against the ever expanding post- 
Cold War debate over humanitarian intervention, when it comes to genocide (for the reasons 
discussed in Chapter Five), the 1948 Genocide Convention sets out a clear legal framework 
that provides states with the right to intervene. Whilst Jackson's thesis provides a thoughtful 
and enriching analysis of international relations, when one places the crime of genocide 
within this pluralistic framework, the legitimacy and internal coherence of Jackson's thesis 
becomes untenable. 
For example, Jackson defends political autonomy on the grounds that this serves the diversity 
of humanity. Quite simply, this could not be further from the truth when one considers the 
implications of genocide. Jackson claims that political independence allows states to "tend 
their own patch" allowing for citizens to achieve the "good life", yet this grossly misses the 
point that genocide occurs precisely because state leaders "tend their own patch". For 
example, in Zygmunt Bauman's seminal analysis he refers to the genocidal process as "the 
gardening vision of the state" 41 By which it is meant that the state admires the flowers it 
wishes to keep and eradicates the weeds that it perceives pose a threat to the garden 
39 Ibid, p. 18. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Zygmunt Bauman, Modern and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), esp. p. 18 and p. 122. 
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flourishing as state leaders think it should. 2 Hence groups such as the Jews or Tutsi were 
deemed to be weeds within their own societies and their destruction was the outcome of state 
leaders "tending their own patch". It is within such circumstances that Jackson's thesis 
suffers from a striking lack of internal coherence as it is clear that genocide grossly 
undermines the diversity of humanity, yet this is the very thing that Jackson sets out to 
protect. As discussed in Chapter Three, the process of destruction that is to be found within 
the genocidal process acts to destroy "the essential foundations of a group". If one upholds a 
commitment to cultural diversity (as Jackson does), it is internally incoherent to suggest that 
bringing an end to such a destruction process (via humanitarian intervention) would somehow 
hinder the cultural diversity of humanity. Although Jackson hopes that non-military methods 
can be used to prevent human rights violations within states, in denying humanitarian 
intervention in all contexts, the author ultimately grants state leaders a licence to destroy 
groups and in doing so destroy the diversity of humanity which he himself sets out to 
uphold. 43 
It is also evident that the state-centric nature of Jackson's political autonomy serves the 
interests of state-leaders more than it does the idea of humanity. For example, Jackson claims 
that "the global covenant enables state leaders to relate to each other, to co-exist with each 
other, and to cooperate with each other without sacrificing the political independence and the 
values and life ways upheld by it" 44 Despite the fact that such rhetoric explicitly endorses the 
co-existence of state leaders, Jackson qualifies this position in relation to humanity by basing 
his argument on the assumption that "leaders represent humanity in its full heterogeneity' as 
The problem with this rationale is that state leaders do not represent humanity: how can it be 
that the one hundred and ninety two state leaders represent the six billion plus of humanity in 
its full heterogeneity? The understanding, therefore, set out by Jackson seems to serve state 
elites rather than humanity. The state-centric assumption that is built into this claim only goes 
to undermine any notion of humanity which would undoubtedly be better served through a 
solidarist commitment to conditional sovereignty. As discussed, the legal, moral, and 
constitutional consensus forged over the idea of conditional sovereignty (embodied in the 
42 I am drawing here upon the keynote lecture given by Zygmunt Bauman, `Done to Humans, Done by 
Humans', presented at the 1" Global Conference on Genocide by the International Network of Genocide 
Scholars, at the Centre for the Study of Genocide and Mass Violence, The University of Sheffield, (09/01/2009). 
43 For Jackson's discussion on this point see The Global Covenant p. 414. 
44 Ibid, p. 23. 45 Ibid, p. 22. 
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1948 Genocide Convention and the R2P) represents an attempt by international society to 
constrain the idea of absolute power in international relations. This reflected international 
society's view that absolute sovereignty acted to serve the interests of leaders rather than 
citizens within such tyrannical contexts as genocide. 
Whilst Jackson implies that English School pluralism serves the interests of states, and the 
individuals within states, this perspective is built upon an assumption regarding the 
relationship between the rulers and the ruled. It seems that Jackson has overlooked the role of 
power within his attempt to construct the notion of a global covenant on the grounds of 
international legitimacy. This defence of political autonomy is built on the notion that states 
will sort it out for themselves, yet as Jackson knows, the role of power within the state means 
that citizens do not have the power to sort it out if for themselves (when they find themselves 
the victim of state tyranny). When a state implements the genocidal process there is very 
little, or nothing, that the victims can do without outside help. They are victims not because 
of what they have done, but because of who they are. This is critical. Quite simply it leaves 
the victim group with no power to compromise. This is important when one considers 
Jackson's opposition toward humanitarian intervention as he claims that countries do not want 
to be unduly concerned about outside intervention. Whilst one could imagine this to be the 
case in times of "'good weather" (to use Jackson's phrase), it is more difficult to imagine that 
people feel this way in times of tyranny and "bad weather". When a regime is committing 
genocide, then the groups being targeted are not worried about intervention, they are worried 
about non-intervention. The only people worried about intervention are the perpetrators of 
the crime. Despite the fact that Jackson is motivated by an obvious compassion for humanity, 
his thesis would undoubtedly find great favour with genocidal perpetrators. This raises a 
critical point in that such ardent pluralism may increase the frequency of genocide. If a state 
leader knows that he, or she, will not answer to outside interventions then what is to stop such 
tyranny from escalating? 
Overall, the legitimate foundations of Jackson's anti-humanitarian intervention stance, at least 
within the context of genocide, are indefensible. For example, Jackson draws quite 
extensively on Tony Blair's seminal speech regarding `The Doctrine of The International 
Community', before rejecting the idea that democratic states have the moral right to invoke 
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regime change on non-democratic states. 46 Jackson states that if this inference is correct, such 
a movement would see a transformation from a "societas of states into an international 
community (universitas) based on democracy and human rights". 47 The problem is that this 
inference drawn from Blair's speech is not correct, as Blair's speech was not built upon the 
single idea of pro-democratic regime change. Instead, Blair raised a whole host of ideas 
relating to sovereignty and human rights which need to be considered further: 
The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which 
we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts. Non -interference has long been 
considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to 
jettison too readily. One state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of 
another or foment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some 
claim. But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of 
genocide can never be a purely internal matter. 48 
On reading the statement, and in the light of what occurred in Iraq, one can understandably 
infer that Blair advocated pro-democratic regime change. From this perspective, the 
legitimacy of such regime change is rightly brought into question as it is clear that no overall 
moral or legal consensus exists, within today's world, regarding pro-democratic regime 
change. However, the statement also raises the perfectly legitimate point regarding the fact 
that whilst sovereignty is extremely important, there are certain acts of state tyranny that 
cannot be considered as a domestic issue. This is not simply a debate over pro-democratic 
regime change, but a more profound question of where international society should draw the 
line between conditional and absolute sovereignty. Reaffirming the sentiment outlined in 
Chapter Five, Blair states that genocide can never be viewed as a purely internal matter. This 
latter aspect is gravely omitted in Jackson's analysis as he rejects the legitimacy of the pro- 
democracy none yet fails to gauge the legitimacy of the anti-genocide norm. 49 
7.2.1 Summary 
As discussed, international legitimacy is a process rather than a property. The collective 
understandings that are constructed can be deconstructed. The English School pluralist 
commitment to absolute sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force implies that on 
46 Ibid, pp. 355-365. 
47 Ibid, p. 360. 
" Tony Blair, `The Doctrine of the International Community', (24/09/1999) 
htti): //www. numberlO. &2y. uk/Pa&tl297 Accessed 23/07/08. 
49 Such understanding creates the basis for Jack Donnelly's analysis of the "anti-genocide norm" which was 
raised in Chapter Four. Donnelly goes onto to claim that the moral consensus over genocide far outweighs that 
over pro-democracy. See, Donnelly, Universal Human Rigg p. 252, footnote. 21. 
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the one hand, states should not forge any understandings that challenge these rules, and on the 
other hand, states should deconstruct any such understandings that have been forged in the 
past. At present, it is evident that the pluralist rules of absolute sovereignty, non-intervention, 
and non-use of force have been deemed to be outdated within the context of genocide. The 
conditional element embodied in the understanding of sovereignty espoused by the 1948 
Genocide Convention and the 2005 R2P has ultimately been deemed as rightful conduct. 
State leaders have seen that such understanding is necessary for the health of international 
society as such mass atrocity crimes cannot be tolerated in a world that strives to become 
more civilised. It should be stressed here that the understanding of English School pluralism 
put forward by Jackson does not engage explicitly with the idea of genocide, which as 
discussed, places the context of such pluralism in a stark light. However, the silence on this 
subject matter does not deter from the fact that in upholding a commitment to such rules, 
Jackson's thesis comes under intense scrutiny within the context of genocide. Such silence is 
perhaps a common feature of such a pluralistic approach. As Richard Shapcott claims: 
"Because of their assumptions of limited interaction, pluralists are at best silent and at worst 
indifferent to the extent of transnational ethical problems that face modern communities". so 
This silence has not been helped as Jackson has produced work on sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention since the endorsement of the R2P, yet failed to engage in an 
analysis of whether conditional sovereignty is legitimate. 51 
7.3 The revolutionist voice 
The tradition of revolutionism remains the most under-theorised tradition in the English 
School approach. As discussed in Chapter Two, for Wight, revolutionism was a hybrid 
category which captured the "soft" revolutionaries from Kant to Nehru, as well as the "hard" 
revolutionaries of Jacobins and Marxists. S2 Obviously such a `broad church' of thought 
cannot be fully addressed here. Because of this, this final section re-engages with Andrew 
50 Richard Shapcott. `Anti-Cosmopolitanism, Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Harm Principle', Review of 
International Studies (vol. 34, no. 2 2008, pp 185 - 205), p. 192. 51 See Robert Jackson, Sovereignty (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), esp. chapter five. Also, Jackson, `Human Rights 
Protection in a World of Sovereign States', in Tinnevelt, R., and Verschraegen, G., (ed. ), Between 
Cosmopolitan Ideals and State Sovereignty Studies in Global Justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 
pp. 135 - 147). Again these analyses offer valuable insight into debates surrounding these key concepts yet fail 
to critically fail to engage in questions surrounding the legitimacy rules such as non-intervention in the context 
of genocide. 
52 Martin Wight, International Theory. p. 267. 
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Linklater's focus on the relationship between the English School and cosmopolitanism. 53 A 
range of work will be drawn upon here as Linklater has spent over thirty years addressing 
questions surrounding the problems of establishing an international community. 54 Notably, 
Linklater's focus on the principle of harm has relevance for the relationship between order, 
justice, and genocide and it provides insight into the potential for progress (within limits), in 
international relations. 55 The final section will focus on Linklater's central idea that the 
consensus to be found in international relations, regarding the principle of harm, provides not 
just a potential common ground for IR scholars, but also a basis for progress in international 
relations. This offers insight into how the R2P can be entrenched further as an international 
norm. 
In an attempt to answer the question: what is harm, Linklater utilises the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition: "evil (physical or otherwise) as done to or suffered by some person or 
thing: hurt, injury or mischief'. 56 Although this in itself seems quite straightforward, 
Linklater acknowledges that although the notion of harm is universal, the notion of what 
constitutes harm is not. 57 As one would expect, alternative schools of thought approach the 
subject matter of harm in a manner of different ways as harm could be measured on a 
physical, emotional, economic or even cultural level. 58 The English School focus therefore is 
on direct physical harm, or what Linklater refers to as "concrete harm", by which means the 
33 Although a critical theorist, Linklater's engagement with the English School has seen him go "from being the 
official dissident of the School to becoming the principle advocate of its Kantian wing", see Iver, B. Neumann, 
'The English school and the Practices of World Society', Review of International Relations (vol. 27, no. 3. 
2001, pp. 503-507), p. 503. "A collection of Linklater's essays on these themes has now been published, Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory 
and World Politics. Citizenship, vereiaty and Humaoity (London: Routledge, 2007). 
The focus here on justice does not seek to engage in cosmopolitan debates regarding citizenship, humanity, 
identity and deliberative democracy. For an overview on such debates see, David Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). S. Rosenberg, Can the People 
Govern: Deliberation and Democracy (New York: Palgrave, 2007). Steven Vertovec and Robert Cohen (ed. ), 
Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. Theory. Context, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2002). Martha 
C. Nussbaum, For Love of Country? Joshua Cohen (ed. ), (Boston: Beacon, 1996). David Held, Democracy and 
Qlobal Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
Andrew Linklater, 'Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions', in Steven Vertovec and Robert Cohen (ed. ), 
ConcCivina Cosmopolitanism. Theory. Context. and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 255. 
Ibid. 
's For example, the English School's focus on harm within the context of seeking justice differs substantially 
from the cosmopolitan debates over harm within the context of global distributive justice. For an overview see 
Simon Caney, 'Global Distributive Justice and the State', Political Studies. (vol. 56, no. 3,2008, pp. 487 - 
518). Thomas Pogge, (ed. ), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right : Who Owes What to the Very Poor? 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For a critical engagement with cosmopolitanism on the issue see 
Brian J. Shaw, `Rawls, Kant's Doctrine of Right, and Global Distributive Justice', The Journal of Politic (vol. 
67, no. 1,2005, pp. 220 -249). 
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intentionally infliction of harm. 59 It is the issue of "concrete harm" that is of relevance here. 
Placing the principle of harm within an English School framework, Linklater states: 
A pluralist society of states is concerned with reducing inter-state harm and incorporates 
'international harm conventions' within its institutional framework, whereas a solidarists 
society of states incorporates `cosmopolitan harm conventions', designed to reduce harm done 
to individuals in separate political communities. 60 
The understanding put forward draws upon the pluralist solidarist divide. On the one hand, 
English School pluralists attempt to reduce the level of harm between states, yet on the other 
hand, English School solidarists attempt to reduce the level of harm both between and within 
states. As a result, Linklater claims that English School solidarists uphold cosmopolitan 
harm principles. From this perspective, both English School solidarists and cosmopolitans 
share a commitment to reducing the level of harm between and within states which reflects 
that there is a substantial common ground between these two schools of thought. 
This analysis leads Linklater to claim that attaching the revolutionist label to Kant is 
misleading. Instead, it is proposed that Kant should be placed within the rationalist tradition 
of Hugo Grotius (albeit at the revolutionist wing). The reason being, that Kant attempted to 
build "cosmopolitan attachments into international society", rather than offer any genuine 
revolutionary blueprint. 61 It is worth pausing here to gauge this `less revolutionary' position 
a little further, as Linklater explains: 
Kant's vision of a world order which combines sovereignty with respect for human rights and 
cultural diversity is very different from the cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity which 
Wight described. Bull and Wight would have been closer to the mark if they regarded Kant as 
a dissenting voice within the Grotian tradition and one of the great exponents of a radicalized 
form of rationalism which envisaged the progressive application of the harm principle in 
international affairs- its extension, in short, from interaction between members of the same 
state to relations between all states, and in time, to relations involving all sections of 
humanity 62 
The statement underpins Linklater's portrayal of Kant as a radical rationalist, rather than a 
revolutionary. 63 As is well documented, Kant did not explicitly favour the idea of 
humanitarian intervention which would in fact align Kant with English School pluralism if it 
were not for his commitment to cosmopolitan law which attempts the regulate the behaviour 
59 Linklater, `Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions', p. 260. 
60 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations. A Contemporary 
Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 8. Emphasis added. 61 Ibid. p. 180. 
62 Ibid, p. 163. 
63 Ibid, See Linklater discussion of "Kant's radicalized rationalism", pp -160-169. 
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between and within states. M Such complexity underlines the problem of categorising Kant 
within the English School framework, yet the focus here is not on the accuracy of the term 
"revolutionary rationalism" but on Linklater's claim that one should not dismiss Kant's ideas 
as somewhat utopian (as often suggested by Wight and Bull). 65 In highlighting the respect 
that Kant held for both sovereignty and human rights, Linklater seemingly upholds the 
broader view that cosmopolitanism should be understood as: "universality plus difference". 66 
Notably, Linklater is not alone in this approach as Richard Shapcott also focuses on the 
principle of harm to suggest that a consensus can be struck between cosmopolitans and anti- 
cosmopolitans. Both scholars aim to ease the fears of "communitarian realists" (such as 
Walzer), and "international pluralists" (such as Bull), as they claim that neither a "world 
state", nor a "collective universal definition of the good", is needed to establish a common 
ground over the principle of harm. 67 In acknowledging that harm can be regulated without 
the establishment of a world government or a universal conception of `the good', both 
scholars aim to debunk the utopian myth that surrounds Kant and Kantianism. As Linklater 
explains, the English School's defence of rationalism, has, at least at times, been bound up 
with a "crude and misleading interpretation of Kant and the larger Kantian tradition". 68 This 
led Bull to portray Kant as a "revolutionary revolutionist" who advocated a world 
government, yet this was not necessarily true. 69 This utopian portrayal of Kant can also be 
found in Wight, for as Garrett W. Brown explains, Wight portrayed Kantianism as: 
"inordinately demanding of a common morality and therefore so fantastically universalistic 
64 I feel it is also necessary to qualify this point as I personally struggle to comprehend that Kant would have 
sed genocide intervention within the context of the Holocaust or Rwanda. 
With regard to the accuracy of the term `radicalised rationalism" an in-depth analysis of Kant and Kantianism 
as well as identifying exactly what Wight meant by revolutionism would be needed. This is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Indeed, this latter point certainly needs to be addressed further as even within Linklater's analysis 
it is unclear what exactly differentiates the "radicalized rationalism" from revolutionism. Whilst there is a 
discussion of what Kant is, in relation to rationalism, there is not enough of a discussion with regard to what 
Kant is not, in relation to revolutionism - other than to say he does not advocate a violent revolution. 66 This is taken from Kwame Anthony Appiab, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: 
WW. Norton & Co., 2006), p. 151. 
67 Richard Shapcott. `Anti-Cosmopolitanism', pp. 196. It is important to stress here that neither scholar attempts 
to reduce Kant's entire moral philosophy down to just this principle, but that they utilise the principle of harm to 
demonstrate the potential common ground upon which progress can be made, see Linklater and Suganami, The 
-- iah School. A Contemporary Reassessment. pp 170- 171. 
Ibid, p. 159. 
69 Ibid, p. 161. For a discussion on Kant's position on this subject matter, see Group ' Cosmopolitanism. 
From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009), chapter 
three. 
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that it is rendered both untenable and extremely dangerous to a plurality of global beliefs". 70 
Such misrepresentation ultimately fuelled the belief that Kant should be regarded as a 
revolutionary, whose legacy should, therefore, be disregarded as utopian. This has 
undoubtedly contributed to the general image amongst critics of cosmopolitanism that 
Kantianism represents an: "out-of-date package of `Enlightenment' outlooks". 7' 
Of course, one should not get carried away here and it is clear that the focus on harm does not 
allow us to overlook the array of complexities, ambiguities, and confusion within the "always 
highly problematic category of Kantianism". 72 If Wight and Bull have misrepresented Kant, 
then perhaps they can be offered some form of forgiveness as it is evident that even 
cosmopolitans have problems grounding Kant. This point is explicitly raised in Brown's 
work on Grounding Cosmopolitanism as he illustrates that even Kantian's appeal to 
alternative constructions of Kant when advocating their vision of how international relations 
should be ordered. 73 As a result, the picture painted presents Kantianism as somewhat of a 
`broad church', in which legal, political, cultural, and civic cosmopolitan conceptions of Kant 
sing from a different Kantian hymn sheet. 74 This illustrates that critics should not dismiss 
Kantianism as idealistic on the grounds that certain elements to be found within certain 
conceptions of Kant may be considered to be idealistic. For example, the work of Martin 
Wight is not dismissed as idealistic because of his commitment to the idea of a `God-given' 
morality. This is despite the fact that, as Paul Guyer explains: "In the practical sphere, few 
can any longer take seriously the idea that moral reasoning consists in the discovery of 
external norms". 75 Essentially, Brown, Linklater, and Shapcott make the point that a more 
informed understanding of Kant provides a potential common ground for a three way 
conversation between IR scholars, and also an opportunity for progress to be made in 
international relations. This is important when we begin to consider the relationship between 
morality and consensus in the construction of international legitimacy. 
70 Ibid, p. 66. 71 This is taken from Ken Booth, Tim Dunne and Michael Cox, How Might We Live? Global Ethics in a New 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 7. 
72 Andrew Hurrell, `Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School', Review 
of International Relations (vol. 27, no. 3.2001, pp. 489-494), p. 503. 73 Garrett W. Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitan= From Kant to the Idea of a osmopoli an C^nstitution (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
74 Ibid, pp 12 - 14. Brown draws upon the work of Gerald Delantly here for these four distinctions. 75 Paul Guyer, (ed. ), Kant and Modem Philosohv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p 3. 
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For example, Brown puts forward a `tamed' version of Kantianism which advocates the 
establishment of a Kantian constitution committed to both morality and institutionalism. This 
two-fold commitment claims that international relations should be constructed on "a weak 
form of moral cosmopolitanism" which in turn acts to underpin "a strong form of 
cosmopolitan law". 76 This constitution reflects Brown's view that there should be a universal 
moral order, but that we also have to be wary of an ever increasing normative agenda. Such 
understanding reflects the more mainstream view, that in a world full of competing moral 
claims, we have to tread carefully when attempting to construct a universal moral order. Any 
attempt to construct this universal moral foundation will be undoubtedly hindered, by what I 
refer to here as moral over-reach. To go back to our understanding of international 
legitimacy, legitimacy is not a product of morality alone and it is therefore imperative, if 
international society is to construct global standards of legitimacy that embody a universal 
moral commitment, that our moral expectations are anchored upon what is achievable in 
moral, legal, and constitutional terns. What is interesting about Brown's approach is that he 
grounds more than just Kant, Kantianism, and cosmopolitanism, as he seeks to ground 
international relations itself upon a "weak form of moral cosmopolitanism". This is of direct 
relevance to this analysis as this understanding of a "weak form of moral cosmopolitanism" 
aligns itself with the aforementioned idea of a universal moral minimalism. The 
establishment and practice of a universal moral minimalism is imperative if international 
relations are to progress upon such commitments as the R2P. Whilst sceptics challenge the 
idea of progress within the anarchical realm, one has to question any attempt to uphold an 
international system that does not embody a commitment to universal moral minimalism. 
This neatly brings us back to the crux of the matter regarding the principle of harm and the 
potential for progress in a post-R2P world. Essentially, both Linklater and Shapcott reduce 
the debate over a universal moral minimalism and a weak form of moral cosmopolitanism 
down to a specific focus on harm. " Acknowledging the ever problematic point (that forging 
a universal consensus on a universal moral order will be difficult); they claim that the 
consensus that already exists over the issue of harm provides an opportunity for progress in 
international relations. This ties in nicely with the sentiment so aptly expressed by R. J. 
76 Brown, Grounding Coýpolitanism. p. 14. " For an analysis of Linklater's reasoning for focusing on harm see, Linklater and Suganami, The English 
School. A Contemporary Reassessment. pp. 176-177. 
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Vincent who claims we should: "seek to put a floor under the societies of the world and not a 
ceiling over them". 78 Such understanding highlights that states should not get bogged down 
in idealistic debates over whether international society can, or should, establish a world 
government but instead focus on establishing universal moral foundations. It is with this in 
mind that Linklater and Shapcott's focus on harm demonstrates that progress, at least on this 
specific issue, does not require a utopian shift in policymaking for as Linklater explains a 
"global harm narrative" has emerged in international relations. 79 The reality being, that states 
have managed to forge a common understanding on a "range of matters which belong to a 
lower moral register than visions of some supposedly universal conception of the good". 80 In 
other words, although there remains a debate regarding what constitutes a `universal good'; 
states have forged an understanding over what constitutes a `universal bad'. It is here that the 
crime of genocide is of relevance. 
The idea that "we should seek to place a ceiling beneath the society of states" aptly 
underlines the premise of this thesis. Whilst Vincent focused on the issue of starvation, this 
thesis has focused on the issue of genocide in relation to establishing global standards of 
legitimacy that incorporate a universal legal, moral, and constitutional foundation. Genocide 
provides international society with both a fundamental problem and opportunity: to establish 
a universal legitimate order that embodies both a commitment to sovereignty (in the 
conditional sense), and human rights (in the universal sense), through utilising its existing 
aversion toward genocide. Quite simply, this thesis has taken the consensus regarding the 
principle of harm one step further as it utilises the fact that genocide acts as the quintessential 
example of harm in international relations. Despite the fact that all societies have their views 
on what constitutes harm, there is a universal consensus regarding the crime of genocide. As 
Shapcott explains: 
It also follows that the more serious or fundamental the nature of the harm, the more likely it 
is to be identified as such by people in diverse situations. Starvation is a clearly harmful 
condition that is close to being both objectively identifiable (the point at which life can no longer continue) and commanding of a near universal consensus as to its harmful status. Likewise, having one's identity, or community of belonging, removed or destroyed (harmed), is also something that might well command such a consensus. Genocide is perhaps one value 
78 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 126. "The idea of a "global harm narrative" is taken from Andrew Linklater, Human Interconnectedness', 
International Relations (vol. 23, no. 3,2009, pp. 481- 497), p. 491. g Linklater, p. 177. For an overview of debates over existing cosmopolitanism, see Pheng Cheah, Bruce Robbins, (ed. ), Cosmopolitics" Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1998), especially Part II: `Belonging to a World: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism? 'pp. 117 - 229. 
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that states have agreed (in principle) overrides nationals sovereignty, thus recognising a 
universal crime (or harm) against communities as well as individuals. 
The statement reiterates much of the sentiment expressed throughout this thesis. Shapcott 
acknowledges that there are issues such as starvation that conceivably violate a cosmopolitan 
harm principle (or what has been referred to in this thesis as a universal moral minimalism). 
Both Shapcott and Linklater recognise genocide as a paradigm example of harm and claim 
that the 1948 Genocide Convention signifies a cosmopolitan harm convention. 82 From this 
perspective, the legal developments toward genocide (see 4.3.2), begin to highlight how 
difficult it would be for international society to regress upon its commitment to prevent 
genocide. 
As Linklater and Shapcott highlight, the 1948 Genocide Convention embodies a 
cosmopolitan harm principle, which has then been entrenched further via legal and normative 
developments such as the establishment and practice of the ICC and the R2P (this goes back 
to the understanding set out in Chapter Four). With this in mind, it is inherently difficult to 
see how international society can regress upon its cosmopolitan commitment to prevent 
genocide which is embodied in the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statue, and the R2P. To 
illustrate this let us consider the Kantian idea of a `categorical imperative'. According to 
Kant, the categorical imperative stipulates that individuals should act `only according to the 
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law". 83 
Although such cosmopolitan ideals can seem somewhat `lofty', the point made by Linklater 
is that such cosmopolitan thinking is evident in the establishment of cosmopolitan harm 
conventions such as the Genocide Convention. Whilst the actors involved may not talk in 
cosmopolitan terms, they have willed such universal laws into existence. Therefore, it is 
difficult to see how international society could regress to the point that international society 
could collectively will the idea of harm (especially within the context of genocide) to become 
a universal law. This takes us back to the understanding of international legitimacy set out in 
Chapter Four, for as discussed, it is theoretically plausible that states could construct an 
understanding of genocide as rightful conduct, yet when one considers that this would mean 
that states would have to forge a consensus that genocide is legally, morally, and 
$1 Shapcott, `Ant-Cosmopolitanism', pp. 198. 
t2 For Linklater's position, see Linklater and Suganami, The English School. A Contenmorarv Reassessment. p. 
181. See also, chapter six, 'The Sociology of State-Systems'. 
13 Cited in Brown, CMXU& Cosmopolitanism. p. 1. 
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constitutionally acceptable, it is practically impossible to imagine that such an outcome could 
be constructed. 
It is here that the critical point emerges: if international society cannot regress upon its 
commitment to prevent genocide, it has to do its best to try our best to fulfil it! In other 
words, it is simply not enough to have treaties and conventions floating around in the air in 
some abstract sense. If societal relations are to be guided by any sense of international law 
and morality (and I would argue that it is within the interests of all states to do so), then states 
have to do their best to uphold the commitments they forge. Hence, international society 
should think carefully about what it commits itself to as any attempt at legal and moral over- 
reach will ultimately hinder its ability to entrench a universal legitimate order. However, for 
the reasons discussed throughout this thesis, the Genocide Convention should not be seen as 
just another legal convention as it embodies a universal legal and moral obligation that needs 
to be fulfilled if ideas such as international law and morality, as well as the institution of the 
UN, are to hold onto their perceived value in international relations. 
7.3.1 Summary 
The idea of cosmopolitan harm principles embodied within existing cosmopolitan harm 
conventions reiterates the idea of a universal moral minimalism. A moral basis, if you will, 
for international society. As discussed in Chapter Four, genocide is internationally regarded 
as the "crime of crimes" from both a moral and legal perspective. This has seen the idea of a 
universal moral minimalism entrenched within an attempt to construct a universal legal 
minimalism (/us cogens) from which states should not deviate. However, as discussed, 
genocide remains much lower down the priority list within the political context. Whilst there 
remains an international expectation that genocide should be prevented, policymakers do not 
see its prevention to be within the national interest of states. 
Quite simply, it gets to a point in international relations when policymakers are faced with a 
question: Kant or Won't? 84 As discussed, Linklater's questions whether international 
society's aversion toward human suffering provides an apt foundation for moral progress in 
international relations. In doing so, he reduces the debate over a universal moral order down 
to this one principle of harm, to highlight the fact that an international consensus can be 
s' Phillip Allot, `Kant or Won't: Theory and Moral Responsibility', Review of In ational Studies (vol. 23, no. 2,1997, pp. 339 - 357). 
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forged. This is important from a legitimacy perspective for the reasons discussed in Chapter 
Four. Essentially, this thesis takes such an approach one step further as it reduces the debate 
over international order down to its barebones regarding what states can agree upon, in the 
universal sense, from a legal, moral, and constitutional perspective. In essence, this approach 
strips away the discourse over sovereignty and human rights to the point that a central core is 
revealed: states have an obligation not to commit genocide, and international society has an 
obligation to prevent genocide from occurring. Because of the relationship between genocide 
and international legitimacy, genocide prevention is about more than `just' saving strangers. 
As discussed, genocide erodes the legitimate authority of the UN and the UNSC more than 
any other crime. Moreover, its relationship with international legitimacy highlights that in 
failing to prevent genocide, states erode the value of international law and international 
morality. When such ordering principles are devalued, the likelihood of international 
instability is increased. 
7.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, I return to the aforementioned sentiment expressed by John McCain over the US 
involvement in Somalia, for as discussed, the US Senator implied that the pursuit of the 
collective interest can seriously undermine that of the national interest. In many ways, this is 
understandable as the US carried too much of the economic, political, and military burden 
within the context of Somalia. This dictates that critics such as John McCain remain hostile 
toward the idea of a UN led collective security agenda built upon the military and economic 
power of the US. Despite the fact that the US remains the world's leading source of power in 
this respect, such power cannot disguise the fact that US `sons and daughters' pay for this 
burden with their lives. However, in order to resolve the problem of the US carrying too 
much of the burden in international relations, the answer is not for the US to regress upon its 
international legal, moral, and constitutional obligations. 
Whilst this analysis has centred on the US, the same is true for all states. The UN is an 
institution that embodies and oversees internationally agreed standards of legitimacy. These 
act to guide and shape international relations. As a result, the UN acts to constrain the power 
of states, such as, the US, but also helps constrain the much broader misuse of power between 
and within states. When states act in an ad hoc manner, they undermine the value of the very 
rules that they themselves depend on in order to try and keep the behaviour of other states in 
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check. It is within the national interest, therefore, of all states, to adhere to global standards of 
legitimacy, which they themselves help forge. Even if this means such understandings 
constrain their individual right to "maintain freedom of action" (to use Wight's phrase), these 
understandings ultimately set out what constitutes rightful conduct which in turn helps 
constrain wrongful conduct. The overarching point then is quite simple: if international 
society forges global standards of legitimacy, then states have to do their best to uphold them, 
for if they do not, or offer ad hoc support, what message does this send to other states? 
Despite Groves' claim that the R2P does not represent a legal obligation, it is evident that the 
1948 Genocide Convention does carries with it a legal obligation and the value of 
international law, and the benefits that come with it, are undermined when states do not fulfil 
this obligation. 
This leads us naturally back to the insight offered by the cosmopolitan thinkers above as it is 
clear that international society should not commit `moral over-reach' when attempting to 
construct global standards of legitimacy. Whilst it may seem peculiar to suggest that there is 
scope of a common ground between realists and cosmopolitans, this is exactly what Linklater 
and Shapcott propose as they focus on the issue of harm. Since progress within the anarchical 
realm remains a fickle and fragile process, it is imperative that states do not try and run before 
they have learnt to walk. The idea of a universal legitimate minimalism (in the constitutional, 
moral, and political sense), seems to provide an apt basis upon which societal relations can 
develop. Despite the fact that forging agreements between states is difficult, we have to start 
somewhere and placing a legal, moral, and constitutional floor beneath states (to use R. J. 
Vincent's idea) seems to provide an apt `starting point'. Linklater and Shapcott's focus on the 
issue of harm aligns itself with this approach and I would support the idea that international 
society's aversion toward human suffering provides a universal benchmark from which 
international relations can build upon. Essentially, this thesis takes this approach one step 
further as it specifically focuses on the crime of genocide to claim that genocide provides 
international society with a problem and an opportunity: to combine an understanding of state 
sovereignty and universal human rights within a coherent and obtainable legitimate order. 
The cosmopolitan perspective also aligns itself with the English School solidarist position in 
that although both schools of thought remain wary of `moral over-reach', they also reject the 
idea of `moral under-reach'. It is precisely this latter point that highlights the moral 
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deficiency of English School pluralism and the idea of normative pluralism put forward by 
Jackson above. Notably, none of the cosmopolitan perspectives raised above advocates the 
idea of a world government or intergovernmental institution acting as some sort of `moral 
busybody'. Instead, they present a sobered and realistic view of international relations in that 
states should not be granted a carte blanche licence to do what they want in the knowledge 
that they will not face external intervention. Although there may be cultural differences that 
shape our understanding of morality, to go back to Chapter Four, there are universal 
understandings of human wrongs, from which we can infer universal understandings of 
human rights. Reaching an acknowledgment of a universal moral minimalism is the absolute 
minimal position that actors should advocate for anything less signifies `moral under-reach'. 
If international society cannot establish a universal moral minimalism, then it is difficult to 
see how international society can have order in the anarchical realm. In order to maintain and 
increase levels of international order, it is imperative that states seek cooperation on matters 
which occupy this universal minimalist space. As discussed throughout this thesis, if there is 
a space (and I would argue international society has constructed the understanding that there 
is a space), then genocide certainly occupies this space. If international society cannot retreat 
upon this commitment, it has to do its best to fulfil it. It is clear that the legal obligation to 
prevent genocide cannot be seen as just some abstract obligation that states do not have to 
fulfil, for when they do not, they undermine the value of international law, international 
morality and the international institution of the UN, all of which help stabilise international 
relations. 
I finish therefore by returning to Senator John McCain: "If we do not accept that the nature of 
regimes shapes their conduct, we misread international politics in a profound and detrimental 
way... A world where the human rights of more people in more places are respected is not 
only a more just world. It is a more stable, more secure world". 85 Despite the fact that such 
sentiment has been utilised by neo-cons to advocate pro-democratic regime change, I would 
argue that humanitarian intervention has to be grounded upon international legitimacy and it 
is crystal clear that whilst the moral and legal basis for such pro-democratic regime change is 
85 Senator John McCain, These remarks were made as part of a speech on the need to incorporate human rights 
into US foreign policy. The speech was given to the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nita School of 
Advanced International Studies, (09/11/2009), available at 
http: //mccain. senate. gov/public/index. cfm? FuseAction=PressOfiice. Speeches&ContentRecord id=D9E96B7C- 
A8DO-2425-C43D-046EC72CE0E2 Accessed 12/05/2010. 
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lacking, the legitimate basis for the anti-genocide norm already exists and needs to be fulfilled 
in order to achieve a more stable and secure world. 
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8 Conclusion: Answering the "East Tennessee Question" 
The idea of the "East Tennessee Question" is taken from Ken Booth's analysis on human 
rights and the proposed need for inventing humanity. ' Booth recalls that William F. Shulz 
(one-time director of Amnesty International), made a speech in Knoxville on human rights 
and human rights violations occurring around the world. The speech aroused the following 
question: "But what does this all have to do with the person in East Tennessee? "2 The 
question underpins the premise of the "East Tennessee Question" proposed by Booth. 
Despite the fact that the question was raised in East Tennessee it could have easily been 
raised in any other part of the world: why should we here, care about those over there? As 
Booth explains: "One powerful response is to try and engage people's sympathies by trying 
to make immediate the pain and oppression some suffer". 3 This is perhaps the most common 
response. However, as Booth notes, Shulz himself: "was not convinced by the effectiveness 
of such an approach". 4 Essentially, Shulz questioned the impact of this approach and instead 
attempted to answer the "East Tennessee Question" from a more pragmatic perspective. By 
which Schulz meant that legal and ethical issues had to be framed in the "language of 
realpolitik" if they were to hold people's attention. 5 
The "East Tennessee Question", therefore, provides an apt context for understanding this 
thesis as it takes us back to the logic embodied in the question set out at the start of Chapter 
One: genocide refers to the destruction of a group, however, if I am not a member of that 
group, why should I care about their destruction? Accordingly, the question sits well 
alongside the "East Tennessee Question" as it questions why I, or we, should care about 
victims of genocide. Furthermore, the two approaches identified above help illustrate the two 
alternative approaches that can be adopted when responding to such questioning: i) respond 
by trying to engage people's sympathies, ii) respond by framing one's response within a more 
pragmatic realpolitik framework. Accordingly, I would like to conclude this thesis by 
reflecting on these two approaches. 
' Ken Booth, IhM of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 379 - 380. 
2 Ibid, p. 380. 
3 Ibid. 
` Ibid. 
5Ibid 
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8.1 Engage people's sympathies 
Although this approach was not utilised in this thesis, it is evident that this remains the most 
common approach and as a result, needs to be considered further. Quite simply, the majority 
of genocide scholars (and human rights scholars in general), try and stir people's 
consciousness to provoke the idea that people should care about human suffering in other 
parts of the world. When assessing the question of genocide prevention, this approach is 
completely understandable for one would expect that most people would be stirred by the 
personal accounts of genocide victims. The truth is that there have been many times 
throughout this research when I have simply had to `close the book'. By this I mean that one 
has to stop reading (at least temporarily), because of how one is so disturbed by real-life 
events that have occurred within the context of genocide. For instance, a UN Report into 
practice of mass rape in the Rwanda genocide found: "A 45-year old Rwandan woman was 
raped by her 12-year-old son-with Interahamwe holding a hatchet to his throat-in front of her 
husband, while their five other young children were forced to hold open her thighs". 6 I 
suppose every genocide scholar must be able to recall a story that has silenced them; this is 
(one of) mine. 
From this perspective one can understand why scholars answer the "East Tennessee 
Question" by appealing to the first approach raised by Booth above. Advocates of this 
approach attempt to engage people's sympathies by simply recalling real life events. It is 
hoped that the nature of the crime (as discussed in Chapter Three) is so morally abhorrent 
that this will stir the conscience of humankind thereby creating a response. This is put into 
context within Fergal Keane's analysis of the Rwandan genocide: 
A year before the Rwandan genocide occurred I was sitting in the BBC radio studio in 
Johannesburg taking part in the annual correspondents' review of the year. The subject of 
central Africa came up and I spoke about the increasing danger of a catastrophe in the 
region... A London-based correspondent wondered aloud why we should care about disputes in 
obscure countries. I was taken aback by the question, believing that it reflected a narrow view 
of the world and issues and emotions that shape our collective history. I answered by saying - 
and I hold passionately to this view today - that we should care because we belong to the same 
brotherhood of man as the citizens of seemingly remote African countries. It is not a political 
reason and some may call it naive. That is their prerogative. For me, however, the conclusion 
is unavoidable: genocide killing in Africa diminishes us all. 7 
6 Cited in Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect. low Good People Turn Evil (London: Ryder, 2007), p. 13. 7 Fergal Keane, Season of Blood. A Rwandan Journey (London: Penguin, 1995) p. 30. 
228 
Genocide and its Threat to International Society 
The statement is of direct relevance as the London-based correspondent raised the exact same 
sentiment to be found within "The East Tennessee Question" when he questioned: why 
should we care about disputes in obscure countries? In his response, Keane upholds the first 
approach identified above as he appeals to the idea of a "brotherhood of man", claiming that 
genocide does not only diminish the group being targeted, genocide "diminishes us all". The 
problem with this approach is not that it is wrong, or naive, as such, but that Keane presents 
the idea of a "brotherhood of man" as a self-evident truth and does nothing to substantiate 
this claim. 
This exact point is raised in William Bain's analysis of normative theory within the English 
School. Of specific relevance here is Bain's analysis of Nicholas J. Wheeler's seminal text, 
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, as Bain states: "It 
seems as though Wheeler merely invokes humanity as a self-evident moral truth - the 
authority of which requires no further explanation - which in the end cannot tell us the 
reasons why we should act to save strangers". 8 The statement is significant in that it explains 
that in failing to justify the existence of humanity, scholars fail to explain why we should act 
to save strangers. It is important that anyone upholding this first approach considers this 
implication carefully. Whilst Keane claims that genocide "diminishes us all", one is left 
questioning: how exactly does it diminish us all? Again, the point here is not to dismiss this 
approach, for as stated in Chapter Two, this thesis does not reject the idea of a common 
humanity, yet at the same time, it is not built upon the assumption that a common humanity 
exists. The point is that despite all the appeals made to ideas such as a common humanity, or 
even an international community, simply invoking such abstract ideas does not prove that 
they exist. As Bain rightly points, if one fails to substantiate such an approach, one fails to 
explain why we should save strangers. It would seem therefore that the political will of the 
politically unwilling remains unaltered because such approaches fail to explain why 
policymakers should prioritise genocide prevention? As Keane stated, his approach is not a 
political one, yet to return to Shulz's second approach (structuring one's response within a 
realpolitik framework), it may be that this is exactly what is needed. 
' William Bain, `One Order, Two Laws: Recovering the `Normative' in English School theory', view of 
International Studies (vol. 33, no. 4,2007, pp. 557-575), p. 561. 
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8.2 The political approach 
The idea of realpolitik is a contentious one so it is important to establish some parameters in 
that Shulz simply raises the point that policymakers do not formulate policy on behalf of 
humanity but on behalf of the state. As a result, if legal and ethical issues are to hold 
resonance amongst policymakers then the case needs to be made that such issues are within 
the national interest of states. At this point, realists may claim that those that uphold this 
second approach, within the context of genocide prevention, are trying to create a link 
between genocide prevention and the national interest. To which the response seems 
obvious: yes, that is exactly what the second approach involves but this is not a bad thing. 
Throughout history, individuals have made the case that it is within the national interest of 
states to pursue things such as power, security, and survival - those that uphold the second 
approach are simply making the case that it is within the national interest of states to pursue 
other things as well, such as, the moral value of order within the anarchical realm. 
Significantly, this second approach goes back to the central problem laid out in Chapter One 
regarding the relationship between genocide prevention and the national interest. Throughout 
this thesis an attempt has been made to respond to the logic embodied within the "East 
Tennessee Question", from a more pragmatic political perspective. At the same time it is 
important to note that the two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for 
example, it was international society's aversion toward the suffering that occurred within the 
context of the Nazi genocide that acted as the catalyst for establishing the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. It was a direct engagement, therefore, with the sympathies of those targeted that 
saw the anti-genocide norm established. Yet of course, such developments do not go to 
prove that human beings are inextricably linked or that genocide diminishes us all, which 
suggests that we should not build our response upon such assumptions. As stated in Chapter 
One, this thesis upheld the view that one should develop an understanding of genocide and 
genocide prevention by beginning with the facts of the problem rather than from any specific 
faith in any particular form of response. As a result, this thesis has distanced itself from more 
mainstream attempts to appeal to ideas such as a common humanity. Instead, this thesis has 
utilised a novel approach to tackle the more pragmatic political question: is there more to 
genocide prevention than `just' saving strangers? Although it should again be stressed that 
there is nothing wrong with making the case that saving strangers is, in itself, enough, the 
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premise of this thesis is that a case can be made that in preventing genocide, international 
society saves more than `just' strangers. 
Now let us be clear on this: groups have been destroyed throughout history yet genocide 
prevention has never been deemed to be in the national interest of states, so why can this 
claim be made now? In response to this question I propose that although the act of genocide 
may be ancient, international society is new. 9 By this it is meant that international society is 
not a static reality, it develops in many different ways over time. 1° Therefore, our 
contemporary understanding of international society is indebted to the legitimacy framework 
that was constructed in the post-Second World War era. At the time, an attempt was made to 
steer international relations away from the scourge of Great War and toward an alternative 
international society. The collective understandings that underpinned the norms of morality, 
legality, and constitutionality were altered to the point that a new legitimacy framework was 
constructed, which as discussed, acts to increase the likelihood of international stability in 
international relations. At the heart of this legitimacy framework stands the institution of the 
United Nations. With the shadow of the Second World War, a failed League of Nations 
experiment, and the Holocaust looming large, a state-led collective understanding of order 
and justice was institutionalised into the fabric of the UN. Despite the fact that these 
collective understandings have changed over time, the durability of the order embodied 
within this organisation is quite remarkable. As discussed in Chapters Five and Six, states 
are aware that there exists `two UN tables': the UNGA and the P5, yet they accept that it is 
better to sit around an unequal table than to have no table at all. States are more willing to 
accept a decision, or indeed the failure to make a decision, because they feel as though they 
are part of the legitimacy process. This reality helps illustrate the English School's belief that 
states perceive that it is within their national interest to uphold the moral value of order in 
international relations. 
9 The idea plays on Leo Kuper's seminal claim that the `The word is new, the crime is ancient", see Leo Kuper, 
Genocide. Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 11. Such 
understanding remains part of a contested debate as to whether genocide is a modern phenomenon. 
10 Such thinking is evident in seminal English School texts such as, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, The 
Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International 
Soc (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society. A 
Con arative Historical Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
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Of course this does not mean that a more legitimate intergovernmental organisation cannot be 
developed. Although at present, the complexities of international legitimacy dictate that such 
a task has not been achieved. As discussed in Chapters Two, Four, and Five, international 
legitimacy should be thought of as a process rather than a property. Since international 
legitimacy is not a property, no institution can claim to own it, produce it, or safeguard it. 
However, to utilise Hedley Bull's logic on institutions raised in Chapter Two, it is clear that 
the UN contributes more than any other secondary institution to the workings of international 
legitimacy in international relations. At the same time, if the UN is to maintain its position as 
the cornerstone of international legitimacy and the UNSC is to maintain its position as the 
stabilising force in international relations, then it is difficult to see how they can survive if 
they are perceived to be illegitimate. 
It is here that the crime of genocide is of relevance and it is here that one can begin to see 
why there is more to preventing genocide than `just' saving strangers. Quite simply, there are 
many laws within this world, yet the law to prevent genocide is not the same as any other law 
because as Chapter Four demonstrated: genocide is international regarded as the "crime of 
crimes" from both a legal and moral perspective. As discussed, complexities arise as 
genocide is not viewed in the same light from a political perspective. It would seem that 
crimes such as drug trafficking have been prioritised over that of genocide prevention as 
genocide is not perceived to pose a transnational threat to states. The understanding, 
therefore, set out in Chapters Four and Five, challenged such mainstream understanding. 
Utilising the concept of international legitimacy, it was claimed that genocide should be 
understood as a transnational threat because it erodes the legitimate authority of the UN 
(which acts as the cornerstone of international legitimacy) and the UNSC (which acts as the 
stabilising function in international relations) more than any other crime, thereby aiding the 
likelihood of international instability. Whilst the bi-polar "balance of terror" paralysed the 
UN within the context of the Cold War and the threat of omnicide saw the threat of genocide 
marginalised, it is evident that in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, international 
society became re-sensitised to the horror of genocide which paved the way for the 2005 
Responsibility to Protect. 
To understand genocide as a transnational threat, is important to consider that in 
acknowledging that the UN only contributes to international legitimacy, the UN acts as 
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somewhat of a red herring. It is the special relationship between genocide and international 
legitimacy that is of relevance. For example, let us contemplate the idea that international 
society decided to abandon the UN. Although this may seem highly unlikely, it is 
nevertheless feasible. However, what is less feasible is the thought that international society 
could then go on to forge an alternative understanding of order and justice in a post-UN 
world without having a commitment to genocide prevention embodied within it. As 
discussed in Chapters Four and Seven, whilst this is theoretically possible, in practice, such 
an outcome would mean international society constructing a legal, moral, and constitutional 
world so alien to the present that it is practically impossible to comprehend. In other words, 
it is extremely difficult to conceive that in a post-Holocaust era, international society could 
construct a collective understanding of order and justice that does not embody a commitment 
to genocide prevention. In this sense, genocide prevention is about more than `just' saving 
strangers; it is about saving the perceived value of international law, morality, and politics. 
This is something that policymakers need to consider carefully. 
A final point worth considering here is that in appealing to policymakers, those that uphold 
the second approach identified above, help legitimise the current state of international 
society, which, itself, may be morally bankrupt. As touched upon in Chapter Six, R2P 
advocates may celebrate the fact that international society endorsed the R2P principle in 
2005. However, it is important to pause and consider: what exactly, is being celebrated? In 
2005 state leaders agreed that they have a responsibility not to commit genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Whilst this seems progressive, it is important 
to question: what sort of world do we live in when we have to get state leaders to agree to the 
fact that they have a responsibility not to commit these four crimes? To go back to the work 
of Ken Booth and his self-entitled "emancipatory realist" position, Booth has basically come 
to the conclusion that the state system cannot sustain international relations in the 21st 
century. From this perspective human beings need to start thinking in terms of a world 
society, ordered on securing and protecting the needs of human society, both at the local and 
global level. " This is in sharp contrast to the more state-centric English School approach 
which accepts that although states may be a part of the problem they remain an unavoidable 
" Booth, IhM of World Security. Such a blunt overview cannot hope to do justice to the insight that is 
provided in Booth's seminal work. For an analysis on how Booth distances himself from the English School 
approach of Bull, see pp. 4 -5. For an explanation of the term "emancipatory realism", see pp. 87 - 91. 
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part of the solution. 12 As an English School scholar, I stand in the latter camp; however, it is 
extremely important to question how international relations will develop if political decision- 
making becomes increasingly detached from the pressing legal and moral issue of genocide 
prevention. If international society is to be constructed on an appeal to the value of 
international law and morality (I would argue that it is within every states' national interest to 
do so), then states have to engage with, rather than overlook, their obligation to prevent 
genocide. If they cannot, then I would have to question whether the society of states can be 
part of the solution. To go back to Martin Wight's three traditions, if one accepts that 
genocide cannot be prevented within the present society of states framework then it seems 
that one is left with the choice of adopting, i) a more Booth-like revolutionary approach, or ii) 
the realist view that genocide is just another insoluble problem. However, as discussed in 
Chapters Four and Seven, it is hard to see how this latter position could become a legitimate 
position to adopt. 
It is here that further research needs to be done as the obvious question arises, if the 
prevention of genocide is in the interest of international society, then how do states go about 
preventing genocide? As discussed in Chapter One, this is the second strategy identified by 
Gareth Evans which naturally follows on from the issue of conceptualisation. At present, the 
discipline of genocide studies has produced a host of selective chapters and a small number 
of books dedicated to the question of genocide prevention strategies. However, once again, 
one cannot help but feel that these approaches are built upon the assumption that an 
`international community' exists. It is here that the discipline of IR offers potential insight by 
highlighting the reality of the security dilemma. In an anarchical realm plagued by fear and 
mistrust how can international society strengthen its cooperative links to the point that a 
functioning collective security system is established? 13 It is here that the idea of genocide 
prevention within the context of the security dilemma needs to be explored. To go back to 
the relationship between genocide and a universal moral minimalism, surely the case can be 
made that if greater bonds of trust international society are to be established then it is 
imperative that international society establishes universal moral foundations. The consensus 
therefore felt toward genocide may act as the key that enables a functioning collective 
'2 Andrew Hurrell' work provides an accomplished defence of this English School position, see On Global Order Power. Values and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). t3 See Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma. Fear Coop tion and Trust in World Politics (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2008). 
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security system to be developed, thereby, aiding genocide prevention. In other words, the 
universal consensus regarding the anti-genocide norm may provide the key for unlocking the 
door of political will. 
To bring this thesis to an end, I would like to raise Hedley's Bull's analysis of apartheid in 
South Africa. 14 Writing in 1982, Bull claimed that a "world consensus" existed on this 
particular issue. 15 In other words, the consensus that existed against this particular human 
rights violation outstripped the consensus to be found over any other human right violation at 
the time. Crucially, Bull's point was not that other human rights violations should be 
ignored, but that the "world consensus" that existed regarding this issue, provided 
international society with an opportunity to unite against this specific human right violation. 
It is with such rationale in mind, that this author proposes that the "world consensus" that 
now exists over genocide prohibition provides international society with both a problem and 
an opportunity to do something: prevent genocide. In doing so international society will not 
`just' save those being targeted, but also help fix the legitimacy deficiency within the present 
ordering structure stabilise international relations. By which I mean, genocide prevention 
helps save the perceived value of international law, morality and politics. This is critical and 
it is within the national interest of each and every state. 
" Hedley Bull, The West and South Africa', Daedalus (vol. 111, no. 2,1982, pp. 255-270). 
15 lbid, p. 266. 
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